



US SOUTHERN COMMAND



United States Southern Command

Public Affairs

AFTER ACTION

Report

"OPERATION JUST CAUSE"



Dec. 20, 1989 - Jan. 31, 1990



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SCPA

31 January 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Public Affairs After Action Report


1. It has been said that the failed coup attempt of Manuel Antonio Noriega on 3 October and the tragic shooting of Marine 1st Lt. Robert Paz on 16 December 1989, were the catalyst for Operation Just Cause. But, in essence, Operation Just Cause was the end result of more than 20 years of tyranny and injustice publicly exposed on 5 June 1987, when the former Panama Defense Force (PDF) chief of staff charged Noriega with several heinous crimes.

2. After his declaration, the following two and a half years were marked by an incredible reign of abuses, suppression of the press, blatant disregard of rights guaranteed by the Panamanian Constitution and the Panama Canal Treaty, and an endless litany of political, economic and military confrontations between the Noriega regime and the United States.

3. Intertwined within this crisis was a relentless war of words, misinformation, and disinformation, drawing the U.S. Southern Command Public Affairs community directly on to the front line. It is fitting that during Just Cause, the overwhelming success of the military operation was accompanied by an equally successful public affairs effort.

4. These public affairs successes were accomplished by a dedicated team of true professionals. While their names may never be recorded in history books, I use this after action report to publicly thank the men and women who from H-Hour on D-Day, through it all, made unparalleled contributions.

Atch
PA Team Members


RONALD T. SCONYERS
Colonel, USAF
Director, Public Affairs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Operation Just Cause posed some unique public affairs opportunities, challenged by both the fog and friction of combat. The obvious international scrutiny of the operation found all public affairs assets as decisively engaged as any combat maneuver unit.

While there had been substantial prior planning for such an operation, no amount of planning can adequately prepare for all contingencies. Much of the day-to-day and hour-to-hour effort had to be supported by quick command decisions to cement the overall effort.

It also had to initially be accomplished within existing manpower assets: three permanently assigned active duty officers and one NCO; two recently assigned active duty augmentees and one NCO; two reserve component officers; and one civilian for a total of ten SCPA personnel. Seven additional reserve component personnel (three officers and four NCOs) from the Theater Support Element were also available and they were immediately pressed into service. (This does not take into account component manning or public affairs officers (PAOs) deployed with their units.)

The public affairs mission was two-fold. First, to inform the American people, through the national media, of the situation as it developed; and second, to keep the internal audience informed of the developing situation, particularly as it affected them.

In order to accomplish these missions, five specific intermediate objectives were established. These objectives were: (1) Prepare for and support the DOD Media Pool; (2) Facilitate the news-gathering efforts of the resident media in Panama; (3) Logistically support what was anticipated to be a minimal number of incoming media; (4) Command information; i.e., keep the local community (military, dependents, retirees, civilian employees, etc.) fully informed of the situation; and (5) Be responsive to CINCSOUTH, CJCS, OSD, SECSTATE and Congressional requirements.

These objectives are briefly outlined below.

(1) This command's position was that the DOD media pool was unnecessary because of sufficient resident press. The command's fallback position was that if pool deployment were a certainty, it should be a "fly-away pool," i.e., one which would deploy with the CONUS forces, cover the deployment and then redeploy to the

States. However, SOUTHCOM was notified at H -8 (1700 hours) of the final decision to launch the pool. Having had an on-the-shelf plan (See Supplement) and experience with three previous media pools, the staff felt reasonably comfortable in initial preparations. However, there is never sufficient time to adequately plan for all contingencies.

Hostilities severely degraded the lines of communication and the logistical support planned and in place for the pool. The SOUTHCOM plan called for initial media pool reception at Howard Air Force Base. The pool would then move, via ground transportation, to the established media center at Quarry Heights. At Quarry Heights the pool would be met by the Director of Public Affairs and, situation permitting, the CINC, for a situation briefing.

It was anticipated that the Bridge of the Americas and the ground route to Quarry Heights might not be secure at the time of the pool arrival. As a backup, the pool would move via helicopter to Quarry Heights. As it happened, however, the Bridge of the Americas was closed, the ground route was unsecure and Quarry Heights itself was receiving sniper fire. The pool was diverted, therefore, to Fort Clayton via helicopter (CH-47). No sooner had this aircraft touched down at Clayton than it was diverted from the media pool mission to recover a downed OH-58 in the Bay of Panama. This priority operational mission left the pool temporarily stranded at Fort Clayton. On several occasions on Day One and early on Day Two, the pool experienced excessive downtime waiting for transportation, helicopters that were directly or indirectly engaged with the enemy.

Serious decisions had to be made by commanders as to the employment of helicopter support--combat or media pool transport. This is an issue that will receive much public and private debate.

Another serious degradation in the pool was its late arrival. The pool arrived at approximately H + 5 hours. The initial assault on targeted objectives was essentially completed. By the time the pool got launched on its first mission (delayed by lack of immediate helicopter support), it was H + 9 hours and the combat operations were gearing more to quick reaction, making media coverage very difficult. While there was sporadic fighting, it was impossible to predict when and where it would occur. Just Cause focus had already shifted from combat operations to refugee and detainee processing, standing up the government, etc. The pool members felt they had "missed the war."

A third concern expressed by the media pool itself was an alleged unwillingness, lack of trust, and lack of cooperation of on-the-ground commanders to support the media pool. The pool has also charged that they were subjected to a public relations agenda designed to meet the command's own political purposes.

There were, in fact, conflicting guidance and actions that might have given that impression. For example, Rangers had allegedly been ordered not to talk with the media. Many special operations personnel and equipment were off limits. Debate, even within the public affairs community, about the appropriateness of interviewing/filming wounded soldiers left the staff with unclear guidance. And the difficulty of access into specific areas (even after it had supposedly been worked through the chain of command from the top down), slowed down the movement of the pool.

It must be made clear, however, that no SOUTHCOM guidance was ever issued that indicated anything but a full commitment to support of the pool. That was not always universally understood at the field command level.

A final area that made the overall support of the pool very difficult was the apparent lack of USARSO support to the JTF-South PA officer who was charged with the overall responsibility for developing the pool's daily agenda. Where the JTF-South PA officer should have had access to the entire U.S. Army South PA staff for support, he essentially had to work the entire issue single-handedly.

While the media pool met with limited success, much work must be done, especially in the education process with commanders, and even PAs, on the role, function, and priority of the pool in combat. Some charged it a "dismal failure." There were problems, admittedly, and many lessons were learned. Some can be readily solved. Others will likely be encountered again.

(2) Our second objective was to facilitate the local press in Panama. At H-hour there were somewhere between 50-100 resident press, many of whom are permanent, some of whom came in after the shooting incident of Lt. Paz, in expectation of some kind of retaliation from the U.S. These news media representatives (NMRs) had covered the Panama story locally over the past couple of years and were well aware of the situation, the likely targets, facilities available to them, etc. Unfortunately, many of these NMRs were part of the initial group of "hostages" held in the Marriott Hotel and were out of action for the first 24+ hours. Others could not mobilize throughout the city because of the on-going hostilities, lack of transportation, etc.

Therefore, none of these media were able to make contact with our media center (set up at H -3) until about H + 15 or later. Those that did eventually come to the media center were looking for refuge and a place to work.

(3) A third objective was the "care and feeding" of incoming media--eventually a heavyweight problem. An early arrangement had been made with OSD-PA to let a minimal number of media transit

through Howard Air Force Base (since Tocumen/Torrijos International Airport was closed down at initial assault). The arrangement would allow three aircraft to come in from Costa Rica and three from Miami.

There was apparently some confusion in that agreement, and what was expected to be a minimum number of inbound flights resulted in an (almost) unmanageable number, significantly degrading the public affairs mission, converting it into a logistics operation.

By D + 5, we had serviced some 20 flights into Howard Air Force Base, one of which included an L-1011 with more than 220 pax and 30,000 pounds of equipment on board.

There was absolutely no way logistically to satisfactorily support this group. The USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs office, in addition to accomplishing all other missions, was now solely responsible for all support of this group including transportation, feeding, lodging, etc. Hotels were not open, public transportation was not working, and restaurants were not available.

By D + 25, we had facilitated more than 850 media and 36 flights, the bulk of which were processed through Howard AFB. More than 200 media opportunities were arranged, and, in general, after initial care and feeding was worked out, the media were well supported.

(4) Command information (CI) efforts operated exceedingly well. Both Southern Command Network (SCN) and Tropic Times provided maximum coverage of the operation.

SCN, which worked hand in glove with the major TV networks, had ready access to all media opportunities and, in fact, operated within the network pool after the DOD pool was disbanded.

One severe degradation to our CI efforts was the inability (by order) of the combat documentation teams to share their products with SCN after D + 1. A second shortfall for SCN was the tremendous lack of practical experience resident in its newly assigned broadcasters, a condition quickly overcome through hard and dedicated work by the broadcasters and superior leadership by the few remaining experienced personnel.

Tropic Times continued its daily publication and stepped up its press run to 75,000 on D + 1 thru D + 3 to get copies of the paper on the streets, both to deployed troops as well as Panamanian citizens. The psychological operations (psyops) community then began publishing a Spanish-language paper and the distribution of the Tropic Times into Panama City was terminated. (There was a near disaster as the Psyops paper brought the Tropic Times dangerously close to shut down for lack of newsprint.)

USARSO focused its efforts on command information, establishing a military media center. With a total of 16 journalists, they produced more than 100 stories for local use and transmission back to home installations.

(5) The final objective was three fold. The first was response to query (other than bona fide media). This was basically in preparation for various press conferences, etc., held in Washington. The second was orchestrating media opportunities for VIPs, ranging from SECDEF to Chairman, JCS, and numerous congressional delegations (CODELS). The final mission was to conduct more than 20 major press conferences. These conferences included, again, the VIPs. But they also included such announcements by the CINC as Noriega's refuge at the Nunciature and his eventual turnover to U.S. authorities.

In total, the overall public affairs effort for Just Cause cannot be considered anything less than a tremendous success. There are many valuable lessons learned from this, the first wartime public affairs experience since Vietnam. The task is now to refine procedures and PA policy based on this experience and most importantly to share these valuable lessons throughout the joint service PA community.

Attached are two volumes that will address the specifics of the public affairs mission during Just Cause. Volume I is the basic after action report. Volume II is supporting documentation.

DOD MEDIA POOL

1. Chronological Summary of Events:

DAY ONE, 20 DEC 89 - Southern Command Public Affairs (SCPA) was telephonically alerted to actual pool deployment at approximately H-3. The Director, SCPA, previously had several secure conversations with OSD/PA prior to the final decision to deploy. The director's recommendation was not to deploy the pool since all four major networks, AP, UPI, Reuter, Newsweek, New York Times, and numerous other news media representatives (NMRs) were already in country. There was a permanent cadre of media in Panama and that number increased after the Lt Paz shooting incident, in anticipation of U.S. reaction.

As a compromise position, the Director suggested that a "fly away" pool, similar to the one done for Nimrod Dancer, be established, as remain for the first X hours and then return to CONUS. (This was also the recommendation in the public affairs guidance (PAG) provided to OSD-PA in early November.) A regional pool would then be instituted. The final decision, however, was made in Washington to deploy the pool.

Due to the complex nature of the operation and the limited time between the execute order and execution, there was little time to fully prepare. SOPs, directives and after action reports were immediately reviewed. (SOUTHCOM had previously hosted three other media pools: Nimrod Dancer, Golden Pheasant, and another Honduras exercise. A detailed pool plan was already developed and was immediately instituted. See Atch 2.) JTF-South PAO was tasked to develop coverage lists and arrange air/ground transportation, housing, and security.

Simultaneously, the SOUTHCOM Media Center was activated at the Quarry Heights Officers' Club. Because the international airport was an initial target, we assumed that no international media from CONUS would arrive for the first several days. Therefore, the media center was initially organized to handle the media pool and the in-country media only.

The JTF-South PAO arrived prior to H hour and immediately reported to the Director, SCPA. Command relationships were established and general policy guidance discussed. In general, SCPA would remain as CINCSOUTH's PA and the Operation Just Cause spokesman. JTF-SOUTH PA, which would incorporate USARSO PA, would serve as the operational commander's PA and executive agent for DOD media pool logistics support, itinerary development, etc. (It should be noted that through D+2, the USARSO PA was out of country.)

The DoD media team, including 14 journalists, two technicians and three DoD escort officers, arrived on a C-141 aircraft from Andrews AFB at H + 4 1/2, approximately two hours later than the initially scheduled arrival time. SCPA had been notified at approximately H -3 of the formal decision to deploy. JTF-South was tasked to obtain appropriate transportation, billeting and security.

The original reception plan called for bus transportation with armed escort from Howard AFB to the Quarry Heights Media Center. However, as arrival time approached, the security arrangements had still not been made. Ground transportation, which was squared away, was too dangerous without security escort. Aviation support was immediately requested to transport the pool to an alternate site at Fort Clayton since the security of Quarry Heights was uncertain.

Once the pool's C-141 was on the ground, a bus and flatbed truck, arranged by the Air Force PAO, were dispatched to pick up the personnel and equipment. Once on the bus, a very quick introduction was made by the two SCPA escort officers and a ground rules briefing provided.

The bus and equipment returned to the general base operations area to await the arrival of the helicopter. Initially, a UH-1 was dispatched to transport the team and equipment. Use of this helicopter was not feasible because it was too small and would be required to make at least three lifts and sling load the satellite gear. A bigger aircraft was requested. After a 20-minute wait, a CH-47 arrived. The crew chief advised everyone to wait while all the satellite equipment was loaded (20 boxes, approximately 2500 pounds).

The NMRs and escorts were allowed off the bus to await movement to the aircraft. It was still dark and activity was extremely heavy throughout the flightline. The aircraft departed for the SCN field at Fort Clayton at approximately 0600, H + 5. Since it was not possible to fly the pool directly to the media center at Quarry Heights due to on-going military actions, a decision was made to go to the more secure Fort Clayton. The SCN facility was chosen because it afforded security and a briefing room big enough to initially handle the pool.

Once on the ground at Fort Clayton, the crew chief requested that the cargo be off-loaded as quickly as possible because the aircraft had been given another priority mission. The pool was asked to assist and they did. Due to the late change in destinations and numerous other on-going events, ground transportation from the field to the SCN facility was not immediately available. Considering the tactical situation, it was not wise to keep this large group waiting for vehicles, so everyone began walking to SCN, a little over a quarter mile away. SCN did dispatch a vehicle shortly after the pool arrived, but everyone chose to walk.

The JTF-South PAO arrived and introduced himself to the escort officers and accompanied everyone to SCN. One technician, the equipment, and one SCPA escort officer remained at the field. The other technician went with the group to link up with the SCN engineer who was to provide technical assistance.

Once at SCN, at approximately 0630, the pool was greeted by the SCN Commander and escorted to a briefing room to await the Charge d' Affairs of the U.S. Embassy, who was to provide current information. (The Charge was invited to address the group because he was already at Fort Clayton with President Endara and his two vice presidents. The more appropriate "receiving" officer would have been CINCSOUTH or JTF-South/CG, to provide a current operations update. Both, however, were decisively engaged.) Everyone took this opportunity to relax and freshen up. A television was provided to keep pool members abreast of the Washington reaction. (This became a matter of "ridicule" in later media reports since the media pool viewed the CNN broadcast of CJCS's operations update from Washington, while the pool was on the playing field in Panama.) Box lunches were also provided.

Meanwhile, the satellite uplink technicians were surveying the situation. The first field site was determined to be unworkable. (As they surveyed the area, two mortar rounds impacted a short distance away.) The technicians wanted to set things up outside the SCN facility, but the SCN commander disapproved due to security requirements and the possible disruption of normal SCN operations. Another Fort Clayton site was suggested. Ground transportation was summoned, but took an hour to arrive.

The media pool itself waited several minutes for the Charge's arrival. Once that briefing began, he was interrupted by breaking TV reports.

While the briefing was going on, the JTF-South PAO was trying by phone to arrange story possibilities and transportation for the pool. The phone system was jammed, so he departed to physically coordinate at JTF-South, Building 95, about a mile away.

The JTF-South PAO was gone for approximately three hours and there was no phone or radio contact with him. The press spent a great deal of nervous time just waiting for the PPA staff to get its actions coordinated. Finally, the JTF-South PAO called to say he had arranged coverage and would return shortly to advise the pool. It was still several minutes before he returned. (The SCPA director or deputy were kept informed of our progress or lack thereof.)

While waiting, there was time to check on pool housing for the night. This requirement had been handed off by SCPA to the JTF-South staff the night before and apparently had not been fully worked. This was to be a major problem that consumed a great deal of valuable time through the day and evening as various people worked towards

a resolution. Rooms were finally found at the Clayton House and Quarry Heights O'Club. (Having the pool billeted at two different locations eventually created a transportation problem.)

JTF-South PAO returned and briefed the mission which was to go to Fort Amador to witness on-going fighting. A CH-47 arrived for transport at approximately 1000 hours. The technicians and one SCPA escort remained behind to resolve the satellite question. The Fort Clayton site was not suitable, so the gear was eventually transported to Quarry Heights by ground transportation and erected at the Media Center by early afternoon.

The CH-47 deposited the pool on the Amador golf course and then immediately departed. JTF-South PAO understood that this was to be a dedicated aircraft and could be recalled via ground to air communications. Unfortunately, once they were on the ground and the helicopter had departed, the pool found out otherwise.

As soon as it was determined that the helicopter could not be recalled, SCPA was notified via radio and help was requested.

Meanwhile the media pool had the opportunity to witness ongoing operations against the PDF barracks. They were able to talk with soldiers, shoot video of artillery positions, shoot photos and also interview family members who lived there and had a ring side seat to the action.

After more than an hour at this site, the pool made its way back to the pick-up point to await the arrival of the helicopter. The SCPA staff was trying to recall the aircraft and were told several times that it was enroute. Another hour passed before it finally arrived.

As the group awaited air transport, they were advised by SCPA to proceed to Howard AFB to cover the arrival of additional troops and then to proceed to Tocumen Airport to cover ongoing operations there.

Once the helicopter arrived at Fort Amador, the JTF-South PAO informed the helicopter crew they were to remain until released. The group proceeded to Howard AFB at 1245 hours, where, once on the ground they discovered there was no imminent arrival of troops. Photography of the flight line had been approved in advance by the Commander, USSOUTHAF, but once there, photography of special operations personnel, equipment positions and medical operations were prohibited. Since special operations personnel were located throughout the flightline, photography became impossible.

After waiting at base operations for a little over an hour, the group flew to Tocumen to cover 82nd Airborne operations. At Tocumen, they found little activity, which resulted in more idle time. The

JTF-South PAO left to coordinate with the 82nd command center. The pool photographed what was available and made its way to the terminal to phone in and work on stories.

Fortunately, as the pool began to depart, two young women who had been held by PDF at the airport after the attack began, suddenly appeared and provided excellent story material.

The pool boarded the helicopter for the return flight to Fort Clayton where they would pick up bags and head for Quarry Heights. Enroute, a request was made to fly over areas of the city that were under fire. The pilot refused due to the uncertainty of PDF air defense weapons in the area and restricted air space, but did agree to fly with the ramp down as they flew around the city.

The bus and security escorts were waiting at Fort Clayton and they departed. Along the way, the bus passed a detainee center near Albrook AFS. As the bus drove by, several pool reporters asked to stop and to be allowed to cover the scene. The bus was slow to stop and the escorts were immediately accused of wanting to keep the press away from the detainees. After the bus stopped, the senior escort requested and was granted permission to enter the compound. Some other reporters were concerned that it was getting late and they needed to file stories. One escort took the bus with those needing to return to the media center and sent the bus back to retrieve the others.

Stories were then filed, film processed, etc. At approximately 2000 hours, the Director, SCPA, briefed the team on possible stories/events that the pool would cover. At approximately 2030, the pool was reassembled at Howard AFB for a press conference of the returning U.S. ambassador to Panama. This time, the pool proceeded by bus and passed the refugee camp at Balboa, the destroyed DENI station, and continued up through the heavy defenses on the Bridge of the Americas. While navigating the obstacles on the bridge, the bus blew a tire on concertina wire. However, a PA escort "commandeered" three HMMVs on the bridge and transported the media with them. The ambassador's press conference took place at 2130 after which the media returned to Quarry Heights for more story preparation. Those staying in the Clayton House were transported there after midnight.

Day Two - 21 Dec 89 - Arrangements were made to pick up the pool at 0700. An SCPA representative provided an informal update covering events from the night before.

The pool was divided into two teams in order to maximize coverage. Both teams received an initial operations briefing and then pursued separate itineraries.

Team A

Team A bussed to Fort Clayton to meet with the JTF-South PAO. A UH-1H was dedicated to their use, took the team to Tocumen Airport to pick up the 82nd Airborne Division PAO. While waiting for the 82nd AD/PAO to arrive, the team covered 7th ID (L) troops as they moved into position along the airfield.

After the 82nd AB/PAO arrived, the team was transported to Paitilla Airport, near the Marriott Hotel, the scene of heavy fighting the day before. As the helicopter began to touch down, sniper fire was received and the group was immediately waved off. As the helicopter flew back over the bay an Air Force helicopter made a very close visual inspection of our aircraft. Apparently, our pilots had not been on the right frequency and had not been able to properly identify themselves. (They were suspected of being PDF for a short time.)

The team returned to Tocumen to let the 82nd AB/PAO off and evaluate the situation. They were not allowed back into Paitilla because of the hot LZ and no other opportunities were available. It was determined that the team would return to Fort Clayton to monitor activity there. On the way back, the pool requested and received a flyover of the canal.

Approximately two hours were spent on the ground at Fort Clayton trying to develop the next story. At one point, it appeared that the team would be diverted by the JTF-South commander to pick up Sam Donaldson to cover events. The SCPA escort said this would be a violation of the pool and that the director SCPA would have to be informed. After discussion between the director and JTF-South PAO, the idea was disapproved and the team eventually departed for Rio Hato at 1430.

At Rio Hato the pool interviewed the Ranger regimental and battalion commanders whose troops dropped onto and secured the airfield Wednesday morning. A tour of a captured arms cache was conducted by one of the soldiers who led the assault. Footage of prisoners boarding a C-130 for evacuation was also collected.

The team returned to Quarry Heights at 1700. Stories and videotape were immediately filed. Videotape appeared on network news within 20 minutes of airing at the media center. Participants appeared to be satisfied with the results.

Team B

Team B departed Quarry Heights at approximately 1015. Several members of the pool were escorted through the Comandancia area and portions of the Balboa refugee facility. Two HMWVs provided

security. The SOUTHCOM surgeon provided a briefing at the refugee camp. The pool walked through the medical facilities for military and civilian casualties and were able to interview a wounded U.S. soldier and refugees about the treatment they had received at the center.

The team then drove through Via Espana and Calidonia towards the legislative assembly.

As the convoy moved through Calidonia and Via Espana, the three vehicle convoy was welcomed by crowds of clapping and cheering people chanting, "Viva Bush." The media was extremely impressed.

The drive also allowed a glimpse of the total breakdown of law and order as hordes of people broke into and looted stores.

The DOD pool was the only U.S. press at President Endara's proclamation ceremony. At approximately 1310, President Endara addressed the nation and announced the appointments of his vice presidents. The team returned at approximately 1430 and filed stories. The rest of the evening was spent filing stories, processing film, etc. JTF-South PAO, in coordination with SCPA, developed the following day's itinerary.

Pool members began questioning the validity of the pool as numerous press representatives arrived at the media center, including ABC's Sam Donaldson, who flew in just for a live report. By day's end, approximately 300 media representatives were in-country.

Day Three - 22 Dec 89 - The value of the media pool became increasingly questionable as more press representatives began to arrive.

The media was picked up at 0700 and transported to the media center. Mr. Francis of NBC News needed to leave NLT 0630 for an on-air telecast Friday morning. Additional transportation was provided as requested. After an informal briefing outlining the day's events, they boarded the bus at approximately 0800 to begin the day's coverage.

The itinerary included a tour through the captured PDF barracks at Fort Amador including General Noriega's personal office, the witch's house, a tour of the Chorillo area and the Comandancia, including General Noriega's office. None had been previously covered.

Upon arriving at the front gate of Ft. Amador it became evident that the "troops on the ground" had not gotten the word of our approved visit. This had been pre-coordinated between the JTF-South

PAO and the 193d Brigade headquarters. Approximately 30 minutes were spent with the battalion commander contacting his brigade to get approval to proceed.

Two UH-1s were sent to Fort Amador to transport the pool to the next site. Before leaving the Comandancia, SCPA relayed another story possibility--Smithsonian hostages who had been rescued by U.S. forces were available at Fort Clayton. There were a few reporters who wanted to return to Quarry Heights to file their stories, but the majority wanted to cover the Smithsonian opportunity. Those wishing to return to the media center were loaded on one helicopter that eventually flew on to Quarry Heights after stopping at Fort Clayton.

On the ground, the pool linked up with JTF-South PAO and another escort officer who guided them to where the hostages were being housed. Approximately 45 minutes were devoted to this story, and the pool members were grateful for the opportunity.

Upon returning to the USARSO PAO shop, other members of the pool requested to return to the media center to file their stories. These individuals boarded a helicopter and were transported to Quarry Heights. (The helicopter arrived there shortly before gunfire erupted at the bottom of the hill near the DNTT station.)

Back at the USARSO office, plans were made by the JTF-South PAO to visit the detainee camp on Empire Range. Another possible story involving a drug cache, found somewhere in an area under Navy control, was briefly considered, but the decision was made to fly to the detainee camp.

On the ground, the group was met by the camp OIC who made it clear that the detainees could not be interviewed and photos of the interrogation area were prohibited. A formal briefing was planned but the escort advised the camp OIC that, although the photographers were not interested, the writers would like some background information.

As the photographers were shooting, a helicopter arrived and several blindfolded, handcuffed detainees disembarked. This became the emphasis of attention. An officer shouted that this scene should not be photographed, but gave no reason why. The escort officer asked the photographers to move back, but allowed them to continue the shoot.

The helicopter then transported the team to Quarry Heights to file stories and film.

Another story had developed during the afternoon--a night shoot with the 7th ID (L) soldiers who had taken the city of Colon. The mission assignment was at first garbled--the original intent was to cover the surrender of about 2,000 PDF/Digbats at the city ballfield, but the unit that had first entered the city was actually covered.

A group of six, one escort and five pool representatives, were picked up by helicopter at Quarry Heights and taken to Fort Sherman where a unit escort officer was picked up. A short briefing was provided and the flight continued to Colon. A tactical landing was conducted as sniper activity was still possible in the areas around the landing zone. The battalion commander was available and provided a briefing on what the unit had encountered. He then teamed the group up with a unit moving through the streets.

A van full of confiscated weapons was parked outside the gate and presented an opportunity for the press. They also covered soldiers walking through the streets, the people of Colon cheering the Americans, and conducted interviews with soldiers and Panamanians.

Upon returning, the helicopter pilot opted not to fly into Quarry Heights helipad at night and instead flew to the SCN field. The team went to SCN to prepare stories and await transport. Although ground transport to Quarry Heights had been requested earlier from USARSO, it took almost an hour for the MP escort vehicles to show up. (This had little impact since it gave the writers an opportunity to complete their stories before leaving.)

The rest of the evening was spent filing stories, processing photos, etc.

At the same time, JTF-South PAO was developing story possibilities for the following day. The Rangers had liberated a prison camp that evening and the results would provide a good media opportunity the following morning. At this point, more than 300 media representatives were registered at the media center, further eroding the validity of the pool.

Day Four -- 23 December 89 - The prison story required an early wake up, approximately 0530. Once assembled at the media center, the press was briefed on what was to take place. They immediately rejected the idea as "old news." They would not continue to cover this type event, but insisted that they cover troops in current action, even at the risk of physical danger.

The Director, SCPA and JTF-South PAO were informed, the prison coverage was immediately discarded and a request was passed along to JTF-S to get the pool out to the troops. Two new missions were arranged to cover 82nd and 7th I.D. soldiers as they conducted clearing operations in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). The intent (as expressed by the media) was to remain in the field for several days, at least through Christmas Day in order to capture troops spending Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in the field. A system was set up to ensure stories could be picked up and brought to the media center for filing.

The television crew with the 82nd returned late the first night, pleased with its material and ready to file stories; an overnight stay was not necessary. A photographer and writer remained with the unit. The pool with the 7th stayed in the field overnight as originally planned.

The media pool was formally disbanded as of 1200 hours on 23 December.

2. Lessons Learned

a. Air Transportation

(1) Initially, air transportation was a monumental problem that resulted in excessive time lost. Air assets were still being arranged after the pool was on the ground Wednesday morning. Once helicopter support deposited the press at their initial site, for example, the tactical situation dictated that it immediately depart. On the ground, separated from the helicopter, there was no direct communications available. As a result, the pool was forced to communicate with SCPA via radio and telephone to get the helicopter back.

(2) The requirement to arrange transportation was passed on to the JTF-South PAO at a time when all air assets were being channeled to the tactical mission. The competition for these air assets put the media pool at a lower priority.

(3) Someone designated at SCPA as the dedicated media pool coordinator and a full-time representative at the JTF-South Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to handle such immediate problems would have cut down on lost time. In addition, the JCS op order should have directed dedicated air (ground and security) assets for the duration of the pool.

b. Pool composition and equipment

(1) The pool was far too large. There were 14 working journalists, two technicians and three DOD representatives. The DOD representatives were unnecessary.

(2) Access to "hot areas" requires a small group prepared to handle the current situation. Fourteen media and three DOD representatives were excessive. When economy of force and stealth were critical, media pool presence was too visible because of its large size. Splitting the pool into two or three separate smaller pools would have multiplied the transportation problem by a proportionate amount. The composition of the pool did not lend itself to such a division anyway. The TV requirement for three

personnel also exacerbated the problem (and caused a rift among pool members with the print media when, for example, helicopter seats were at a premium).

c. Mission

Recognizing the fluidity and uncertainty of combat operations, a basic plan must be developed early, a plan that has command approval and backing. Among the questions that must be addressed by the plan: Where will the key events be? How can we get the press in there? How do we get local authority to enter combat areas? How do we get the word to the ground commanders who will ultimately make it happen that this press pool is authorized to get shot at?

d. Experience of the Pool

Several members of the pool were not experienced in military operations. One reporter was dressed in suspenders, tie and baseball cap. A ground commander is going to be very reluctant to accept any added risk. If he is presented a group dressed more for softball than field operations, he may refuse. Pool members may be willing to accept the risk, but the commander does not need additional risk factors added to his soldiers and their mission.

e. Operational Briefings

A major flaw was in not providing a current operational update from day one. If the pool had arrived at SCN, been escorted into a briefing room and immediately been provided someone with field knowledge, the approach would have been more successful. Instead, an embassy representative with no knowledge of the tactical situation, was on hand to provide the briefing. Each morning should have been started with an operational briefing. These were started after the pool was dissolved.

f. Housing

This requirement was given to the command that was fighting the battle, adding to its already heavy workload. Resolution of this issue later caused a great deal of time spent on the part of the SCPA staff.

g. Media Pool Coordinator

One person should have been given the in-office responsibility both at JTF-South and SCPA to react to specific media pool needs. The JTF-S PAO, who spent a great deal of the early hours with the pool on the ground, was often out of the EOC where major problems could be addressed and solved quickly. He was needed on the

ground but without someone "in the rear" in authority to help make things happen, the fate of the pool was left in jeopardy. The SCPA deputy became the overall problem solver at a time when there were many other problems requiring attention. One person at each headquarters taking calls and looking for solutions would have eased the problems. This person(s) would also need to anticipate future needs, i.e. transportation, field coordination, security needs, possible story ideas, etc.

h. Tactical Gear

The press wanted to be placed in a combat situation. SCPA was not prepared to issue Kevlar helmets, flak jackets, etc. Field commanders did not have the equipment to issue. Other critical items include web belt and canteens. These reporters left freezing temperatures and snow in Washington, D.C. for 85 degrees and high humidity. The escort officers' water supply saved several members of the pool. Some thought should be given to a DoD equipment pool to be used for issue to the press prior to departure. Equipment could be tailored for the situation.

i. Communications

This is always a problem. The hand held radio became inoperable during the first afternoon, making essential field communication almost impossible. Telephone calls had to be made when and where available. (However, this was an isolated case. In most cases, radios worked well.)

j. Media Pool Authority

If DOD is going to assemble these teams and ship them out, ground assets must be made available to support them. When the intent of the pool is determined, plans for required assets can be developed.

k. DOD Escorts

The field team needs help, not more bodies to worry about (three reps was excessive). DOD expertise is certainly needed, but these officers should also be experienced in whatever operation is being conducted. This was largely an Army, ground operation. Instead of senior Army officers, two Naval officers and a senior Air Force officer comprised the team. All were well versed in media pool theory and helped solve particular problems, but none was armed with Army field savvy that could contribute to the pool's specific understanding of the situation. These escorts did not deploy with field uniforms or gear and stood out as much as the press, possibly detracting from the escort team's credibility with ground commanders.

1. Security

Plans must be made to address security requirements. Pool escorts were always looking for a proper security force whenever they moved. Although security in the form of one or two armed soldiers was usually available to accompany the group, a dedicated security team with tactical transportation would have been preferable.

MEDIA CENTER

The SOUTHCOM Media Center was established at H -3 hours. The Officers Club at Quarry Heights had been previously designated as the site for the establishment of a Media Center and had been used for this purpose during previous crises, to include the May elections. A ready kit had been prepared and was brought to the Media Center. (This kit included telephone instruments, one computer and printer, a FAX machine, typewriters, and administrative supplies.) Telephone outlets that had been used in May were left in place and the lines only had to be activated. Lines were activated and telephone instruments attached and at H -1, the Media Center was operational with seven telephone lines and all other equipment functional.

The SOUTHCOM Public Affairs Office maintains and constantly updates a Media Center SOP. This SOP was implemented and the Media Center was fully operational at H -1 hours.

The center was prepared to accept the DoD Media Pool expected to arrive at H + 4 hours and a minimum number of additional correspondents. Members of the pool arrived at the Media Center at H + 14 hours and immediately began to file their stories. A photo transmission machine was installed and film was developed in the ladies restroom.

At the same time the TV satellite crew began to install an uplink dish and associated equipment. This equipment was installed and began sending video to the U.S. for the evening news on the 20th.

In addition to setting up the facility, the Media Center began responding to queries at H + 8 hours and began to register media who were already in Panama at H hour. Although the exact number is not known, there were at least 50 correspondents in Panama at H hour.

Because of the chaotic situation in the downtown area, many of the correspondents who came to the center were unable to return to the city. The Media Center did not have assets to provide security escort for these personnel.

Many of the correspondents elected to remain at Quarry Heights. The Media Center basically became a "Safe Haven" as well as a source of information and filing facility.

As the numbers increased, the entire club was eventually taken over. On Day One, MREs were provided and by Day Two, blankets were available.

By H + 36 hours, approximately 65 correspondents had registered with the Media Center, the majority staying because no hotels or restaurants were open. Additionally there were no rental cars, taxis, buses or other forms of public transportation available.

By D + 1, the Media Center staff was expanded to six personnel (two officers and four NCOs).

The initial seven telephone lines were totally inadequate to handle the requirements. Four of the seven lines were tied up 24 hours a day with the Media Pool, two for video transmission, one for still photo transmission, and one for FAX of print stories to DOD. Priority use of all telephone lines was provided to the DOD Media Pool, which operated from the Orchid Room. The remainder of the correspondents worked out of the dining room and patio. This allowed the Media Center to conduct two separate operations, with priority given to the DOD pool.

The 1109th Signal Brigade pulled seven additional lines from offices and quarters on Quarry Heights to activate additional numbers by D + 3. Fourteen telephone lines were still inadequate and correspondents stood in line to use the telephones to file their stories. Because the Panamanian telephone system was unreliable, the Media Center was able to obtain control numbers and use the U.S. switch at Corozal to file stories. (The switch only had five lines to the U.S. and calls were always backed up.)

By D + 48 hours an additional 275+ correspondents had arrived at Howard AFB on board various charter aircraft. (One L1011 arrived with 30,000 lbs of equipment.) Because of widespread combat and the fact that there were no accommodations in Panama City, these personnel were held temporarily at Howard AFB and on the Naval Station Panama Canal. This massive influx of NMRs posed a very sensitive problem. SCPA could not logistically or administratively support such a group. Yet, pressure from Washington had mounted to accommodate them as well as possible. Just over 100 opted to return to the United States while the remainder with equipment were transported to the Media Center on 22 December.

By D + 72 hours, 180+ correspondents were living and working out of the Media Center.

On the 22nd, two cooks who work for the officers club came in and served two hot meals per day. The club personnel were able to get food from the commissary and arrangements were made with the major press organizations for billing and payment for these meals at a later date. By the 27th, the club began to serve 3 meals a day and all personnel began to pay for their meals as they were consumed.

As the situation began to stabilize on the 22nd, some correspondents were able to obtain accommodations in the city. (There were still personnel staying in the club as late as 30 December.)

By 23 December, the Media Center began to organize media opportunities. (Until then priority on all media opportunities

was given to the DOD pool and if additional seats were available, other correspondents were given the opportunity to participate in the events.) Two school buses with armed guards and one 15-passenger van were pressed into service to transport correspondents to these events. By 22 January, 195 events had been scheduled.

Beginning on the 21st of December, an operational update briefing was given at the Media Center at 0730 hours each morning. The daily briefing was given by the J-3 Current Operations Division. It consisted of a summary of all military activities conducted in the theater during the past 24 hours as well as updates on casualty figures (both U.S. and PDF), number of captured weapons, number of detainees, number of refugees, and an update on the total number of U.S. military in Panama. This briefing was also telecast live over SCN and was an excellent tool for keeping the press, the military and the U.S. civilian population informed and up to date on all current activities. These morning updates continued through 31 December when they were replaced with a daily written update.

As the press began to move into the downtown area, a sub-JIB was established at the Holiday Inn. Most of the TV media had established their bases of operation there because it was across the street from the Papal Embassy where Noriega had taken refuge. From that vantage point, they were able to conduct 24-hour watches of the embassy.

The sub-JIB was manned by one officer and one NCO from the Media Center staff. (The cost of the room was covered by the TV networks.) Radio as well as telephone communications were established with the sub-JIB. This dual communications link insured information could be passed from the Director of Public Affairs and the Media Center to the sub-JIB instantly.

The establishment of the sub-JIB at this point of media concentration enabled the Director of Public Affairs to maintain face-to-face liaison with all of the TV networks and the major print media outlets that were represented in Panama. This operation was very successful, keeping the media current on all military activities in Panama. Both locations remained in operation 24 hours a day until 20 January 1990. On 20 January, the sub-JIB was closed and all activities were conducted out of the Media Center at Quarry Heights. On 21 January, the Media Center went to a 12-hour schedule with personnel on call after 1900 hours.

On 1 January, a formal query system was established to better account for questions being filed at the Media Centers. Once questions were received, they were formally logged in and sent to the SCPA operations officer for action. They were then tracked until final disposition and returned to the originating NMR. (A query system was in effect from the beginning of the operation but the establishment of the logs and formal follow-up system contributed to better management of queries.) This formal follow-up system became

necessary as the volume of individual requests for detailed information (that could not be provided from the daily updates) grew, correspondents began working on individual detailed stories and moved away from coverage of the overall operation.

By 22 January, 855 correspondents were registered with the Media Center.

Lessons Learned:

1. Communications: Telephone communications were a constant problem. Fourteen telephones were inadequate for the large influx of correspondents. This problem was compounded by the lack of lines available from Panama to the United States. A minimum of 25 telephones and functional lines is required to allow correspondents to file their stories in a timely manner, to maintain TV uplinks and transmit still photos. To accomplish this, a facility must be designated for use as a Media Center before a crisis exists and pre-wired for telephones. In this case an adequate facility had been designated and was instantly available for use. However, the telephone capabilities of the facility were inadequate for the large number of correspondents.

2. Security: In a hostile situation, a security detachment needs to be assigned to a Media Center. These personnel would provide security for the press while they are being transported to and participating in media opportunities. In the early days of the hostilities, many good stories were missed by the press due to a shortage of security. Although the media center was able to get two armed guards by tasking the USARSO Headquarters Commandant, they did not have security vehicles. They could also have used at least six more security personnel with security vehicles to allow more media events to be conducted in the early phases of the operation.

3. Personnel: Six personnel cannot adequately support 500+ correspondents and maintain 24 hour operations in two locations. The vast majority of the correspondents have nothing but praise for the support they received and the overall coverage of operation "Just Cause" has been extremely favorable. Doubling the number of Media Center personnel or the activation of a Reserve Component press camp in the early hours of the operation might have enhanced the coverage of the entire operation. However, they pose an immediate problem in that (a) they require logistical support and (b) they are not up to speed on the current situation and require a major amount of initial briefing.

These personnel should be included in the operational planning so they are troop listed and arrive at the operational site with the first wave of troops. The increased personnel assets would allow the Media Center OIC to establish two 12-hour shifts with separate sections responsible for:

- a. Media registration and inprocessing.
- b. Organizing media opportunities and escorting correspondents to the events.
- c. Responding to individual queries and requests.
- d. A command element for overall control of the Media Center operation.

During the early phases of operation Just Cause, the six media center personnel worked 20-22 hours a day and performed all of these duties. Although all of the tasks were accomplished, they could have been done better by a larger organization divided into sections with distinct areas of responsibility.

4. Media billeting: If there is no available lodging in the civilian community and the military does not have adequate housing, serious consideration should be given to using the DOD (or regional) Media Pool longer and disallowing a massive influx of correspondents into the area until the situation is stabilized. The logistics of supporting a large number of media representatives out of a Media Center designed to support a DOD Media Pool, and minimum number of correspondents already in country, detracts from the ability to support them in an appropriate manner.
5. Transportation: Dedicated transportation from the beginning is essential to the operation of a Media Center. Using whatever is available causes many opportunities to be missed while correspondents sit around waiting for transportation. The logistics of moving hundreds of correspondents around an ever changing battlefield is enormous at best and almost impossible without dedicated ground and air transportation.
6. Payment for meals and lodging: A system needs to be immediately implemented to collect money for meals and lodging. This would eliminate the need for mass billing when the situation stabilizes. This needs to be set up by the agencies providing the meals and lodging and should not be a public affairs function.
7. Management of Queries: The formal follow-up system that was implemented on 1 January should have been in place before the volume of queries became large. The system needs personnel dedicated to performing only that task.
8. Media Pool reports: Personnel assigned to support the DOD Media Pool or any other media pools that are created must be responsible for getting copies of all pool reports and insuring that they are distributed to all correspondents. Additionally a file must be maintained on all reports for later reference. This can also be accomplished by having a section of the Media Center dedicated to media events and pool formation.

MEDIA AIRCRAFT SUPPORT

On D-Day, H-Hour, more than 25 resident media and 25-50 visiting media were in Panama City. Additionally, Omar Torrijos International Airport was an initial target and destined to be closed for several weeks. The assumed result was that a minimal influx of media was initially expected. In addition to the DOD media pool and resident media, only a small number of "outside" media was anticipated for the first several days.

However, early phone calls from news media representatives and OSD/PA showed that great pressure was being exerted to allow the media to use Howard AFB to land charter aircraft.

There was an originally agreed-to settlement that would allow a minimum number (total of six) aircraft to depart from San Jose, Costa Rica and Miami, Florida.

Because the airdrome at Howard would be extraordinarily busy receiving Just Cause flights and the SCPA staff was extremely limited in numbers, it was not possible to handle large numbers of people. Initially, SCPA could not provide the necessary security or logistics support for more than about 75-100 people.

At some point, however, the negotiated settlement was revoked by parties unknown and by D + 2 (22 Dec 89) at 2000, more than 300 news media representatives arrived on 12 charter flights. Ultimately, 36 flights arrived, and more than 850 media were eventually registered.

The following are significant events as they relate to support of media aircraft. Specific arrival/departure information is attached.

On 21 Dec 89, 1000-1500, SCPA was established as the POC for media aircraft landing requests. Coordination procedures were set up with a number of Howard AFB agencies: Base Operations, Public Affairs, Command Post, Air Terminal Operations Center. Coordination was also conducted with the Costa Rican government through the U.S. embassy there. They wanted written proof of authorization for aircraft from Costa Rica landing in Panama.

SCPA received requests from media throughout the day.

At 1700, the first media aircraft landed (Sam Donaldson, ABC).

On 23 Dec 89, due to overcrowded conditions at Quarry Heights and Howard AFB media centers, SCPA decided to temporarily suspend civilian aircraft landings at Howard AFB bringing additional media in-country.

On 24 Dec 89, SCPA began allowing media aircraft landings at Howard AFB for swapping people/equipment. Swaps continued through D+11, involving over 70 media representatives, at least 14,000 pounds of equipment, and 17 aircraft.

Starting 29 Dec 89, media representatives were allowed flights out of Panama on MAC aircraft, due to the closure of Torrijos airport. They paid \$264 for a seat regardless of destination. Normal MAC rules for luggage, etc. applied. Sixteen media representatives arrived at Quarry Heights media center to take the first flight out. This operation continued through 1 Jan 90. A total of 45 media representatives took advantage of the flights.

The commercial airport resumed operations on a limited basis 2 Jan 90. However, the flight schedule was not reliable. Flights were often cancelled, leaving a growing waiting list. Chartered aircraft could land at the airport, but security conditions made access to the aircraft difficult. Since commercial flights from Panama were unreliable, SCPA requested more flights on MAC aircraft for media representatives, beginning 11 Jan 90. SCPA coordinated with SOUTHCOM J-4 and TMO at Howard AFB. The TMO arranged reservations for up to 43 people on the Freedom Birds. The reservations were on aircraft departing for Miami on 11, 13 and 14 Jan 90. Only two media representatives took advantage of these flights.

Lessons Learned:

a. Based on SCPA's recommendation, a definite limit should have been established on the number of media representatives allowed into Panama through Howard AFB. Based on facilities available, prevalent security risks and safety concerns in the area of operations, the recommended number would have been no more than 100 people.

b. When setting up coordination procedures for media aircraft landings, the SCPA POC developed a form used for recording, tracking and coordinating those requests. However, this was a duplication of effort, since Howard base operations already had forms for this purpose. Also, the SCPA form was in a different format than base operations and made reconciling information difficult.

c. The fifth aircraft that landed with media representatives aboard was an L-1011 chartered by NBC. This proposal came up when SCPA thought there was a six aircraft limit, and seemed a good way to get maximum media coverage with minimum aircraft. Allowing the L-1011 worsened a bad situation. There were 220 people aboard, and handling them was difficult. Off-loading the 30,000 lbs of equipment from the aircraft proved to be a monumental task, since the Air Terminal Operations Center personnel were still involved in supporting the combat mission. They managed to get the aircraft

unloaded, but it took more than four hours. A limit imposed on the number of people and on the amount of equipment military support personnel could off-load for the media would have alleviated this situation.

d. Between D + 2 and D + 4, a total of eight media-chartered aircraft landed at Howard without Prior Permission Required (PPR) numbers. Two reasons for this are:

1) A misconception that any aircraft claiming it had media on board should be allowed to land. This came from the confusion on how many aircraft were to be allowed access to Howard AFB, and before the SCPA POC had been established.

2) Sneaky tactics. These tactics included sending two aircraft at the same time under one PPR number, and attempting to land on an expired number. The origin of these tactics is unknown. (Allowing aircraft to land at Howard without PPR numbers made it difficult to track how many media representatives were in those aircraft and their affiliations.)

e. When media representatives requested a swap of equipment/personnel, the easiest method was to let them assume responsibility for transportation. SCPA would simply provide a military escort from the gate of an installation, to the flightline or media center and back.

MEDIA ARRIVALS/DEPARTURES THROUGH HOWARD AFB

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PAX</u>		<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
	<u>AFFILIATION</u>	<u>ACFT</u>			
21 DEC 89	ABC	GULF STREAM 2	7	1,000	LBS
	(SAM DONALDSON'S AIRCRAFT)				
	ABC	HAWKER	7		MIN
22 DEC 89	NBC & OTHERS	L-1011	220	30,00	LBS
	CBC	SABRE LINER	14	(LANDED TWICE)	
	CNN, AP, UPI	727	36		MIN
	BBC	LEAR	35	5	"
	BOSTON GLOBE	LEAR	35	7	"
	5 OTHER AIRCRAFT WITHOUT PPR#S		30		UNKNOWN
23 DEC 89	CBS	LEAR	25	5	(2 HOSTAGES RELEASED)
	REUTERS	LEAR	35	3	MIN
	1 OTHER AIRCRAFT WITHOUT A PPR#		6		UNKNOWN
24 DEC 89	CBS	LEAR	25	3	MIN
	TWO OTHER LEAR JETS WITHOUT A PPR#		12		UNKNOWN
26 DEC 89	NBC	LEAR	25	3	MIN
	UNIVISION	LEAR	25	3	"
	CNN	727	64	26	9400 LBS
27 DEC 89	NBC	LEAR	25	6	6 MIN
	BOSTON GLOBE	LEAR	25	7	"
28 DEC 89	CBS	LEAR	25	2	2 900 LBS
	ABC	LEAR	25	2	5 MIN
29 DEC 89	NEWSWEEK	LEAR	25	3	2 MIN
	CBC	LEAR	25	0	6 "
	CBS	LEAR	25	0	6 "
30 DEC 89	MCNEIL/LEHRER	LEAR	25	4	MIN
	NBC	LEAR	25	1	4 400 LBS
	ABC	LEAR	25	7	6 900 LBS
	ABC	LEAR	25	0	900 LBS
31 DEC 89	KGGM/WRAL	PIPER NAV.	4	0	MIN
	MCNEIL/LEHRER	PIPER NAV.	2	0	"
	ABC	LEAR	25	3	0 400 LBS

OUTGOING MAC FLIGHTS

<u>DATE</u>	<u># PAX</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DESTINATIONS</u>
29 DEC 89	27	C-141	KELLY AFB, CHARLESTON AFB, MCGUIRE AFB
30 DEC 89	9	C-141	CHARLESTON AFB
31 DEC 89	7	C-141	CHARLESTON AFB
1 JAN 90	2	C-141	CHARLESTON AFB
4 JAN 90	2	C-5	CHARLESTON AFB/DOVER AFB
13 JAN 90	1	727	FREEDOM BIRD TO MIAMI
14 JAN 90	1	727	FREEDOM BIRD TO MIAMI

SOUTHERN COMMAND NETWORK

Not since the days of Vietnam have personnel at an AFRTS outlet found themselves in a hostile fire environment. Even as mortars impacted sporadically in the vicinity of the network headquarters, the professional urge of the SCN camera crews was frustrated by not being able to be out in the thick of "the action." In fact, although our videographers and reporters were ready to roll, the first hours of video opportunity rightfully fell to the combat videographers attached to the Joint Audio-Visual Detachment (JAVDET). Portions of the video shot by JAVDET cameramen were made available to SCN for on-air use during the first six hours. JAVDET was then ordered to immediately ship all video to DoD. As soon as our primary mission was accomplished and the early-on potential need to reconstitute mitigated, news teams were deployed in force on a rotating basis, turning out a final total of over 50 television news stories over the two-week period ending 5 January 1990.

OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMMING (Television)

On the afternoon of 19 December, the commander called together all section supervisors to direct a "test" of the network's operational readiness. In response, a mobile van team deployed to Quarry Heights to establish a microwave link to SCN and an engineer was designated to go to Ancon Hill. The mission was to be able to deploy and set up a return microwave link from the van to SCN at any location on the Pacific side of the Isthmus. A TV news team was dispatched to Howard AFB under 24 COMPWG/PAO's operational control, and two news teams prepared equipment for standby. All personnel were instructed to remain on duty until released. Operational and contingency plans were reviewed again and another assessment of displaced equipment conducted. Equipment necessary to reconstitute broadcast capability was displaced previously in the event the network headquarters and studios were destroyed or disabled due to hostile action.

It was necessary to reconfigure remaining manpower to ensure mission essential operations. The Command Information section was totally chopped to the news department as were all other personnel not essential to radio or master control operations. This ensured maximum flexibility in the news department to cover all missions while keeping a studio crew with anchor available continuously for live cut-ins. All operations assets were pooled and divided into two teams for 12 hour shifts to provide 24-hour live radio, television, and studio programming capability. Because a number of SCN personnel resided off-post and previous real-world crises always included non-travel curfews, Ft Clayton on-post sleeping areas had to be identified. Ft Clayton residents who were on shift were identified to share their quarters with off-Clayton personnel who would not be allowed to leave post.

Practice drills were conducted to prime news and studio crews to go live for a news cut-in with five-minutes notice.

The decision was made to leave the 11-meter programmable satellite dish on Galaxy 1 in order to guarantee direct access to CNN/CNN HEADLINE NEWS. It was to be left there due to prior history of motor damage which would make dish movement potentially impossible. The loss was primarily NBC entertainment programming (which subsequently became a continuing source of complaints from frustrated "soap" watchers).

By 2230 that night, most senior personnel sensed that we were involved in more than a routine exercise.

The commander, having been alerted earlier in the day that our abilities would be put into action, was hour by hour, carefully placing the network into an immediate response posture.

During this time, provisions were made to insure that a historical record would exist of any and all network media coverage of whatever event was apparently about to take place. Steps were taken to increase video dubbing to multiple simultaneous reproductions of CNN, CNN HEADLINE, and AFRTS for later consolidation of Panama situation stories and requirements from external sources. In addition, provisions were made to add multiple cassette audio recordings for on-air use and eventual archiving. Previous experience during the May elections and the coup attempt had taught us this lesson well.

Shortly before midnight, a camera crew left the building with only a destination known, and did not fully know their objective other than to cover a three-person "news conference" inside a house. They soon found themselves in a clandestine location as the sole media allowed to videotape the historic swearing-in of President Endara and his two vice presidents. A member of the radio staff also was detailed on a special mission with two portable audio cassette recorders in hand (one was a personal one belonging to the commander but was more "user friendly" than the other one). This SCN member was to provide radio production assistance in support of President Endara and the new Panamanian democratic government.

When word came to stand by for a live studio cut-in about 25 minutes after midnight, the news and studio crew were cocked and ready to go within three minutes. The commander handed the news anchor a telefax news release and moments later he was calmly announcing that an armed conflict was in progress in Panama. Throughout the coming hours and days the continuing focus would be to keep audiences as totally informed as humanly possible, but to do so in a measured, non-inflammatory manner, attempting to maintain an atmosphere of calm within a chaotic climate. The non-verbal significance of each news

anchor's on-air demeanor was particularly addressed by the commander as being key to how acutely our television audience would react with calm or panic.

The live studio cut-in was simulcast on AM/FM stating that Personnel Movement Limitation (PML) ECHO was in effect and that the U.S. military action in progress was directed, not at the Panamanian people, but against Noriega and his Panamanian Defense Forces. The first PML Echo crawls began to air immediately on TV with a 10 minute frequency, and corresponding repetitions on radio. The frequency of PML ECHO announcements on both radio and TV would subsequently be lengthened to 15 minutes apart. When the command returned to PML Delta on 28 Dec, crawl frequency was gradually decreased to one per hour.

Within 15 minutes of the first live cut-in announcing hostilities, CNN HEADLINE NEWS aired their first Panama situation newsflash. Berta Thayer reported hearing the SCN announcement of PML ECHO, referring to it as "USSOUTHCOM'S highest state of alert." Moments later SCN again aired a live studio cut-in reemphasizing PML ECHO status, that hostilities were now in progress, and what precautions non-combatants should be taking.

Regularly scheduled programming essentially was stopped at 2330 on 19 December due to the need to keep the satellite on CNN. SCN shifted to pretaped Carson and Letterman programming (normally carried live) which allowed the network to stop the tapes and cut in and out without disrupting the integrity of entire programs. From 0130 until 0500, filler programming was aired with off-lined CNN news updates. Generally, 30 minutes delay was the longest period between off-lining and airing and was actually requested by SOUTHCOM operators due to the timeliness of the reports and the operators concern for OPSEC. A press announcement by White House Spokesman, Mr. Marlin Fitzwater was taken live at 0145 and the President was aired live later in the morning.

Beginning at H-hour, Master Control/DupFac personnel continuously monitored and flagged news stories dealing with the Panama situation and alerted management of significant story changes for potential use on upcoming live studio cut-ins.

Radio continued to interrupt programming to simulcast TV audio of live studio cut-ins and special network TV news reports. In these early hours of the developing crisis situation, the overriding critical importance of both radio and TV speaking with "one voice" dictated the continuity of TV audio on both mediums. Within the space of four hours, radio would break away to go live around the clock for the duration of Operation Just Cause, airing all radio newscasts live as they were sent across the AFRTS voiceline. Music programming would go essentially to a call-in request format until

29 December. This would prove to be both a blessing and a curse as it was later determined that the programming signal was being pumped through loudspeakers outside the Papal Nunciature.

At 0500, 30-minute tape delaying of TV news programming ended and a nearly unbroken stream of live CNN and major network special news coverage continued until early the 23d of December. At that point, we began to ease off the heavy news diet, moving slowly toward a return to more and more entertainment programming. Over the next two weeks, daily attention was paid to the fine tuning of the news/entertainment balance until by 8 January SCN resumed regular programming totally.

On 2 January, 1990, a 24-minute SCN Special News Production produced by two SCN personnel aired. The program was an overview of Operation Just Cause and required approximately 28 hours continuous work to produce. This news special was updated with additional opening and closing segments to disclaim some date errors and conclude with a wrap-up of Noriega's surrender--the final mission accomplished for Operation Just Cause.

OUTSIDE AGENCY SUPPORT

One day after the intervention, on 21 December, a request was received from a PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) unit, and a representative of the newly established government for a satellite downlink capability using SCN equipment and our satellite receive-only terminals. Equipment was readied to provide service should the request be approved, and the requestors were advised to send their request through SOUTHCOM channels for official tasking. Further, they were advised that SCN would take no action until directed through proper channels. SOUTHCOM/PA, ABS, and AFIS were advised and were supportive of SCN's effort to be helpful, but not impact adversely on the primary AFRTS mission. The request ultimately went away as other alternatives were found in theater, with SCN's help, to get information to Panamanians in Spanish that was supportive of the new government. An additional request for use of a telephone interface unit was received from same unit. This request was approved by SCN since it did not adversely affect our mission. The interface was removed from radio production and an SCN engineer was dispatched to install the unit in an AM radio transmitter broadcasting on channel 1160.

On 22 December, the SCN Commander and an engineer went to Channel 4 to provide engineering/technical assistance as needed to Channels 2, 4, and 13 to get them back on the air. After discussions, no support was needed to bring them on line. In fact, Channel 4 was transmitting already and Channels 2 and 13 were up that afternoon.

On 23 December, assistance to eliminate interference on PSYOPS radio station call-in's was requested. Several SCN personnel were dispatched accompanied by the SCN commander. Alignment of telephone interface was accomplished. The system worked well with calls being received from on post. Problems with off-post calls were overcome on the 24th. SCN engineers were dispatched several times in this effort in support of the new government. Technical assistance was provided in addition to 1000 ft of shielded audio cable.

Although PSYOPS is not within the charter of an AFRTS outlet, limited, emergency support of such activities in the form of equipment sharing or technical assistance was deemed by this organization to be within the spirit of regulatory guidance, and in the immediate best interest of the United States and ongoing combat operations.

PSYOPS units should not, however, be deployed to the operational area of an AFRTS outlet with the presumption of any such support as we believe was the case in this instance. Repeated PSYOPS requests for use of AFRTS library music and programming were denied. The extent to which AFRTS outlets may interpret existing DOD guidance with regard to PSYOPS broadcast support requests should be addressed and disseminated for future reference.

PENTAGON MEDIA POOL SUPPORT

At 0430 hours on 20 December, the SCN conference room was set up for arrival of media pool.

At 0605 hours the Pentagon Media Pool arrived by helicopter at Luzon field for brief at SCN by US Charge d' Affairs, Mr John Bushnell. Tapes of Endara's swearing-in were disseminated to the media before the briefing. SCN ENG cameraman and media pool cameraman both shot the press conference. SCN camera was cabled to master control for possible live use, but was recorded for later playback with all equipment working properly.

At 0610 the DCO and Asst. Chief Engineer went with media pool engineer to coordinate satellite uplinking. Several locations were looked at prior to choosing the original suggested location at the Media Center on Quarry Heights.

At 0625, the DCO and two Supply personnel assisted the media pool engineer in the transfer of the media pool's equipment to SCN from the helicopter landing field (approx 200 meters from SCN building)... Mortars/RPG's hit the field during this time; no injuries.

On 21 December, an SCN broadcaster became part of the Pentagon media pool. He and an NBC cameraman totally supported the media pool at Quarry Heights through 22 December.

On 21, 22 December the media pool used the broadcaster's footage exclusively: looting; destruction of Comandancia; President Endara's address at the Presidential Palace. The staffer was assigned to the media pool for these two days and was the cameraman for all network live standups at Quarry Heights. Afterwards the media pool had sufficient cameramen and from then on, the SCN staffer went on media pool tours to obtain video for SCN. The SCN broadcaster provided all of his footage daily to media pool for uplinking.

More news teams arrived from the States on 21 December with BetaCams and a second request from satellite uplink folks for 1/2 & 3/4 inch players. A BVW-40 and BVU-5000 were issued to the team.

Quarry Heights press conferences were uplinked to major networks via SCN mobile van beginning on 21 December. Initially, the media pool also was dependent exclusively on mobile van equipment to uplink all their stories. Three networks used the SCN van to review their B-roll footage. Networks could not have filed early reports without presence of SCN equipment.

Additionally numerous tapes in various formats were straight-dubbed and cross-format dubbed on Quarry Heights as a service to JAVDET and Pentagon media pool.

THEATER PUBLIC AFFAIRS INTERACTION

SCN was tasked by SOUTHCOM/PA to submit a daily Activity Report to include significant actions from Operations and Radio and Television Programming.

Because of inadequate coordination or miscommunication, the two-person news team deployed to Howard AFB spent approximately 30 hours during the initial onset of the operation attempting to cover Air Force activities and were prevented from accomplishing their objective. Very little usable video resulted because their tapes were either confiscated or not allowed to be shot, despite the on-scene presence of an Air Force Public Affairs Officer.

Numerous releases for broadcast were received directly from subordinate theater PAO's despite long-standing policies instructing them to funnel all inputs through SOUTHCOM/PA as final release authority during crisis situations. These direct, apparently uncoordinated inputs required time-consuming backtracking, re-faxing, and re-coordination. In several instances, valid information

ultimately never made it on the air because SOUTHCOM/PA was overcome by events in the reconfirmation/re-release process. Valuable, time-sensitive information was lost because proper release authority chain of command was not followed.

On 30 December, a special studio recording was made of a Noriega prosecution witness for SOUTHCOM/PA. Tape dubs were produced for media pool use with simultaneous translation and special effect mosaic video alteration of facial features and audio distortion of voice for identity protection of the witness.

Because of the established credibility and lack of manipulation SCN, an Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Network, was able to receive numerous valuable tips on major intelligence matters that were passed immediately through military intelligence channels with over 90 percent accuracy. Because the station is able to give unbiased national and international news, not just good news, it is trusted by local nationals which accounted for numerous valuable information calls. Military Intelligence and PSYOPS folks need to understand that SCN can do them and the network a real service by ensuring the station doesn't lose its credibility. SCN must function as an unmanipulated information service; and it can then feed good solid information to them. Missions must be kept separate in order to be accomplished.

SCN personnel answered numerous phone calls requesting/giving information/help, referring weapons cache information, and Panamanians expressing thanks to U.S.--especially heavy in the first three days of action.

Most of these kinds of questions were referred to SOUTHCOM/PA in the early going until SCN was finally apprised of proper phone numbers and official PA answers.

AFRTS outlets can expect to bear the brunt of initial inquiry phone calls because to the average member of the audience, the public affairs function is essentially invisible and unknown, while common logic leads to the reasonable conclusion that radio and television, as the high visibility disseminator of information, must also be the originator, or at least the central information clearinghouse. During the early hours of a developing crisis operation, consideration should be given to dedicating a public affairs person or cell to provide a command information clearinghouse function. SOUTHCOM Public Affairs was overcome by the deluge of external media and placed priority on support to external information over internal information to the detriment of the internal audience. The cell must be collocated with the other Public Affairs personnel in the Unified Command headquarters to understand requirements and priorities.

RADIO

On 19 December by 2100 the Radio Section was mustered. One military member left at 2230 with a tape recorder on a special assignment lasting three days to support radio production for the new Panamanian government. Two others remained on the overnight shift, while two more who live on Fort Amador, found housing on Fort Clayton. This left four people in radio.

We went to PML Echo on the 20th at 0030 simulcasting the announcement with television. The PML Hot Line audio carts were immediately changed. Radio continued to simulcast normal AM/FM programming, inserting PML announcements every 15 minutes.

At 0135, SCN took TV audio for a White House announcement from Marlin Fitzwater announcing U.S. troops had engaged Panamanian Defense Forces in an attempt to remove Noriega from power. At 0300, SCN took an ABC News Special Report. The network dumped out of the Special Report so that all newscasts for troop movements and tape delay if necessary could be monitored. SCN was told at 0400 not to delay but air all the newscasts as they came down on AM and FM. By 0430, SCN was broadcasting live, simulcasting on both stations. No newscasts were delayed on radio during the hostilities.

News coverage consisted of radio and TV audio. The station did switch around initially so that it could stay on stories concerning Panama. Beginning at 0710 hours SCN eventually stayed with TV audio which featured CNN's continuous coverage of the operation and President Bush's address. At approximately 1500, the network broke away from TV audio and began airing all the five minute newscasts when available. In addition, SCN aired appropriate programs such as Armed Forces Digest, Pentagon News Break and Paul Harvey news and Commentary as well as SCN TV updates. Many of the live TV updates were not aired, however, as the station was not notified they were going on the air.

During the first day of the conflict SCN asked people not to use their phones to call the station unless it was an emergency. SCN received many telephone calls asking to send troops to certain areas of town and these people were referred to a number at SOUTHCOM. Since SCN was not airing any pre-packaged programming, to a live mixed music format was used. The objective was to maintain an atmosphere of calm and to keep people informed as best as possible. The request line was opened on the second day of the conflict and by that afternoon when troops began to come in from the field the phones were constantly ringing. For the first several days the songs requested were for the various units in the field. But an increasing number became directed at Noriega. The music content was heavily weighted towards rock and heavy metal. The station tried to honor all the requests but also tried to keep to a mixed music format.

When Noriega found his way into the Papal Nunciature, the song requests were almost totally aimed in his direction. Christmas day, only Christmas music was played, but people still called in asking for musical requests with a message. The following day, the "requests" were played and the phones were constantly ringing with some very imaginative requests. It was later determined, on network newscasts, that the soldiers at the Nunciature were blasting SCN's signal at the building. The radio NCOIC received a call that day from someone saying he was from PSYOPS and he said they were the ones doing it. SCN was even receiving requests from reporters from the network news teams. This was done for two days. Realizing the network was not really serving its audience well, it went back to a mixed music format and remained so. As a result of the attention SCN received over the music programming, the station received requests for interviews from about 45 radio and television stations, magazines and newspapers. During each of these interviews, both broadcast and print, SCN DJ's repeatedly stressed our command information mission and specifically clarified that PSYOPS is not a part of the AFRTS charter.

SCN broke from the mixed music format to air Shadoc Stevens Top 100 "year ender", a country countdown "year ender", both received from AFRTS, and then put together and aired a top 100 Black/Urban "year ender".

ENGINEERING

The engineering department began contingency planning several months prior to the Panama elections with a focus on capabilities and "what if" scenarios. The what if scenarios led to identification of alternate broadcast sites and equipment which could be airlifted to Panama on short notice. Operations during the May elections provided new insight as to mobile broadcast capabilities and helped identify shortcomings such as two-way radio communications. SCN coverage of the elections resulted in a requirement for increased security and refinement of contingency plans. The coup attempt coverage brought increased threats against SCN and resulted in repositioning broadcast equipment for emergency operations. Two weeks prior to 20 December three major pieces of equipment experienced component failure and replacement components were placed on 02 priority requisition (the highest priority for deadlined mission essential equipment).

By 20 Dec, with the exception of the mobile van air conditioners, 11-meter satellite elevation motor and the AVA-3 graphics system power supplies, SCN was technically ready to meet contingency requirements to include contingency training for personnel. Army Broadcasting Service and TASA liaison personnel began immediate procurement action on 20 Dec to include arranging for equipment delivery directly to Howard from Ft. Ord. Replacement components began arriving within 36 hours of the requests. The AVA-3 power

supplies were replaced and equipment was operational within 24 hours of arrival. The air conditioner compressors were installed on field location and modifications were required to make them operational. The satellite motor installation was delayed pending a break in satellite movement needs. The satellite had to be taken off CNN to install the motor. During the entire JUST CAUSE operation every objective was met without any loss of radio or television signals. The following paragraphs outline specific actions and taskings which required system modifications, new capabilities, and technical assistance to external organizations.

H-hour minus 16 hours - Two engineering senior noncommissioned officers were dispatched to Ancon Hill transmitter site to become familiar with the mobile van microwave system operations. The transmitter maintenance and operation is usually a civilian contract operation so plans were made which assumed the contractors would not make it to the site when required. Research on the status of the mobile van air conditioner unit compressors intensified. By noon on 19 December one compressor was located in country and coordination was made with the Directorate of Materiel for immediate installation. The installation was completed by 1745 hours without positive results. The mobile van and engineer were directed to locate the van on Quarry Heights by 1830 hours regardless of air conditioner status.

At 1830 hours, two military personnel were dispatched to standby at USSOUTHCOM PAO for a possible test shoot. Engineering personnel were notified to remain on duty until released by the commander. At 2100 hours the commander directed all personnel to work 12 hour shifts and rotate sleeping spaces on Ft. Clayton. Second shift personnel were released at 2230 hours to designated rest areas on Ft. Clayton.

PML-Echo was announced at 0030 hours and resulted in a number of engineering taskings. The van crew was tasked to establish a link for a live feed from Quarry Heights Officers' Club during the first hours of heavy fighting around Quarry Heights. One of the Army personnel made two attempts to reach Ancon Hill and was turned back because of hostile fire. An MP escort, helmet, and flack jacket were provided him and Ancon Hill was reached about 0430 hours. The live shot link was established at 0600 hours.

Within the first few hours, requests to provide multiple video and audio cassette dubs came in and in-house system modifications were made to accommodate this normally TASC requirement. This was followed by a USSOUTHCOM request to help establish a facility as a media briefing room with a feed for live airing. The SCN conference room was modified accordingly. In addition USSOUTHCOM requested SCN provide assistance to the contract satellite uplink technicians who

deployed with the DoD Media Pool. The assistance provided was identifying a location for the uplink and providing playback equipment to supplement the one M-2 format machine brought to Panama.

On 21 Dec a PSYOPS team requested technical assistance to provide a telephone interface for their broadcast operation. A telephone interface was removed from the radio production room and installed by SCN technicians. SCN had another interface for FM radio so there was no loss of capability at SCN. Difficulty with Panama telephone lines required several technical assistance visits to the PSYOPS radio broadcast station over a three day period.

The remainder of the critical period was spent providing these special requirements in addition to maintaining the station for the SCN mission of providing national news and local command information. An additional requirement from USSOUTHCOM was generated when the media team was relocated to the Holiday Inn and requested the use of the mobile van to microwave relay the signals from Quarry Heights to the Panamanian contract satellite uplink at the Holiday Inn.

Engineering also assisted a special Nation-building Task Force in evaluating the local television stations transmission capability. After a visit to Channel 4 and discussions with their engineers, it was concluded that all stations were operational and no further technical assistance was required.

In summary SCN engineering was fully prepared to meet all of SCN objectives to provide continuous on-air operations and although the station was not engineered nor manned for the additional external requirements, all requests were accomplished to the satisfaction of the requestor. A summary of these additional requirements follows.

JAVDET: Equipment maintenance and dub/edit assistance

PSYOPS: Equipment (telephone interface, audio cable), technical assistance, audio/video dub assistance (multiple copies), evaluation of local television stations broadcast capabilities, satellite downlink

MEDIA POOL: Conference room setup, satellite uplink assistance, playback equipment for various media formats, microwave relay support from mobile van on Quarry Heights to Holiday Inn, dub/edit support from the mobile van.

SRTV: Billeting, office room, and editing facilities to support their Army mission.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED

1. AFRTS Radio and Television remained the primary continuing source and most direct conduit of information to the command.
2. Establish a central Operations Center to monitor status of vehicles, cameras, personnel, and supplies. Also, the creation of a central archiving point for logging of ongoing events, telecons, faxes in & out, and a diary-like journal of operational & programming decisions by date/time group will prove absolutely critical to reconstructing the facts for after-action reports long after fatigue and stress have fogged over the memory of even the most conscientious soldier.
3. A special reserve of videotape should be maintained to meet crises/natural disasters and the associated increase in off-lining and taping requirements.
4. Reliable radio communications is absolutely essential to ensure ability to react to changing circumstances--do not rely on land line communications which become clogged with traffic.
5. Vehicles should be equipped with DC battery chargers for hand-held two way radios and ENG camera batteries. Additionally, all batteries should be "quick charge" capable.
6. DoD Media Pool should establish a standardized equipment package to include 8mm, 1/2", and 3/4" tape formats editing equipment, and uplink capability. These equipment items should be pre-positioned and palletized (or put in a transportable van) for quick uploading to accompany any media pool deployment. The pool should be totally equipped to be self-sustaining, to include telephones, to ensure the pool can quickly fill stories.
7. Periodic race-against-the-clock rehearsals were essential to test capability for live studio news cut-ins to respond to fast-breaking crises/natural disasters.
8. Wargame the pooling and shifting of resources in "what if" scenarios. Example: What if both your Program Director and News Director were on emergency leave at the same time when a major crisis/disaster/conflict kicked off? That's exactly the position SCN found itself in when the Operation Just Cause balloon began. Contingency planning and wargaming is essential to enable pooling manpower to provide support to mission essential positions. Determine what one absolutely must have to stay on the air, i.e. radio, master control, studio operations, off-lining facility, news talent, etc.

9. Redundant key equipment proved extremely effective in an environment where so much of the day-to-day operation is dependent upon civilians and civilian contractors. For example, the two fax machines enabled SCN to still receive timely critical news releases when one of the facsimile machines broke.
10. Although a number of taskings came from external sources and were not related to our mission, the story was told to the American public and the people of Panama. SCN was able to organize and contribute to the success of the military objective due to the flexibility and expertise of SCN technicians. Technical training/preventive maintenance paid big dividends as evidenced by the quality of signals and continuous "no trouble" operation.
11. Additional external requirements such as support to PSYOPS and DoD Media Pool must be addressed at higher levels to determine agency responsibility to support these requirements.
12. Contract maintenance, utilities support, and key personnel living locations were definite major problems during the first days of the crisis.
13. Contingency planning and prelocating broadcast equipment, although not used, could have been vital to continuous broadcast operations if the station had been hit.
14. Emergency shipment of equipment/parts requires entry of shipment into the manifest for tracking purposes.
15. TA50, personal field equipment, was not readily available for the jointly-staffed unit and is currently being evaluated for standard operations.

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION & VIPS

Numerous CODELs and VIPS visited Panama during Operation Just Cause. While the overall responsibility of these visits was primarily a Protocol function, SCPA had to play a major role in media support.

(1) The following is a list of principal visitors:

(a) Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, 24-25 Dec 89. In his party were: Mr. Henry S. Rowen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Mr. Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Mr. David S. Addington, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; RADM William A. Owens, USN, Sr Military Assistant to Sec Def; SGM Julius W. Gates, USA, Sergeant Major of the Army; Mr. Bill Brown, Personal Security, Sec Def.

(b) U.S. Representatives John P. Murtha (D-PA), G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-MS), 28-29 Dec 89. In their official party were: Mr. Don Richbourg, Senior Staff Assistant; Mr. John Plashal, Staff Assistant, HAC, Defense Subcommittee; RADM Thomas J. Lopez, USN, Dep Dir J3, JCS; Colonel Robert Zogelman, USA, Army Escort Officer; LTC Charles Horner, USA.

(c) U.S. Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono, 28-29 Dec 89. In his party were: LTG Jimmy D. Ross, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; LTG Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; COL Alcalla, Chief, CSA Assessment and Initiatives Office; COL Fettig, Public Affairs Officer for CSA; MAJ Petraeus, Aide De Camp; Mr. Tom Donnelly, Editor, Army Times; CW3 Lord, Assistant Executive Officer for Communication; SFC Miller, Communicator.

(d) Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command General James J. Lindsay, 29-30 Dec 89. In his party were: LTG Gary D. Luck, CG U.S. Army Special Operations Command; MG Thomas E. Eggers, Commander, 23d Air Force; COL Charles D. McMillin, Executive Officer for USCINCSOC; COL Peter Stankovich, SOJ3-S; BMCM Rudolph E. Boesch, Senior Enlisted Advisor, USCINCSOC.

(e) Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), John Warner (R-VA) and Charles S. Robb (D-VA), 2-4 Jan 90. In their official party were: Mr. Arnold Punaro, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee; Mr. George Tenet, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; Mr. Les Brownlee, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee; Mr. Grayson Winterling, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee; and COL Frank Norton, USA, OCLL, Senate Liaison.

(f) Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger,
3 Jan 90.

(g) Senator Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO), 4-5 Jan 90. In his official party were: (30 U.S. Congressmen) Norman D. Dicks (D-WA), Les Aspin (D-WI), Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN), Dave McCurdy (D-OK), Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-WI), Gerry E. Studds (D-MA), Roy Dyson (D-MD), Don Edwards (D-CA), Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), Mary Rose Oaker (D-OH), Mickey Edwards (R-OK), Bob Livingston (R-LA), John Kasich (R-OH), Toby Roth (R-WI), Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), Henry J. Hyde (R-IL), Larry Combest (R-TX), William H. Gray III (D-PA), Kika de la Garza (D-TX), Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Claudine Schneider (R-RI), David Obrien Maran (R-NY)

(h) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell, USA, 4-5 Jan 90. In his party were: LTG Tom Kelly, USA, Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff; BG Tom Whie, USA, Executive Assistant to the Chairman, JCS; RADM Edward (Ted) D. Sheaffer, Jr., USN, Director, Joint Support, DIA; Colonel Bill Smullen, USA, CJCS PAO; Major Colin Mayo, USMC, Aide to CHCS; TSgt Arnold Rowe, USAF, Communicator for CJCS; Mr. Fred Francis, NBC Pentagon Correspondent; Ms. Naomi Spinrod, NBC Producer.

(i) U.S. Army Chief of Public Affairs Major General Patrick H. Brady, 4-6 Jan 90. In his party were: LTC (P) George H. Stinnett, SGM Jack Hooper.

(j) Chief, U.S. Army Reserve Major General William Ward, 4-6 Jan 90. He came on MG Brady's aircraft.

(k) Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), 7-8 Jan 90. In his official party were: Mr. Robert Dockery, Sr. Foreign Policy Advisor; Ms. Janice O'Connell, Professional Staff Member; LTC Gammon, OCLL, Senate Liaison.

(l) CINC, U.S. Forces Command, General Edwin H. Burba, USA, 8-9 Jan 90. In his party were: MG Jerry A. White, FORSCOM J-3; LTC Nahrwold, Aide de Camp; CSM Beach, FORSCOM CSM; Communications Representative.

(m) Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), 19-22 Jan 90. In his official party were: Mr. Morgan Hardiman, Minority Staff Director, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control; Mr. Gary Sogka, Senate Intelligence Committee Staff, Ms Zenia Mucha, Press Secretary; COL Gary Bourne, USA, Military Escort.

(n) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Stephen M. Duncan, 19-21 Jan 90. In his official party were: BG Carl E. Morin, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Training; COL Andrew Finlayson, USMC, Military Executive; MAJ David Super, ARNG, DoD Public Affairs Officer; Mr. David Wood, Newhouse News Service.

(o) Vice President Dan Quayle, 27-29 Jan 90.

(2) ISSUES:

(a) Problems with itineraries, and schedules, i.e., rapid changes and missed media coverage opportunities

(b) Problems with press conferences

(3) Issue: Not enough attention was given to the inclusion of media and photo opportunities, or the timing of press conferences during the development of itineraries for CODELS and VIPs.

General Summary: Itineraries for CODELS and VIPs were developed without enough thought, in some instances, given to the CODELS desires for media coverage. Photo and interview opportunities were set up at specific locations or events according to the established itineraries. Invariably, as soon as the official party was on the move, the itinerary would change. Events would be cancelled or moved ahead as much as two hours. Predetermined locations for interviews or photo opportunities were passed by or cancelled. PA escort officers were constantly scrambling to find a location to "ambush" the official party for a media opportunity. This was disconcerting to the CODELS and the press because both wanted the coverage. Itinerary planners and security personnel would not bow to the merits of having a media pool accompany certain VIPs or CODELS, to insure thorough photo and video coverage.

Problem areas/lessons learned: Secretary Cheney's itinerary was completely changed on Christmas day. A military still photographer was allowed to accompany the official party from their breakfast with troops at Fort Amador throughout the day. Video cameramen were not permitted with the official party on any of the three helicopters used because one was to be kept as an instant backup should the Secretary's chopper become disabled. (If the chopper had developed problems, these personnel could have been left at the site and picked up later.)

The scheduled stop at Gorgas Hospital to visit wounded was cancelled because all battle-wounded personnel had already been evacuated to Kelly AFB.

The official party then proceeded to Rio Hato, Colon and Paitilla Airfield by helicopter. These would have been outstanding opportunities for video coverage, had either civilian or military media been allowed to accompany the official party.

The official party then went to the Foreign Ministry to meet President Endara (another missed opportunity) and then to a press conference at the Quarry Heights Officers' Club. This went very well.

The CODEL visit of Senators Nunn, Warner and Robb was another example of the futility of trying to "ambush" the official party at predesignated locations on their itinerary. News media were staged at the Comandancia where the official party was to get a walking tour. In order to make up time and get to the Presidential Palace for a meeting with President Endara, the decision was made to skip the Comandancia. Media and PA escorts watched the official party drive by; at which time media reps ran to their cars to catch up with the official party at the Palace.

On Wednesday, 3 January, it was the news media that the Nunn-Warner itinerary. ABC requested that Senators Nunn and Warner be interviewed on tape for "Good Morning America". NBC then wanted them for a live feed on "The Today Show". Ultimately CBS and CNN wanted to interview them as well. The four networks got together and agreed to conduct their interviews using an ABC pool camera, during 20 minute increments from 0630 to 0730. This would make the Senators only a few minutes late for their scheduled working breakfast. Technical difficulties blamed on the satellites and technicians in New York delayed the process over an hour. Only two of the four networks - CBS and NBC were successful in airing their interviews. Ironically, ABC, the network that started the whole thing, came away with nothing.

ABC and CNN were to interview Senators Warner and Robb the next morning (4 Jan 90). However, the announcement that Noriega had surrendered to U.S. authorities caused ABC to cancel the interview. Senators Warner and Robb went to the Media Center at the Holiday Inn that morning, where they did a CNN interview and two others.

The CODEL visit of Senator Gephardt and his delegation had several successful media opportunities primarily because the delegation insisted upon them. They demanded a press conference upon their arrival at Tocumen Airport. Primary responsibility for this fell on SCPA, despite the fact that this was a Congressional delegation arriving at a civilian airport. USIS did provide an escort officer for the media that were transported to the airport to cover the event.

Press was on hand for the briefing by the 82d Division commander and Ranger battalion commander on the seizure of the airfield. The military briefers intended to provide the delegation with a classified briefing. However, they modified it because the CODELs wanted the press coverage opportunity.

The delegation then traveled by helicopters to Rio Hato for more briefings. If a C-130 had been used instead of UH-60's, a media pool could have accompanied the Congressmen--another missed opportunity.

Several members of the delegation wanted to set up their own media opportunities. Sen. Gephardt kept this in check, however. Although not originally scheduled, SCPA created additional photo opportunities for the CODELS when they met with the Ambassador and President Endara. A bus load of media were taken to the Ancon DNTT for a photo opportunity of the CODEL meeting with VP Calderon and Public Forces leaders. And yet another opportunity was offered to news media for coverage of the CODEL round robin visit to the Refugee Center at Balboa High School. A final press conference was changed from Fort Clayton, at the last minute, to Howard AFB. It went well.

Conclusion:

More attention must be given to media opportunities and timing of press conferences during the planning of CODEL and VIP itineraries. A media pool or military media pool should be considered for inclusion in the official party so that full coverage of the visit can be accomplished and avoid having to "ambush" CODELS and VIPs along their itinerary route.

(4) Issue: Problems with CODEL and VIP press conferences included:

(a) Some press conferences were scheduled so late in the day that it would not make the evening news programs, and thus negate the impact of what the principal had to say.

(b) Events forced some press conferences to be put together very hastily, presenting problems getting word to the media.

(c) Some were not as highly attended because of a breaking news story or the fact that so many stories were active at certain times that participation in a particular press conference would be limited.

General Summary: Press conferences for the CODELS and VIPs all went well, despite unplanned events. Secretary Cheney's initial press conference upon arriving in Panama was usurped by General Thurman's announcement of Noriega turning up at the Papal Nunciatura. Members of the press literally ran to their vehicles to get to the scene. Six bus loads of news media were quickly reduced to one.

Senator Gephardt's delegation and General Powell were scheduled so late in the day that extraordinary measures had to be taken to insure coverage on the evening network news programs. In fact, SCPA had to convince itinerary planners that these two press conferences could not be scheduled at the same time and location. A helicopter was arranged to fly the videotape from Howard AFB to the downtown Holiday Inn media center after each press conference to insure that

General Powell's assessment of the Panama situation and that of the Congressional delegation made the evening news programs. The times for these press conferences were not coordinated initially with SCPA and had to be negotiated to earlier and separate hours.

The following is a summary of CODEL and VIP press conferences conducted:

Arthur Davis, U.S. Ambassador to Panama - Wednesday, 20 Dec 89, 2100-2130 at Howard AFB (Ambassador's return to Panama after 7 months absence)

General Maxwell R. Thurman, CINC - (1) Saturday, 23 Dec 89 1700-1740 at the Quarry Heights Media Center (2) Sunday, 24 Dec 89 1800-1815 at Quarry Heights Media Center (Announcement of Noriega at Papal Nuncio) (3) Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 2130-2200 at Holiday Inn Media Center (Details of Noriega surrender to U.S. authorities) (4) Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1130-1200 at the Tocumen Airport (Impromptu)

Jon Meyersohn, Producer CBS News - Saturday, 23 Dec 89 1830-1900 at the Quarry Heights Media Center (PDF hostage)

Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense - (1) Sunday, 24 Dec 89 1810-1840 at Howard AFB; (2) Monday, 25 Dec 89 1630-1700 at Quarry Heights Media Center

John P. Murtha (D-PA), U.S. Representative - Friday, 29 Dec 89 1300-1320 at Howard AFB

Sam Nunn (D-GA), John Warner (R-VA) and Charles S. Robb (D-VA) U.S. Senators - Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 1500-1530 at Howard AFB

Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State - Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 1700-1730 at the U.S. Embassy.

Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) U.S. Senator and Congressional Delegation- (1) Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1200-1230 at Tocumen Airport; (2) Friday, 5 Jan 90 1515-1600 at Howard AFB

Major General Marc Cisneros, USARSO Commander - Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1300-1330 at the Holiday Inn Media Center

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff - Friday, 5 Jan 90 1615-1645 at Howard AFB

Christopher A. Dodd (D-CT) U.S. Senator - Monday, 8 Jan 90 1545-1615 at Howard AFB

Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY) U.S. Senator - Sunday, 21 Jan 90 1500-1530 at USIS Library


Problem areas/lessons learned: The conduct of all the press conferences went well. The reason is that locations (i.e., the media centers and Howard Ops) were set up in advance, wired for sound, so that a press conference could be called with as little as 10 minutes notice. The primary lessons learned were to have the facilities ready, stay flexible and "go with the flow" as news events unfolded.

Conclusion: Between 20 December 1989 and 21 January 1990 SCPA coordinated and assisted 17 press conferences. In addition, there were press conferences conducted by Panamanian leaders in which SCPA informed the news media of and coordinated their transportation to insure coverage. The conduct of press conferences was a very successful part of the overall SCPA effort.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION

The organization of Public Affairs assets during operation Just Cause should have generally reflected the command relationship. The creation of JTF-South added a new layer in the Public Affairs community, therefore, the PAO for the XVIII Airborne Corps became the JTF-South PAO. The planned Public Affairs organization is illustrated graphically as follows:


PLANNED PA ORGANIZATION



The Southern Command Network, Tropic Times and Theater Support Element maintained their normal command relationships directly under the USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Office. With the formation of JTF-South, the component Public Affairs Offices of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines should have come under the direction of the JTF-South PAO. However, because of proximity and the reluctance to force new relationships during a crisis situation, this did not happen.

The PA organization which functioned in practice was as follows:

ACTUAL PA ORGANIZATION



In retrospect, this was a cumbersome organization as SCPA was not able to communicate with component PAs because of the continual press of business. This severely hampered the operation of at least two of the components (Marines and Navy) because they were consistently out of the loop.

For example, the NAVSO PA never had any contact with the JTF-South PA and, in fact, did not even know there was ever such an organization until D + 30. This was obviously a major failing in communications, exacerbated by an inexperienced junior officer at NAVSO and possible lack of command support within her own chain of command. (It should also be pointed out that she was a recent DINFOS graduate and felt that there was no preparation for combat public affairs organization, requirements, etc.)

The component mission was also degraded because the USARSO PA, essentially designed to function as the deputy JTF-South PA, as well as Army component PA, never firmly established a chain of command for the components.

The PAO for the 82nd Airborne Division deployed with the initial force and the PAO for the 7th Infantry Division (Light) arrived in-country soon afterward. Both integrated easily into the PA organization and contributed significantly to the overall PA success. The PAO for the 5th Mech never deployed, nor did any PA assets from his staff. In fact, no communication was ever received from the 5th Mech PA.

A request from USSOUTHCOM to JCS for PA augmentation resulted in the deployment of the 11th PAD from Ft. Polk. The augmentation request was for three officers and three NCOs. The 11th PAD deployed with one officer and three enlisted (E-4 and below).

The fact that the 11th PAD was selected to deploy created some confusion on the part of the 5th Mech insofar as the commander thought the PAD was a 5th Mech asset, which it was not.

Problem areas in organization were:

(a) Proximity: JTF-South fell in on the U.S. Army South organization--i.e., they shared the same facilities at Ft. Clayton and in many cases integrated their staffs. The Air Force, Navy and Marines, on the other hand, were located on the opposite side of the Canal.

(b) Service Unique: The largest portion of the JTF-South Force was Army and the JTF-South headquarters element (XVIII Airborne Corps) was Army. (All other components expressed in their after action reports a strong feeling that their services were overshadowed.)

c) Normal Relationships: Because of the numerous PA "crisis events" during the course of the past years, effective working relationships have been established between the component PAs and USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs. These relationships involve knowing the facilities, capabilities, manpower resources, etc. Furthermore, the OIC of the Media Center routinely set up media opportunities with the component PAs without going through JTF-South. This relationship is a necessity; otherwise, JTF-South PAO would have been overwhelmed by the sheer volume of media requests.

PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED:

a) Operational headquarters/PA headquarters:

The operational headquarters for JUST CAUSE was JTF-South, located at Ft. Clayton. The Public Affairs headquarters (and Media Center) was USSOUTHCOM PAO at Quarry Heights.

During the first three days of the operation, this functioned extremely well. SCPA had direct access to the CINC and SOUTHCOM CAT, both of which had immediate access to needed information. Clearance on releases was achieved quickly. Notification of important events/incidents, etc., was instantaneous.

Public Affairs was also able to maintain a full-time presence in the CAT and SCPA was able to serve as "an enlightened spokesman."

The CINC then moved from Quarry Heights to collocate himself with JTF-South when Noriega sought refuge at the Papal Nunciature. The CINC's move to Ft. Clayton had the effect of removing the SOUTHCOM CAT (and SCPA) from the information loop. The SOUTHCOM Public Affairs Office, however, still remained the single point of contact for responding to queries from OSD/PA and JCS/PA; the Media Center (whose task it was to respond to the hundreds of queries received from the more than 800 media in country); the AmEmbassy, who used Public Affairs channels as their primary means of keeping informed about the operation; and hundreds of media queries from CONUS filed directly with SCPA.

The vast majority of these queries had to be answered by JTF-South since the USSOUTHCOM CAT was not kept up-to-date. Lack of support from the Army component made this effort difficult. This situation resulted in an unnecessary, excessive, built-in time lag, far less responsive to SOUTHCOM requests than was desirable.

b) 24-Hour operation: Throughout the crisis period, 24-hour-a-day operation was essential for all public affairs activities. The USSOUTHCOM PA Office, the Media Center, the sub-Media Center, the Southern Command Network and the Air Force Public Affairs Office all

operated on a 24-hour basis from D -1 on. The U.S. Army South Public Affairs office apparently never assumed a 24-hour posture. Additionally, they focused on CI almost exclusively, except in response to SOUTHCOM queries.

The JTF-South PA tried to stay receptive to all PA requirements, but was without the appropriate support from the USARSO PA staff, especially at night. This created numerous problems for the PA operation. Much of the coordination for the next day's media opportunities had to be done at night. Also, responses to media queries are, by necessity, worked 24 hours a day. Both of these vital PA actions were often at a standstill due to the fact that the U.S. Army South PA office did not conduct 24-hour operations. Although requested to do so by the director of SCPA, this never happened.

In hindsight, early on, there should have been either a meeting or preparation of a document to articulate specific taskings and responsibilities. The press of combat, the massive influx of media and the support of the media pool precluded that. However, it should have happened!

REPORTING THE NUMBERS

During an operation like Just Cause, there are many "things" to count and media like to track all of them. It then becomes the task of the PA to accurately track all these "things" and report them on a daily basis to both the media and to OASD-PA. The task seems to be a simple one--take the figures reported in the daily sitrep and provide them to the media. Some of the areas in Just Cause were:

- U.S. military killed in action
- U.S. military wounded in Action
- U.S. civilian dead
- U.S. civilian wounded
- U.S. civilian missing
- Enemy KIA (PDF & Dignity Battalion members)
- Enemy WIA
- Panamanian civilian dead
- Panamanian civilian wounded
- Enemy captured (Detainees)
 - PDF
 - Dignity Battalion
 - Black list personnel
 - Detainees processed
 - Detainees released
 - Detainees repatriated
 - Number of refugees (total)
 - Number of refugees (total processed)
 - Number of refugees current
 - Number of meals provided
 - Number of weapons captured by type
 - Number of weapons turned in under cash for weapons program
 - Dollars spent on cash for weapons program
 - Ammunition and explosives captured
 - Disposition of weapons
 - Humanitarian aid
 - Number of U.S. troops in country

However, the numbers reported in the daily sitrep were invariably 24 hours old and depending on whose sitrep was being read, JTF-South or USSOUTHCOM, the numbers were different. Generally the reporting of U.S. military KIA and WIA was accurate and easy to track. Other problems in the accounting process, however, raised serious questions about the procedures for counting important statistics.

PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED:

a) Civilian casualties: The counting of civilian casualties presented the immediate problem of defining the term "civilian." Many of the enemy force personnel were members of the Dignity Battalion (Digbat), which were an armed civilian militia. Should

these casualties be counted as military or civilian? And, how are Digbats identified? Also, it is known that a number of PDF soldiers were caught wearing civilian clothes. Differentiating between military and civilian casualties was a subjective process at best.

Civilian casualties also implies that these were casualties from U.S. forces action. This is impossible to determine and, in many cases, is not true. Following the invasion, there was widespread looting in Panama City and many property owners took arms to defend their homes and businesses. How many of the civilian dead were killed as looters, by looters, by fleeing PDF or Dignity Battalions, or by U.S. action? It is impossible to say.

The process of obtaining a civilian casualty figure that could be agreed upon was difficult and involved dealing with a multitude of Panamanian government agencies, the International Red Cross, etc.

In most conflicts, reporting "enemy" losses is not the responsibility of the friendly forces. The "political" nature of this conflict, exacerbated by the "attacks" of Ramsey Clark and Jesse Jackson, necessitated close scrutiny.

The number of weapons captured would seem to be a pretty clean statistic. Weapons are identifiable, they are relatively easy to count, they have serial numbers, etc. This proved not to be the case. The number of weapons captured was reported on a daily basis to the media based on the numbers in the sitrep. With each new weapons cache found, the number rose. Numbers were always represented in the sitrep as exact, i.e., 34,564 weapons, not in round figure estimates.

However, it was later learned that the initial numbers (that is up through D + 20) were only battlefield estimates. The actual, final count was thousands less than what had been reported to the media all along.

No numbers should ever be reported to the media as exact numbers. Enemy casualties could be termed as light/heavy or approximately or less than, etc. Weapons captured should be offered as approximate numbers because the system is just not precise enough to provide accurate numbers. Redeployment figures should be approximates.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Due to the nature of the Panama invasion, women soldiers quickly found themselves in the "front line" of the conflict doing battle with the enemy. In fact, there were no "front lines" during the hostilities. What was considered to be a relatively secure area one minute would come under sniper or mortar fire the next. These circumstances placed women soldiers, for the first time, in direct contact with enemy forces. This fact, coupled with an inaccurate article concerning one such incident (Atch A) triggered a media "feeding frenzy" on the subject of women in combat. This frenzy created a number of problems for the command and for public affairs.

The subjects of the media interest, i.e., women soldiers, were generally unwilling to be singled out; their commanders indicated that the media attention was having a detrimental effect on the unit, and soldiers, in general, resented the special attention focussed on a single group within the unit. Guidance from DOD and DA, on the other hand, was "to be as responsive as possible to the media."

The following is a chronology of events surrounding the issue:

- a) 1 Jan 1990 - After receiving several media requests to interview female soldiers, the Media Center announced a media opportunity to interview eight female soldiers and posted a sign-up sheet. Four reporters showed up for the interview. Capt. Linda Bray, an MP company commander, was one of the eight female soldiers interviewed.
- b) 2 Jan 1990 - An article was published in the Washington Times "Army Women Went Into Panama with Weapons -- and Used Them," by Peter Copeland. This article started the media frenzy on the general subject of women in combat and on Capt. Linda Bray specifically. The article was based on an interview which Copeland states was independently conducted by himself when he found Capt. Bray on his own. Capt. Bray has a list of all reporters she talked to and does not recall speaking to Copeland. Copeland's article portrayed Capt. Bray as a company commander leading the attack on an enemy facility where 3 enemy dead were later found. The story contained a number of inaccuracies; the most significant of which was the discovery of 3 enemy dead on the objective. In reality, no dead were found and there were no injuries on either side. (The problem was multiplied when a White House spokesman used this press account as factual, only later forced to recant.)
- c) 3-9 Jan - Media Center received numerous media requests to interview Capt. Bray.
- d) 4 Jan - USSOUTHCOM PA prepared an accurate release on the story of Capt. Bray and faxed to OASD-PA for the press brief.

e) 4 Jan - Secretary of the Army's office called to confirm that the SOUTHCOM release, which does not mention PDF dead, is correct. This was again verified directly with Capt. Bray and provided to the Secretary of the Army's office.

f) 6 Jan - The Los Angeles Times reported that the earlier account of Capt. Bray's actions were exaggerated and that no PDF dead were found.

g) 8 Jan - A New York Times article entitled "Female Captain's Role is called into Question," by Philip Shabecof, stated that

"Today an Army Spokesman in Panama, Col James C. Swank, said Captain Bray and all other female officers are currently unavailable for comment until authorized by the Secretary of the Army."

This statement resulted in a call from the Secretary of the Army's office. LTC Swank, OIC of the Media Center, did not make such a statement. The policy of this command at the time, was that Capt. Bray, who had already conducted media interviews, was not currently available. As an MP company commander, she was in the field with her troops, doing her job. It was unfair both to her and to her unit to pull her out for interviews at that time. It was further stated to the networks, who were requesting Capt. Bray for morning talk shows, that while she was not available now, she would be available later in the week and would satisfy the talk shows request at that time.

h) 10 Jan - Capt. Linda Bray was interviewed by all four morning talk shows (two live and two as thirty-minute delay.) This action satisfied the networks and reduced the media interest considerably insofar as Capt. Bray dispelled the myth concerning the 3 PDF dead, which for many was the story peg. Capt. Bray also indicated at this time that, if possible, she would like to just return to her job and not have any more interviews.

Both her battalion and brigade commanders echoed this request. Additionally, her battalion commander indicated that he did not want to make any more of his female soldiers available to the media on this subject because he believed that singling out the females was having an adverse impact on his unit.

While there was considerable media interest in the "women in combat" angle, the real "feeding frenzy" did not start until the initial article erroneously reported 3 PDF dead as a result of the action. This was not the only significant error in the story. The story also stated that the facilities were defended by "40 heavily armed troops." Capt. Bray had told the reporter that there were 40

beds at the facility, but she didn't know how many troops were there during the action. While the role of women in operation "Just Cause" was an item of media interest, it was sent out of control by an inaccurate account of one incident.

Once the initial stories reported the action resulting in three PDF dead, all four networks, together with numerous other media, wanted Capt. Linda Bray, even though she, together with eight other female soldiers, had already been made available by open invitation to the media previously (four reporters conducted interviews). Many were quick to criticize SOUTHCOM PA for not making her immediately available again. The SCPA position at this time was that Capt. Bray was in the field, with her troops, where a company commander should be and would be made available again later in the week. To do otherwise would have had an adverse impact on the operation of her unit.

Lessons Learned:

a) An interview should not be conducted without going through the proper PA channels, i.e., the Media Center, and without a PA representative present. This may not have totally precluded the inaccurate report, but would have assisted in correcting the problem more quickly with the correct story.

b) Certainly media needs are important, but of necessity, they must take second place behind operational concerns.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Exclusives?

Fred Francis, NBC, was allowed an "exclusive" opportunity to travel with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on his visit to the area of operations. Tom Donnelly, Army Times, was given the same exclusive with the Chief of Staff of the Army. It seems that this kind of preferential treatment into an area that already has representatives of both organizations (as well as 800+ others) might be counter to DOD's policy of non-exclusive treatment. SCPA received heated criticism locally since it had already established a solid policy of providing pool coverage of distinguished visitors (to include SECDEF, dozens of CODELs, etc). Suggest this issue be discussed and a policy be established.

There was also some concern on the part of commanders to give certain media personnel, e.g., Sam Donaldson, privileged treatment. SCPA worked hard to ensure equal (and privileged treatment) for all news media representatives. But there is a tendency to lean toward "heavies."

Operations vs PA

During the first several days of the hostilities, SCPA was literally swamped with operational-type requests/questions from ASD/PA. For example, they included: (a) initiate action to ascertain the whereabouts of missing CBS reporter Jon Meyersohn; (b) why aren't the "hostages" in the Marriott Hotel being rescued; and (c) what are the details surrounding the shooting of the Spanish journalist. While all of these, and the countless others, had some public affairs connections, the questions being asked were not necessarily in response to media queries, etc., but rather were operational questions asked at high political/business levels. During such an operation, the PA staff is essentially unable to maintain track of legitimate PA issues, let alone follow-up on operational issues. Recommend that some determination be made to differentiate between legitimate media queries and operational questions and direct questions appropriately.

Combat Photo Documentation

For the past two years, this AO has had extensive use of combat documentation teams. When originally deployed, at the direction of CINCSOUTH, they were placed under the operational control of SCPA as the Joint Audiovisual Detachment (JAV-DET). The mission was clearly defined, in priority order, as (a) photo documentation; (b) command information; and (c) where appropriate, public information (i.e., unclassified copies were provided to the media where it supported the CINC's objectives). This concept worked exceedingly well. Several months ago, it was decided, via memorandum of agreement, that the JAV-DET would be opcon to JTF-P so that it had direct operational control. Although it severely degraded (b) and (c) above, SCPA accepted the change. At D + 1, JAV-DET was directed to not provide copies of their products to anyone within command or public information channels. This was a major setback to SOUTHCOM efforts. SCPA has previously provided extensive after action reports/lessons learned on deployment of the JAV-DET. Suggest a review of the issue.

Mail, Hamburgers, and the Marriott Hotel

The public affairs office frequently finds itself involved in a variety of non-PA issues, simply for lack of ownership elsewhere. In such a combat operation, that needs to be minimized. Two of the most notable during Just Cause were mail lift and the distribution of White Castle hamburgers.

We accepted initial responsibility for processing and distributing mail sent from the States to soldiers involved in Just Cause. Thousands of letters and many packages began arriving 24 Dec 89. (Stateside news-wire services and radio stations for some reason announced the address of USSOUTHCOM PAO as the point of contact in sending goodwill mail.) This office arranged for various media opportunities covering receiving and distribution. (ABC videotaped the first shipment.) SCN and Tropic Times also provided appropriate coverage. SCN also was prepared to provide videotapes for interested media.

White Castle also attempted to deliver more than 10,000 hamburgers to deployed troops--as a goodwill gesture, as well as publicity stunt. We managed to deflect the initial planning, coordinating, etc., to the J-4, but component PAs (especially Army and Marines) ended up working the issue.

A third time-consuming issue that was gratuitously passed from the Pentagon to SCPA was efforts to reopen the Marriott Hotel. We received dozens of calls directly from the Marriott to help restore its operation. On one occasion, word was passed to release the 20+ Marriott employees being held at the Howard AFB refugee center so they could return to work. They were brought to the media center and SCPA was presented another challenge--getting the employees back to their homes.

Commanders should make every effort to free up PAs to do PA business.



USSOUTHCOM



United States Southern Command

Public Affairs

AFTER ACTION

Report **Supplement**

"OPERATION JUST CAUSE"



Dec. 20, 1989 - Jan. 31, 1990

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SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD(CPA):DPL//

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCPA//

SUBJECT: MEDIA OPERATIONS

1. BY DIRECTION OF SECDEF, THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WILL BE DEPLOYED TO ACCOMPANY U.S. FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN PANAMA.
2. THE POOL, CONSISTING OF 14 PERSONNEL WITH DEPART ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE AT 2300 EST AND WILL ARRIVE IN PANAMA AT APPROX 0330, 20 DEC. COLONEL PETER ALEXANDRAKOS, USAF, COMMANDER DAVID THOMAS, USN, AND LCDR KEN SATTERFIELD, USN, WILL SERVE AS ESCORT OFFICERS FOR THE POOL.
3. USCINCSO WILL SUPPORT MEDIA POOL ACTIVITIES TO ENABLE COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES IN THE THEATRE TO INCLUDE DEPLOYING MEDIA POOL MEMBERS WITH U.S. FORCES TO COVER VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF THE OPERATION, REASSEMBLING THE POOL PERIODICALLY TO FILE THEIR STORIES, AND PROVIDING RESOURCES TO GET MEDIA PRODUCTS BACK TO THE UNITED STATES IN A TIMELY MANNER. USCINCSO WILL BE RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

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ACTIVITIES OCCURRING IN THEATER.

4. AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS LINKS FROM PANAMA TO THE U.S. IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. THEREFORE, TO FACILITATE REPORTING, CINCSO PA MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE PRIORITY COMMUNICATIONS {MESSAGE, VOICE AND DATA} TO MOVE MEDIA REPORTS UNTIL CIVILIAN MEANS ARE ADEQUATELY AVAILABLE. PLANS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRANSMIT POOL REPORTS ASAP, BUT NO LATER THAN TWO HOURS AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS. MESSAGE PRECEDENCE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO ENSURE THIS OCCURS.

5. IF MESSAGE TRAFFIC IS USED TO TRANSMIT MEDIA REPORTS, MESSAGES SHOULD BE SENT TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:PA// NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED, WITH A SUBJECT LINE OF MEDIA POOL REPORT NUMBER {SUPPLY SEQUENTIAL NUMBER}.

6. USCINCSO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE PRIORITY AIRLIFT TO MOVE MEDIA PRODUCTS, VIDEO, ETC., OUT OF COUNTRY. FURTHER, PLANS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO FACILITATE ARRIVAL AND SETUP OF U.S. MEDIA SATELLITE UPLINK EQUIPMENT.

7. REQUEST USCINCSO PA IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL PA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION AND NOTIFY OASD{PA} BY MESSAGE OR

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SECURE PHONE ASAP. ALSO, REQUEST UPDATE ON PRESENT PLANS FOR OBTAIN-
ING PHOTO DOCUMENTATION OF PLANNED OPERATION.

8. DOD PA POC FOR THIS ACTION IS MAJ SHELLEY ROGERS, USMC,
COMM (202) 697-1254, AV 227-1254.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

19 Dec 89

SUBJECT: DoD Media Pool Travel Authorization and Orders No. 89-02

TO: Individuals Concerned

The Secretary of Defense authorizes and invites the individuals identified on the attached listing to travel aboard military conveyance, including air, sea and ground transportation, during the period 19 thru 25 Dec 89 for the purpose of gathering information for publication or broadcast. This travel is primarily of official concern to the Department of Defense, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and meets the criteria of DoD Directive 5122.8 for use of military carriers for public affairs purposes.

Travel by military transportation is directed and no fare will be assessed. All other expenses incurred as a result of these orders will be borne by the individuals named. Access to flight deck during non-critical phases of flight is authorized at discretion of the aircraft commander. All safety regulations will be strictly observed. HQ MAC/DOXT has waived portions of AFR 60-16, MACR 55-130, and MACR 55-141 to permit named individuals aboard MAC aircraft during tactical missions.

News media representatives are granted mission essential ground personnel (M&GP) status in accordance with HQ MAC message 022300Z Dec 88.

This is a non-revenue mission.

These orders do not constitute authorization for access to classified information or to enter classified military areas. Aircraft commanders must be advised of the contents of these orders.

REQUESTED:

Peter Alexandrakos
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Director for Plans

APPROVED:

Robert W. Taylor
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs)

Attachment:
As stated

NAME	SSN	ORGANIZATION
MULERA, John H. CH	330-32-2168	NBC TV
BASCOM, Jon CH	440-46-4543	ABC TV Radio
FRANCIS, Fred CH	267-70-3787	NBC TV
BROWN, Edgar W., Jr. CH	577-66-6246	NBC TV
KEARNS, Robert M. QH #5	053-26-3796	Reuters
KUHN, Steve J. QH #8	106-54-6293	NBC TV
LEVIN, Alan C. QH #9	212-44-1848	NBC TV
JOHNSON, Cynthia QH #6	300-38-3581	TIME Magazine
MENDELSON, Matthew QH #5	079-58-2098	UPI
AUBRY, Timothy R. CH	283-56-3197	Reuters
THOMPSON, Dick CH	054-36-5480	TIME Magazine
CLAYTON, William E., Jr. CH	462-54-0961	Houston Chronicle
KOMAROW, Steven QH #8	045-54-5184	AP
LEWIS, Katharine QH #6	493-54-4800	Houston Post
APPLEWHITE, Scott CH	407-76-1904	AP
MERIDA, Kevin CH CMDR Thomas #9	577-78-7757	Dallas Morning News

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 PL3D TO act

one - Ted has some QH instead of C.H. "
 5653

for 3/26-28
 1 day

QH rooms: 5, 6, 8 & 9
 1 MAKE each

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APO MIAMI 34003-0176 0201

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
DOD MEDIA POOL ACTIVITIES (U)

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) The DOD Media Pool was established to accord media the opportunity to cover certain military contingencies that they might otherwise be excluded from coverage because of security considerations. Today's media are highly competitive and extremely mobile and can be counted upon to find their way to the scene of a military operation quickly, once it becomes known. In the ~~GRENADE~~ operation "Urgent Fury", the joint information bureau, established at ~~BARBADOS~~, had over 700 individual's claiming to be reporters request accreditation during the first 24 hours of the operation. That experience serves to emphasize the situation that public affairs officers and commanders may have to deal with during future contingencies.

b. (U) When operational security is the primary consideration during the planning and initiation of a contingency operation, use of DOD National Media Pool will be considered. The DOD Pool would normally be used until open coverage of the operation is established. At that time the Pool would be disbanded and would either return to Washington or remain and cover the operation as part of the general media. DOD may also consider lack of access to the theater by other means as consideration for pool deployment.

c. (U) The DOD Media Pool when deployed is an official DOD sponsored group and is considered part of an exercise or contingency operation.

2. (U) MISSION. Provide logistical and administrative support and arrangements to insure adequate, prompt and accurate coverage of US military activities to the American public consistent with operational security and troop safety.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of Operation

(1) (U) Sequence of Events

(a) (U) Notification and Deployment. A decision on deployment is made at DOD and call-out of the Media Pool in Washington will be accomplished by the DOD national media pool coordinator, and the pool size and call-out time will be based on transportation and OPSEC considerations.

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(b) (U) Arrival and Activities. The arrival of the media pool in the operational area will normally be timed to enable poolers to be briefed on the upcoming operation, then to deploy (scatter) throughout the force in order to provide balanced coverage of the operation and will have sufficient extra time built in to allow for potential minor delays in the itinerary.

(c) (U) Reassembly. Once the pool has covered the initial event, it will need to be reassembled so pool members can consolidate and file their stories. Then the pool should be returned to the operational area to repeat this cycle as often as necessary until open coverage can be established.

(d) (U) Departure. Pool members will return to point of origin with their DOD host unless prior arrangements are made for further activity.

(2) (U) Provisions of Annex F to this plan apply as appropriate to execution of the DOD Media Pool. For purposes of this appendix, the on-site-commander (OSC) will be CJTFSO.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) OASD-PA

(a) (U) Establish general ground rules for the pool which are listed at TAB A to this appendix. Also general ground rules for media at Appendix 3 to Annex F of this plan will apply. Specific ground rules for on-site activities may be established by the OSC and disseminated to pool members on arrival or in advance through OASD-PA.

(b) (U) Notification/assembly/deployment using the checklist at TAB B to this appendix.

(c) (U) Notify pool members to have essential items to include luggage, clothing, toilet articles, sleeping gear, passports, money, immunizations, medicines as delineated at TAB C to this appendix.

(d) (U) Brief and check pool members for essential items at airport using the checklist and associated forms at TAB D to this Appendix.

(e) (U) Assign an escort officer and assistance to monitor operations.

(f) (U) Initiate a message to sponsoring command which delineates names and composition of the pool, instructions for message format and

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addressees for pool reports and other information as appropriate such as expected time of travel.

(g) (U) Receipt of products of pool.

(h) (U) Inter-theatre transportation.

(i) (U) Providing general OPSEC guidelines to pool members as described at TAB E to this appendix.

(2) (U) USCINCSO

(a) (U) Notify the OSC of impending pool deployment.

(b) (U) Coordinate with OSC to establish communications procedures to insure prompt transmission of pool products.

(c) (U) Assign a senior officer to escort the pool to further assist in coordination with subordinate commands.

(d) (U) On coordination with the OSC provide any additional clothing and equipment necessary, e.g., mosquito netting, web gear and canteens, ponchos, and water purification tablets.

(e) (U) Coordinate with the OSC to insure arrangement of intra-theatre and on-site transportation.

(3) (U) OSC

(a) (U) Be prepared for the requirement to transport pool members to sites of activity for coverage. The normal size of the pool is 12, and two DOD military escorts and one SOUTHCOM escort. Pools may have women Pool members and will generally be comprised of the following:

1 (U) One wire service reporter and one wire service photographer.

2 (U) One Pentagon press reporter.

3 (U) One reporter and one photographer from a national weekly magazine.

4 (U) One network TV team; reporter, cameraman, soundman.

5 (U) One network radio reporter.

6 (U) Two national daily reporters.

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7 (U) An additional weekly magazine reporter.

(b) (U) Accordingly, the OSC must be prepared for transportation of personnel and equipment as well as security of equipment both on site where pool members may have residual items left in vehicles or aircraft and/or at the base camp, rear area, where luggage and other equipment may remain.

(c) (U) Be prepared for the electronic transmission of three 600-800 word media pool messages with an immediate precedence at the beginning of the operation for exercises, one filing of three messages is normal. For actual contingency operations, the requirements will vary depending upon the availability of adequate civilian communications and the period of time the pool is in-theatre. Movement of other media products (video/audio tapes, exposed film, etc.) is also critical and the OSC should be prepared to provide for rapid movement of those products to the nearest secure area where the DOD Media Pool coordinator will arrange for its pick-up by the participating bureaus.

(d) (U) Be prepared to establish a Press Center where pool and escorts will receive an actual briefing on the operation of the exercise, store equipment if necessary, and have access to communications for filing of stories. The Press Center should have equipment or access to facilities as listed in TAB F to this appendix.

(e) (U) Be prepared to host pool members who by prior arrangement remain under the sponsorship of the theatre command or to arrange for hosting by appropriate subordinate/lateral commands.

(f) (U) Coordinate with appropriate commanders to insure availability of briefers and information for the pool.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. See Annex F, Annex J.

4. (U) ACCREDITATION. See Annex F and TAB D to this appendix.

5. (U) WISP. See Annex F.

6. (U) ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB F to this appendix.

7. (U) SECURITY. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB F to this appendix.

8. (U) AUDIOVISUAL. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB F to this appendix.

9. (U) INTERNAL AUDIENCE. To the extent feasible, coverage and documentation of pool activities will be captured for use in internal publications.

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10. (U) TRANSPORTATION. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB F to this appendix.
11. (U) COMMUNITY RELATIONS. See Annex F.

Tabs:

- A - Ground Rules
- B - Notification/Assembly/Deployment Checklist
- C - Memorandum for Bureau Chiefs
- D - Application for DOD Accreditation/Airport Checklist/Media Pool Questionnaire/Waiver of Liability
- E - OPSEC Guidance for Media Pool
- F - USSOUTHCOM Checklist for DOD Media Pool Operations

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
NOTIFICATION/ASSEMBLY/DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST (U)

- _____ Bureau Chiefs notified
- _____ Reception area ready (coffee, snacks, typewriters, etc)
- _____ Area checked for security problems (phones, people)
- _____ Gate guards briefed
- _____ Parking lot guides in place
- _____ Collect pool members at parking lot
- _____ Secure vehicles
- _____ Record names and license number on vehicle registration form
- _____ Escort/direct personnel into briefing/holding area
- _____ Serve refreshments
- _____ Fill out forms as time permits
- _____ Brief all participants (use briefing checklist)

- _____ Complete forms for each person
 - _____ Participants read Ground Rules
 - _____ Application for accreditation
 - _____ Invitational travel orders
 - _____ Waiver of Liability Agreement
 - _____ Media Pool Questionnaire
 - _____ Issue badges

- _____ Complete forms for escorts
 - _____ Invitational travel orders (for group)
 - _____ Manifest

- _____ Issue military gear
- _____ Collect for/issue inflight meals
- _____ Conduct aircraft safety briefing
- _____ Final toilet call before boarding
- _____ Contact OASD-PA before departure if appropriate
- _____ Final equipment accountability check
- _____ Load personnel on bus to transport to aircraft
- _____ Final check of room for gear before departure of bus
- _____ Load aircraft
- _____ Final check of bus for equipment
- _____ OK for aircraft to depart
- _____ Get actual departure times/proposed arrival time for aircraft and aircraft tail/flight numbers

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
MEMORANDUM FOR BUREAU CHIEFS (U)

SUBJECT: Essential Items List for Pool Reporters

Pool reporters will experience the same conditions as troops. We will provide purely military equipment such as canteens, web belts, ponchos, first aid kits, and any special gear required for extreme cold weather conditions. Pool members are responsible for the rest of their gear. Generally, this should be similar to what they would take on a backpacking trip to a remote area. Some examples are:

1. LUGGAGE: Easily portable gear, like a flight bag, is strongly recommended. A backpack is best. Poolers will need to carry all their own gear and equipment in the field, and the more mobility they have, the better.

2. CLOTHING: First, a well broken-in pair of lightweight hiking boots, with soles that won't slip on the wet deck of a ship or aircraft. Leather boots breathe better than man-made materials, and are more adaptable to different climates. Trousers should be of heavy cotton twill or denim material, so they do not tear easily. Shirts should be of similar material, and long-sleeved, for protection against sun and insect bites. A medium-weight windbreaker with waterproofing is necessary in nearly all climates. Polyester, or "double-knit" materials should never be used since they tear and snag easily, do not breathe, and can cause serious burns if they catch fire. A "floppy" wide-brimmed hat to protect against sun is also recommended.

3. TOILET EQUIPMENT: Reporters should bring their own towels, soap, shaving equipment, metal mirrors, etc. Extra toilet paper is useful--electric razors are not.

4. SLEEPING GEAR: A sleeping bag, rated for cold climates is needed.

5. MEDICAL/PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS:

a. Shots. Reporters must have immunizations current for travel worldwide; otherwise they are not deployable. Required shots and their duration are: Yellow Fever, 10 years; Cholera, 6 months; and Typhoid, 2 years. Shots which are not required, but recommended are Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Gamma Globulin (for protection against Hepatitis). Smallpox shots are no longer required. All immunizations should be documented on Public Health Service Form 731, "International Certificates of Vaccination as approved by the World Health

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Organization," which may be obtained through the Government Printing Office (cost \$0.10) or at any PHS clinic. The shots may be obtained by making an appointment through the George Washington University Hospital Traveller's Clinic, at 676-8466. Appointments may be made for Mondays, between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., or Wednesdays and Fridays, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. The cost per shot is \$15.00, with a \$15.00 office fee per visit. The Typhoid series requires two shots, taken four weeks apart. Public Health Service Clinics, which previously administered the shots for a nominal fee, were disestablished in 1982.

b. Other. Reporters should take a sufficient supply of any prescription medication, and should inform the pool officers of their medical condition upon reporting. Sending personnel whose condition could become serious or life-threatening if their medication was not administered properly is strongly discouraged. DOD cannot guarantee access to a pharmacy, if their supply of medication should run out, be lost or destroyed. Other recommended supplies are sunscreen, insect repellent and band-aids (for blisters).

6. PASSPORT: A valid US passport is an absolute requirement.

7. MISCELLANEOUS: Any equipment which your correspondent takes must be carried and supported by him. That support includes protective cases for transportation, batteries, cables, converters, etc. Since overseas telephones generally do not have modular jacks, an acoustic coupler for the modem on portable word processors is necessary if you intend to receive copy in that manner.

8. MONEY: Reporters should take funds sufficient to cover minimal expenses (such as messing aboard ship, purchase of field rations, use of a commercial long distance telephone exchange, etc.). It never hurts to bring extra, if the pool happens upon a local cafe, store, hotel, etc.

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
APPLICATION FOR DOD ACCREDITATION/AIRPORT CHECKLIST/MEDIA POOL QUESTIONNAIRE/
WAIVER OF LIABILITY (U)

APPLICATION FOR DOD ACCREDITATION

Last Name	First	MI	Nationality	Age
Employer	Address		Phone	Passport #
Business Phone	Home Phone	Length of Time with Employer		

Check Type of Media:

<input type="checkbox"/> Wire Service	<input type="checkbox"/> Newspaper	<input type="checkbox"/> Photo Service
<input type="checkbox"/> Radio	<input type="checkbox"/> News Service	<input type="checkbox"/> Freelance
<input type="checkbox"/> TV	<input type="checkbox"/> Magazine	<input type="checkbox"/> Other

In the event I am assigned to cover combat actions, I agree to abide by the rules governing public releases of military information and concerning access to the operational area. I understand that violation of the rules or failure to present credentials to military policy upon request may result in suspension or cancellation of my accreditation. I am also aware of my financial responsibilities in case of illness or injury that may require treatment in a US government medical facility.

Signature

Date

Card Number:

Date Issued:

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AIRPORT BRIEFING CHECKLIST FOR POOL

- _____ Collect pool members at operations center. Make sure all have arrived. Feed coffee and make comfortable.
- _____ Check passports and collect personal data for master list.
- _____ Welcome address. Introduce escorts. Emphasize importance of secrecy, that they will be briefed on operation on a as-we-go basis, and that you can't tell them about it now. They will need to read some paperwork and fill some forms out. Left-hand (loose) side is info and will be returned to DOD, right-hand (stapled) side are copies of what their bureau chiefs were briefed and the ground rules for the operation.
- _____ Have them read ground rules and briefing to their bureau chiefs. If there are any questions, tell them the rules are hard and fast. If anyone objects to going, they may decline, but must not tell anyone else in order to protect the security and safety of the operation, troops and the pool. Record objections and advise OASD-PA/Bureau Chiefs if anyone refuses.
- _____ Explain purpose and have them fill out and hold harmless agreement, with NOK data. DOD retains.
- _____ Explain purpose and have them fill out accreditation application. When complete, issue badge and record badge number on application. DOD retains application. Warn them to keep the badge safe at all times. They will be told to put it on when appropriate (in actual area of operations).
- _____ Check shot records to insure up to date.
- _____ Issue Invitation Travel Orders (ITOs). They must keep these for identification at all times.
- _____ Conduct safety briefing. Tell them they will be permitted to film in flight, provided conditions are VFR and that their equipment does not interfere with aircraft instruments.
- _____ Equipment issue.
- _____ Make them comfortable, inform OASD-PA if any unusual situations arise. Wait for aircraft.
- _____ Load into aircraft and depart.

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MEDIA POOL QUESTIONNAIRE

PERSONAL INFORMATION:

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

ORGANIZATION: _____

SOCIAL SECURITY NO: _____ DATE OF BIRTH: _____

PASSPORT PLACE/COUNTRY OF ISSUE: _____

PP DATE OF ISSUE: _____ CURRENT? YES NO

MEDICAL INFORMATION:

SHOTS: **REQUIRED** MUST BE DOCUMENTED ON PUB. HEALTH SVC. FORM #731.

YELLOW FEVER (10 HRS) MUST BE DATED AFTER: _____ YES NO

CHOLERA (6 MO) MUST BE DATED AFTER: _____ YES NO

TYPHOID (2 YRS) MUST BE DATED AFTER: _____ YES NO

SHOTS: **RECOMMENDED** (CHECK IF YOU HAVE)

DIPHTHERIA _____ SMALL POX _____ TETANUS _____ GAMMA GLOBULIN _____

OTHER MEDICAL INFORMATION:

AMPLE SUPPLY OF NEEDED MEDICINE? YES _____ N/A _____
ANY SPECIAL MEDICAL CONDITION/PROBLEMS? YES _____ NO _____ (IF YES SPECIFY
IN REMARKS)

PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT:

IS EQUIPMENT ADEQUATE? YES _____ NO _____

IS EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR OPERATIONAL CLIMATE/CONDITIONS? YES _____ NO _____

IS EQUIPMENT AS AGREED UPON WITH BUREAU CHIEFS? YES _____ NO _____

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT: (CHECK IF ON-HAND/SUITABLE. IF NOT COMMENT IN REMARKS.)

TOILET ARTICLES _____ WALKING SHOES _____ SLEEPING BAG _____
ARE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTABLE BY ONE PERSON? YES _____ NO _____

REMARKS:

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WAIVER OF LIABILITY FOR TRAVEL IN GOVERNMENT CONVEYANCE

Date: _____

WHEREBY, I _____ am about to embark as a passenger in certain Army, Navy, Marine Corps and/or Air Force conveyances, and whereas I am doing so entirely upon my own initiative, risk and responsibility; now, therefore in consideration of the permission extended to me by the United States, through its officers and agents to travel by said conveyance; I do hereby for myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators, remiss, release and forever discharge the Government of the United States and all its officers, agents and employ, acting officially or otherwise, from any and all claims, demands, actions or causes of action, on account of my death or on account of any injury to me or my property which may occur from any cause during said transportation, as well as all ground, flight or sea operations incident thereto.

(Signature)

(Witness)

Name, address and phone number of person to be notified in an emergency:
Name: _____ Phone: _____

Address: _____

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APO MIAMI 34003-0176 0201

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
GROUND RULES (U)

1. You have been selected to participate as member of the DOD media pool in an operation which you will be briefed on soon. The following ground rules will protect the security of the operation and the safety of the troops involved, while allowing you the greatest permissible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all US media.
2. You may not mention to anyone the fact that the pool has been activated.
3. You may not file stories, or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other material (film, sound bites, etc.) have been pooled with other media organizations. This pooling may take place at a briefing immediately following the operation, or by filing from military communications facilities. You will be expected to brief other members of the press concerning your experiences at this briefing. Detailed instructions on filing will be provided at a later briefing.
4. You must remain with the escort officers at all times, until released--and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting, and are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety.
5. Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool.
6. Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these guidelines and your willingness to abide by them.

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TAB E TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
OPSEC GUIDANCE FOR DOD MEDIA POOL (U)

D O:

Upon receiving a call that activates the DOD pool, have worked out in advance what you are to tell your family, friends and co-workers about your absence.

Drive yourself, take a taxi or use another transportation system to get to assembly point without getting anyone else involved with your departure.

Have your equipment, clothing and other material needed for the deployment, ready to go; but not in a place that would raise questions.

Have prearrangements made that will allow you to disappear with no significant disturbance in your work, neighborhood and family.

Think hard about things you do or say that might be out of the ordinary or give indications/signals that you are doing something unusual. Could a good investigative reporter determine something unusual was going on?

Keep the fact you have been called away on the pool secret. Lives depend on your ability to do this.

Follow the ground rules and instructions given you by your PAO escort.

D O N ' T:

Let your co-workers know you are in the DOD media pool.

Let the equipment you take with you give away that something "big" is going on.

Have a friend drive you to the assembly area.

Call home until allowed to do so by PAO escort.

Use the telephone to notify your headquarters that the pool has been called away.

Be concerned if the story of your deployment is released in Washington, D.C. because it normally will be done that way. Remember your pool report will be the first on-scene report with information about the planning phase.

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Let the clothes you pack signal where you are going. Have both warm and cold environment clothing in a location where they won't be missed.

Inadvertently talk about any information concerning your call-up, ultimate destination, etc.

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TAB F TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
USSOUTHCOM CHECKLIST FOR DOD MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS (U)

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Receipt of LIMDIS Warning Order/Message Addressees and formats and transmission to OSC. | DOD, SCPA |
| 2. Establish and test communications between USSOUTHCOM, OSC and DOD by voice (commercial and military) and message. Establish feasibility and/or procedures for collect calls. Consider and use facsimile machines if feasible. | SCPA, SCJ6
OSC, DOD |
| 3. Establish Press Center for Pool:
a. 4-5 typewriters (preferably electric to be tested in advance), paper, pencils.
b. Electrical outlets and extension cords to be tested in advance.
c. 4-5 tables, chairs for tables and for briefing area.
d. Access to telephone, message center facsimile machine and transportation facilities.
e. Secure facility for equipment.
f. Access to food, beverages (MREs are acceptable).
g. Access to rest area (cots, blanket, etc). | OSC |
| 4. Arrange intra-theatre transportation for pool members with backup. Time and recon routes. Plan for communications during transport and appropriate security/escort. | OSC |
| 5. Coordinate for briefings, briefers and associated equipment (map, charts, etc). | OSC |
| 6. Coordinate for security of pool equipment. | OSC |
| 7. Determine and arrange means for transmission of pool A/V products. | OSC ← |
| 8. Coordinate for customs and immigration and entry and exit procedures if required. | OSC |

UNCLASSIFIED

9. Coordinate with debark/embark location officials for entry/exit and pickup and delivery of pool members. OSC
10. Evaluate likelihood and/or implications of host country international or US media or representatives based in country. Coordinate with USIS. OSC
11. Consider in-country media representatives for handoff of A/V products. If used, coordinate for identification of those personnel, access to facilities and possible translator requirements. Arrange transportation if necessary. OSC
12. Arrange deployment of USSOUTHCOM public affairs representative. SCPA
13. Coordinate for message typing, location personnel, equipment. OSC
14. Arrange for foreign currency transactions and change. OSC
15. Determine local ground rules and arrange for distribution to pool on arrival or in advance by DOD; e.g., photography restrictions on flight lines, etc. OSC
16. Consider safety, OPSEC, A/V considerations (e.g., sunlight) for pool requirements. OSC
17. Consider and arrange if necessary billeting for pool members and food service arrangements. OSC

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PAGE 1 MLN=28186
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>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

OR = 242035Z DEC 89

TION = [SVC]SCPA(1)
INFO =

[SVC]TOTAL COPIES = 00001 MDC = 5004

RTSZ:DKW RUEKJCS2176 3570517-SSSS--RHLBAAA.
NY SSSSS
P 230303Z DEC 89
1 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:PA//
2 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCPA//
4 WFO RUEHQP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY
5 JEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS:PA//
6 JEHK/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
7 4CUAAA/USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
8 4CGSRB/FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
9

E C R E T

SUBJECT: MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS - JUST CAUSE (U)
REF PHONE CON ASD(PA) WILLIAMS AND COL SCONYERS, SCPA, 22 DEC 89.
(U) PER REF, THE DOD MEDIA POOL WILL TERMINATE OPERATIONS ON
R ABOUT 1200, 23 DEC 89. USSOUTHCOM WILL ESTABLISH A REGIONAL
EDIA POOL TO BE COMPOSED OF AVAILABLE LOCAL MEDIA AND MEDIA
4 WHICH HAVE ARRIVED AT YOUR LOCATION DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS.
(U) POOL COMPOSITION AND GROUND RULES WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY
5 SOUTHWESTCOM. SUGGEST FIXED POOL SIZE WITH DAILY MEMBERSHIP ROTATED
6 AMONG THE MEDIA AT YOUR LOCATION. ALSO SUGGEST GROUND RULES
7 SIMILAR TO THOSE USED BY THE DOD POOL.

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]

(U) FOR THE TIME BEING, FILING PROCEDURES WILL REMAIN THE
SAME AS THOSE FOR THE NATIONAL POOL. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF
MATERIALS SHOULD ALSO BE ARRANGED FOR REGIONAL POOL MEMBERS IN
PANAMA. OASD(PA) DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS WILL MAINTAIN 24-HOUR
OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT FILING OF MEDIA MATERIAL.
(U) MAC AIR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE
RETURN OF NATIONAL POOL MEMBERS. BASED ON LACK OF COMMERCIAL
CARRIERS, AND TO BENEFIT THE COMMAND, BY TEMPORARILY REDUCING
THE NUMBERS AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES, THOSE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE ARRIVED IN
PANAMA SINCE THE OPERATION BEGAN ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO RETURN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AGE 2 MLN=28186
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>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS ON THE MEDIA POOL AIRCRAFT TO ANDREWS
B, MD. NORMAL WAIVERS OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY ARE REQUIRED.
NON-POOL MEMBERS USING THE RETURN FLIGHT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THEIR OWN TRANSPORTATION FROM ANDREWS AFB TO THEIR FINAL
DESTINATION.

(U) THE BUREAU CHIEFS OF MEDIA IN PANAMA ARE AGREEABLE TO
PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEIR PERSONNEL IF REQUIRED. REQUEST
USOUTHCOM IDENTIFY AND INFORM OASD(PA) OF ANY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS,
ORGANIZATION, OF THOSE MEDIA PERSONNEL. PLEASE INFORM BY 1800,

AGE 03 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]
DEC.

(U) YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ONSLAUGHT OF MEDIA IS CONSISTENT
WITH THAT OF THE OPERATION IN GRENADA, WHEN MORE THAN SIX HUNDRED
PEOPLE REPRESENTING THEMSELVES AS MEDIA DESCENDED ON BARBADOS
DURING THE FIRST 24-HOURS OF THE OPERATION. THEREFORE, SUGGEST
YOU ANTICIPATE FURTHER MEDIA ARRIVALS WHEN YOUR CURRENT AIR
RESTRICTIONS ARE LIFTED AND OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE IS ESTABLISHED.
SINCE THE MEDIA ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY IN PANAMA, ALL MILITARY
PERSONNEL, OPERATIONS, ETC WILL BE SUBJECT TO THEIR ATTENTION.
THIS COULD REQUIRE MORE PA ASSETS THAN YOU CURRENTLY HAVE.
PLEASE IDENTIFY YOUR REQUIREMENTS TO US SOONEST, BY MESSAGE, SO
THAT APPROPRIATE AUGMENTATION RESOURCES MAY BE IDENTIFIED.

(S) SECRETARY CHENEY WILL VISIT THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND,
ARRIVING ON SUNDAY, 24 DECEMBER AND DEPARTING MONDAY, 25 DECEMBER.
FORMAL PLANNING INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY. THE
TRIP WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE OF THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL
IN PANAMA. MEDIA QUERIES ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S TRAVEL WILL BE
RESPONDED TO WITH, QUOTE: WE DO NOT DISCUSS TRAVEL PLANS OF
SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. END QUOTE. AMEMBASSY PANAMA AND
CPA MAY ACKNOWLEDGE THE VISIT UPON ARRIVAL OF THE SECRETARY.

AGE 04 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]

THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO ENABLE THE
SECRETARY TO SEE FIRST HAND THE SITUATION IN PANAMA AND TO GIVE
HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMED
FORCES THE GRATITUDE AND PRIDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR

[REDACTED]

S E C R E T

GE 3 MLN=28186
N=403-123220

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

URAGEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND
FREEDOM IN PANAMA.

(U) OASD(PA) POC FOR THIS ACTION IS MAJOR JOHN SMITH AT
TELEPHONE, CMCL 202-697-9312 OR AV 227-9312.
CLAS 25 DEC 89

176

NN

[REDACTED]

SOUTHCOM ORGANIZED DOD MEDIA POOL OPPORTUNITIES

20 DECEMBER 89

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Briefing by Mr. Bushnell, Charges d'Affairs U.S. Embassy, on current political events in Panama.	All - 14 press, 2 technicians and 3 DoD escorts	Helicopter Howard to SCN
Activities at Ft. Amador. Photos of troops, fighting positions, interviews with troops involved in assault on barracks complex, interviews with family members residing at Ft. Amador.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Helicopter
Tocumen International Airport activities. Photo op of limited ground ops, interviews with two women held by PDF during early stages of assault.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Helicopter
Detainee camp near Albrook Air Station. Photo opportunity.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Bus
U.S. Ambassador returns to Panama.	14 press, 3 DoD escorts	Bus/HMWV

21 DECEMBER 89

Tocumen. Shots, interviews of 7th ID (L) soldiers.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Patillo Airport No coverage due to hostile fire.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Rangers at Rio Hato. Interviews with commanders, soldiers, photo op of arms cache and prisoners being loaded onto C-130.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Driving tour of the city. Included Commandancia area, Calidonia, Via Espana. Saw looting, celebrations. Covered Endara ceremony. Visited Balboa displaced persons center.	9 press, 2 DoD escorts	Van

22 DECEMBER 89

<u>EVENTS</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Tour of PDF barracks at Ft. Amador, including Noriega's personal office. Tour of "Witch House." Tour of Commandancia, including Noriega's personal office.	14, 1 DoD escort	Bus
Smithsonian hostages.	8, 1 DoD escort	Helicopter
Detainee center.	6, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Colon to visit 7th ID (L) troops.	5, no DoD escorts	Helicopter

23 DECEMBER 89

Urban operations with 82d Abn Div and 7th ID (L).

Pool formally dissolved before these stories were covered. Pool teams that covered these operations were primarily made up of DoD press members who stayed in-country.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT TO PANAMA

CHRONOLOGY

Tuesday, 19 December 1989

1930 Began call out.
2115 (Approx.) Departed Pentagon for Andrews AFB.
2140 Arrived Andrews AFB.
2300 Boarded C-141.
2326 Took off from Andrews AFB.

Wednesday, 20 December 1989

0015 Briefed pool members on aircraft. Made following points:

1. Destination Panama.
2. Major U.S. military operation to remove Noriega and install duly elected government officials.
3. Air drop scheduled for 0100.
4. Presidential announcement 0100.
5. We arrive approximately 0530.
6. U.S. ground troops arrive 1300.
7. We will cover what is taking place. Caveat: I don't know what will be happening when we arrive.

0500 Arrived Howard AFB. Picked up at plane by bus. (Truck for satellite gear.) All time on ground spent in bus waiting to be loaded on helicopter.

0553 Departed Howard AFB.

0604 Arrived Ft. Clayton. Although original plan was for pool to be taken to the media center upon arrival, Quarry Heights was taking heavy fire, so decision was made to have the pool go to the Southern Command Network (AFRTS affiliate) headquarters building until safe passage to Quarry Heights could be arranged. Watched President's speech, then briefing by SecDef and CJCS. Watched video tape of fighting on CNN. Media frustated that they were watching action on TV that they felt they should have been covering. Mr. John Bushnell, Charge d'Affairs at U.S. Embassy, gave a background briefing on how he had briefed Mr. Endara over the weekend on the pending U.S. operation. Discussion with Col. Sconyers by phone about security review. Maj. Bill Maddox, our SOUTHCOM escort, named reviewer.

0900 Radio report #1 filed.
0928 Print report #1 filed.
0953 Print reports #2-4 filed.

1008 Arrived Ft. Amador by helicopter. Gunfire and explosions from direction of Chorillo. Loudspeakers calling for people to come out with hands up. Prisoner driven by in HMMV. Firing from direction of PDF barracks.

1039 Wife of a battalion commander interviewed while fight for PDF barracks went on. 105 mm howitzer aimed at barracks.

1120 Howitzer fired at barracks. Much small arms fire. Media moving through garages under houses.

1219 Fred Francis (while waiting for helo pickup at Ft. Amador) said he will recommend that NBC pull out of pool. No quid pro quo. NBC had story before attack. Held off anticipating pool. No return on investment. Won't hold tongue in future. \$25,000 uplink with no return. Pool media are not getting story.

1235 Plan was to go to Howard AFB to see arrival of troops; then to Tocumen airport to see 82nd Airborne; then to overfly city and return to Ft. Clayton. Media requested to see wounded. This request was made numerous times by the pool members. Pool escorts were instructed by OASD(PA) that it was not appropriate and violated the Privacy Act. The pool then saw the wounded being interviewed at military treatment facilities. Pool members felt they were not being given access to the story.

1238 Helo arrived Ft. Amador.

1245 Arrived Howard AFB. Nothing going on, no troops arriving. Pool members learned that helicopters damaged in combat were being repaired in a nearby hanger. Requests to photograph the ongoing repairs were denied. General feeling of pool members was this is a joke. When are we going home? Why are we here? Need to see more action. Downtime is killing us. Can't photograph flight line at Howard because of special aircraft present.

1350 Fax print report #5. Given to PA rep to fax.

1355 Departed Howard.

1405 Arrived Tocumen airport. General Johnson, Rangers commander, could not talk to us because of restriction in Ops Order. Found Maj. Baxter Ennis, 82nd Airborne, who could talk and was interviewed by Fred Francis. General Johnson said too risky to fly to perimeter of airport; had no ground transportation for us. Impression was that general really wanted to help, but felt that he is under orders (Ops Order) and could not. The general expressed the opinion that he thought it was important for the media to tell the story of what our soldiers had accomplished, but that the Ops Order prevented him from making anyone available to discuss what had happened during the fight for the airport.

1500 Found two college girls held in airport previous night as hostages of some PDF and other Panamanians. Pool interviewed them at length.

1524 Depart Tocumen. Pilot said it is too risky to fly over city as requested by media.

---- Arrived Ft. Clayton.

---- Departed Ft. Clayton.

---- Stopped to cover detainee area. Delayed in coverage by soldiers guarding detainees. Even though SOUTHCOM PA escort said approval had been given for media to see and photograph the detainees, the unit commander went through the chain of command to obtain permission. This situation was encountered often, no matter what event had been arranged for the pool.

1645 Arrived Quarry Heights. The media center had four phone lines, one fax machine, one computer and printer, a television (featuring CNN and all network news shows) and two typewriters. The center was manned by one SOUTHCOM officer (O-5) and one enlisted man. This arrangement worked relatively well when only the pool was in the center; as the second wave of media arrived, there was competition for use of telephone lines.

1744 Print pool reports 6 - 8 sent out.

1830 Fred Francis went live with NBC and CNN. Video tape already uplinked to satellite. Technician advised that satellite uplink requires a dedicated phone line available for technicians to confirm quality of transmission constantly during process.

1950 Print reports 9 - 11 sent.

2000 Col. Sconyers brief.

1. U.S. Ambassador to Panama to have news conference tonight upon arrival at Howard AFB from CONUS.

2. General Thurman, maybe General Steiner will brief them tomorrow.

3. Will get us downtown with security escorts.

4. More photo opportunities will be attempted.

5. Some Dignity Battalion troops still roving and getting in last licks.

2045 Departed Quarry Heights. Possible Dignity Battalion member captured at checkpoint at Bridge of the Americas while media pool bus was at checkpoint.

2130 Arrived Howard AFB for press conference with U.S. Ambassador. Some pool members complained that they were being forced to cover events considered advantageous to administration goals while being denied the opportunity to cover combat activities.

2205 Departed Howard AFB.

2235 Arrived Quarry Heights.

2310 Print reports 12 -15 sent.

Thursday, 21 December 1989

0010 Fred Francis appeared live on CNN.

0830 SOUTHCOM plans officer gave briefing on previous night's action.

1015 Faxed press report 16.

1145 Faxed press report 17.

1150 Gun fire south of Quarry Heights.

---- Ground team of pool saw refugee center at junior high school. Some wounded. Car with dead body and parts of weapons. Looters were shouting "Viva Bush." Went to Commandancia, Assembly - saw assumption of power by new government. Then first press conference by new leaders. Civil disturbance outside of ceremony.

---- Air team of pool went to LZ near Marriott Hotel, but was waved off because of gunfire. Saw airport and Seventh Infantry Division establishing positions. Overflow Panama Canal and saw ships. Went to Rio Hato to see where Rangers assaulted. Talked to Ranger commanders and soldiers. Saw captured Soviet weapons and POWs loaded onto a C-130.

---- Left for Witch House.

1900 Returned from Witch House. No luck getting in, house still being cleared of booby traps. Thirty radio reports and 31 print reports filed to date. First group of new reporters arrived. Sam Donaldson and Prime Time Live crew arrived. The arrival of Sam Donaldson (ushered in like a VIP) angered the pool because they perceived that he would get what they did not.

Friday, 22 December 1989

0710 Plan for day: Tour PDF barracks at Ft. Amador, Witch House, Commandancia and Empire Range detention compound. Note: Media have requested morning brief - advised SOUTHCOM, nothing scheduled.

0800 Departed Quarry Heights.

0805 Arrived Ft. Amador. Noriega Headquarters, Barracks, boats for escape, Witch House.

---- Commandancia, Noriega office, weapons rooms. Man in street with RPG round, turning self in, ex-PDF.

1108 Helo to Ft. Clayton to interview Smithsonian hostages. Ten adults + 1 child.

1145 Ft. Clayton PA office to work on stories and file.

1405 Departed Ft. Clayton enroute Empire Range to tour detainee center.

1505 Departed Empire Range.

1515 Arrived Ft. Clayton. Short situation summary distributed to pool members.

1715 Departed Ft. Clayton.

1730 Arrived Quarry Heights. Pool members announced their motto is: "If it's news today, it's news to us!" Another motto: "Semper Tardis." They talked about a DoD media pool T-shirt bearing both mottos; front and back.

Saturday, 23 December 1989

----- Media declined opportunity to visit prison, see political prisoners. Rationale was that they should have been there to cover the action to liberate the prison, not the aftermath.

0900 SOUTHCOM formed a pool to cover a sweep action. Pool included Fred Francis and his crew, Bill Clayton, Houston Chronicle, and Scott Applewhite, AP.

1445 Pool print reports up to 45.

1500 Arranging for pool departure. By this time in the week, the SOUTHCOM public affairs staff was exhausted. They were asking the DoD escorts why DoD had not augmented the staff with additional public affairs support. Scheduled for 1825 takeoff from Howard AFB.

2345 Departed Howard AFB for Andrews AFB. Passengers include Evergreen employees held hostages. Pool members talked to them.

Sunday, 24 December 1989

0445 Arrived Andrews AFB.

Comments:

A. Callout:

During the second hour of the callout, DPL was asked to inform the wire service bureau chiefs that they could each send a writer and a photographer on the deployment. This caused short term and long term problems. In the short term, it delayed the pool's departure from Andrews AFB because reporters/photographers added to the pool by this supplemental callout could not be expected to report within the 40 minutes remaining prior to the original reporting time. The longer term problem is that the pool included three photographers, rather than two, resulting in requests that they each go to different places to avoid duplication of effort. This was not always possible due to transportation shortages. In addition, this last-minute change to pool composition may raise questions regarding our future intentions with respect to wire service representation on the pool; i.e., was this a one shot deal, or will the wires be able to take two people on future deployments as well?

B. Lack of Media Access to Early Combat Operations:

One of the complaints heard most frequently from the media is that the pool was not able to cover the beginning of the operation. Since many media believe the purpose of the media pool is to provide access to combat operations from the start, and since our own SOP states that a "specific" pool objective is to "enable the media to cover military contingencies from the onset of an operation," a case could be made that we failed in this regard.

Once the decision was made to deploy the DoD pool, the additional decision to delay the callout for a couple of hours violated our procedures. The delayed callout and the subsequent late pool arrival in Panama have led to some media speculation that we were concerned about COMSEC being violated and deliberately called the pool out later than we could have, thus precluding coverage of the operation from the beginning.

It appears that our only defense is that the report of the Sidle Panel reflects disagreement on the matter of how soon before an operation begins should the pool be called out, and how soon pool correspondents should be able to cover an operation after it begins. In each case, the report indicates that the timing should be as soon as possible and as soon as it is feasible.

C. DoD Pool vs. Regional Pool:

It appears that if SOUTHCOM had been directed to constitute a regional pool made of correspondents already in Panama on the night of 19 December, we would have avoided the criticism that media were not given early access to the operation. COMSEC could have been preserved and the regional pool correspondents could have been prepositioned with combat units before combat operations began. We may have been criticized for not activating the DoD pool, but we could have defended our action based on the report of the Sidle Panel which says that a pool should be used only when "media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation." The report also points out that the media dislike the pool concept in general. This was borne out by the large influx of media into Panama on 21 December. On the other hand, our action to get a satellite dish into Panama to facilitate TV coverage was an important, positive action. Without that dish, it may have been necessary to airlift video products to the U.S. at a time when confusion caused by the tempo of operations and flight schedule changes could have resulted in serious delays. Film shipped by the TIME photographer encountered such problems. Overall, the question of whether the DoD pool worked better than a regional pool would have worked is a tough call.

D. Alleged OPSEC Violations:

There have been press reports of OPSEC violations after the callout of the DoD media Pool. One allegation is that a pool reporter called a "law maker," who in turn called the White House. The other allegation is that when TIME's pool reporter left a TIME Christmas party "many of the nearly 200 guests wished him well on covering what all assumed was to be the invasion of Panama."

If the above allegations are true, we suffered a serious breach of security that could have endangered American lives. A formal investigation into each allegation appears to be warranted, especially since the allegations were in published news reports. If swift action is not taken it could be perceived that we are not concerned about possible breaches of security.

E. Difficulties in getting combat units to cooperate with the Media Pool:

DoD National Media Pool coverage of operational activities in Panama were thwarted by such problems as lack of helicopter support, lack of ground transportation, lack of cooperation by various units that had operations orders stating that soldiers were not to talk to reporters, etc.

SOUTHCOM PAO comments to us on this problem pointed out that an OASD(PA) message informing the CINC and PAO that the media pool is being deployed has little value with respect to obtaining in-theater operational support. Their recommendation is for the Joint Staff to issue a "frag order" to the CINC informing him that the pool is being deployed and that all operational units must support pool requirements with helicopter airlift, communications gear, necessary security support and access to personnel for briefings and interviews.

How well this would work is anybody's guess. It also would be contrary to our DoD directive that says public affairs guidance flows to the CINCs from the ASD(PA). Obviously, the matter requires further study.

F. Lack of Daily Update Briefings in Panama

While the DoD Media Pool was in Panama, there were no regularly scheduled daily update briefings for the press. On one day there was a briefing in the morning by an officer who was deeply involved in planning Operation "Just Cause." There also was a news conference held by General Thurman. More briefings probably would have served the media well.

G. Overall Assessment

The acid test of the DoD National Media Pool concept is whether the American people are kept informed of developments in the field during the early stages of a U.S. troop deployment to a combat area.

With respect to the deployment of the media pool to Panama, there was a time after the pool's arrival early Wednesday morning when media coverage didn't take place as quickly as we would have liked. However, by the time the pool was dissolved on Saturday morning the pool print reporters had filed 45-50 stories, the wire photographers had transmitted some 150 still photo images, the radio reporter had filed many stories and the pool TV

crew had provided continuing reports to all the major networks for use on morning news shows, evening news shows and other series telecasts, such as NIGHTLINE.

Overall, despite glitches that occur under combat conditions, the American people were well served by the DoD National Media Pool and it functioned as well as could be expected in a combat situation.

DoD National Media Pool was established in Panama City, Panama, to provide a central point of contact for the media in the Panama Canal Zone. The pool was organized to provide a coordinated effort in the reporting of news from the Canal Zone. The pool was composed of representatives from the various news organizations and the DoD. The pool was established in Panama City, Panama, on 15 January 1968. The pool was organized to provide a coordinated effort in the reporting of news from the Canal Zone. The pool was composed of representatives from the various news organizations and the DoD. The pool was established in Panama City, Panama, on 15 January 1968.

The pool was organized to provide a coordinated effort in the reporting of news from the Canal Zone. The pool was composed of representatives from the various news organizations and the DoD. The pool was established in Panama City, Panama, on 15 January 1968.

With respect to the deployment of the media pool in Panama, there was a time after the pool's arrival early in the morning when media coverage didn't take place as quickly as it would have liked. However, by the time the pool was deployed on Saturday morning the pool's reporting had picked up. In fact, the wire photo service had transmitted some 150 photos in the first few hours of the pool's operation. The pool's reporting had picked up very quickly and the pool was well served by the DoD National Media Pool.

AN EVALUATION OF THE DOD MEDIA POOL

"If it's news today, it's news to us." That was the motto of the Pentagon pool deployed for the invasion of Panama. An amusing but entirely accurate slogan for the first 36 critical hours of combat.

Since it was supposed to function at the "onset of an operation", the pool was a failure. The Sidle Commission, which was formed after the media was frozen out of the 1983 invasion of Grenada, made specific recommendations that inclusion of the national media be part of the initial planning of all future military operations. Those recommendations were adopted in full by the Pentagon. This invasion did have the media but they arrived after the fighting began and were not permitted near U.S. troops who were still involved in action.

The pool was in the air on a C-141 two hours out of Andrews Air Force base when U.S. troops began their assault on Noriega strongholds. Upon its pre-dawn arrival in Panama the pool was sequestered for five hours when there was still a real opportunity to report to the American people on the actions of U.S. soldiers still engaging an enemy.

"Where the hell have you guys been?" barked Colonel Mike Snell, whose men controlled the area around the commandancia, Noriega's headquarters. "I been wanting you guys to talk to my kids about how they took this place in one hell of a fire fight," Snell said to the pool two days after the fierce fighting. It was impossible to explain to that proud Colonel that the pool was looking for today's news.

It was first and foremost a failure of policy makers to follow up on specific orders to deploy the pool. The decision to use force in Panama was taken at the White House on Sunday yet it was not until Tuesday, less than twelve hours before the invasion, that the Pentagon's Public Affairs shop was directed to ready the National Media Pool.

So, the fatal flaw of the National Media Pool's deployment was that it was ignored in the first thirty-six hours of operational planning. It is difficult to judge whether the continued missteps once on the ground were the result of poor Pentagon liaison with Panama or a Grenada mentality on the part of the on-scene commanders. In my view it was both. A complicating factor was the pool's composition. It was clearly too large with many pool members unprepared and wholly inexperienced.

The errors on both sides are too many to detail, but a few examples will paint a picture of a Pentagon pool which DID NOT cover the inception of the largest U.S. military action since Vietnam.

The Pentagon's top priority in any military campaign is operational security. As it must be. The Staff of the Joint Chiefs moved 12 thousand troops with 48 hours planning, but gave the Pentagon's Public Affairs chief only a few hours to form a pool to cover the action. Inadvertantly, that short notice jeopardized security and insured that the pool missed the opening stages of combat. Most pool members were given less than two hours to report to Andrews. Everyone made it, but the frenzy in some shops contributed to leaks.

It is unclear why a Pentagon pool had to be formed at all. The Sidle panel said a stateside pool should be used when that is the only way

the American media can accompany the troops. There were enough reporters already in Panama who could have been quietly gathered from hotels the evening before the invasion and sent out with the troops. I am told by DOD sources that that suggestion was rejected by military leaders.

Once on the ground in Panama the pool had to wait five hours for a briefing and transportation. In the middle of that period CNN carried a news conference from the Pentagon in which we learned ALL the details of the operation we were constituted to cover. It was especially frustrating since we were only a few miles from troops fighting, yet we were grounded.

~~FLIGHT~~

The first serious attempt to work the pool came at ten o'clock with a ~~flight of~~ helicopters to Fort Amador where combat operations were still underway against a Panamanian Army barracks. The siege at Amador involved occasional shooting and a few interviews. But less than two miles away the pool could clearly see the area around Noriega's headquarters in full blaze. Loud speakers were blaring at Noriega loyalist to surrender. A tank was pounding away. We told our escorts that was where we needed to be. We were told, "It is too dangerous."

We were shuffled around for the rest of the day missing action and being denied access. At the captured international airport General Johnson, a two star commander who genuinely wanted me to interview his airborne and ranger troops said, "Sorry, my operational orders are that I can not let you talk to any of my men. I can't speak with you."

One escort officer who was almost as frustrated as pool reporters complained that they were not getting cooperation from Commander in Chief General Maxwell Thurman or the staff of operational commander Lt. General Carl Stainer. We would hear that often in the days ahead.

The pool was repeatedly denied or ignored when it asked for access to front line troops, wounded soldiers, picture opportunities at the air base, senior commanders, simple interviews with GIs who had seen fighting. Even a basic request to spend the night in the field with soldiers was turned down. What we got was a steady stream of propaganda. We were taken to greet the returning U.S. Ambassador, offered freed political prisoners and scheduled for events with Panamanian political leaders.

All we wanted was to join troops who were hunkered down against sniper fire and on perimeter defense against looters and armed bands of Noriega supporters. Though I never heard an escort or an combat officer say it, it seemed that those stories of an incomplete operation were too embarrassing for the military.

Put simply, in the first 36 hours the commanders were not prepared for reporters, seemed to go out of their way to keep the pool away from combat or controversy and either had no concept of what constitutes news or deliberately tried to steer us to events that supported the political objectives of the Panama invasion. I have determined since returning from Panama that those were not the wishes of the senior leadership at the Pentagon.

There seemed to be a constant friction and confusion between the Pentagon's office of Defense Information who wanted to make things happen but had no clout on the ground, the staffs of both the Commander-in-Chief General Thurman and Operation Commander Lt. General Stainer, who seemed to care little what access the pool enjoyed, and the host Public Affairs officers of the Southern Command who were undermanned and caught in the middle.

The media can be faulted almost as much as the Pentagon for poor planning and execution of the pool. Though the number of transgressions

was much fewer, the one single lapse in security far out weighed all the Pentagon's fumbling.

There is no excuse for being ill prepared for pool duty or careless of operational security. Time Magazine was both. It was notified at a Christmas party that the pool was activated. In the course of finding a correspondent to go the entire staff of Time Magazine learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement.

Some pool members showed up at Andrews without passports and without the proper gear. Even my NBC News team had to call back to the bureau for a vital piece of transmitting equipment. That raised the number of staffers privy to the invasion to an unacceptable number.

Furthermore, only a few members of the pool had any combat experience and fewer still had ever covered a military event. A good reporter ought to be able to cover any story but combat is no time for on the job training. Troops expect seasoned professionals, not reporters who have to be looked after.

In the evolution of the DOD media pool the Washington bureau chiefs insisted on a broad representation of professionals if the pool were ever activated. It doesn't work. With a military reluctant to help in the first place it is extremely difficult to get one helicopter for news coverage. This pool needed a nearly impossible two helicopters whenever it moved.

The working pool was made up of a reporter and a photographer each from the Associated Press, Reuters and Time Magazine, a photographer from United Press International, a reporter from ABC radio news, one reporter each from the Houston Chronicle, the Houston Post and the Dallas Morning News. NBC NEWS sent one correspondent, a cameraman, sound man and two satellite technicians with 25 hundred pounds of gear.

We were good company. We were too many.

If the DOD pool is to function, to serve the needs of the military the media and ultimately a free democracy some fundamental changes are needed.

First, there must be clear and unequivocal political and military instructions to the commanders in the field. It must be ordered that the DOD media pool be involved in the initial phase of combat.

Second, the pool must be reduced to its absolute minimum of one print reporter, one television reporter, one radio reporter, one video cameraman and one still photographer. As in any military operation a second echelon of producer(s), reporter(s), photographer(s) and technicians can join the mini-pool within 24 hours to create an expanded pool.

Third, the pool should be exercised every three months and the pool members should interact with commanders of rapid response forces each time. In addition, at least once a month during each cycle the pool should be tested for quick reaction and operational security.

Fourth, a general or flag officer for the Joint Chiefs should be the pool escort. The senior officer should rotate the duty and drill with the mini pool and the second echelon. There is no substitute for someone who speaks for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Fifth, a minimum standard of military experience should be expected of pool members. Conversely, senior military commanders should

be familiar with media needs and methods. The bureau chiefs and the Pentagon public affairs office should organize the ways and means to achieve that understanding.

Finally, if we are ever to have a working relationship both the military and the media MUST begin to work on a basic level of trust. It seems to me the Panama operation was only one step above Grenada. Consider the example of this reporter and a Lt. Col. Joseph Hunt, a Ranger, whose men attacked Rio Hato, 75 miles from the capital. Late on day two I was flown with a crew and two other pool members to Rio Hato where the largest arms cache in Panama was discovered. Hunt had laid on several hours of show and tell with interviews. I tried to explain to him that it was past four o'clock, that we only had thirty or forty minutes on the ground or we would miss our deadlines.

Hunt said, "My Rangers want to tell you how they jumped from under five hundred feet and took this base in twenty minutes." I'll never forget the look in his eyes when I told him we had lost half the day waiting and simply had no choice. He didn't want to hear it. All Lt. Col. Hunt knew was that I did not have time for his troops.

Fred Francis, Chief Pentagon Correspondent, NBC NEWS

DoD Press Pool Meeting
Fort McNair, Wash. D.C.
Friday, January 19, 1990

Mr. Williams: I appreciate you all coming here on a day when there is a story of some substance going on out in town. (Laughter) I guess that's not the greatest choice of words. This shows you some of the skills I have and how I got my job!

We had originally planned to go as long as you wanted, but I think what we'll do is even though I know there are some people who are still on their way and ordinarily, I suppose we would wait for them, but this is just an indication of the sort of problems you have with a pool. When do we start? But I think we'll try to get it wrapped up here and give you a chance to say, so that some of you who may have to cut away for other events can go without missing the substance of this.

The purpose of this meeting here today is to gather your impressions of what went wrong, your impressions of how the pool worked, what you think was good about it, what you think was bad about it, so that we can fix the problem. I very much appreciate your willingness to make contributions today because indeed, the success of this meeting will depend very much on your willingness to make contributions.

Someone who isn't here today but who is working very hard on this question right now is Fred Hoffman. Many of you know Fred. Fred is a 35 year veteran of the Associated Press, covered the Pentagon since before there was a Pentagon for AP, covered Vietnam, and later under Secretary Weinberger, became a principle Deputy of Public Affairs of the Pentagon for a short time. Any of you who know Fred know that Fred is a very independent person. Fred owes no allegiance to anybody. He has strong feelings about the pool. And we have asked him, although he retired in December, we asked him to come back and make a very thorough, independent review of the pool. He's doing that now. He's in Panama today. He talked to Max Thurman when General Thurman was in town earlier this week. He's down talking to military commanders, field commanders today. He will be making his way up, probably going to Fort Bragg and trying to talk to General Stiner, talk to all of the people who were involved. I realize he's spoken to many of you who were in the pool so far, and he will try to do that before he's finished. He will not try, he will in fact talk to every reporter who was on the pool. But it is not possible for him to talk to all of you who are Bureau Chiefs and who are reporters involved and who care about the pool.

So one of the things that we are doing today is making a transcript of these proceedings, and Fred will get a copy of that as indeed will all of you, and that will help him a great deal. So any comments you make here today will not simply vanish into the ether. They are being recorded. That will be part of the record on the pool.

I realize that to some extent you will want to know what went wrong and why. There will be a natural tendency to sort of want to fix blame, and we will work with you as much as you like on that question, but I think the real goal for us now is to try to find solutions. After all, if this pool is to work, it's to work for you. It's your pool as much as it is the DoD pool. If you don't find it satisfactory, then it has a problem.

So the question is what do you want? How do you want to fix the pool? What are your ideas on how you think it could be made to work better? Or indeed some of you might say at all. There are different viewpoints on this issue, I've discovered.

Many of you who are in the pool have already spoken out. Fred Francis from NBC News has written a paper for a professional journal on the subject. There are a variety of different viewpoints, and I hope to hear some of those today.

While I am doing my best to remain open to Fred's ideas, and indeed I am open to Fred's ideas, I want to hear what Fred has to say because he will be doing, unquestionably the most exhaustive analysis of the pool, looking at it from all possible sides, I do have some initial observations of my own that I would make.

The first point is, I think perhaps lost in all the discussion, and indeed we probably won't hear much about it today but I think it's nonetheless important to bear in mind, after General Sidle's panel, the Winant Sidle Commission recommended the national media pool concept in 1984, there were many exercises of the pool. It was used in the Persian Gulf, but certainly the majority of the time that the pool has been called out has been on exercises. There were many people who said it's nice that you have exercises but we know that when push comes to shove and something really serious happens, you won't use the pool. I hope this has at least dispelled that notion.

The Secretary of Defense in one of his first acts when he became Secretary, was to sign an order furthering the pool and continuing the pool, and in fact the decision was made to use the national media pool very early on. The Secretary informed me on Monday that the President personally wanted to use the pool, and I think that's a good sign. So I want to dispel the notion that the pool won't be used when things get rough.

Obviously that's not to say that on every conceivable military mission the pool will be used. I am sure you can all imagine scenarios, something akin to the aborted Iranian rescue mission, that kind of special operation, in which the pool may not be practical. But I hope that if nothing else, it has dispelled that idea that we wouldn't use the pool when things really got interesting.

During the Panama operation General Tom Kelley who is the Chief of Military Operations in the Pentagon on the Joint Staff, said no plan survives contact with the enemy, but even so, I think it's fairly clear that the pool, to some extent, suffered from insufficient or the wrong kind of planning. There is no way to guarantee anything in the military, but we obviously need to raise the potential for the pool's success.

The pool's goal remains to get eye witnesses to the scene of action. That has to be the primary reason for having a pool. All of the other things about getting the right kind of cameras and the right kind of equipment there have to follow on to that.

Things obviously won't end with this meeting. In addition to Fred Hoffman's report, which we intend to make public, by the way. I would say that I have not seen Fred's report. I have no idea what kind of report he will write. I have simply said to him that everything is on the table as far as I'm concerned--even the very question of whether there should be a pool is up for discussion. There are no preconceptions. I've given Fred very free reign and encouraged him to look at a number of different questions, but not limited him to anything. So he has wide range and he's totally on his own in terms of what he'll report. I don't know whether he will include in his report for the sake of detail things that military folks might be sensitive about releasing publicly. I hope to keep the number of redactions private, but as Molly Moore said, she'll undoubtedly get an unredacted copy and she can write a story comparing them to see whether we redacted the right things or not. But in any case, it's our goal to make the report public.

But we will be making our own suggestions, obviously. The National Defense University has an instructor, for example, at this meeting today, who is interested in learning about the media pool. At the conclusion of this meeting we're going to meet with another instructor who wants to revise his training plan to enable him to make his students more aware of these issues. Indeed, his students are future military commanders. The Joint Operational Planning System which instructs commanders to incorporate media coverage plans into their combat operations will obviously be something we'll be spending some time with. The discussion of the pool has indicated that those plans may not be sufficient. They may have to be reevaluated to ensure that they adequately cover the mechanics of getting the pool into action and getting pool members back so that they can file.

Anyway, those are my preliminary comments. There's no question but that the pool didn't work right in Panama. We got it there, and then from there on it was less than a thrilling success. We are interested in your comments.

Let me prevail upon you to do this. As shy as you all are, we are making a transcript, and indeed I would say that the transcript of the proceedings is important. There are microphones throughout the hall. Those of you in the front row will find microphones behind you. There's a little black button that you need to press and hold down while you speak.

I have no great structure in mind for this meeting, but we'll be happy to impose one if that will help the proceedings. This meeting grows out of, as I said, two forces, I suppose you could say. One is our own desire to hear from you and see what you think--not only the people who were on the pool, and there are many reporters here today who were part of that pool, but also those of you who use the pool, who receive the pool. You are as much a part of the operation as those who went down there and put things into that end. So those of you who receive the pool products on the other end are important to hear from as well. So it's important to get both those sides. But as I say, part of it is our own desire to hear from you and part of it is the regular quarterly Bureau Chiefs meeting we had in January with the new rotation, the new organizations that come in. Several of them at that time suggested we have such a meeting. So for those two reasons, that's why we're here.

Those are my initial comments, and I'm happy to respond to questions. I'm happy to hear from you. Perhaps to get things going, I see Fred Francis from NBC News, Steve Kamarow from AP who were reporters on the pool, perhaps you would be willing to share some of your observations about how it went. Fred, you're so shy and humble. Why don't you go first?

Mr. Francis: I think since I wrote that paper, which some of you have seen, I have since learned, Pete, that the planning for the pool, while you may have been told on Monday, over the weekend prior to the invasion, during the planning in the Joint Chiefs, it may have been Friday, it may have been Saturday, and Fred Hoffman can track this down. What I'm saying I think goes right to the crux of whether the military wants the media in place. The public affairs man in the Joint Chiefs, Erv Sharp, went to General Kelley and said, "General Kelley, a lot of activity. Do I need to stick around, because I'm going on vacation on Monday to visit my parents." General Kelley said you don't need to stick around.

Mr. Williams: That was what day?

Mr. Francis: That was either Friday or Saturday. General Kelley hesitated for a moment, and said to Captain Erv Sharp, "You don't need to stick around," I am told. Erv Sharp went off on vacation to visit his parents.

If the concept of the pool is to be effective, the planning for a pool has to begin with the planning of the operation, as the Sidle Commission said. I don't question Tom Kelley's motives. All I'm saying, quite simply, is that Tom Kelley told the one public affairs guy with an institutional memory in the Joint Chiefs, to go off on vacation.

I think, based on my conversations, that that key decision prior to your learning, prior to the President even making a firm decision on Sunday, damned the pool from the beginning. That's what we have to get at, it seems to me.

It was our experience when we were on the ground there, as you all heard, that there was no real concept or no real logistics laid on for us. If Colin Powell or General Kelley don't tell the three star commanders on the ground that we are to be there at the beginning of military actions or as soon as possible, it's not going to work. I don't believe this worked because it was never planned for when it should have been. That's a mindset, I think, and that's what we have to change.

I think everything else that's been said about the pool has either been in print or we talked about it. That's my key concern right there.

Mr. Williams: Steve, would you like to make some observations? You don't have to.

Mr. Kamarow: I've talked to Fred about this and I tend to agree, there are a whole host of logistical problems which you'll have to go through, but the key thing to me is sort of the cultural acceptance of the pool. It seemed, and Fred Hoffman, again, will have to track this down, that there was a strong institutional resistance to us seeing anything and there was a lot of difficulty understanding the difference between the pool which wanted to see action, and the reporters who were trapped at the Marriott who wanted to be protected. Perhaps a subtle difference in the roles of the press was misunderstood.

The only thing I'd add is I think within the pool there are going to be arguments made about whether the pool was too large or too cumbersome with equipment and this sort of thing. I think there should also be an operational understanding that within the pool, regardless of the size, we could have broken down upon arrival in Panama to a smaller group. If we had arrived there and the military could only get us an armored vehicle or something to take us in, we could have flipped coins or something and just taken a small group in. I have the feeling, and I haven't confirmed this, that there was a bias toward taking the whole group everywhere together, and that was not a necessary thing in my mind.

Mr. Williams: Thank you.

Ms. Lewis: It strikes me that there were four key problems--the very first being our very late arrival in Panama. I at some point would like to ask the question of why the decision was made to bring us in hours after the invasion.

The other has already been mentioned, the lack of action. During the time we were there I saw one body and one wounded U.S. soldier, and that, I think, illustrates the fact that we didn't really cover an invasion.

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Mr. Aukofer: Frank Aukofer for the Milwaukee Journal.

I think Fred really hit the nail on the head when he talked about mindset. I remember in the early days of the pool we had endless discussions about commanders, military commanders on the ground and how they didn't like the press and they were busy with other things. I don't know how you change that, how you change attitudes. But it seems as if the exercises have worked fine, but the real thing doesn't because maybe the mindset changes. I've been on one of the exercises and it worked great, but it seems as if on the two occasions when the real thing happened, it didn't work.

Mr. Starr: Frank Starr of the Baltimore Sun.

I would defer to those who were members of the pool for discussion about why the pool didn't work and the extent to which it didn't work. I'd like to speak to another issue as a user of the pool. I think there needs to be some common understanding among the people who are administering it as to what the purpose of the pool is.

By that I mean this. Two days after the invasion had occurred, the existence of the pool as being cited to us as reason why we were not allowed to send anyone into Panama independently after the pool had been there for a couple of days. We had a correspondent in San Jose, Costa Rica who was trying to get in, could not get permission for an aircraft to land at Howard Air Force Base.

Mr. Williams: What day was that?

Mr. Star: That was the second day. I believe it was Thursday. That discussion started on Thursday and went over into Friday, and by Friday he still wasn't in. He ultimately went in over land, through David. But the point is, the existence of the pool, which by the way was not working very effectively, was cited to us as a reason why he could not go in, because there was a pool down there, and we were told the purpose of the pool was to make it so that the military would not have to handle additional individual requests.

It seems to me that the Sidle Commission report makes the point clearly the purpose of the pool is to protect the security of the mission. By this time there was no secrecy at all involved.

Mr. Williams: That's a good question and I'm not sure I know the answer to that one.

Mr. Fichenberg: I'm Bob Fichenberg of the Newhouse Newspapers.

Our national security reporter, who is a member of the pool and has participated in several exercises, and incidentally who is on his way to Panama today to do some followup stories, gave me a little memo at my request. I'm not going to read from the memo but I'd like to give you the sense of what he suggests.

Mr. Williams: I would say, by the way, that any of you who have similar memoranda from your people that you think would be useful to us to have, we'd certainly be interested in seeing those, and Fred would be interested as well.

Mr. Fichenberg: What I'll do, instead of reading this, is give you a copy of it for the record, but I just want to give you the sense of what he suggests and what he says is that what he sees as one of the cores of the problem. He says I think the key

problem is that the press has not earned the trust of the military, and that is essential if we are to literally drop in on a combat commander and ask for his or her cooperation.

In the pools in which I have participated, and I think this may have been the case in Panama, pool members have been unfamiliar with the military and uncertain how to behave in combat, and thus unwilling or unable to take the necessary risks.

What he suggests, in brief, is that all the reporters selected for the pool be required to undergo a brief military-type training, perhaps a day of classroom work and a day of field work, perhaps at a place like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The benefits of this, he says, would one, enable the pool to demand quicker and more immediate access to combat action as it is happening rather than being held back by the commanders until the fighting is over and there's not much to report. Also it would give the combat commanders confidence that the pool is seasoned and professional and can be placed in risky situations, and it would give the pool reporters a new understanding and sympathy for the troops who bear the burden of combat. I will give you the rest of the memo, but that's the sense of it.

Mr. Nelson: Jack Nelson of the LA Times. I wanted to support what Frank Star said. We had a reporter, of course, who tried to get in for several days too, and couldn't give in, and we were given the same reason. But it also seems to me that the problem goes far beyond just the pools. I only know, of course, what I've read about what happened down there, but for one thing, as I understand it, we were barred from even interviewing injured soldiers for four days. There were other restrictions put out. It seems to me that a lot of the reason for lack of cooperation on the part of the military came from the top officers who told lower commanders to tell their troops not to cooperate with the press.

Mr. Williams: For those who are here from the pool, this is the first I've heard of barring from interviewing injured soldiers. Is that correct?

Voices: Yes, or photographing. They wouldn't even let us photograph an injured helicopter.

Mr. Mendelsohn: I'm Mat Mendelsohn from UPI. For the record, we were not allowed to see crippled aircraft which were sitting maybe 150 yards, 200 yards away from us. We were not able to talk to civilian wounded, military wounded. We were not allowed to visit with POW's. This is on the first day. Although we inadvertently stumbled upon a makeshift detainment camp and there was a little mutiny there and we forced our way into the camp. But at that point there was no plan for us to see POW's, wounded, dead, crippled aircraft. These were definite no's. No, you cannot do this. It wasn't we did not ask, it was a definite no. I asked Colonel Sconyers several times about the aircraft, we were at Howard Air Force Base. The aircraft were sitting within eyesight and they were working to repair aircraft. We were not even allowed to see crippled aircraft.

Mr. Williams: What kind of aircraft were they?

Mr. Mendelsohn: They were helicopters. I'm told they were Apaches, I believe. We didn't see them. So it's not a question, it was clearly we were not allowed to see this.

Mr. Raines: I'm Howell Raines, New York Times. Pate, to return to your opening point, I think it's worth noting that I was among those who thought the Department

would not use the pool in a real situation, so I think your point is well taken and the Defense Department is to be commended for following through.

However, I'm also struck by the fact of the predictability of these problems. I was on the first pool that was activated on an exercise in the spring of 1985, and we had a meeting which I think Fred Hoffman was a witness, in fact, discussing the problems, and the problems that were predicted then were exactly the ones that pertained here. I think it's important not to get too detailed in the analysis. The needs were simple and the problems were simple, and the cure seems to be simple. It is to get people to the action in a timely way. That means what was missing here and what was missing in '85 needs to be applied--that is a senior escort officer who is sophisticated and has a commitment to the mission. That was lacking in '85, and I gather from the report here it was lacking in this instance. And secondly, to provide timely communications from the start. In '85 we were more or less held incommunicado while at the same time watching Signal companies set up switchboards in the boondocks. Everyone knew that it was possible to call the K-Mart back home within 15 minutes if the will was there.

From an editor's point of view back in Washington, the pool may have some long term utility if it's there and can't file, but the real usefulness in the first 12-24 hours is if you're getting dispatches every 15 minutes, every hour, on unfolding actions. So from an editor's point of view with some experience here, I would say the escort officer and the timely filing are the keys. If you take care of that, I think a lot of these other problems are going to melt away.

As a historical footnote, one of the ironies here is that the model for how to do this is clear, the historical model. If you look at World War II, if you look at Korea, if you look at Vietnam, it was simply correspondents being put into the action with the understanding that they incurred the possibility of risk and injury and let it go from there.

Mr. Williams: There are several other comments, but let me just suggest one of the big problems, and one of the things I think we have to think a lot about. The distinction I would draw with experience from World War II is simply this. There were no people like Fred Francis in World War II. There were no needs to file television, for example, or there were no means to get pictures out. One of the things that General Thurman told me when he was here the other day when we were discussing the pool is, you know it never occurred to me how much the logistical problems of getting reporters to the action and then back to file and into the action and back to file were a complicating factor.

So I guess one of the questions that I would add into this process is, is there a way to file from the field and satisfy everybody? Radio, television, still pictures, and data for newspapers. I don't know the answer to that question. Is it worth looking at I think is one question we have to look at.

Mr. Raines: Not to monopolize the discussion, I think that's a valid point, and obviously print and electronic media are going to be at odds on this, but it seems to me that the rule of logic would be to start your print filing as early as possible, teletype dispatches and so forth, even television with Dan Rather or Tom Brokaw there would know information and the camera saying it would be snatching at those pieces of paper. Then as the situation became more predictable, the handing off of video-tape or audio-tapes or electronic links, it would seem to me would fall in logically. But in the outset, I think, I'm guessing that the broadcast media would be willing to pool on some kind of handoff that their people back home would have access to on an equal footing.

Mr. Rubenstein: Larry Rubenstein from Reuters.

Two things I want to raise. The first one is I'm hearing two sets of complaints here, and I want to make sure that in Fred's report, and if not in your mind, we separate these things. I think it's integral to separate them. One are the problems we had with the pool, with the call-out, with the implementation of the pool in the first 12-18 hours, and getting them into action, and getting that material back. That is one problem that I think we all agree on needs to be addressed.

The second problem that I think needs to be separated from the DoD pool is the problem of unilateral coverage of an invasion, or for that matter anything else that goes on, and how the Pentagon and the Southern Command or whatever command is involved, responds to that. I think those are separate issues.

Mr. Williams: Tell me what you mean by unilateral coverage.

Mr. Rubenstein: That means the 500 reporters that wanted to drop in on D+24 hours. What do you do with them? Do you let them in or not? The press in the Marriott demanding protection. The whole gamut. Our pool representative has told me the horror stories that I'm sure all the pool members suffered trying to get access to the four telephones in the press center. They had a shot at it initially, and then all of a sudden a tremendous amount of unilateral press descended on the same facilities and they had to invoke all kinds of higher military authority just to get near a phone on the ground. So I think that is a separate issue. I think the Pentagon's response to that, and more importantly, the individual command's response to that, is something that definitely needs to be looked at and how you deal with that.

In Grenada there were no unilateral people on the ground, and people didn't try to fly into that airport within five hours of the invasion because it was still full of potholes and military craters, so the Sidle Commission I'm not sure really explored that issue.

The second point along those lines is, as we discussed in the Bureau Chief's meeting, the third triad of the pool, the Pentagon, the pool members, and the individual commands and their representatives, I'm not sure have been represented well to this point in pool discussions and in pool meetings. I think as we have seen in all the pool exercises and in the actual deployments we've experienced on the tanker export and stuff like that, that invariably the problems that occur, occur with the commands, with the local on-scene colonel, whoever is in charge of the press and who's actually given the responsibility, as Colonel Sconyers was in Panama, of a lot of authority and what the pool did.

Mr. Conan: Neil Conan from NPR. I would just like to point out that perhaps Fred Hoffman would like to go back in history a little bit, other than details, as one who survived a fabulous tour in the Persian Gulf, other than details and differences between the Army restricting your access and the Navy restricting your access, the same problems occurred on the Persian Gulf pool. We were kept out of the action, filing was a nightmare. Everything was very similar. The same kinds of problems that we had in the Persian Gulf are the same kinds of problems that people are reporting from Panama, to some degree even worse in the Persian Gulf. Why were those lessons not learned? Why were there no meetings like this after that?

Mr. Williams: That's interesting, Neil. Yesterday Larry Rubenstein on the radio from ABC Radio, said that he thought the problems were just the opposite. That in the

Persian Gulf they saw stuff but couldn't file, and in Panama they couldn't see stuff but could file.

Mr. Conan: Different times.

Mr. Calbfeld: Brad Calbfeld, AP Radio. In answer to the question you raised, it is possible to set up a very small portable uplink from very many locations, as long as you can see certain satellites, and the satellite time has to be arranged.

Mr. Williams: For audio.

Mr. Kalbfeld: For audio, for still photographs, and for data. They can all be filed from the same location. Television is a lot more difficult because the equipment is larger and the number of satellites much more limited, but it is within a longer period of time and with greater expense, it is something that can also be done from very many field locations.

What is troubling to me is that these are questions that we raised back in 1985. The same questions of access to how to file and those kinds of things were raised back then. The lack of follow-through on the Pentagon's part is very troubling, especially in light of all the ways in which we have been asked as members of the pool, to change in very many arcane ways, our security procedures, our filing and reporting procedures. I think there is a degree to which the Pentagon needs to take some responsibility for asking us to follow through on very many details and being real sticklers about it, but not in fact following through on many of the things that we've been asking for five years.

Mr. Wolman: Jon Wolman from AP. Tom Kalley says no plan survives contact with the enemy, and clearly the enemy here was lack of preparation and SOUTHCOM in the field.

I just want to emphasize a couple of points that were made earlier. The need for a strong escort from the Joint Chiefs is absolutely essential. A couple of people have said, both on the broadcast and on the print side, that these problems are predictable, have occurred as early as 1985, have occurred in both exercises and in the Persian Gulf. We know they're going to happen. I don't think we're going to stop them from happening. What we need is a strong Joint Chief's presence to work between the pool and the local command. The local command, obviously, is juggling any number of balls. We were talking about command problems in the first four hours of the existence of this pool, and through this extremely annoying circumstance where we were trying to drop open coverage into Panama and finding out that the pool, lo and behold, was being held as a reason not to provide open coverage. All of these things can be addressed by a strong troubleshooter, I think. Instead we found the Pentagon essentially walking away in the face of SOUTHCOM resistance on the ground. I don't know about in Washington, but on the ground. I think the Pentagon escorts essentially were walking away to any SOUTHCOM resistance at all.

Mr. Lewis: My name is Chuck Lewis. I'm with the Hearst Newspapers. I have an observation and a question.

My observation is that the Sidle Commission and the early architects of the pool in 1984 and 1985 envisioned the possibility that everything would be nicely arranged within the beltway and would fall apart downstream. To thwart that, both the Sidle Commission and the early architects, including Secretary Weinberger, decided there would be no operational plan approved without a public affairs annex that accounted for downstream operations of the pool.

My question is this. Was there a public affairs annex to the plan of operation for the assault in Panama?

Mr. Williams: My understanding is that there was. Bob Taylor's been looking into that question. Do you know the answer?

Mr. Taylor: The annex that I saw was there and it suggested that the DoD media pool would be used, but it fell short of discussing exactly how it would be employed.

Mr. Williams: The annex was...

Voice: That's your problem right there.

Mr. Hoyt: Clark Hoyt from Knight Ridder. Into this rich stew you're developing here I'd like to throw in one other issue which is the sharing of pool material after it was gathered in Panama.

As you know, we operate with the Chicago Tribune a photo service that was denied pool photos throughout that operation. You and I talked about it at the time. We have since applied to have that photo service be part of the rotation. But it's always been my understanding from the beginning of pools, that all material, that pool members were surrogates for everyone, and that all pool material gathered was to be shared with everyone. Is there something I don't know here that says that principle does not apply to photographs?

Mr. Williams: No, all material is for pool members. I guess that's the distinction that I would make.

Mr. Hoyt: These two news organizations are and were pool members.

Mr. Williams: I don't want to debate with you here, Clark, because I think you raise an interesting point and one we will look into. In explaining why it worked the way it did, clearly member newspapers, KRTN's member newspapers were receiving pool material from the wires, from AP, from UPI, from Reuters, but as to specific photographs exclusively or given, provided for KRTN, for you, and in turn to pass along to your clients, KRTN is not a pool member, and that's the distinction. Obviously individual newspapers are and they received their pool materials. But you raise a good question and we will look at it.

Mr. Clayton: I'm Bill Clayton of the Houston Chronicle. I'd like to elaborate on the access question. I'm not clear whether we should be demanding to be on the front lines in the cross-fire. I personally don't relish that idea. But there's middle ground for access that would be better than what we had. One example is on Quarry Heights, there's a place at which the hot firing could be observed if we had been there early enough to see it, that would satisfy the questions of personal security.

A lot of the access ground could be covered by earlier briefings by somebody knowledgeable. Our first briefing, the whole time we were there, our first briefing was by a diplomat who was not briefed on military matters and wanted to discuss the history of the Panama Canal.

The other thing about transmission, aside from the equipment malfunction at the sending point which took hours to correct, there was a delay that I don't understand, maybe some people here in Washington know, between the time the copy was transmitted successfully and the time it was received by outlets for newspapers.

Mr. Williams: How long a delay?

Mr. Clayton: I'm not sure. I don't know that.

Mr. Williams: We'll look into that. The way it's supposed to work is as soon as they get that stuff in the Pentagon, they immediately turn around and fax it to the distribution points here. But I'm sure we can figure out some better way to do that. That's the first I've heard of that problem. Do you know anything about that, Bob?

Mr. Taylor: The only one I'm aware of is we had a couple of pieces of copy that came in that had one side completely blanked out and they asked to have it retransmitted, they asked them to transmit it upside down, and finally we ended up back here trying to cut the two and paste them together to get them out quickly. That's the only ones I'm aware of.

Mr. Clayton: That relates to the fax machine problems mostly.

Mr. Francis: I just wanted to answer a couple of the things. First and foremost I agree wholeheartedly, and I wrote in the paper that you need a senior escort. It needs to be from the Joint Chiefs, needs to be a one star, needs to speak for the Joint Chiefs to the operators on the ground. Without that, you can't do anything. But first and foremost, the planning has to begin.

In Panama, and I agree with Hal, that a small pool, and I'm not saying this for NBC, I'm saying this as a practical matter, that you can't set up a satellite uplink for television in the middle of combat. I agree with Hal, that the first words, the first pictures, the first copy can get out as long as provisions are made for a second echelon pool, as long as provisions are made that after the initial pool, after that pool goes in with the troops, files the material, with the equipment we have that can file the initial reports, then a second echelon comes along, a pool, 12-24 hours later with the uplinks, with the feed machines to feed the photographs, to feed the video. Those are the key things.

But none of this will work unless --

(END OF SIDE)

Mr. Mendelsohn: -- it doesn't help to ask. I think that just kind of underscores some of the problems we were having. Again, this was a civilian escort and seemed pretty much out of the loop.

Mr. Merida: I'm Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News. I just wanted to amplify on some of the logistical questions, particularly as relates to firing. At least as far as newspapers go, we had incredible difficulty. My understanding from talking to my own desk and from other news organizations, that there were significant delays from the time the copy, the faxes, got to the Pentagon and when they got out. I think it's also a question of distribution, how they distributed. That should be addressed.

One of the problems, other than just the copy getting lopped off. This happened over a several day period. It wasn't just one day. The faxes, material we went, repeatedly showed up in news organizations with margins cut off, and in some cases they were unusable. This was not relayed to us. That, I think, makes Kathy's point about having an editor there, someone to represent us, more relevant.

In many cases, we had filed and only hours later did we know there was this problem. There was no relaying from the Pentagon back to SOUTHCOM so that we would know this was a problem.

I think there's another point to be addressed. The rules, I believe, are sort of stringent, sort of restrictive from the standpoint of newspapers. We have to submit our files to a commander on the scene to be read. As it was, in many cases we were getting back sort of late. We had to get the copy and then send it through a fax, sometimes two or three times, before it got there. I think early on when we realized this was a continuing problem, Kathy had asked one of our escorts can we just call the wires and let them distribute it, or call our news organizations and let them distribute it through the wires, or some way to get around that and make it more expedient for news organizations, and we ran into bureaucratic red tape. Our escort then had to call the Pentagon. He said well, he's waiting to get clearance for that. That is the kind of thing in a timely situation, we need to be able to make these kind of amendments right on the spot. It's just a flexibility question.

Mr. Bagnato: I'm Barry Bagnato from CBS. I want to look at some of these same problems in a non-combat situation. Last spring we were involved in an operation where the first additional troops were flown into Panama. It was a 24 trip, two stops: North Carolina and one in Panama. We discovered in both places that unilateral coverage had already been permitted. There were other reporters on the ground there, which made us unnecessary. In Panama we were given an hour and a half to talk to whomever we could find, and then to deal with the logistics which were three telephones in an office, and to file.

What this underlines is the same problem in both the combat and the non-combat situations we've been finding, that somewhere deep in that mindset is a concern that the wrong story is going to get out, that the press should somehow be an arm for the Pentagon in some ways. I know that mindset must exist. And the point has to be made to commanders in these situations that it doesn't do any good to put the media in a situation where they're not going to be able to do their job, to do our job, because that is only in the end going to make the Pentagon look bad, as it has especially in the case of the last couple of weeks.

Mr. Sloyan: Pat Sloyan with News day. This is a big brother question. You're sitting on what I'm told is dynamite footage of the largest airborne assault since World War II, combat footage. Infrared, electronically enhanced, of the jump itself. I'm also told pretty good stuff at the Comandancia. Some of that was released. You're also sitting on when Noriega comes out of the Vatican Embassy and outlines his deal to Thurman, footage of his surrender at the Vatican. Why are you holding this stuff back?

Mr. Williams: I've not heard of some of this, Pat. The only videotape that I know of that I've seen myself is the videotape of Noriega getting on the C-141 at Howard. I'll look into this other stuff.

Mr. Sloyan: Have you not seen the jump?

Mr. Williams: No.

Mr. Sloyan: Do you know it exists?

Mr. Williams: This is the first I've heard of it, Pat.

Mr. Sloyan: There may even be stuff of Rio Hato.

Mr. Williams: I don't know. I will look into it, though.

Mr. Sloyan: Isn't there some freedom of information stuff filed?

Mr. Williams: I don't know. Not every FOI request goes through me. Do you know the answer to this Fred?

Mr. Francis: It was promised today.

Mr. Williams: I'll look into it, Pat, and give you a buzz.

Mr. Hillman: I'm Bob Hillman with the Dallas Morning News. Just another point on the distribution of the newspaper pool reports. When they got back to the Pentagon in some fashion they were faxed over to member pools, but I never got the idea, other than being distributed to the Pentagon, that really anybody else was really getting access to it like they should, particularly late in the night.

Mr. Williams: You mean such as individual newspaper members?

Mr. Hillman: Right. Such as the Baltimore Sun, did they have access at midnight to the newspaper pool reports that were being faxed in for the Pentagon? That part of the distribution. I never was sure that other newspapers around the country were getting access.

Mr. Russell: Bruce Russell of Reuters. This is a peripheral matter, but given the context of the military as looking into its relationships with the press on this particular occasion, the coverage was on two levels. It was the pool and it was reporters on the ground. If the military is reviewing its attitudes, we found we had 12 reporters on the ground, there was a very high string of incidents involving those reporters, I only want to give one. It was an American national. Our chief photographer for the region, caught out doing his duty slightly after curfew time, was instructed to slam down on the ground and told to stay there in the rain for quite a long time, for what seems to me to be nothing but punitive purposes. So if military attitudes are being reviewed, I'm not making a special case, and I only cite that one. We had reporters shot as well. That's perhaps the risk of the game. But it seems to me the military was sometimes treating clearly identifiable press people who were part of the coverage as almost the enemy.

Mr. Aubry: Tim Aubry from Reuter Pictures. The basic thing I want to say is I've got to reiterate what Fred said. Unless we get orders from the top and unless there's someone at the top of the chain making this stuff happen for us, we're dead in the water, and everything else we talk about is very incident. It makes no difference at all unless there are people who are going to say in Washington that this stuff has to be done and has to be given priority.

To address one other comment made earlier, there was some talk about reporters not being allowed to come into Panama partly because the pool was there. I don't know the reasoning why they didn't let other people in. I can state very plainly, though, the people that were brought in, and maybe this needs to be addressed, if they were allowed in, maybe they should have been allowed into the airport because the military controlled the airport and then let them do their own ground support once they were there. When the military tried to add ground support for every person that came in there, it was a logistical nightmare at SOUTHCOM. When you had, the first night there were 40 or 50, the second day we were there filing, the days tend to run together, 40 or 50 of them

were brought in, and they were eager to go and do whatever they could do, made it very difficult for us. The next day there were the people that were kept from 5:00 in the morning until midnight at the airport and then brought to SOUTHCOM. These people were fighting, screaming mad. I was in the middle of transmitting pictures, and one of them came in and told me they were going to take my phone.

We can't lend ground support. If you're going to give the ground support to all these people that are coming in, 250 people or whatever, it needs to be done somewhere else other than where the pool people are. The pool people need to have their facilities, and if the military wants to lend ground support, which for the first three days, some ground support was necessary because there was nothing downtown. Everything was looted, a lot of the stuff was closed, there was no food, the people that had been at the airport had not eaten, had not slept, had not showered. There were a lot of specific problems, but it should not have all come to SOUTHCOM. It was a very big problem for the pool people that were there, and it did hamper what we were trying to do as far as I'm concerned.

Mr. Glass: Andy Glass, Cox Newspapers. One quick anecdote and then a philosophical observation, if I may. Our regional correspondent was in Bogota at the time of the invasion. We chartered an airplane to fly to Panama. While we were over the area, the military air controller said if you don't get out of here in five minutes, we'll shoot you down. So we got out of there. It was quite awhile before our correspondent got in.

But it seems to me that what we're really dealing with is that World War II was the last good war in the sense that the press and the military were on the same side and cooperated. Many of the senior commanders who are now in charge were the same people who were junior commanders in Vietnam, and for better or worse, regard the press as an enemy, and feel that one reason the United States failed in Vietnam was that the press was on the other side.

So until these attitudes change, until there is a philosophical feeling that we are one country and that the people deserve to know what is going on, Pete, many of these things are just going to be bandaid solutions and are not really going to be addressed.

Mr. Bascomb: John Bascomb, ABC Radio. I had the good fortune of being not only on the Persian Gulf pool, the original DoD pool, not the theater pool, but the Panama pool as well. I wanted to point out a couple of similarities and differences.

We were told in Panama frequently when we asked to go close to the action, that it was not safe. However, I felt we were in much greater risk in the Persian Gulf. We were on a body of water filled with mines. In the Persian Gulf they supplied us with flak jackets and helmets which were never even offered to us in Panama. We know the risk and we're willing to take that risk if we're part of the pool. So keeping us away because it's not safe for us, I don't think is a good argument.

In terms of access, in the Persian Gulf we were on the ship with the captain. We had access 24 hours a day in his quarters, on the bridge, immense briefings. We just couldn't file. In Panama, we had no access, of course. And I think something that should be included in future public affairs annexes would be a rigid minimum of two briefings a day from perhaps the G3. I couldn't understand why we were not housed closer to or even in the operations center where we could listen to the briefings that General Thurman must have been getting throughout the day.

Finally, as far as communications, there's been a lot of concern about ground support. This is something I suggested when I came back from the Persian Gulf. I think there needs to be a separate fly-away package, if you will, uplink of phones and faxes and television transmission that goes in on the second wave, perhaps handled by DoD personnel, perhaps handled by broadcast and print personnel. This would make the initial wave of reporters small enough to go in with the troops, and it would mean you could be assured of having quality transmission out anywhere in the world and not have to rely on the local phone system.

Ms. Sproul: Robin Sproul from ABC Radio. In addition to all the ground problems, Pete, I hope Fred Hoffman's report will really deal with the issue on the thought process that went into sending the pool in as late as it went in and why, when they got to Andrews, they sat on the ground another two hours, and how that decision was made. That's a really key thing.

Mr. Williams: I agree. Although key as it is, I have a hunch we probably wouldn't be discussing it if the pool had access to whiz-bang stuff once they got there. But it's all part of the same stew.

Let me just take advantage of the passage of an hour to say a few things, and then we'll go back for another round here.

First of all, some small points. We will look at all these points that you raised, the questions that several of you have raised about the size of the pool and breaking it up into smaller groups, having an editor in Washington, having pool members attend briefings before they go, communications problems, better briefings, all that sort of thing.

In terms of the late arrival, the question you just raised Robin, and that you raised as well Kathy, the call out on this pool was the most complicated call out of any pool deployment we've ever had, exercise or for real. Partly because of the season of the year. It was very difficult to find Bureau Chiefs. Once we found the Bureau Chiefs, it was very difficult for them to find their reporters. This was the most time consuming, problematic call we've ever had, I suppose because of the season. It was December 19th, and people were at Christmas parties or on leave or that kind of thing. That was problem number one.

As I've explained to many of you already, the original operational plan for getting the pool to Panama, the general procedure is to get reporters in with the first troops who land. Those of you who know the operation know that the first that arrived in Panama jumped out of airplanes. That was not practical, clearly. So the operational staff came to us on Monday and said all right, here's the plan for the pool. They'll leave Washington at midnight and go to Fort Bragg. They will load on with the troops. They will leave Fort Bragg at 8:00 a.m. This was when H-hour was 1:00 a.m., and they will arrive in Panama at 1:00 p.m. We said no, that won't work. That's too late. That's 12 hours after the operation started.

I'm sure many of you are saying in retrospect, you should have done that and then we would have at least been with troops. But at that point it did not seem like the right idea, so we said the pool has to have its own airplane. The airplane was ready to go. The call outs began at 7:30, and it was not until I guess shortly before midnight that the plane left and arrived in Panama at 3:00 a.m. So that was an improvement from 1:00 p.m., and it was a compromise. Just about everything you do. Who should be in the pool, where should it go, all that stuff is a compromise. This was too. But that

accounts for why it took so long. It just was a complicated call out. It was hard to get everybody rounded up.

There have been some who suggested that rather than continuing to try to fill the slots in the pool, as soon as you get a certain critical mass the pool should leave and you shouldn't wait for people. So if you can't find the radio correspondent or you can't find the news magazine representative or whatever, you start a stop watch and then when that time elapses you say okay, the plane's gone. That suggestion has arisen since the Panama operation. I see several of you nodding yes. Be sure you note all the people who nodded yes so that when they don't go on the pool they will remember that they consented to that. (Laughter) But that's the sort of thing you're up against in terms of the lateness of the arrival.

I guess the primary point, and the one that keeps coming up over and over again is this idea of cultural acceptance, or the idea that somehow the people who are running the military now were the ones who felt abused in Vietnam. I've heard this point made over and over and over again. It was made after the Sidla Commission and it was made in Grenada, and it's been made repeatedly. I will wait for Fred's report. Fred is obviously aware of that criticism. He will look at it. I'm confident that Fred will give us an honest assessment of that.

Having talked to General Kelley, and I think it was important for you to note, Fred, in your initial discussion of the fact that he said it was okay for Erv Sharp to go home, I would just remind everybody that no decision was made to undertake this operation until Sunday. Whether Tom Kelley should have guessed that things might get dicey, that it would be a good idea for Irv Sharp to stay or not, I suppose is a different question. I just don't want anyone to think, nor did I think you meant to imply, that Tom Kelley knew all along there was going to be an operation and he intentionally got Irv Sharp out of the way. I suspect that was not your point, and I think it's important to emphasize that.

I've talked to Thurman, I've talked to Ron Sconyers. I don't have the advantage of what Fred will have and what several of you had of talking to the lieutenant colonels and colonels who made the operation work on the ground. I have found no evidence of the cultural acceptance problem. My own view is that it was a matter of insufficient planning. Now you may well say if the cultural acceptance problem went away, the planning problem would go away as well. That may well be. I intend to look into that.

I guess my point is this. I don't know how to make the military culturally accept reporters. I don't know a way to do that. I do know a way to try to fix the planning process if it turns out that the planning process is the problem. I guess I'm going to concentrate on things where I think the situation can be fixed. But the other point that I would make, is obviously the cultural acceptance thing is a long term question. There are people here from the National Defense University today that are eager to address this. This is something we work on all the time. It's a continuing matter of getting reporters and military people together, and indeed there was a recommendation of the Sidla Commission, as many of you may recall, which Admiral Baker reminded me of the other day, which is we should have more meetings between editors and military people. I think all that is true and all that is good, but at the same time, if it's fundamentally a planning problem, then that's something we fundamentally need to address.

Mr. Francis: First of all, this notion that we have to do something to have the military trust us, is ludicrous. The second notion I think that is ludicrous is that we have to jump out of airplanes or go to the National Training Center and become combat ready. That's ludicrous. It's the planning process.

I don't find a lot of evidence in the field that men like General Kelley don't like reporters. I don't see that evidence. I see a professional Army that will take orders, and I see a professional group of journalists that know how to do their jobs. Sure, there are going to be colonels and generals out there that remember Vietnam and want nothing to do with us, but I've yet to meet a colonel or a general who will not take orders when the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense issues orders. I don't think that's a problem. I don't think there has to be some lovefest here. I do think there has to be exercising of the pool every three months. I think those commanders like General Stiner and the commanders at the 82nd Airborne ought to have some interaction with us on a fairly frequent basis because the memory is gone every couple of years. It's a function of planning. It's not a function of changing customs and mores and ideas.

Ms. Cohen: Barbara Cohen, CBS. Some of the points that I wanted to make Fred just made about the professionalism on both sides, and I wanted to speak particularly to the responsibility that we members of the pool have. Once you agree to be in the pool, it is a very serious thing. There really is no excuse for not being reachable 24 hours a day for the three month period. It's a burden, but it's a burden that we willingly accept, and it's the tradeoff for having this arrangement made that facilitates our coverage.

Secondly, the notion of training people or of having people who are not adequately prepared to be members of the pool, I think again it's up to the Bureau Chiefs to select people who are capable of carrying out this responsibility. The fact that this and the Persian Gulf are the only real events that have occurred, whereas the exercises I think were seen as not particularly useful in journalistic terms, I think maybe this will cause us all to think among ourselves about the kinds of decisions we make in selecting who's available and the kinds of steps we take to be prepared to respond to a call out at any time.

Ms. Moore: Molly Moore from the Washington Post. I've been on three of the pool exercises, including the Persian Gulf. I can't speak to the Panama situation from firsthand, but I think in addition what's critical to the planning and the support of JCS up here is to underscore one of the things that's been brought up before, is to have the rank on the ground to back the execute orders.

The exercises, one of the problems I've found is the military escorts the Pentagon sends along with the pool from up here are very well versed in what the media needs, that they want to be where the action is. The problem you encounter is with their mid-level equivalent on the ground of the command you're going to. It's sort of the natural military inclination is to be very territorial. I've seen quite a bit of resentment from the ground officers toward the Pentagon corps who comes down and tries to tell them what to do. I think this is where a general officer or flag rank could help.

The other problem, that can also help with the commanders. In all the situations I've been on, the ground commander in charge, once they knew what the media wanted and what they needed, was actually very accepting to providing it. The problem was cutting through the mid-level ranks to get to that commander to get the request in for what you wanted.

Mr. Lewis: Findley Lewis of the Copley News Service. Among the things you said you wanted to look into, let me just reiterate the problem of unilateral coverage, the issue that Andy raised and some others raised. Just be aware that with editors and reporters there will be a continuing interest in getting access to scenes of action. I

suspect that boils down to the issue of getting people on planes, on military aircraft, and into the scene of combat. Since you did not mention that in your recap of things that you were going to look at, I just wanted to reiterate that as an issue that's of concern to many of us here.

Mr. Williams: I understand. While it's not technically a pool matter, it is one that we spend a considerable amount of time on. Somebody was, I can't remember who was making the point about World War II was the last time that there were warm and fuzzy feelings between the military and the press. There was also full field censorship. Korea was the last conflict where there was full field censorship. I can't envision a time in which there would be full field censorship again.

The unilateral coverage problem is a very real one. We had, at some point while the Panama operation was still going strong, 600 reporters all trying to jam into Quarry Heights Officers Club. I guess the difference is, between World War II and where it becomes a different matter not only in terms of quantity but quantitatively as well, communications are faster and more complicated. More people are needed to support the news product now than used to be. Although fundamentally I would agree that the principal part, and this is off the pool topic for just a moment, the principal point of the pool, again, is to get reporters, eye witnesses, if you will, to military actions and at some point you get right back down to pencils and notebooks again, and that's what we need to remind ourselves of. But when you get to the unilateral coverage issue, it's a lot of people with a lot of support stuff, and John made this point yesterday when we were on WAMU. In a sense, we had fairly good facilities in Panama, but if we undertake a military operation, and I had better for the sake of diplomatic nicety not mention a specific country, but if we go to Taylorland which is about as lush and comfortable as there is hair on top of Bob's head, we're out literally in the middle of nowhere. Then we're really going to be up against it when suddenly we have an enormous number of people wanting to come in to some makeshift airstrip and that kind of thing. I don't know the answer to that question, but it's certainly something we have to look into.

But to some extent, while the purpose of the pool and the purpose of the unilateral coverage are the same, to allow more and better coverage of military operations, as some have already suggested in terms of demand for telephones and facilities, unilateral coverage is a competing interest, to some extent, with the pool. I suppose your response might be well if the pool had worked better we wouldn't have wanted so much unilateral coverage. That may be true early on, but there are a lot more reporters out there than there were in World War II.

Voice: It seems to me that the purpose of the pool originally, as originally conceived, was a temporary arrangement to last until the unilateral could get there. The purpose was to protect the security of the operation.

Mr. Williams: That's part of it.

Voice: Two days after the invasion had occurred, when the whole world knew that the United States had military operations going on in Panama, there is no excuse for not allowing unilateral coverage.

Mr. Williams: There were at least two charter planes that I know of that came in Thursday. There was an L-1011 that came in Friday with over 250 people on it. There were reporters already in Panama before the operation started. So this is not like Grenada in that sense. It's not like we went to a remote place where there weren't any reporters to start with.

I guess the problem is this. The unilateral coverage issue, and please understand that I'm not telling you what the answer is, I'm just indicating to you some of the problems that we face as we go through this process. The unilateral coverage issue is significant for two reasons. Number one, it's a matter of people come in and they want to be able to do stuff. There is no point in going somewhere and getting your reporters there if they can't do anything, if they just sit on Howard Air Force Base. That means they want to be able to go out into the countryside. That means they want to be escorted. It's very difficult to escort 250 people.

Now you'll say, well we don't want escorts. As a matter of fact, there were reporters who called during the operation saying hey, I've got a reporter on Howard Air Force Base. Let my people go. Let them go out and cover.

Some would say all we need is an escort to our bureau downtown. It's safe, just escort us to the bureau. Of course there's a little tilt sign that comes on that says well if it's safe, why do you need an escort?

The second problem is that while, and I don't know what the answer is but I'm just drawing you into the problems we face, while on the one hand I have you saying look, reporters have been covering military operations since the Peloponnesian Wars, these are risks we take; we also had reporters in the Marriott Hotel and news organizations calling us saying what's the matter with you? Don't you know there are reporters in there? Go save us. We also had at least one instance that I know of of a producer who was held against his will by the PDF. The news organization understandably calling on behalf of that individual saying what is the matter with you, go fix that.

It's slightly more complicated than it might appear, the unilateral coverage issue. Fundamentally, reporters are American citizens. At some point that has to be remembered as well, and indeed in this operation there were news organizations saying go get my guys. If I worked for that organization I would like to think they would do that for me too. But it's not as simple as it might appear.

Voice: One aspect of the unilateral coverage, I know it's difficult to decide where the dividing line is, where the pool is called out and goes back home, and the 250 people who have arrived on a plane are allowed to do whatever they want to do. But whatever the answer to that, the pool operations center should probably be where nobody else can get to a phone, as long as the pool is operating those phones should be only for the pool. It became too difficult, I know, for SOUTHCOM people, to just tell those people to wander into Panama City, so they said well come over to the Officer's Club and try for the three phones.

Mr. Rubenstein: Larry Rubenstein from Reuters. Two things. One, in echoing what we're already hearing about the leadership at the Pentagon, one thing we have found on past pool movements, and it's changed somewhat. When the two Taylors were originally in charge of the original pool, there was always one back here and one on the mission so we had somebody with knowledge of operations that we could talk to. In ensuing events, through the change of commands, what we've found most often is -- Colonel Alexandrakos and before him, they go on the mission. We are left with very competent and concerned individuals who take our phone calls, but who are just not high enough in the loop to be able to take the information and run with it or the problems.

It shouldn't have been up to NBC, whoever got to Colin Powell, or to you raising hell on that first day to say hey, this is not working. There should have been somebody at the Pentagon who the Bureau Chiefs could have gone to and said this is not working,

what can we do, and gone to somebody with enough clout here in Washington in addition, you know, I understand the value of a high ranking escort, that's probably very valuable too, but to get back to the command and control center, if the command and control is here in Washington we need better input here in Washington from the moment the pool leaves me.

For instance, I heard on NBC that the pool had been deployed at like 1:06 a.m. on Tuesday. I called our contact at the Pentagon and said are we in second stage notification on pool movement? First her response was what's second stage notification? The second one was she didn't think so and she'd get back to me. An hour and a half later she called back and said yes, we're in second stage notification. I said thank you, the world knew about this three hours ago. So I think we need to enforce that.

The second one about unilateral coverage, I debriefed extensively our photographer who was shot and wounded down there who was with the photographer who was killed by the American troops down there accidentally. One point he made was the fact that the troops on the ground really had no conception of media, and they weren't even, for instance the wounding took place, a group of American tanks and personnel carriers came down the street in front of the Marriott, and there was a group of news people standing together in front of the Marriott, visibly, with cameras and the whole thing, and all of a sudden the second tank in the thing opened fire, supposedly at a sniper, and just was sweeping the entire area with bullets and nailed everybody that was standing in this little crowd. Right afterwards the American medics came up to them and interrogated them as to who they were, and then gave them medical assistance, which he thought was kind of ridiculous. It wouldn't have saved the other guy, he was dead instantly, but in his case it prolonged the thing. Then they medivac'd them to the hospital.

So if you're talking unilateral coverage, that's a risk of unilateral coverage you automatically assume by being there, but I just don't know where you can draw the level with the military about acceptance of that.

Mr. Williams: The purpose of the pool, of course, was number one, to be a way of getting reporters with early arriving troops and maintaining operational security. Several of you are right, it was not envisioned that the pool would last forever. The complications that we had in Panama, and this is not an excuse but it is an observation, were fundamentally that the first troops jumped out of airplanes, and that would not work.

We could have put a pool together from people who were already in Panama, and perhaps in retrospect that's what we should have done. But our feeling was that the people here in the national media pool were best qualified and knew the ground rules and all of that. In fact as some of you know, the Persian Gulf pool was a locally assembled pool.

Voice: Not so.

Mr. Williams: The first one was.

Voice: The first one was a DoD pool, and then they went locally.

Mr. Williams: Okay. But the only other point I'd make is this. I don't have any doubt that we need to do a better job of planning these pools. I don't think anyone can have any doubt about that. On the other hand, I think I have wondered whether if it weren't that Howard Air Force Base were on the other side of the Panama Canal, we probably wouldn't be sitting here today. So we have to bear in mind, this is no excuse,

this is merely an observation that even if we improve, and I hope we will, improve substantially our planning, it's no guarantee that it will always succeed. We need to do better. In fact, if the swing bridge had been working and the Bridge of the Americas had been ours, maybe we wouldn't be here today. But still it doesn't absolve us of the need to do a much better job of planning and execution.

Voice: (Kathy) Besides the things you point out, it still would have been better to have had us landed at Howard six hours earlier than we were. I mean it seems to me it's not an either/or of going six hours later or jumping out of airplanes with the paratroopers. We could have been positioned in Panama and tried to do something.

Mr. Williams: That's true. The only thing I would add about that is this. The other dimension of the pool is operational security, and it's terribly important. It's not just some sort of code word that people like to say at the Pentagon. The success of an operation and the lives of people depend on it, and I know you all know that.

The daytime call outs which we've experimented with in the past, have proved to be the least operationally secure. That's one of the reasons that we decided to do it after dark, after 7:30.

Mr. Francis: In defense of us being able to keep a secret. If we downsize the initial pool and plan for a second echelon with all the equipment and support staff, if we downsize for the initial pool and we have a minimum that handles radio, TV, and print, and stills, that initial pool, and we're talking six people, we could have that equipment every three months sitting at the Pentagon so there wouldn't have to be a draw of equipment or something like that. My point is that six people can keep a secret and you can move six people just like General Stiner moved in a couple of days or a day before in his own private plane, he didn't jump out of an airplane. You could have moved people 24 hours earlier. I'm not at the Pentagon every day. Nobody would have said where's Fred, well he's somewhere else. It was doable and you can keep a secret. Twelve hours later the second echelon, second call up, whatever you want to call it. That solves that problem.

Voice: I was just going to add that the continuing pool in the Persian Gulf was a six person pool and was enough to fit in a Black Hawk and move around fairly comfortably.

Voice: I don't want to beat this poor dog to death, but just one point here that perhaps ought to be made. That is that the issue of multilateral coverage wouldn't be so urgent had the pool that was there been able to function effectively.

Mr. Williams: Sure. However, while I have no doubt that that's true, I can't imagine that at some point the same thing wouldn't have happened. Maybe it would have happened two days later or something, but I can't imagine that there still wouldn't have been a desire to get people in to supplement, to rotate...

Voice: There certainly would have, and I'm not saying it would go away altogether. I think there are a lot of people at DoD that work very hard to make the pool work and there was a lot of good will and good intention in making it work. However, in the heat of the operation at a certain point along about Thursday afternoon, it was very tempting to conclude that some commander had used the pool to prevent any news from getting out. The pool was locked up and multilateral reporters couldn't get in, and that's that so go away.

Mr. Williams: I can understand that, and frankly I'm astonished that I haven't heard more of that today. You're all being very charitable. But I do want to reassure you that we were working on the unilateral coverage problem as well, and some of it wasn't entirely of our making. Some of the Costa Rican authorities wouldn't let planes take off even after we had cleared them. But still, your point remains a sound one.

Mr. Headline: Bill Headline from CNN. To punctuate that point, remembering back to the Sidle hearings, we made the point over and over and over again that pools are basically repugnant and we want unilateral coverage, we want unilateral coverage as quickly as we can make it. As superb a job as Fred Francis did for television, NBC would rather have had Fred covering for NBC and we all would rather have had our own people covering as quickly as possible. That won't change. So I think the point there is that while we need to continue perfecting the pool, and we certainly appreciate your willingness to proceed down that path, at the same time you do have to take a careful look at the next stage in handling unilateral requirements as quickly as you can.

Mr. Williams: That is something that I think is less well thought out on both sides. In a sense, if this operation had been in some bizarre, small, remote, uncivilized in the sense of having landing strips and that kind of thing, country, I think our problems would have been much worse because the problem is this. You say to news organizations or they come to you and say we want to send in more people. We need more people in. I say okay, but remember that I've got no place to put you, I've got no place to house you, I can't feed you, there's no water, there's no phones, I don't know what the hell to do with you once you get there, and people say yes, fine, we'll figure that out. That's our job. You just get us in there.

Once they get there, of course, people start saying could I get a jeep, how about this, and that's just the natural part of things. So I guess what I'm saying is I'm willing to do that, but we all have to understand it's not going to be real smooth.

Mr. Francis: Unilateral means you're on your own. 

Mr. Williams: Fred's point is unilateral means you're on your own and of course that's true, but it also means I can't absolve myself, I mean you say you're on your own, but another organization will say say, my guy just got captured, would you please go get him.

Mr. Francis: The point is that until Friday afternoon, Panama was not safe. If you had let the Howard 200 or 300 loose on the streets of Panama you'd have had 20 or 30 hostages. That's the simple fact. I don't know if your people told you that, but it wasn't safe to work. You go to ugly-land somewhere, and it's basically the same problem. We've got to fix the pool to make the pool work in that first 12, 24, 36, 48 hours. Unilateral means you're on your own and NBC will take care of themselves, and the New York Times and the other papers will take care of themselves on a unilateral basis. I think the concept is that it's a competing interest. NBC was still trying to get people in while the pool was working, and that's the way it's going to be in any situation.

Mr. Russett: Tim Russett, NBC. I was the lucky guy who was the network pool chairman for this great event. I think one thing for the Hoffman report, Pate, and to your point about notification, in the very early stages, after the initial notification which we were able to execute pretty well, there really was a major delay in the second phase allowing me to tell the other networks that in fact the Pentagon pool had

been activated, when it was all over the wires that we were at war, the invasion had taken place. I finally had to call and say listen, this is ridiculous. I have to be able to notify my colleagues. It was through no fault of the people who were designated as liaisons because they just weren't authorized. Finally after several hours of difficulty I called you out of frustration. I think as part of this process, either you or someone at your right arm has to be designated in the initial stages as the contact person. Once we were able to get through to you or Kudla, things moved and things happened and there were responses and tensions were lowered considerably. It's just --

(END OF SIDE)

-- principal deputy be authorized to deal directly with us.

Voice: I just wanted to throw in a vote for the idea of the six person pool as an original pool going in. The basic concept of the pool as I see it are those first 12 hours. You have to get the information out. I can understand commanders sitting around looking at an operation and not wanting to send 30 people into the field. It's just inconceivable. If they had six people to deal with and every thing they planned an operation they know there are going to be just six people, they can plan from the start getting those people onto the scene. That also helps the second wave too, because by the time these people are in the field they have a better understanding of where they can send the second wave, if they can send them out at all. So I think that's an excellent concept. It solves the problem of getting the news out immediately, and it would help solve the problem of getting people in the field where the reporting is supposed to be taking place.

Mr. Rubenstein: I totally agree with what you're saying on numbers. I think the numbers have to be issued. But the problem with a six person pool is that while logistically it's easier to move them around and you could break that out of a larger pool on arrival, that doesn't deliver you the information. Six people, if there's one still photographer he doesn't have time to file the pictures. If there's one TV crew you've got nothing to do with the tape. If you've got one or two print reporters possibly you might be able to get some print media out. If there's one radio tech, if the radio tech's out in the battlefield there's no way to file those tapes. So in effect what you have is fine, you have a pool in motion and that's great and we love that idea, but the pool in motion doesn't do us any good because in this case with the first still pictures, 16 or 17 hours for the first still pictures after the pool call out, that kind of thing, unless we can, and this is something we've gone over with Bob and Steve from the very beginning and everybody since then, the logistics of dealing with material and how long and when and where and how. So the problem with a small pool is it's not really a small pool.

Mr. Williams: Let's talk about this for just a second, and maybe kind of try to wrap things up here shortly. Who is on a six member pool? One wire reporter, one wire photographer, that's two; one television reporter, one television cameraman, that's four; one newspaper reporter; one news magazine reporter?

Voice: No, radio. It's got to be a two man TV crew in a wartime situation.

Mr. Williams: Three television people?

Voice: With the new equipment that we have available to us, and if it were done right, you only need two television people. Only if there is a provision made for a very quick second echelon.

Voice: I don't want to overrule my own correspondent here.

Voice: I know you're going to fight for three, and that's fine.

Voice: We wouldn't send a one man crew in a riot on the streets of the United States. I think for safety's sake a guy with a camera needs someone to hold on to his belt.

Voice: We can work that out later. The point is, that your small crew with a still photographer, with a wire reporter, with a radio reporter, and your second echelon, the point is the second echelon handles the filing. The second echelon handles the filing. Everybody wants immediate stuff within an hour, that's just not going to work. You're covering combat.

Mr. Williams: I guess I still would like a little more discussion, and I apologize to the radio reporters. I spent ten years as one, I don't know why I forgot radio. It's a problem we constantly fight. But who is the six person pool?

Voice: In the Persian Gulf the standing pool was a three person TV crew, a wire still photographer, they varied. The people who were on the pool when I went there were both wire service photographers. There was one writer who happened to be either from AP or UPI, they just rotated it; and the radio guy.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time Magazine. Excuse me, I think in the Persian Gulf there was a wire still photographer and a magazine still photographer and they went to different places.

Mr. Williams: Larry says that was only on the initial deployment.

Voice: (John) I just want to second what Fred Francis had to say. I think it can be done with a five person pool, and to allay any concerns about how you get these photos back, the videotape or the audio tape or the written reports, the second echelon goes in. I think the plane we took out of Andrews at 11:20 at night should have carried the second echelon. If we had been notified during the day and flown to Fort Bragg and left with the troops, we would have been on the ground for four or five hours before the uplink arrives, and we would have been able to file by 6:00 a.m. the day of the invasion.

Mr. Williams: On what day? You wouldn't have gotten there until 1:00 in the afternoon.

Voice: No, if we had gone in with the troops. Or if we had gone in during the day. There were planes landing at Howard all during the day on Tuesday before the invasion began. If we could have gone in pre-positioned 12 hours, we would have filed on the invasion as it occurred, and then the support gear could come in on the same plane we left Andrews on, and the first reports could have been out of there in time for the morning shows, the morning drive.

Mr. Williams: There's a radio guy!

Voice: I was just going to emphasize the importance of that quick second echelon to file, even on the standing Persian Gulf pool when we were out in the ship, they would helicopter tape back to the island we weren't ever on. They'd just bounce it around one of the news bureaus until they figured out somebody knew how to feed a radio

tape. That was a major problem. It was a problem for the TV, of finding a way to get the TV video back to the States. The idea of the second echelon is crucial.

Mr. Aukofer: Frank Aukofer for the Milwaukee Journal. Once again I have this sort of deja vu feeling. In the early days of the pool, the whole discussion over the size of the pool was to be determined by the size of the exercise. If you had something where you could only squeeze five people on a plane, that was going to be that.

Mr. Williams: But it had its own plane so we could squeeze a lot more.

Mr. Aukofer: But again, this was supposed to have all been handled in the planning process. If it was a small operation, you had a plan for a small pool. If it was a larger operation, as the one I went on with Fred one time, we had 14, and that worked fine.

Ms. Moore: This will be sacrilege to some of my print colleagues, but if you're talking about trying to keep the numbers down on a first echelon, there in truth is no need for a wire service, newspaper and magazine. You could have any one of the three, as in fact we did out in the Persian Gulf on the pool and it worked fine. When you have two or three from the different medium, we generally always file together anyway.

The advantage to having more later on, obviously you can be in more than one place at the same time. You're going to get a lot of territorialism between the daily newspapers and the magazines and the wire services who all think they have to have one of their own, but if you're really trying to keep the numbers down in a first group, I think you could get away with one representative and you could rotate them among the three over the course of the year.

Mr. Aubry: Tim Aubry, Reuter Pictures. Basically I see the need for the six man pool or the five man pool for logistics, to move people around for tactical stuff. One of the problems, and I think we did it several times in Panama when we were down there. I think there were several occasions where it came up and they said we can only take a tight group and we broke that up very easily. Among ourselves we said this is what's going to happen and they're going to go. That worked very well to the point that we still had some people there that knew what was happening and that kind of stuff.

I think when you come into a second echelon type thing you're going to have several problems. One, how are you going to notify who is going to be the second echelon? And in what capacity are they going to go down? If we're going down with one photographer as a tactical first small group person, the inclination then on a second echelon would be to send someone down that can edit and file. But in a situation where you're only going to have two people doing that, you have to have someone that, in my case of still photography, you have to have someone that can shoot too. A lot of times the person that was left back at SOUTHCOM that was doing the actual stuff, if something came up and the guy was in the field the second thing that was of interest or was necessary to have, if you only have someone there that can file, you're once again dead in the water.

So I agree that maybe we could take the group and break it up as we're down there, and I don't think there was a problem of breaking the group up into something very small when we were there.

Voice: Just to underline, the reason for the smaller pool is to take care of that problem of immediacy in getting on the scene. That's what the pool, in my mind, is the main objective of having the pool. It does no good to get 30 people down there when

they have nothing to report and they can't get the news out. You can do that initially as long, and the point has been stressed here, as you have that second group coming in. There are still pool people who will take care of the filing, who will also take care of more extended reporting after that. But you've got to get the immediate reports out, and from a place where they will be credible and where they're needed. That's what a smaller pool can do.

Mr. Rosenberg: Jeff Rosenberg, NPR. After the Persian Gulf operation we discussed with the DoD people the filing problems, and they told us that there was a plan afoot to put in MARSAT telephone equipment on at least a significant number of fleet ships, which would certainly take care of all voice. I don't know if you're familiar with the MARSAT system. It's a global telephone system that's absolutely public, and you can access it from almost any spot on the globe. It produces acceptable voice data, faxes, it takes care of all that problem. You may not know, we had terrible trouble getting voice back from the Persian Gulf, the initial stages. Can you report any progress on that?

Mr. Williams: I don't know the answer. Alex or Bob, do you know the answer? I'm sorry that I don't. We'll have to make sure that our next operation is on board ship, obviously.

Mr. Massey: Toby Massey with AP. I'm afraid I have to agree with Mr. Francis totally. I think when you have a small working group, and that's what a pool should really mean, that it's a workable group, that you get them in initially, and if you bring in the backup crew, and as far as who's in there, that's just housekeeping chores. We can decide who's going to be in it, whether there will be a second editor, a second photographer, three more writers, whatever it is. But I think the initial thing, and we made the point over and over again on the pool, is to get them to the scene, make them eye witnesses, and get them out into the field of action. It's easier to do with six or eight people than it is with thirty.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time. I just would like to say in terms of magazine still, or in addition to wire still, we have very different requirements for the magazine: We shoot chrome. We very rarely use wire pictures unless we can get a print. That's just the requirements of a magazine. So it's another factor to consider.

Mr. Williams: And I'm aware of the fact that you guys prefer color and other people what black and white, that kind of thing.

Ms. Johnson: It's not a difference between, the wires shoot color. It's that we use chrome. We print our magazine from chrome.

Mr. Williams: Other comments?

Let me thank you all very much. Let me assure you that we intend to follow up on all these ideas. We'll be meeting with our planners. We'll be giving a transcript of this to Fred, and we'll send a transcript to all of you as well. Thanks very much for coming.

END

Second-Hand News Coverage Blamed on Military

By Michael Specter
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Department spokesman Pete Williams said yesterday that the "incompetence" of U.S. military leaders in Panama prevented American reporters from accompanying troops into battle on the first day of the invasion.

"There really is no excuse for it," Williams said when asked why access of media pool reporters was limited almost exclusively to interviews with U.S. Embassy officials. He said that he and other Pentagon officials protested strongly to U.S. commanders in Panama. "Yesterday [Wednesday] was a disaster. We stomped all over them and they got the message in spades."

Pool reports yesterday on the combat in and around Panama City were second-hand and sparse. Despite promises of help from the Defense Department early in the day, bureaucratic hurdles plagued the press. Hundreds of reporters, television producers and film crews trying to reach Panama sat helplessly in planes parked in Miami and Costa Rica.

Late in the day, after his initial comments had been reported widely, Williams said he had not meant to blame only the military in Panama. He said that the pool got off to a shaky start and that he deserved the blame.

"Today I feel better about how things are going," he said yesterday evening. "We made some mid-

course corrections." However, they were not sufficient to placate most news organizations.

On the second day of the largest U.S. combat operation since the Vietnam War, American news organizations, with the exception of ABC-TV, remained largely unable to get their reporters and film crews into Panama.

Costa Rican officials, afraid to permit American planes to take off for a war zone, spent hours seeking what they considered appropriate permission. Messages flew wildly among embassies, the Pentagon and news organizations across the United States. But by early last evening nothing seemed to have worked.

"It has been a terribly frustrating

day," said ABC Washington bureau chief George Watson, who, like most of his competitors, struggled all day to get a crew into Panama. "A while ago it seemed that you couldn't imagine another bureaucratic hurdle that needed to be cleared. After the Pentagon said yes, and Howard Air Force Base said yes, and the Southern Command said yes, Costa Rica said no."

Howard Air Force Base outside Panama City was where reporters on the ground from Costa Rica were told they would land in Panama. The Southern Command is the headquarters for U.S. military forces in Central America.

The only plane reported to carry American journalists to make it to

NEWS...Pg. 12

White House takes a slap at impatient journalists

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House expressed impatience yesterday at repeated demands from media executives and questions from reporters that seemed aimed at gaining special treatment for correspondents in Panama.

The calls from the news organizations represented a "selfish disregard for the others in Panama," including the American troops and the 35,000 other U.S. citizens there, said a key administration official who asked not to be identified.

"News organizations fully know that risks are involved" when stationing a correspondent and technical crews in battle zones, the official said.

Heightening the White House's impatience was the leak of information about the Panama mission by a Pentagon "pool" reporter to a lawmaker, who in turn called the White House. That call, the administration official said, without elaborating, "seriously undermined the mission."

White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater expressed disgust yesterday at the pool reporter's breach of the rules.

The identity of the reporter has not been determined, but the Panama pool includes representatives of NBC News, Time Magazine, the Houston Post, the Houston Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, Reuters news agency and The Associated Press.

President Bush, at an afternoon press conference yesterday, bristled

at repeated questioning from CBS White House correspondent Wyatt Andrews about the American citizens trapped in the Marriott Hotel, many of whom were journalists.

"We had calls from your network, your chairman of the board, urging us to go in and take the... No, he did!" insisted Mr. Bush, as some in the White House press corps laughed. "And I understand it. He had a... producer that he felt was held."

"... There's been an awful lot of interest in the Marriott Hotel. But I'm very pleased to say that it is secure," the president said. "And we've had heads of corporations, we've had news organizations other than his, concerned about their people."

The Pentagon said U.S. forces seized the hotel yesterday, freeing all Americans. But three soldiers were wounded, one seriously.

White House and State Department officials said television's preoccupation with the temporary seizure of the Marriott by Panamanian Defense Forces was because the media uses the hotel as a headquarters.

In the case of CBS News, the company's top executives called President Bush and others at the White House "dozens of times" requesting a military plane and U.S. Embassy staff to help locate missing producer Jon Meyersohn, the administration official said.

"I got their point after the first six calls," he said.

CBS spokesman Tom Goodman confirmed that network executives

SLAP...Pg. 10

Pentagon took notes in Grenada to avoid error in Panama operation

By Peter Almond
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Operation Just Cause demonstrated that the Pentagon has learned from its mistakes in Grenada, military experts said yesterday.

However, the possibility remains of continued U.S. military involvement in Panama to contend with thousands of troops loyal to ousted strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, they said.

U.S. forces showed vast improvements in carrying out low-intensity conflicts since the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, but intelligence weaknesses remained a major problem.

"So far, it's a classic joint operation, involving all three services," said retired Army Col. William J. Taylor, director of political-military studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It shows that we have learned a hell of a lot since Grenada."

But with thousands of Panamanian Defense Force troops still at large — one battalion of over 500 men devoutly loyal to Gen. Noriega completely eluded U.S. forces yesterday — questions emerged about prospects of U.S. troops being tied down for months in guerrilla warfare.

"They melted away. We carry them as a possible future problem," said Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the failure of U.S. troops to find Battalion 2000, one of those units which came to the rescue of Gen. Noriega in last October's at-

tempted coup.

Also still unanswered is whether U.S. troops are able to occupy Panama City and turn peacekeeping over to Panamanian forces.

While the successes and failures of Operation Just Cause have yet to be assessed, military experts say it is far superior to the Grenada rescue mission.

Six years ago, U.S. Marines and Army troops moved slowly and often uncertainly against ill-prepared troops under Marxist leadership on the island of Grenada. Although declared an unqualified success by U.S. officials at the time, serious flaws were detected later.

Army helicopters could not refuel from Navy ships for "budget" reasons, radio communications between units were poor and special operations helicopters blundered in broad daylight to attack well-defended positions. Few troops had maps. Considering the weak opposition, casualties were relatively high.

On Wednesday morning in Panama, however, apparently there were no such failures.

In one of the most complex and precise operations since the Vietnam War, helicopters and armored personnel carriers set out from bases in Panama to attack PDF targets all over the country.

At the same time, C-141 and C-130 transports from the United States brought men of the 82nd Airborne Division to coordinated parachute drops onto Tocumen Airport at Panama City.

This was an example of the "new military" of Third World conflicts

GRENADA...Pg. 10

Mission's spotlight shines on Powell — and he shines back

By Alan McConaha
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Gen. Colin L. Powell, the reserved, thoughtful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has emerged as a pivotal figure in the American military effort to restore democracy to Panama.

As a result of his acclaimed presence on television the morning of the invasion and reports of his decisive presence in White House deliberations, the respected Army professional overnight became a household name.

The Wall Street Journal yesterday noted the positive impact of the general's appearance on television Wednesday morning to explain the military operation "in a performance that left politicians and viewers marveling."

At the time, the 52-year-old general's description of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega as "decapitated" from his dictatorship and vow that "we will chase him and we will find him" established the theme of the day's news coverage.

"As an inside player, he seems to be the person who turned the tide on this. He also seems to be playing a much more public role as an administration spokesman," said Jay Kosminsky, defense policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation.

Gen. Powell's willingness to reverse his reservations about use of military force in Panama had enormous influence with White House policy-makers, according to inside accounts.

As White House national security adviser, he had sided with the Pentagon in opposing State Department recommendations that U.S. troops be used to depose Gen. Noriega. He reportedly favored less direct (and unsuccessful) methods.

But outraged at the slaying of an unarmed American Marine by Panamanian troops, Gen. Powell contended later as chairman of the joint chiefs that support for Gen. Noriega was thin and a military operation would work.

Apparently, it has. And his reputa-

tion is likely to be enhanced by yesterday's smoothly unfolding U.S. military effort in Panama despite problems with American hostages and failure to capture Gen. Noriega.

Gen. Powell, who became the youngest chairman of the joint chiefs in history less than three months ago, is the son of Jamaican immigrants. He was born in Harlem and grew up in the South Bronx.

His father was a shipping clerk and his mother a seamstress in the New York garment district. They persuaded their son that the key to opportunity in the United States is education.

Gen. Powell graduated from City College of New York in 1958 with a degree in geology; a ROTC commission and the dream of retiring from the Army after 20 years as a lieutenant colonel.

He is the father of three children and a veteran of two tours in Vietnam. In 1972, he became a White House fellow and was assigned to work for a year in the Office of Management and Budget.

Both Caspar Weinberger, then director of OMB, and his assistant, Frank Carlucci, were so impressed by their aide that each would later lure him from command posts to serve in the Reagan administration.

Coming into the White House as national security adviser at the peak of the Iran-Contra affair, Gen. Powell restored credibility to a position that had been at the center of the controversy.

Earlier, he had peripheral roles in preparations for the Grenada invasion of 1983 and the Libyan bombing mission in 1986. In his new job, he directed the largest U.S. military combat effort since the Vietnam War.

After approving details of an incursion involving the deployment of 24,000 troops in early morning darkness, the general took a brief nap before meeting with his staff to monitor the beginning of the combat.

In effect, his forces appeared to be successful in ending organized re-

POWELL...Pg. 11

that they have been pressured by news executives to open up the international airfield in Panama and let correspondents in. But Mr. Fitzwater noted yesterday, "There are reporters all over Panama — everywhere. The Marriott Hotel is full of them."

A pool system was set up for coverage of overseas military oper-

THREAT...from Pg. 6

The terrorism threat appeared to grow yesterday, officials said, when Soviet-made tanks surrounded the U.S. Embassy in Managua after reports that U.S. troops had taken up positions outside the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama City.

Secret Service Special Agent Allan Cramer said, "We're certainly concerned with all the events taking place...."

But he said the president and vice president are being well protected.

Yesterday the White House received a "suspicious" package at the northwest gate on Pennsylvania Avenue, an official said.

The Secret Service temporarily closed the road in front of the White House as the package was inspected. The official said the package was harmless.

Mr. Bush and his wife, Barbara, repeatedly have shrugged off re-

ports of threats, claiming that they will never be a hostage to the White House. The clearest example of the first family's commitment to shun security shackles was Mr. Bush's decision to fly to Cartagena — the resort city in the world's cocaine center — despite objections from some on his staff and the Secret Service.

"There's always a concern because you never know when" terrorists will strike, Mr. Cramer said yesterday.

Security was increased along White House gates late Wednesday as anti-war protesters gathered along Pennsylvania Avenue to march against the administration's action in Panama.

Uniformed Secret Service officers took positions on both sides of the protesters and cars and trucks were placed along the street. And guards stood at attention right inside the White House gate while protesters were marching along the fence chanting anti-war slogans.

equipped by us. We threw in another 10,000.

"If we couldn't do it there, where could it have worked? Grenada was pulled together in a hurry. And we had no one on the ground to start with."

To the experts, two factors prevent the Panama operation from being a total success: the failure to seize Gen. Noriega and the inability to prevent hostage-taking.

"Unfortunately, our intelligence failed us at the last minute," said Col. Taylor. "We lost track of Noriega 45 minutes before H-hour (start of the operation). "If he is still in communication with at least some of his troops, then we're in some deep trouble.

Losing Battalion 2000 was another failure.

"[That's] another intelligence failure. Here we are in possession of every kind of technical equipment and we can't find a whole battalion?" said Col. Taylor.

The experts would not call the hostage-taking a failure since the risks were considered in attack plans.

"One of the things that still haunts the military is this idea of a surgical operation," Col. Taylor said. "I don't think there's ever been an operation that is really surgical. The military is not a scalpel. It's a sledgehammer."

GRENADA... from Pg. 5

the Army and Marine Corps are focusing on — in contrast to previous planning geared to full-scale conflict in Europe.

Instead of the divided commands in Grenada, all field operations in Panama came under Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the U.S. Southern Commander in Panama. "Packages" of forces, tailor-made for the operation, were sent out against specific targets. Army Rangers worked with paratroopers, Air Force gunships and Navy SEALs under one command structure.

There were very few accidents, and few killed by hostile fire. Pentagon officials had expected at least 50 dead in the first phase of such a major operation. Only 12 were killed in the first seven hours.

"As a military operation, it went very smoothly, isolating the enemy and removing them as an obstacle," said retired Army Col. Harry Summers.

"Well, it should have worked," said one Pentagon official, who declined to be identified. "We've had contingency plans for this for years. We've been practicing it and practicing it. There are 12,000 troops on the ground in Panama, up against, what, 6,000 regular PDF trained and

ations after media complaints of being cut out of the 1983 U.S. operation in Grenada.

Under the system, when the troops left for Panama late Tuesday night, the Pentagon picked a pool of reporters to go along and provide news to their colleagues back home. To avoid jeopardizing the mission, the pool reporters were forbidden to inform anyone but their bosses that they were going.

"We were greatly disturbed that one of the major organizations had divulged their participation and departure before they left here and

had called other government officials to tell them that," Mr. Fitzwater said yesterday. "That does call into question the integrity of the pool and the commitments made."

But Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday that they were pleased with the operation of the media pool, despite media complaints that there had been only limited access to the military action in Panama.

• This article is based in part on wire service reports.

SLAP...from Pg. 5

had made calls to several government agencies.

Representatives of CBS, ABC and The New York Times were seized at the Marriott, but Mr. Meyersohn was the only media representative not released.

White House officials also said

LEAKS...from Pg. 4

President Bush almost certainly will propose some kind of aid plan to repair part of the extensive damage caused in this week's fighting and to help get the economy back on its feet. But U.S. aid will not restore prosperity, and a new government will have to find new ways for the country to compensate for lost banking and commercial business.

The need to reform the Panama Defense Forces poses even thornier problems, according to officials and experts on Panama. Congressional sources disclosed yesterday that White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu had sought advice from some on Capitol Hill as to which past or present Panamanian officers might be able to help Endarra rebuild his military establishment.

The military has traditionally provided a means of upward mobility for poor Panamanians with Indian or African blood. Although the military stayed out of politics for most of its history, it has long been permeated with corruption, collecting the traditional type of police graft from contractors, bars and brothels and distributing the payoffs according to an elaborate system that reached down from the officers to the enlisted ranks.

In 1968, a radical president, the late Arnulfo Arias, tried to shake up the National Guard, which retaliated by deposing him and beginning the period of military domination that lasted until Wednesday's U.S. invasion.

After Noriega became commander in 1983, he moved the Defense Forces from its small-time graft to

alleged collaboration with Colombian drug traffickers in multimillion-dollar smuggling and money-laundering operations that finally brought him into confrontation with the United States. Even with Noriega gone, the United States—and Endarra—now must deal with or help replace a corrupt Panamanian military establishment.

Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on western hemisphere affairs and a supporter of the intervention in Panama, said yesterday: "We cannot be a guarantor of a civilian government or of the security of the Panamanian streets for very long. It's up to the new government to demonstrate it has support among the people. They can't be in hiding. This government has got to be out in the streets."

EXPERTS...from Pg. 6

attachment to the canal, referring to the attacks he suffered while negotiating and defending President Jimmy Carter's 1977 treaties that will cede control of the canal to Panama at the end of this century.

The same history of U.S. domination, Linowitz said, makes Panama a particularly sensitive issue for other Latin American nations.

When the 1977 treaties relinquishing U.S. control over the canal were signed, Linowitz recalled, the presidents of 20 Latin American countries came to Washington to hail a new day of mutual respect in the hemisphere. Linowitz said many of those Latin countries are today displaying "very strong disapproval" of the Panama invasion, which for them "raises the specter of the

SEALS...from Pg. 3

machine-gun emplacements and guard towers, Mr. Livingstone said.

"My guess is it would have taken between 30 and 50 people under cover of darkness, who worked their way up to the buildings, blowing doors and cleaning out rooms," Mr. Livingstone said.

"They usually give very tough stuff to the SEALs, and Paitilla was probably a major target," he added. "It probably wasn't hand-to-hand combat, but I'm sure it was 'up close and personal.'"

There are six active-duty SEAL teams and five reserve teams based in the Philippines, Scotland, Puerto Rico and Miami, in addition to two command centers in Little Creek, Va., and Coronado, Calif., near San Diego.

gringo from the north coming in to interfere in their affairs."

Another special factor in the approval by most of the U.S. public is strong antipathy to Noriega, who was described by Linowitz as "the guy in the black hat" who became a target of official and popular distaste.

Prof. William Leogrande of American University, a scholar of Latin American affairs who also has served as an aide to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, said the unusually broad and fervent U.S. political opposition to Noriega is due "first to the drug connection and second to the fact he is a dictator with a reputation for brutality who, in the television era, looks the role."

Especially since Noriega's indictment on drug-trafficking charges in two U.S. courts in Florida early last year, he has been the target not only of U.S. economic warfare and covert attack but of verbal assaults

Will Ball, a former Navy secretary in the Reagan administration, said the SEALs are the "grandsons" of the famed Navy frogmen, who carried out underwater demolition operations in World War II. They first were set up as counterinsurgency forces in the 1960s, according to the Navy. Most operate in secrecy.

Four SEALs also were killed and a number injured in the October 1983 invasion of Grenada.

"They were among the first to go ashore at night," he said. "They were under cover and their job was checking the situation on the beach and making a preliminary assessment as to the emplacements on shore."

"Their training is suited toward a wide range of missions," Mr. Ball said. "Flexibility is the key."

that are extremely rare from U.S. presidents about the leader of a foreign government.

President Ronald Reagan in May 1988 said that the U.S. goal "must be the removal of Noriega from power."

A year ago today, even before his inauguration, Bush declared that "I am as determined as President Reagan is to see that Noriega not continue in his dictatorial ways there in Panama." In May 1989, in an open invitation for a coup against Noriega, Bush said he would "love to see" the Panama Defense Forces "get him out. . . . The will of the people should not be thwarted by this man and a handful of these Doberman thugs."

After an unsuccessful coup attempt by Panamanians in early October, Bush reiterated that "I would like to see him [Noriega] out" even though he did not on that occasion order open U.S. military interven-

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NEWS...from Pg. 5

Panama City before nightfall yesterday was transporting a group from ABC. Executives of the ABC News show, "Prime Time Live," said that Sam Donaldson, Judd Rose and Forrest Sawyer arrived in Panama at about 5 p.m. Both "Prime Time Live" and "Nightline" planned live shows from Panama City.

"We were on the phone all day with everyone we could think of," said Rick Kaplan, "Prime Time Live" executive producer. "It takes some skill but it's also a lot of luck."

On Wednesday many major news organizations, including The Washington Post, the New York Times, United Press International and all the major television networks rushed reporters, photographers and producers to Miami and Costa Rica to gain easy access to Panama as soon as the U.S. military opened airports there.

Beginning early yesterday morning senior officials of those organizations and others began calling the Pentagon to complain that their reporters were not getting access to the country. Most Washington-based ed-

itors said that top officials of the Department of Defense, including Secretary Richard B. Cheney, expressed sympathy and a desire to help.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post, said he called Cheney yesterday morning and asked him to help get reporters into the country. Editors at other news organizations did the same.

By all accounts Cheney responded quickly to the requests from several news organizations. By noon, officials at the Southern Command began issuing clearances for flights chartered by accredited media. But none could leave Costa Rica for Panama City without approval from Costa Rica.

"At least in Washington the Defense Department has been extremely helpful," said Howell Raines, Washington bureau chief of the New York Times. "They told us we could either get on an NBC charter in Miami or cleared us to use one of our own."

But promises from Defense Department leaders were not fulfilled for most news

organizations. And despite the assertion of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell that the "pool worked marvelously the other evening," few editors were happy with the ability of their reporters to cover the war unhindered.

With little conventional news coverage, perhaps the most vivid early accounts of the invasion and early hours of the conflict came from a Marine who filed a colorful and convincing report for the Marine Corps Public Affairs Office.

"Tracers split the darkness, spraying in all directions," wrote Marine Chief Warrant Officer Charles Rowe, in a dispatch to the Marines and then sent to frustrated news organizations hungry for any details of the combat. "The dull heavy thump of mortar and artillery fire was easily audible."

Rowe, who is based in Norfolk, is on rotation in Panama. As the public affairs officer for the Marine Corps there, he became a sensation among Pentagon reporters who have had to rely on colorless background briefings, rumors and pool reports based far too often on second-hand accounts of fighting.

Journalists constrained by Pentagon

By Walter V. Robinson
GLOBE STAFF

PANAMA CITY - Unlike the 1983 US military intervention in Grenada, this one is open to coverage by American journalists. But they have discovered that this newfound freedom, for the most part, has been illusory.

The US government, after acquiescing to demands that it open Panama to coverage, has made it all but impossible for journalists to do their jobs during much of the last week. Indeed, more than 100 members of the news media opted to take a military flight home on Saturday, many of them without ever filing a story.

They were long gone by the time Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's surprise arrival at the Vatican Nunciature here became public yesterday.

Until Saturday, armed guards had prevented reporters from leaving the US military installations where they had been confined since Thursday, in many cases without food and in nearly all cases without a place to sleep other than on concrete or linoleum floors.

There were few telephones, just two at the principal facility at Howard Air Force Base where 350 members of the news media were kept. Those who could get to phones found themselves waiting for hours to get calls through the strained Panamanian central telephone facility.

Then too, Murphy's Law - if something can go wrong, it will - seems to have taken hold in the army's overburdened public relations apparatus here.

The result, in many cases, has been a lack of information that has been reflected in the coverage of the US intervention.

The press arrived just in time to discover that the military operation was not nearly as close to completion as the Pentagon suggested. Indeed, the first briefing for the horde of reporters had to be scrubbed when Panamanian forces mounted a fierce assault not far from the supposedly secure site where the news conference was to be held. Several soldiers and Panamanian civilians were killed or wounded.

Then, too, the military took a step that would make a public relations professional blanch: the air

base site chosen to confine most of the journalists was two floors above the morgue set up to receive the bodies of US soldiers. So the only scenes available to many television news cameramen showed the last thing the Defense Department wanted on the air - arriving body bags.

By all accounts, the situation was the direct result of a policy disagreement between the Pentagon and the field commander, General Maxwell Thurman. When US forces invaded Grenada in 1983, the Pentagon and the commander in the field decided jointly to keep the news media off the island. As a result, that operation's flaws received scant attention, but the protests of journalists still reverberate.

This time, the field commander made much the same argument - the battle area was too dangerous and the facility too meager to handle the number of reporters who wanted to come here. But the Pentagon decided otherwise, first letting in a trickle of small chartered jets carrying small numbers of reporters, then clearing the way for the landing early Friday of a chartered jumbo jet with nearly 200 journalists aboard.

Commercial air service to Panama has been suspended, and the civilian airport here was not considered safe for any arriving flights until yesterday, when it was opened for planes carrying humanitarian aid.

"When we set up the plan to allow the aircraft in, we expected 25 to 30 journalists," lamented Col. Ronald Sconyers of the Air Force, the chief public affairs official in Panama. "What we got was more than 300."

Sconyers, of course, has ended up as Johnny-on-the-spot. And he said in an interview yesterday that the command's inability to support the press contingent adequately at the outset was the most "professionally embarrassing" time of his two-year tour in a country that, for all that time, has attracted intense media interest.

But the colonel, despite the admitted shortcomings and the failure to allow the press early access to the fighting, insisted that the Southern Command had quickly recovered and had given reporters the access they needed.

To an extent, reporters agreed.

Addison Armstrong, a television cameraman from VisNews, an international video service for television networks, said the armed forces had definitely improved access to the city as the week wore on. But at the be-

ginning, he said, their attitude and the logistics were "horrendous."

Peter Arnett, a veteran war correspondent who spent 10 years in Vietnam for the Associated Press and is now a correspondent for Cable News Network, said the Pentagon had not improved over its dismal press performance during the Grenada invasion.

Fortunately, Arnett said, many major news organizations already had correspondents in Panama when the fighting erupted early Wednesday morning.

In refusing reporters and camera crews access to the fighting, Arnett said, "They are saying that they are concerned for our security. But their real interest was with keeping a lid on the news as much as possible. They did not want negative images of this action."

"They were able to keep us at bay for those first few critical days," he added.

One negative image of the US military action that remains unclarified is the extent of civilian casualties, which are believed to have been substantial. But the lack of coverage of the early fighting, when most of those casualties occurred, kept those images from the public. And Scon-

yers and other American spokesmen have repeatedly refused to quantify those losses.

Yesterday morning, for instance, when Lt. Col. Jerry Marguia was asked about the numbers of civilians killed and wounded, he claimed not to know. "We'll get back to you on that," he said, repeating a line used by officials in one form or another since Wednesday.

Arnett said: "We still don't know the extent of those casualties. Nor do we know how well these American troops performed in the stress of battle. Those are two very important gaps in the knowledge of the public."

Other reporters have grumbled all week that the command's unwillingness to give them controlled access to the city forced many to take risks to get the story on their own.

But Maj. Tim Vane, a deputy to Col. Sconyers, said that the US command was in a difficult position. Noting that one journalist, a Spanish photographer, had already been killed and several others had been wounded, Vane said that granting reporters wider access would have inevitably increased their casualty toll. But, he said, by refusing reporters access for their own safety, the military might face charges that it was hiding atrocities.

Seized Panama files may be good evidence

By Doralisa Pilane
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

PANAMA CITY, Panama — U.S. drug agents have been poring over thousands of seized documents that are providing valuable intelligence on international drug trafficking, authorities said yesterday.

They said the information could be used against Panamanians facing U.S. drug indictments, such as Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega and his associate, Lt. Col. Luis del Cid, who has been arrested and taken to the United States.

One windfall came at the headquarters of Panama's Anti-Narcotics Special Force.

U.S. soldiers stormed the headquarters Monday and detained three men after being tipped off by an informant, said U.S. Army Lt. Col. William Leszczynski, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regi-

ment.

Authorities reported finding rifles, shotguns, handguns and much ammunition as well as cocaine, marijuana, morphine and drug paraphernalia.

Torture apparently was carried out in the same building. Lt. Col. Leszczynski said his troops found "electronic devices that could be hooked up to people for electric shocks."

They found a room filled with immigration files of foreigners from more than two dozen countries, including Cuba, Nicaragua and Colombia. The files, in racks that reached the ceiling, contained detailed information on foreigners' entries and exits. Each file had a small photo of the subject.

One Miami-based agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration who visited the white stucco house said the files largely were from the 1960s through the '70s.

Basic Blackout

The Pentagon kept the press — and public — in the dark about the Panama invasion.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says he's pleased with the operation of the media pool that accompanied the U.S. invasion force to Panama last week. Maybe, from his point of view, there's reason for satisfaction. But from the public's point of view, it was a bloody outrage.

As news, the first days were Granada reviewed, a wholly unsatisfactory, sanitized and one-sided version of events spoon-fed to the public. The Pentagon kept the press and public in the dark about the invasion, the only coverage came from Pentagon cameramen and public relations operatives giving the story with the Defense Department's spin in briefings that could as well have been held in Washington.

Why doesn't the Pentagon understand that reporters might just as well stay home if they're denied the opportunity to be eyewitnesses to newsworthy actions of U.S. troops?

16 Pentagon reporters from television, radio and print media was activated, but not in time to cover any of the heavy fighting in the early hours of the invasion. And when 300 other journalists and camera crews arrived two days later, they found themselves without transportation and effectively restricted to military installations for a day or longer.

This was in fact violation of an understanding reached after Grenada to facilitate news coverage. Such arrangements were supposed to be made by U.S. forces and they failed miserably.

Why doesn't the Pentagon understand that reporters might just as well stay home if they're denied the opportunity to be eyewitnesses to newsworthy actions of U.S. troops?

Pool operations should be a way to gather and disseminate information, not a way for the Army to control the press, and there has to be accommodation for other journalists as well.

Of course, there are logistical problems in handling large numbers of reporters and photographers. But it's ludicrous for the Army to act as if it were surprised that there would be so much interest in the Panama story, and disingenuous to blame some of the problems on safety considerations.

Reporters and photographers conscientiously and willingly take risks all over the world to carry out their mission to inform the American people. It's the same public that the military is accountable to in a relationship that must depend on independent reporting. It's nothing but sham and mockery to ignore this vital principle while going to war for Panamanian democracy. Worry first about American democracy.

BALTIMORE SUN

JANUARY 12, 1990 Pg. 21

Defending Korea

London.

NOT LONG before the invasion of Panama there had been serious talk of relocating the U.S. Southern Command away from Panama back to the U.S. mainland. Even the Pentagon brass regarded this large permanent foreign presence on Latin American soil as an unnecessarily provocative problem.

But there has been little talk about South Korea where there is no international canal, no strategic back yard, indeed no vital interest. But there are 31,600 U.S. troops and

By Jonathan Power

150 land-based nuclear weapons. The reasons for them remaining there lessen by the year.

After the post-war settlement with the Soviet Union that carved Korea into two halves, one led by a fanatical communist and the other by a fanatical rightist, Washington felt that South Korea had little strategic value and that its protection should be left to the United Nations. Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw America's interest in the Far East as encompassing Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, but excluding Taiwan and South Korea.

So uninterested was America that North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950 took nearly everyone by surprise. But it angered President Truman, who reasoned that aggression tolerated was aggression encouraged. The United States (and a number of its friends and allies) were committed to battle — under the U.N. flag. The three-year war cost 34,000 American lives. Nevertheless, overshadowed by the Vietnam war, it has all but faded from public memory.

Today, thanks to the economic miracle that made it the world success story of the 1980s, culminating in the brilliant extravaganza of the Seoul Olympics in 1988, every schoolboy has heard of South Korea. But it would be hard to find a North American or European schoolboy to explain why the West went to war against North Korea and China. More problematical would be to find a South Korean schoolboy to explain it. Two thirds of the South Koreans

alive today were born since the war ended. Popular resentment has grown at the continuing American presence. What was once a feeling localized to rebellious leftist students is now widespread, even among some senior government figures.

Yet the troops stay on, their nuclear arsenal with them, as if nothing has changed. But the Korean peninsula is a different world than it was a mere ten years ago.

South Korea has moved from rags to riches in a generation. In 1950 it had an income per head of \$87. Today, it is over \$4,000 and growing fast. In 1950 it was poor, with weak defenses and easily assailable. In 1990 it is wealthy, militarily strong and virile. Politically, it is no longer isolated. The east European states are recognizing its government. China trades more with the South than with the North and the Soviet Union is increasing its trading links.

North Korea, in contrast, has a troubled economy. It has defaulted on \$770 million worth of Western debt and is unable to borrow another cent. Politically, it is more and more on its own. Even its old admirers like the Japanese socialists and communist parties have begun criticizing it, and after the bombing of a South Korean airliner two years ago by Northern secret agents many of its Third World friends cooled. The Soviet Union and China still maintain close links, but the North finds

it more difficult to play off one against the other as both reduce their estimation of the geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula, while raising their appreciation of the value of ties with the South Korean economy.

Expert opinion still believes North Korea has the military edge, not least because it has bled its economy to build up armed prowess, but times are changing. Over the last decade Seoul has modernized its armed forces, buying the best equipment from the United States. Now it's outspending the North without any apparent harmful effect on the rest of the economy.

Washington badly needs to look at the situation afresh. President Bush should be talking to Moscow and Beijing, fashioning an understanding that would commit the major outside powers to refuse to intervene in any war in Korea, whichever side began it. Further, that they would encourage the two Koreas to partially demobilize and to disengage from the front line.

Most important, as a contribution to the spirit of perestroika and disarmament, the U.S. should unilaterally withdraw its nuclear weapons. There are none on the northern side. They are a historical anachronism, a grim reminder of a period of extreme South Korean vulnerability and dependency on the United States which has long since passed.

DEFENSE WEEK

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Muddled Pool: Fred Hoffman, the Pentagon's just-retired principal deputy assistant for public affairs, has promised to find out why the media pool activated for the Panama invasion started out as a "fiasco."

Hoffman had nurtured the media pool concept since its inception after the news blackout that accompanied the 1983 Grenada invasion. He convinced the Pentagon brass that it was vital to have the press on hand when the fighting began and to accompany units in the field—tenets that worked pretty well in the Persian Gulf but not in the early hours of "Just Cause."

Hoffman told us he was worried that the Pentagon's civilian leadership might have "rolled over" to requests from the brass to keep the press at bay. Hoffman said that he was very upset by one pool report that a ground commander decided against taking reporters on a flight over Panama City out of concerns over sniper fire.

The ground commander had no business making that decision, Hoffman said. "I want to get to the bottom of this," he said.

Military press pool misses most of the action

By George Garneau

The national military press pool flunked its first combat assignment, missing most of the fighting it convened to cover in Panama.

The pool of 16 broadcast and print reporters arrived from Washington after the key military action, the assault against Panamanian Defense Forces headquarters, was mostly over Dec. 20.

Then, captives of their handlers for hours at a U.S. military base, pool reporters watched CNN television coverage of the invasion that began just hours before and several miles away.

Much of the pool's reporting, under military escort, for the next four days focused on scenes of past action — "house tour" viewings of Noriega's offices and voodoo altar, for example — pool members said.

"In my eyes it was a complete and dismal failure," said UPI photographer and pool member Matthew Mendelsohn. Except for some artillery firing, he witnessed no combat as part of the pool.

"It seemed as though we had been deputized into the public affairs department of the military," he said, explaining that public affairs handlers controlled what was and was not shown to the pool.

"When the real thing came down, it was the equivalent of journalistic martial law. They did what they wanted with us," he said.

Early pool reports were "basically useless to us," said *Washington* (D.C.) *Post* deputy managing editor for foreign news Michael Getler. Finding no detailed, independent account of the attack to this day, Getler called for "another reassessment of Pentagon planning for press coverage of its actions. I don't think this was a good performance."

The Pentagon begged to differ.

Spokesman Bob Taylor declared the pool "a big success." He admitted reporters could have gone into action sooner after arriving — some things "need to be looked at" — but called the pool "a good, viable system" that has been "accepted" by the military.

Plans called for the pool to arrive

after the predawn attack started, he said, because reporters could not take positions before the assault without giving it away or fly with paratroopers whose planes returned home.

It was the first combat assignment of the Washington-based press pool that was created after reporters were locked out of 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. Practices such as the Persian Gulf tanker escort saw unplanned combat.

The pool certainly found news in the largest U.S. military action since Vietnam, but its access to events was so limited initially that even Pentagon officials had criticism.

Top Defense Department spokesman Pete Williams called press arrangements the first day "a disaster," finding "no excuse" for the "incompetence" of military leaders in Panama. Corrections were made the next day, he said.

In addition, hundreds of journalists on charter planes were prevented from taking off for Panama for at least a day because military officials halted all civilian air traffic. Media complaints flooded Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.

Much of the news about the invasion by 24,000 U.S. troops initially came from non-pool reporters already in Panama, leaving some people questioning the pool's effectiveness.

The pool "did not work to anybody's satisfaction initially," said UPI spokesman Milt Capps. "This is definitely something that needs to be discussed further."

UPI had two full-time reporters in Panama, one staffer and one stringer.

About the only newspeople not complaining were from Reuters, which had three photographers in Panama before the invasion and boosted staffing to seven photographers and five reporters, including two pool members.

"We think that the pool functioned well. It provided a good flow of pictures and greatly enhanced our coverage," said Bruce Russell, Washington bureau chief for Reuters. The pool was "a little slow" the first day but later worked "extremely well," Russell said.

The pool contributed to reporting on the U.S. military point of view, which otherwise would have been hard to get, he said, conceding he would not want to rely solely on the pool.

The pool was activated at about 8 p.m. Dec. 19 in Washington. It included 16 people from a rotating list of news organizations, in this case Associated Press, UPI, Reuters, *Time* magazine, NBC, ABC radio, the *Houston Chronicle*, *Houston Post* and *Dallas Morning News*.

Pool rules designed to protect troops prohibit disclosure of the deployment. The Pentagon said it would look into reports in the *Washington Post* that when *Time* reporter Dick Thompson was called from the company Christmas party to join the pool, it was widely understood his destination was Panama.

The pool left Andrews Air Force Base near Washington in a C-141 military transport, arriving at Howard Air Force Base about 5 a.m., five hours after fighting began.

At Fort Clayton, pool members watched television for five hours before a public affairs officer reported that the operation was a success, but Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had escaped. Then a U.S. diplomat elicited groans from frustrated reporters when he lectured on Panamanian history.

It was not until the pool, traveling with public affairs officers and armed escorts, flew by helicopter to near Panamanian army barracks, that they first saw U.S. soldiers firing.

The pool later saw looting during a downtown bus tour. They were briefed by the commanding general. They saw Noriega's offices, his witchcraft altar, his refrigerator, empty of alleged cocaine.

But Mendelsohn said military handlers refused requests to let reporters see wounded Americans, damaged helicopters, and caskets (which he soon saw on television being unloaded in Delaware).

"It was a non-stop series of events that had already happened," Mendelsohn said of the pool's experiences.

Pool members joked that they were

PRESS POOL...CONTINUED

documenting "lifestyles of the rich and infamous," their motto: *semper tardus*.

"We were always one step behind what was going on. That seemed to defeat the purpose of the pool," the photographer said. "We did not come up empty, but a lot of us felt the quality of events we were covering was far from ideal."

"I think it tended to be short on up-to-date military information," Houston Chronicle reporter William Clayton said of the pool. "On the other hand, we were escorted to some places where there was considerable material available of what I would call a sidebar nature, and that was valuable in its way, but it wasn't what some people expected, which was briefings on the war itself."

Briefings they got were neither daily nor up to date, and "not the sort of thing that would make the pool the source of copy for that day," he said, advocating the need for regular briefings on the latest battle information.

There were no reports of military censorship or of news organizations hoarding news, which is supposed to be shared.

Mendelsohn cited continuing transportation problems. The pool had no ground transport of their own. Once the pool's bus blew out its front tires on protective wire on its way to a briefing.

"It was difficult even to get back from where they took us," Mendelsohn said, adding that public affairs people seemed to have little idea of what reporters needed.

Editors were concerned that it took until the first evening for the first pool pictures to arrive.

Despite the fact that the pool did not witness the U.S. invasion of Panama or report to the American people on the actions of their armed forces, Taylor of the Pentagon insisted, "We did our very best to get them there in time to report on as much as possible."

A "major" problem, he conceded, was, when pool reporters arrived, "we weren't able to get them out to cover as much as we wanted them to."

He said the Pentagon will look into how the pool worked and will solicit comments.

The pool covered a variety of things and overall, he said, coverage was "very good."

"I think we had a big success," Taylor said. "It wasn't perfect — nothing is — but we'll go back and try to fix it."

WASHINGTON POST
JAN. 18, 1990 Pg. 25

Quayle Visit Resisted in Latin America *Panama Invasion Fallout Is a Concern*

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush's plan to send Vice President Quayle on an extensive high-profile tour of Latin America to shore up relations in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Panama has run into strong resistance from the planned host nations, administration officials said yesterday.

When the president announced the trip almost two weeks ago, he called it "very, very important diplomacy." He said he was sending Quayle to a number of Latin American nations to "personally deliver" his message that despite the Panama invasion, U.S. policy remains that of a "friendly, supportive and respectful neighbor."

Yesterday, officials said that Quayle probably will end up taking two trips to Latin America, both tied to presidential inaugurations he had been scheduled to attend. He plans to meet at these events with leaders who were unenthusiastic about a visit to their countries when the State Department began consultations with them after Bush announced his plan on Jan. 5.

Quayle, in a question-and-answer session following a speech to the Hoover Institution, acknowledged that certain "diplomatic sensitivities require a coordination to determine the time," but added, "No country has said we don't want the vice president period."

Administration officials said Venezuela and Mexico, among others, had indicated that heightened anti-American feelings stemming from the Dec. 20 U.S. invasion of Panama made an early trip by Quayle or any senior official unhelpful. One diplomat said, "We have never said we don't want the vice president. We have suggested that this per-

haps is not the best time and a high-profile trip not the best idea."

Quayle's office announced yesterday that he would travel to Honduras, Panama and Jamaica Jan. 27-29. The visit to Honduras was long planned because Quayle was to represent the administration at the inauguration of its president-elect, Rafael Callejas.

In addition, Quayle was scheduled to attend inaugurations in Brazil on March 11 and Chile on March 15 and is working on using that trip to visit other countries. An administration official said that the White House made a "miscalculation" in announcing Quayle's mission so soon after the invasion of Panama, when Bush believed that high-level attention to the region would be appreciated, not cause political problems for the leaders involved.

"We think if we give it a little more time and let it be awhile" the antipathy growing from the invasion and the resulting political uproar in some of the nations will "settle down. That's the hope," the official said.

Aides to Quayle and more neutral officials at the White House and State Department said the reluctance to have Quayle visit had little to do with the vice president. One official noted, "I don't think it had anything to do with Dan Quayle. They just didn't want anyone right now."

Some of the foreign leaders involved told U.S. officials that the trip would be an "invitation to the left" in their nations to attack them because of strong popular sentiment against U.S. intervention in the region. But the left has not fielded the only attacks. In Venezuela yesterday, a spokesman for the opposition said a Quayle visit there was not "opportune."

"It doesn't seem to me that Vice President Quayle's visit to try to improve relations between the United States and Latin America is the most advisable or opportune," Eduardo Fernandez, head of the centrist Christian Democratic Copei Party told El Nacional newspaper. David Beckwith, Quayle's spokesman, said that within two months Quayle will have met with virtually all the leaders in the region to carry the administration's message, accomplishing its goal.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

JAN. 7, 1990

Pg. I-10

In 1st battlefield test, media pool misses mark

By James Warren

You probably don't know the name, but John Bascom was an important voice heard around the world last month. The only problem was that he had precious little to say due to the failure of a mechanism designed to inform the public about U.S. military engagements abroad.

Bascom, a reporter for ABC Radio, was part of the national pool of TV, radio and print journalists flown by the Pentagon to Panama City to cover the U.S. invasion. It was the first time the pool, created following the media blackout of the 1983 invasion of Grenada, was used in a conflict situation, and truth was clearly among the first casualties.

The 12-member pool's C-141 cargo plane didn't arrive in Panama City from Washington's Andrews Air Force Base until 4:52 a.m. Dec. 21, four hours after the invasion started. The journalists were flown to a U.S. installation north of the city and then sat around for several hours "waiting a briefing that never came," said Bascom, the pool's only radio reporter.

"So there we sat, watching CNN and President Bush and Defense Secretary (Dick) Cheney in Washington telling us what was really going on down," he recalled. It was a version, one learned days later, that was far truer than the reality of vigorous Panamanian resistance and many civilian deaths.

For the next 24 hours, the pool's combat reporting consisted of being helicoptered to minor shelling of a Panamanian installation, listening to a history of Panama from the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Panama and receiving a briefing from an American lieutenant colonel who, according to Bascom, "wasn't on duty the night before and was in no position to answer our questions."

Thus, Bascom said of the reports he filed for ABC, CBS, NBC, National Public Radio, Voice of America and other networks around the world: "I didn't have a whole lot to report. It was tremendously frustrating."

"What we got was barely passable. For the first 24 to 36 hours, it was kind of worthless," said George

Watson, ABC vice president and Washington bureau chief for ABC News, echoing the view of newspaper, TV and radio executives.

Even the Pentagon's chief spokesman, Pete Williams, acknowledged that much had gone awry, in particular the failure to let the pool reporters accompany U.S. troops into battle.

"There really is no excuse for it," said Williams, who last week received an analysis critical of the pool's operation from Fred Finkle, an NBC reporter and the TV representative in the pool.

One is left with the impression that a crucial test of a liberal proposition—cooperation between the media and military—was, at best, better than nothing. At worst, it revealed the media's submission to government, aiding an administration's short-term foreign policy goals but providing little insight to citizens of a democracy back home.

Relations between the media and military have varied. During the Civil War, reporters tended to ride horseback with the side favored by their newspaper and, in an age of slow communications, filed reports that tended to be published several days later.

During World War II, the media often saw themselves as patriotic boosters of a good cause and were allowed substantial access, such as to the Normandy invasion. They submitted willingly to censorship.

In Vietnam the press attitude was less obliging and its access was virtually unfettered. Reporters heeded certain ground rules, such as not reporting troop movements in advance. But those who could hitch a ride or a flight could go where they desired, taking responsibility for their notepads, cameras and safety, and often making careers in the process.

The results included some graphic and critical reporting, and military unease. Some felt that journalists undermined the war effort. And as noted by Nicholas M. Horrocks, the Tribune's Washington editor, who covered the Vietnam War, the mili-

tary in the late 1970s and early 1980s was run by "the guys who were the Vietnam battalion commanders in the late 1960s, and they were bitter toward the press."

When the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, the press not only wasn't tipped off and brought along, but it was unceremoniously kept off the island for several days. In a fitting coincidence, the Pentagon's chief media relations post was unfilled at the time. The blackout prompted a hue and cry and formation of a joint military-media commission headed by retired Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle to consider a better way.

The result was the pool arrangement. The members were to be picked by the media, and the pool was to be financed and given access to engagements. The Panama crew included reporters, photographers, camera operators and technicians from the Houston Post, Houston Chronicle, Dallas Morning News, Time, Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, ABC Radio and NBC News.

Reporters are assigned to the pool for three months. They must make sure their passports and inoculations are in order and have a backpack and sleeping bag ready to go, along with walking shoes, boots and clothes for a moderate climate.

A kindly Pentagon, serving as a cross between L.L. Bean and Banana Republic, provides garments if the action is in especially hot or cold settings.

"We felt an obligation to give American people information from the battlefield," said Fred Lash, a commission member and a former Marine Corps public relations officer. "We didn't feel views should be tilted one way, which is why the rotation. The thinking was that varied points of view would be better for the military and American people."

The pool had been activated previously in the Persian Gulf, as well as taken on play-acting exercises in Honduras and Alaska, but it never came close to genuine combat.

Last May, when President Bush deployed an extra 1,000 Marines in Panama, the pool was flown to Panama City. Unlike last month's operation, the May trek was no big secret and of little news value.

POOL... CONTINUED

and the pool was back in Washington within 26 hours.

Surely, the notion of a pool, of bureaucratizing press coverage of anything, is ungainly.

It serves the aim of fairness, but not necessarily accuracy. The best reporters may be left in the cold if only because it's not their institutions' turn. The values that make good reporters good—digging, cultivating sources—may have nothing to do with their being pool members.

But if a pool is a necessary evil in certain situations, especially when the military is the only way to gain access to a story, its only utility is in getting to the action. In Panama, it did not.

Said Tim Russert, NBC's Washington bureau chief and TV's representative in pool-related dealings with the Pentagon: "We showed we could keep a secret. Now, the military has to demonstrate that they'll let us in to cover the story."

The media's frustration may have derived from benign incompetence on the ground, perhaps a harried commander who botched instructions. But it may underline something deeper, namely that reporters, if they do their jobs right, work a different side of the street than the government.

Especially in a TV age, the press poses a threat to the military, noted David Evans, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Marines who writes on military affairs for the Tribune.

Instantaneous broadcasts narrow the gap between action and accountability.

Unlike the Civil War, it may take seconds, not days, before the public learns of a deadly mistake.

"I think pool coverage is something we must see work," said Ed Turner, executive vice president of CNN. "Things being what they are, conflicts like Panama won't go away and, for sure, we won't go away."

James Warren covers media issues for the Tribune.

WASHINGTON POST

JAN. 7, 1990

Pg. 1

Arms Cuts Urged in 2 Germanys

Communist Seeks Troop Withdrawal

By Marc Fisher
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 6—East German Communist Party chief Gregor Gysi called on East and West Germany today to halve their armed forces by the end of next year and urged that all foreign troops leave both Germanys by 1990.

Gysi, a 41-year-old reformer chosen last month to head the party, proposed a disarmament plan calling for immediate abolition of low-altitude military test flights in both Germanys and establishment of a 50-mile-wide demilitarized corridor along their border.

The Communist chief's proposals, presented to the party's executive board in East Berlin, appeared aimed, in part, at demonstrating to East Germans that the party has dropped its former hard-line views.

Under Gysi's "Security 2000" plan, the only weapons remaining in Europe by the turn of the century would be small arms for local police agencies. The Communist leader called for removing all nuclear and chemical weapons from German soil and recommended dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"Between the Urals and the Atlantic, there should be no nuclear weapons, no biological or chemical weapons, no tanks, cannons, bombers or combat helicopters," Gysi said.

By stepping far ahead of the disarmament debate, Gysi appeared to be seeking credibility and support

for his corruption-riddled party and to blunt momentum toward unification of East and West Germany.

Gysi made his announcement two days before massive weekly anti-government demonstrations in Leipzig are to resume after a holiday break. The demonstrations, which helped topple the hard-line government of former party leader Erich Honecker in October, have become a forum for growing calls for a single German state.

The Communists have opposed any discussion of unification and Gysi—who, unlike Honecker, runs only the party and not the government—today called the idea "nonsense." Prime Minister Hans Modrow's government also opposes reunification.

Gysi's proposals parallel strong sentiment among East and West Germans against use of German soil as a European staging area for weapons and troops of the two major military alliances. The United States has about 250,000 troops in West Germany, and about 380,000 Soviet troops are in East Germany.

The West German government today denied a newspaper report that it plans cuts in military strength beyond those announced last month. The West Germans had announced plans to decrease their armed forces by one-fifth, from nearly 495,000 to 400,000, if arms control talks underway in Vienna are successful. The report said the cuts would be deepened, reducing total manpower to 350,000.

[In West Germany, defense policy specialists from Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party called for a new European security force independent of Moscow and Washington, the Associated Press reported. A newspaper article, scheduled to be published Sunday, quoted party officials as proposing that European segments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact be re-aligned to establish an independent European force, the AP said. A De-

The Panama Press-Pool Fiasco

The Military Let Journalists Do Everything Except Cover the News

By Kevin Merida

NOW THAT the Panama invasion is behind us, news organizations should press the Pentagon to reform its flawed system of granting a select group of journalists controlled access during live combat situations. As one of three newspaper reporters in the pool of 14 journalists assembled to cover the invasion, my frustration with the U.S. military bureaucracy reached an early climax. I'm not alone in the pool; I felt the same way. The Pentagon's system failed so miserably in Panama that some of us laughed at the absurdity of it all—especially at being flown 2,500 miles to begin our war coverage by watching television.

The first briefing we received—three hours after arriving in Panama City and seven hours after the invasion began—was given by the U.S. chargé d'affaires, John Bushnell, a diplomat who could not speak knowledgeably about the military operation. He thought he was being helpful by giving us a history lesson on Panama's politics and the rise and fall of General Noriega. We quickly dispelled that notion.

"Here we were sitting in the middle of invasion, watching CNN and listening to some guy tell us when the Panama Canal was built," complained Matt Mendelsohn, a UPI pool photographer who said his first pool picture wasn't transmitted until 17 hours after the invasion began. "I started behind the eight ball and it got worse from there."

The Defense Department created this rotating National Media Pool in 1984 in response to criticism that there had been a virtual news blackout during the 1983 Grenada invasion. Operating under strict guidelines and with military escorts, the pool is supposed to represent all news organizations and serve as eyes and ears of the American public. But what happened in Panama seemed designed to render the American people

blind and deaf to much of the U.S. troop activity.

During the four days the pool was in operation, military officials either didn't understand or ignored our needs as journalists. On the critical first day, for instance, we were taken to Omar Torrijos International Airport to cover the arrival of more troops.

This was not a news event that demanded pool coverage.

We kept explaining to our escorts that we needed to see troops on combat maneuvers, military police on patrol, wounded American soldiers, Panamanians being taken prisoner, whatever was happening today that hadn't been reported or photographed.

What military officials kept showing us was what had happened yesterday—buildings that had been bombed and gutted by fire, weapons that had been confiscated and more weapons that had been confiscated. Officials at the U.S. Southern Command post were not interested in showing journalists scenes that would detract from what they regarded as a military triumph.

Military commanders were especially eager to promote Noriega as a bizarrely prosperous dictator with a degenerate character. This was done by taking the pool on a series of tours of Noriega offices and living quarters, which we jokingly dubbed "Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous."

Indeed, the tours provided colorful details of the deposed dictator's opulent lifestyle, his love of skin magazines and his reliance on voodoo. But enough was enough. When a tour of Noriega's main residence was offered to the pool on Day 4, we respectfully declined, with NBC's Fred Francis insisting that something more relevant be found for the pool to see.

In some respects, the pool was destined for failure from the outset. We didn't depart Andrews Air Force Base until 11:20 p.m. on Dec. 19, and we didn't arrive at Howard Air Force Base in Panama City until 4:55 the next morning. By that

time we were four hours behind American paratroopers and had already missed most of the fighting.

It was not until 10 a.m. that we arrived by helicopter at Fort Amador—the first place where we could actually observe troops in combat position.

And even at Fort Amador, a military installation shared by the United States and Panama under the Panama Canal treaties, the action was largely over. U.S. troops had repeatedly shelled the barracks of the Panamanian Defense Forces in the early morning hours when we were still on a military transport plane. All that was left to do was smoke out a few remaining Noriega loyalists, none of whom surrendered in our presence.

We were told that because of continued sniper fire on the first day it was too dangerous for us to visit the neighborhood of Chorrillo, which housed Noriega's headquarters and was still burning from heavy shelling by U.S. troops. It was also too dangerous, we were told, to take a helicopter tour of Panama City.

The pool didn't work because military officials didn't allow journalists to do their jobs. To best serve the public in times of war, we need to cover events as they happen and not after they are over. We need access, not obstruction. If the pool is to operate effectively in the future, better coordination is needed between the Pentagon and the military command center. In Panama, no one seemed concerned that news organizations have deadlines and that pool members don't have hours to waste on tarmacs, on golf courses and in holding rooms.

During a moment of creative steam-letting, Jon Bascom of ABC radio sketched a proposed T-shirt that may forever symbolize our frustration. On the back will be the words that became our mantra in Panama: "If it's news today, it's news to us."

Kevin Merida covers the White House for The Dallas Morning News.

Editorial

The media and priorities

We normally find journalists' analysis of their trials and tribulations inappropriate for widely circulated magazines and newspapers. They're better suited for journalism reviews and doctoral theses. When scribblers contemplate their navels in public, it's often not a pretty sight.

But these kinds of articles have formed a goodly portion of the news analysis of the U.S. invasion of Panama — Operation Just Cause. The problems with the press pool, the media hostages taken at the Marriott hotel, and Southern Command's public affairs' problems in handling hordes of reporters have taken second place only to the failure to apprehend Manuel Noriega as the operation's biggest shortcomings.

And like every media organization that tried to cover Just Cause, we had some of these problems in our efforts to get stories in last week's paper.

Nevertheless, we are appalled and embarrassed by the way many members of our trade have whined and pouted.

Take, for example, *The Boston Globe's* Christmas Day story, "Journalists constrained by Pentagon." In it, Walter Robinson complains that press freedom to cover the operation "has been illusory. The U.S. government, after acquiescing to demands that it open Panama to coverage, has made it all but impossible for journalists to do their jobs during much of the last week. Indeed, more than 100 members of the news media opted to take a military flight home Saturday [the invasion began Wednesday, Dec. 20], many of them without ever filing a story...."

"Until Saturday, armed guards had prevented reporters from leaving the U.S. installations where they had been confined since Thursday, in many cases without food and in nearly all cases without a place to sleep other than on concrete or linoleum floors."

Does anyone else detect a childish tone here?

In all fairness to Robinson and his newspaper, this story reflects a good reporter's instincts for getting a story, any story, when sent on an assignment. An *Army Times* reporter was locked up along with those hundreds of others. Robinson simply experienced the frustration of being so close to a hot story with no way to report on it.

But lest we forget, there was a war going on. War reporting is an important

American tradition and we would not like any attempt by the Army to manage the news. For 50 years, our life's blood has been our independence from formal channels of Army information. But shepherding a gaggle of reporters, most of whom likely had little expertise in military matters, through street-by-street firefights deserves its place at the lower end of the Army's wartime priorities. Especially in this kind of operation — a quick, violent application of force and the dangerous mopping-up actions that followed.

These complaints about access were at the same time contradicted by the concern of the journalists staying at the Panama City Marriott. Some were taken hostage by Noriega supporters and held for varying lengths of time. CBS News was so worried about one of its producers that

CBS President Laurence Tisch reportedly telephoned the high and mighty to get his man rescued.

This have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too attitude has no place under such circum-

stances. There is no way the government should acquiesce to a demand that journalists be given both access to the war and a comprehensive guarantee of military protection while the fighting rages.

□□□

If journalists' attitudes about their proper role in combat situations were embarrassing, articles and television analyses unfavorably contrasting the Panama operation with events in Eastern Europe were simply obscene. In the minds of some commentators, the liberation of Panama does not hold up to the liberation of the Soviet empire.

As recent events in Rumania demonstrated, the steps towards freedom and democracy often come at a heavy price. The peaceful changes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are to be blessed. But so are the changes in Panama, as the Panamanians themselves are saying loud and clear.

It also is worth observing that the Soviet army could not have performed in Rumania the role the U.S. army did in Panama. If the Soviets intervened, the Rumanians certainly would have worried that the Soviets were propping up the Ceausescu regime, not delivering them from it. There were no such doubts in anyone's mind in Panama.

War reporting is an important American tradition and we would not like any attempt by the Army to manage the news

MAS. MAJDOX

Press

How Reporters Missed the War

On a tight leash, journalists assail the Pentagon's pool system

BY STANLEY W. CLOUD


When Allied troops stormed the Normandy beaches in 1944, American correspondents and photographers were on hand to tell the story. But two weeks ago, when U.S. Marines and Rangers led the charge into Panama as part of Operation Just Cause, not a single journalist accompanied them. The Pentagon-sanctioned pool of reporters did not arrive on the scene until four hours after the fighting began, and they were unable to file their first dispatches until six hours after that. Worse, the initial pool report shed almost no light on the confused military situation, leading off with the hardly titanic news that the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Panama, John Bushnell, was worried about the "mischief" that deposed dictator Manuel Noriega could cause. Complains pool member Steven Komarow of the Associated Press: "We kind of missed the story."

Responsibility for that failure lies with the military—particularly the Defense Department's Southern Command—not with Komarow or his seven colleagues in the pool. From the time the hastily summoned reporters arrived at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington on the night of the invasion until they returned from Panama four days later, the Army kept them under such tight control that journalistic initiative was all but impossible.

During their first, crucial day in Panama, the reporters were kept for several hours in a windowless room at Fort Clayton and treated to a tedious, history-laden briefing. Nor were things much better once the poolers were allowed into the sunlight. "To the extent we got any news at all," Komarow says, "it was pretty much by accident." He notes, for example, that the pool did witness looting in Panama City, but only when their military driver lost his way. Exposure to actual combat was also a matter of chance, as when Noriega forces attacked the Southern Command's headquarters, about 400 yards from the press center.

"It was a Keystone Kops operation, especially at first," says Kevin Merida of the *Dallas Morning News*. "The military seemed to have no concept of what our role was. The whole first day was devoted to taking us to places where the action was already over. It was like forming a White House pool and then showing them an empty hall and saying, 'This is where the President spoke.'"

Acrimony between the press and the military is hardly new. It existed even during the fondly recalled days of World War II, when correspondents had to wear uniforms and submit to censorship, a practice the military abandoned in Viet Nam and has avoided since. In response to criticism over the barring of reporters from the 1983 Grenada invasion, the Pentagon created a National Media Pool of rotating news organizations. The military not only decides when a pool



Captive audience: U.S. military officer briefing correspondents

"To the extent we got any news at all, it was pretty much by accident."

will be "activated" and "deactivated" but also sets the ground rules for participation, including understandably strict limits on what information can be published before an operation begins. Moreover, it allows the local commands to exercise almost complete control over the movements of participating reporters and photographers and acts as a traffic cop for the transmission of copy and the shipment of film and videotape.

That is a price many experienced journalists are willing to pay if it means getting into a place that would otherwise be closed to them. "Bad as the pool operation was in Panama," says Carl Leubsdorf, Washington bureau chief of the *Dallas Morning News*, "it was better than what we had in Grenada." Nonetheless, says Jonathan Wolman, Washington bureau chief for the *Associated Press*, "I don't like prunk. I like open coverage. Our guy just sat around in a little room, feeling frustrated."

Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams blamed much of the difficulty with the Panama pool on "incompetence"—his own and that of the Southern Command. The command's officers argued that logistics and concern for the safety of journalists made it impossible to permit pool members to get closer to the action.

So far the pool system has been tested twice under combat conditions: during the Navy's 1987 Persian Gulf operation and this year in Panama. Retired Major General Winant Sidle, who headed the Pentagon commission that recommended the pool system, has been unimpressed with the results. "If you're going to let the media in," Sidle says, "you have to

let them do something. Others think there may be no acceptable way of achieving that goal. "I just don't see a happy ending to this story," says a Navy public affairs specialist. Pools, he adds, "just don't work."

They never will unless the military agrees to let reporters do their job. Even then, pools cannot substitute for hard-nosed, entrepreneurial reporting. Retired Admiral Joseph Metcalf, who led the Grenada task force, responded to complaints about the way the Panama pool was handled by huffing. "But what about the reporters who were already in Panama? They had plenty of indication that something was happening. If they could have found out days in advance, if they can't use their knuckleheads, it's their own damn fault." The admiral was being unduly harsh, but he had a point. —*With reporting by Bruce van Voorst, Washington*

SUPPLEMENT: FRIDAY, January 12, 1990

Achtung! About those helmets . . .

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
JAN. 11, 1990
Pg. 17

RICHARD C. CARTER

we called Nam helmets. You know, the odd-shaped, emblem-bedecked combat headgear with the sloping sides and back.

Whether it was action newsmag footage from early in the war when a triumphant Wehrmacht ran rampant, hard-hitting magazine photos of Panzers barreling through the countryside or gritty newspaper shots of individual soldiers peering over their weapons, that curious-looking helmet was the one constant. And it struck fear in our hearts.

I can't begin to count the times, seated in a dark movie house, that I and my boyhood chums scowled and growled at some scurrilous SS-type wreaking havoc on some defenseless civilian or helpless prisoner — every move punctuated by that glowering black Nazi helmet.

How well I recall the evil Von Stroheim, the suave Conrad Veidt, the smooth George Sanders, the slimy Martin Kamenik or the calculating Helmut Dardline sipping and savoring their mad furthur in his delicious dream of world conquest.

What scoundrels they were in a variety of Hollywood films. And there was always that horrific helmet basting the image of impending Nazi mayhem. Ugh!

It seems strange today that a basic part of a military uniform could seem so terrifying — even if it was worn by the enemy. What makes it even more strange, however, is the sight of U.S. combat troops now wearing the same kind of distinctive helmets as the German troops of 50 years ago.

The first time I noticed the new U.S. battle helmet was a couple of years back. And as an army veteran who served in the Corps of Engineers in the late 1950s — prior to America's involvement in Vietnam — I was just about knocked off my feet. Of all places, it was in a television commercial aimed at attracting army recruits!

For a moment, I thought my eyes were playing tricks on me. Could I really be seeing this? Are these really American soldiers scaling a cliff wearing Wehrmacht-style helmets? Say it isn't so, G.I. Joe!

After that, I began paying closer attention to news photos, magazine ads, TV film and, yes, even recruiting commercials (remember "Be all that you can be . . ."). And except for the camouflage, what I saw was the new American combat soldier looking for all the world like a member of the dreaded WW II Wehrmacht war machine!

What had happened to the time-honored, all-purpose, heavy steel pot so many of us knew and loved and hated? The thing

we sometimes shaved in, occasionally cooked in and, once in a while, barfed in?

About that time, I asked a good friend of mine — a fellow with an open mind who loves military history — his reasoning.

"Simple," he said. "The so-called Nazi helmet, which actually was adopted by the Germans toward the end of the World War I, provides better protection. It covers more of the ears and neck. Let's face it, when it came to military innovations — tactics, weapons and even uniforms — the Germans were way ahead of us then."

Of course, the U.S. has been way out in front in the ways of war since WW II — which is probably why we've managed to keep our country from being invaded or bombed by a foreign power.

Yet, I have to admit, during the recent American invasion of Panama — righteous though it may have been, which is open to doubt — I got a sick feeling in my gut when I saw all those TV and magazine and newspaper pictures of many of the 14,000 invading U.S. soldiers sporting their terrifying Wehrmacht-style helmets.

Real scary, I thought. Which just may be another reason, aside from extra protection, that our fighting guys and gals are wearing them. Images and memories of war — righteous or not — are always scary.

But for those of us who were around during WW II, it is something we'd like to forget. Every little part of it — including those intimidating Wehrmacht-style helmets.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

JAN. 11, 1990

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The Panama invasion was private

By RICHARD REEVES

There is an arrangement, called the national media pool, between the Department of Defense and American newspapers and television news operations. The idea is to give the press reasonable access to wars large and small — on the theory that the people whose taxes and children are needed to make war have some right to know what is being done with both.

But the current Pentagon-press arrangement is the same deal I have with my 5-year-old when we're out on the street: I hold her hand tight, and she sees only what I want her to see when I want.

At the beginning of the recent unpleasantness in Panama, for instance, the national media pool consisted of 14 reporters and cameramen who were flown to Panama City in military aircraft and then locked in a room and allowed to watch Cable News Network reports from Atlanta.

I exaggerate, but only a bit. Actually, a fellow did come over from the U.S. Embassy and give a lecture on the history of the country. He went a little easy, though, on the good parts, like how we stole the land in the first place from Colombia.

"The Pentagon's system failed so miserably in Panama that some of us laughed at the absurdity of it all."

wrote one of the pool members, Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News, "especially at being flown 2,500 miles to begin our war coverage by watching television."

"I would think the military folks were laughing even harder. The system did not fail for them. As far as I can tell over the years, Pentagon systems are designed to keep the press away from action and decision-making until the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the White House too, get their stories straight and the mistakes cleared up. It is a high-stakes game for them. Like doctors, military officers bury their mistakes — and critical reporting is the equivalent of malpractice suits.

In my experience, the U.S. military professionally defends country and Constitution, but that does not mean it believes every itty-bitty word of wild stuff like the First Amendment and freedom of the press to criticize strategies, execution and officers. I've met more than a few U.S. officers more than willing to risk their bodies to protect mine — for which I was humbly grateful — but who made it clear they thought such duty was wasteful and reporters an unnecessary evil.

Well, they have their job and I have mine. And we are often at cross-purposes. They may not see it the same way, but my gripe is that they usually prevail — and they certainly did in Panama, where they basically

presented us with the heartwarming story of our paratroopers coming down chimneys with sacks of toys and goodies from their sleighs.

"We are doing what we are supposed to do, defending our country," said one Army captain, apparently believing he was a Panamanian or that Panama was a part of the United States of America.

I should make my beliefs (or bias) clear if they are not already obvious: (1) I think the invasion of Panama was stupid and wrong; (2) I think the press has caught the same chicken laryngitis that seems to prevent Democratic "leaders" from questioning the actions of any bureaucrat who wears a uniform to work.

This invasion was a waste of American energy and young men, to say nothing of Panamanian men, women and children and, when we stop congratulating or deceiving each other, of moral credibility. It is hard to figure out why we did this.

To protect Americans? Before the paratroopers came, we already had, under the Panama Canal treaties, more than twice as many troops in the country as Manuel Noriega did.

To stop the dread Noriega from shipping drugs into the United States? There can't be anyone so foolish to believe that the hundreds of millions of dollars we spent on this adventure will stop a single grain of

essence from reaching Harlem.

It is almost impossible to think of an analogy as sensible other than our turning troop ships back from Lebanon, where the going was getting rough in 1982, to the soft sands of Grenada.

In the Mexican War, in the 1840s, we at least got something worthwhile — California and the rest of the Southwest — from the annoying smaller bids on our behalf. Actually, at best, this invasion was a pale imitation of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 to drive out the Khmer Rouge — an invasion we are still officially condemning.

It was in Grenada that the modern U.S. military was first able to use force — pointing its guns at American reporters and cameras — to control totally what Americans knew about a military action. The best reports for a while then were coming from Cuba.

When American reporters tried to reach Grenada by boat, they were stopped by U.S. Navy ships and guns, threatening to blow them out of the water if they did not turn their little boats back. Those reporters, in fact, had as much legal right as the Navy to be landing in Grenada, but the press boats were unarmed.

When it became obvious in Panama that the pool reports were just about useless, some newspapers and television operations in Washington demanded that the Pentagon allow them to fly their chartered planes into the country. Fool free, said people working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the planes arrived over

INVASION...CONTINUED

Central America, they were forbidden to land by American officers. "We can't guarantee your safety..." began the argument the military never loses. Another famous victory. Once

again the combined military might of the most powerful country in the world has proved it can defeat its own free press — in war and peace and "intervention."

Richard Reeves is author of "American Journey," a modern version of Alexis de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America."

day in Panama," Mrs. Legate said.

"One of Our Guns"

Duff's brother, 22-year-old Jim Duff of Lincoln, said the family had been told that the death might have been caused by "possible friendly fire."

"It could mean he was cleaning guns," Jim Duff said. "It just means it was one of our guns and it was accidental."

Duff was one of a dozen or so students to graduate from Clearwater High School in 1988.

He joined the Army under its delayed entry program during his senior year and did not have to report for service until August 1988, Mrs. Legate said. He received basic training at Fort Benning, Ga.

Duff's last trip home was during a leave between basic training and his first duty assignment. Mrs. Legate said her son spent an early Thanksgiving holiday at the farm near Elgin before leaving in mid-November for Fort Ord, Calif.

Promoted in 10 Months

At Fort Ord, Duff was attached to Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Battalion Division. His mother said he was proud to have won promotion from private to specialist within 10 months.

On Dec. 20, a day before his scheduled trip home, Duff called his mother at her farmstead near Elgin.

He told her that his leave had been canceled, that his infantry unit at Fort Ord had been placed on alert and that he wouldn't be home for Christmas.

Duff called again two days later to tell his mother, "They're shipping us out to Panama."

The phone conversation lasted less than a minute, prompting Mrs. Legate to think her son was not supposed to call.

He called home again Sunday, for the last time. The call came from Panama, collect.

"He told me he couldn't tell me

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'Possible Friendly Fire' Fatal to Nebraska GI

By Jeff Gauger.

World-Herald Staff Writer

Army Specialist Douglas J. Duff Jr. had bought his plane ticket from California and was all set to fly into Eppley Airfield for a two-week Christmas leave.

It was to be the 20-year-old infantryman's first visit home to Nebraska in more than a year.

He never made the trip.

One day before the flight home, Duff received new orders. They sent him to Panama.

He died there of a gunshot wound — possibly "friendly fire" — on New Year's Day, 12 days after U.S. military forces invaded the country in an effort to oust Panamanian Gen. Manuel Noriega.

"Supposed to Be Home"

"He was supposed to be home for two weeks for Christmas, and then they sent him to Panama," Duff's mother, Shirale Legate, said Wednesday from her home in rural Elgin, Neb.

Duff was the first Nebraskan to die in Panama since the United States launched its military action there Dec.

20. Twenty-three U.S. servicemen have been killed in action in Panama, most in the first few days.

Duff's death differed from the other military fatalities. Officially, the Army is calling his death an accident, making him a "non-battle casualty."

Pentagon Comment

Maj. Joe Padilla, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon, said Duff died about 6 p.m. Monday of an accidental gunshot wound. Padilla declined to provide more details until Duff's family has been informed of circumstances surrounding the death.

"The Army is regretful that this accident had to happen," Padilla said from the Pentagon.

On Wednesday, Duff's relatives, including his mother and father, Douglas J. Duff Sr. of Bermer, Neb., were still awaiting more information.

Mrs. Legate said she learned of her son's death from an Army officer who visited her home at 8 a.m. Tuesday.

"All we know is what we were told yesterday morning, just that he had been shot and killed by an accidental gunshot wound the day before yester-

ST. LOUIS
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DISPATCH

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At Marine Court-Martial, The Truth Hurts

The Marine Corps says it did not punish a female drill instructor for telling the truth at a court-martial rather than parroting the company line, but that is how it looks.

The case involves Christine Hillinski, a former Marine drill instructor at Parris Island, S.C., fighting to get back pay and restoration of her good-service record. While still in the Corps, she testified at a court-martial in 1988 of a fellow drill sergeant charged with homosexual activity with a female recruit. While stating firmly that she backed the Marines' longstanding policy against homosexual acts, Sgt. Hillinski told the court that overall, the other instructor "did a fine job."

For her answer, Sgt. Hillinski was quickly punished. The brass accused her of questionable judgment for being "lenient in her position on homosex-

uality." That was hardly the case. Still, she was removed as a drill instructor, docked in pay and had unfavorable ratings placed in her service record by the same supervisor who had only days before filed a report saying "her judgment is outstanding."

One Marine spokesman, Lt. Col. Fred Peck, defended the Corps' action this way: "If I'm a priest who's called upon to testify, and I suddenly start espousing views that are antithetical to the church, what kind of faith is my bishop going to have in me?" Col. Peck is wrong; the issue is truth, not the party line. The colonel apparently would have priests commit perjury in the name of dogma.

Sgt. Hillinski should get her back pay and service record restored. The Marines should brush up on legal procedures.

Lax military security could be ruinous next time

By Bill Gerz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Leaks of information prior to the U.S. military operation in Panama did not affect its outcome, but military analysts say such lax security under less favorable conditions could be disastrous.

Norman Polmar, a military specialist and co-author of the book "Merchants of Treason" about U.S. security breaches, said this week that deficiencies in security were of secondary consequence in the Dec. 20 action because the United States had bases and large numbers of forces already in Panama.

"Against another type of enemy, say the Soviets, or if we were engaged against Libya or a country of significance, one would hope things would be a bit more secure," Mr. Polmar said. "Otherwise losses could be catastrophic."

Twenty-three U.S. servicemen died and several hundred were wounded in the mission known as Operation Just Cause. Military planners had expected that as many as 70 troops would die, according to U.S. officials.

Rep. Les Aspin, Wisconsin Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, last week described the Panama intervention as unique because of the U.S. military's existing deployments and familiarity with the country. "We should note that it almost surely won't be as easy anywhere else," he said.

"What I know — what I'm sure of" — is that the PDF (Panamanian Defense Forces) and Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had enough information ahead of time, from various

sources, that told him that we were coming," Mr. Aspin said.

Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also has criticized U.S. intelligence shortcomings in the operation.

The Pentagon has said a preliminary review of the Panama operation found operational security to be adequate, but that a full review of security precautions would be conducted later.

Pentagon spokesmen have said security did not appear to be a problem because Gen. Noriega apparently did not believe reports he received about the impending U.S. operation.

Edward Luttwak, a military affairs specialist with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said operational security should be reviewed as part of the Pentagon's assessment of the lessons learned from the operation.

"An operation that size is not going to have perfect operational security," he said. "On the other hand, a detailed examination of what was done [to protect the secrecy of the operation] is warranted."

Mr. Luttwak said one apparent flaw was notifying U.S. troops about the intervention days in advance, a potential security problem he called "unnecessary."

John M. Collins, a military specialist with the Congressional Research Service, agreed that the mobilization of U.S. troops in the United States was an inevitable flaw in security precautions and may have limited the "tactical surprise" of the Panama operation.

"A possible lesson learned is that if you hope to gain tactical surprise, a deception plan is absolutely in-

dispensable," he said.

An administration intelligence official said the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded a telephone tipoff from Washington to Panama some 24 to 48 hours before the operation as a serious security breach that nearly compromised the operation.

According to U.S. officials, some of Gen. Noriega's forces were on a heightened state of alert, including units that put up unusually heavy armed resistance during the night of the intervention.

In addition to the telephone call that was monitored, U.S. officials have provided the following details indicating that information about the military operation leaked out in advance:

- PDF troops overheard two U.S. soldiers talking about "11-Hour" some three hours before it occurred.

- A former Israeli intelligence operative and a reputed security adviser to Gen. Noriega was tipped off to the intervention some six hours before the operation began. The adviser, Mike Harari, fled the country and later surfaced in Israel. Intelligence sources said Mr. Harari is believed to have been on board an Israeli C-130, loaded with evidence detailing Israel's ties to Gen. Noriega, that left Panama City six hours before U.S. troops attacked.

- An unidentified television correspondent was asking telephone questions about the planned military operation 36 hours before it took place.

- Some PDF forces went on alert after Cable News Network reported troop arrivals in Panama at about 10 o'clock on the night of the operation.

- The operation also became known outside Pentagon channels

when members of the media pool selected to cover the event reportedly failed to follow secrecy procedures.

Time broke the secrecy rules after the magazine's staff was notified at a Christmas party about the pool call-up. In a memorandum on the incident, NBC reporter Fred Francis, a member of the Panama press pool, wrote that "in the course of finding a correspondent to go, the entire staff of Time magazine learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington, the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement."

Another pool member violated the secrecy rules by contacting a member of Congress hours before the operation, prompting one lawmaker to call the White House in search of more information. White House spokesman Martin Fitzwater said. An administration official said the breach "seriously undermined the mission."

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ment command in Washington. The Navy expects cutbacks "not nearly the size of the others," she said. With a total recruitment ad budget of \$19.4 million last year, the Navy, too, must compete for candidates who "score high on tests to be able to handle the technical hardware," she said.

BBDO, New York, has the Navy account.

The Marines, whose officers were not available to comment, still are stressing the image of "A few good men" in their ads from J. Walter Thompson Co., New York.

Candor Panama's 1st Casualty

By Patrick J. Sloyan
Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington — The face of battle is haunting: Robert Capa's photograph of a Spanish civil war soldier shot in mid-step, the grainy footage of GIs withering in the surf of Omaha Beach, a tank rumbling out of Hue covered with dead American Marines.

Those indelible images, along with equally grim eyewitness dispatches, are part of the recorded reality of political decisions that result in military conflict.

But from President George Bush's invasion of Panama, there is not a single public photograph, video or eyewitness account of the moments when 23 U.S. servicemen were killed and 265 wounded.

There is, however, a secret record of what was essentially a one-day war that also resulted in a still uncertain num-

ber of Panamanian dead and injured. But the Bush administration has concealed it from public viewing.

Those classified moments of "Operation Just Cause" were also a triumph for photographic technology. The murky 1 a.m. H-hour over Panama was transformed into daylight by electronically enhanced infrared military cameras. Air Force, Navy and Army combat photographers recorded — from above and below — some of the 4,800 U.S. paratroopers who took a 17-second plunge into combat.

"It is really dramatic stuff," said an Army official who viewed the combat photography. But that footage, along with the moment when Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega surrendered at the Vatican Embassy before Army video cameras, are not for taxpayer consumption.

"Combat photography is for combat

use — internal use," said Robert Hall, an aide to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. To a reporter's request for films of combat and Noriega's surrender, Hall advised legal action against the Defense Department. "File a freedom-of-information suit."

The Pentagon's refusal is just one of the reasons there is only a smattering of images of American troops in the two major battles on Dec. 20 — at the Commandancia, the Panamanian Defense Forces' headquarters in the slums of Panama City, and 76 miles to the west at the PDF barracks in Rio Hato.

"It is all a terrible mistake," said Pete Williams, the chief Pentagon spokesman, of U.S. military decisions to prevent media coverage of the fighting in Panama. Also blocked from witnessing the Commandancia fighting was the so-called Defense Department media pool, a band of newspaper, wire

service, broadcast and magazine journalists and photographers.

"The president personally decided that the pool should be used," said Williams, who arranged to have reporters flown from Washington to Panama as the invasion got under way. "They weren't sent down there to be locked in a closet."

But the delay in getting journalists to the scene left a void in the record of Operation Just Cause that enabled the Bush administration to control the initial and, often, most lasting public perception — a flawless feat of arms on an almost bloodless battlefield.

"If you just looked at television, the most violent thing American troops did in Panama was play rock music," said Robert Squier, a political media expert. "They feel if they can control the pictures at the outset, it doesn't make a damn what is said now or later."

By reducing the reality of combat to sanitized statistics, the administration effectively silenced its critics and enlisted the media in portraying the invasion as Bush's showdown with Noriega. The image was summed up by an Army

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colonel asked to explain the source of the code-name for the invasion. "Just 'cause Noriega really us off," the officer said.

But in the race to tint the first blush of Operation Just Cause, the administration has left a tangle of hyperbole, distortion and half-truths that are just beginning to unravel.

Some senior members of Congress, for example, are concerned over the handling of intelligence that led to the Navy's SEAL team attack on Petillo airport, where it immobilized Noriega's potential get-away plane. Four of the Navy commandos were killed and 11 wounded when the small U.S. force encountered hundreds of Panamanian soldiers and armored personnel carriers.

"The Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence knew the base was heavily fortified," said a House Armed Service Committee investigator. "But there is a real question if the intelligence was given to the SEAL team."

Even though it was a superpower amassing 25,000 elite troops against a Panamanian combat force estimated at only 4,000 men, U.S. casualties were almost certain. But in addition to a photographic blackout, the administration sought to minimize to the media any self-inflicted wounds.

For example, reporters repeatedly pressured military commanders at the Pentagon on the day of the invasion for details of almost predictable accidental injuries from what was the largest airborne assault since World War II.

"I know of no casualties that occurred as a result of the air drop," said Army Lt. Gen. Tom Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "To my knowledge, none of them were accidental." Kelly spoke after the most serious casualties had been evacuated to the United States.

But the Army this week acknowledged that 86 of its 253 casualties resulted from fractures and sprains. "It is presumed they were caused by the jump," said Maj. Col. Joe Padilla, an Army spokesman. All of them were evacuated quickly from Panama to Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.

"It was the worst collection of fractures I'd ever seen in my life," Air Force Dr. William Burner said last week. In a telephone interview in San Antonio he described the first plane-load of wounded as "an absolute orthopedic nightmare." In addition to shattered arms, shoulders and legs there was severe damage to nerves and blood vessels, which was more difficult to treat, Burner said.

Some of those injuries were clearly an inescapable part of combat for the 860 Army Rangers who jumped in Rio Hato to attack the Cuban-trained "Men of the Mountain," Noriega's elite 7th Infantry company. Two one-ton concussion bombs dropped by an Air Force F117 Stealth fighter-bomber stunned some of the Panamanian soldiers but alerted others.

"They were ready for them," said an Army official who told how the Panamanians filled the air with small-arms fire. One Ranger was shot while he stood in the doorway of his plane. Col. William Kernan, who led the Ranger assault, later told reporters they jumped at 375 feet to minimize the time his troops dangled as easy targets.

Kernan's force suffered two killed and more than 40 wounded, but there is still no breakdown on injur-

ies caused by the 12-second jump in which some Rangers plummeted into the roof of the barracks the PDF was defending.

The Pentagon has yet to break down the cause of 23 deaths. But the Army, in addition to listing jump-related injuries, reported 70 gunshot wounds, 51 injured by shrapnel and 11 felled by the tropical heat. Five are reported as "cuts," six as "other" and 24 other soldiers were hurt for "miscellaneous" reasons.

Those catch-all categories may include at least five soldiers injured by their own explosive mauler charges in a raid on Gamboa prison, a Pentagon official said. The Marines, Air Force and Navy still are compiling the causes of their casualties, the official said.

Panama City's international airport was a much cooler landing zone than Rio Hato.

The bulk of U.S. paratroopers jumped there, including the 82nd Airborne, which arrived hours late because of freezing weather at Ft. Bragg, N.C. The airport was secured within the first hour of the invasion by U.S. Rangers. But the paratroopers jumped rather than being landed at two available airports.

"They always jump from perfectly good airplanes," said one senior military planner. "You can't second-guess that forever but the Airborne will always jump." While as many as 40 — the exact figure is still unclear — were injured, the military planner said the rate of injury was within the predictable level for a night drop.

Burner is the chief of surgery at Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center, where reporters were banned for four days after the invasion from interviewing the injured. For reporters, San Antonio and domestic military bases of the invasion force are a backdoor to first-hand information about what really happened in Panama.

But the Bush administration scaled both back and front doors during Operation Just Cause. Orders from the top down silenced soldiers in the field.

"Sorry, my operational orders are that I cannot let you talk to any of my men," an Army major general told NBC reporter Fred Francis. "I can't speak with you." Francis sought the interview only hours after the general's paratroopers had seized the international airport in Panama City on Dec. 20.

For Francis, the chief Pentagon correspondent for the network, it was a day of anger and frustration. As one of the most experienced members of the Pentagon pool that arrived from Washington at 8 a.m. — four hours after H-hour — Francis knew that a 6-year-old pact between the media and government entitled him to a front seat at the fighting.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada featured a press blackout by U.S. military commanders who actually "detained" for days journalists, including a Newday reporter, who arrived to cover the conflict. Media protests led to creation of the pool and Pentagon approval for frontline access.

But in some of the most important ways, Panama was just as bad as Grenada. A horde of reporters was kept out of Panama for three days until the U.S. Army permitted a chartered jetliner to land at airports under U.S. control. Peter Arnett, a Pulitzer Prize-winning combat journalist, was reduced to reporting on Noriega's alleged pornography collection. "They got away with it again," Arnett said of the initial press blackout.

Other reporters in Panama were shut out of Noriega's surrender at the Vatican Embassy. "We got notice

At 10 a.m., Francis was only two miles from the Comandancia where American tanks were still firing. "We told our escorts that was where we needed to be," Francis said. "We were told, 'It is too dangerous.'"

Four days later, the Pentagon released a brief clip of the combat footage at the Comandancia. But it gave no inkling of the firefight that included Army tanks, helicopter gunships and a converted Air Force cargo plane called Specter, or of the pounding by 40-mm. and 20-mm. cannons, along with a Gatling machine gun. That film record could shed some light on what the military calls "collateral" casualties to Panamanian civilians who lived in slums between the American position and the Comandancia. Last week, the Pentagon was continuing to shun all questions about the Panamanian toll resulting from the firefight.

For Francis, most details he gathered about the invasion that first day came from the same source: the rest of the world used — the Pentagon briefing televised in Panama. He watched as Gen. Kelly assured viewers that Operation Just Cause was a "10" on a scale of 1 to 10.

"It was especially frustrating since we were only a few miles from the troops fighting, yet we were grounded," Francis said. When he and his camera crew were permitted into the field the next day, all the dead and wounded had been evacuated.

Squier, who uses television to create Democratic political images, noted Hush's only appearance with the dead from the invasion was accidental. The president would complain later about network split-screen broadcasts that showed him bantering at the White House as flag-draped coffins arrived at Wilmington, Del.

"Everything else was carefully staged," Squier said.

A teary-eyed Bush visited 44 of the wounded in San Antonio on Dec. 31. The "beautiful thing" Bush later told reporters was that he heard no "second guessing" from the victims of Operation Just Cause.

Whatever political motives were involved in sanitizing the record of Operation Just Cause, they were reinforced by some military leaders. Media coverage is still blamed by some senior commanders as the reason for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

"Two things people should not watch are the making of sausage and the making of war," said Burner, who has watched the flow of American blood in Vietnam, Beirut and in San Antonio last month. "All that front-page blood and gore hurts the military. We're guilty by association."

But former Sen. Eugene McCarthy believes it was the reality of war promoted by the media that ended public support for the Vietnam conflict. "That picture of the dead Marines on the tank — that was a turning point for the United States," said McCarthy, who led the public outrage over the war in 1968 that drove Lyndon Johnson from the White House.

One result of Vietnam, according to McCarthy, is little, lauded wars such as Panama, where public approval is secured by limiting the perception of death and injury.

Germany to Join Norway Exercise

For the first time since World War II, troops from the German Army will be on Norwegian soil when a parachute battalion from the Federal Republic of Germany participates in NATO's "Array Encounter" exercise scheduled for Feb. 3 to Feb. 28.

Array Encounter is held twice a year with participation from Canadian, British, and Italian troops of the NATO Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. This year it will take place in Troms, in northern Norway.

only seconds before," said Pentagon spokesman Hall. "There was no time to get the prize at the Embassy." Army video and still cameras filmed 40 minutes of Noriega. But the Pentagon would release only 3 minutes of the footage, showing Noriega inside an Air Force plane that carried him to Miami.

The elaborately planned Pentagon pool did not arrive on the invasion's first day until after most of the heavy fighting ended.

"The pool was repeatedly denied or ignored when it asked for access to frontline troops, wounded soldiers, simple interviews," Francis said in an after-action report. "The pool was a failure."

Richard Harwood

A Pool In Panama

Some things in this world are not fixable.

One of them may be the Pentagon press "pool," an entity properly unknown to the mass of humanity.

We are reminded of its existence by the Panamanian military adventure in which the "pool"—a somewhat ragtag collection of 16 Washington "media" people—was mobilized in the dark of night, flown by military aircraft to the scene of action where, metaphorically speaking, it vanished into the void. Its members were to have been our eyes

Ombudsman

and ears on the battlefield, the Ernie Pyles and Hemingways through whom the world would experience vicariously the rocket's red glare, the bombs bursting in air. And all that good stuff.

But they produced no memorable prose. They shot no film that sears its images onto the brain. The whole enterprise, Fred Francis of NBC news has written in a memorandum on the affair, was doomed from the start by bunglers and incompetents in both the Pentagon and the pool, of which he was a member. The Pentagon, he concludes, wanted

this little war to be covered properly. The field commanders—Gen. Maxwell Thurman and Lt. Gen. Carl Stiner—evidently did not. So the pool members got a cold reception when they arrived and were effectively muzzleed by neglect through much of their stay.

The press was as sinning as sinned against. It endangered the security of the operation hours before it began. This "lapac," Francis wrote, "far outweighed all the Pentagon's fumbling. . . . Time magazine . . . was notified at a Christmas party that the pool was activated. In the course of finding a correspondent to go, the entire staff of Time magazine (and other guests at the party) learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington, the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement. Some pool members showed up . . . without passports and without the proper gear. . . . Only a few members of the pool had any combat experience, and fewer still had ever covered a military event. . . . Combat is no time for on-the-job training."

This bad show, in the sensible view of Fred Francis, was needless. Long before the shooting began, American correspondents were in goodly supply in Panama. The Associated Press, United Press International, CBS News, the Chicago Tribune, The New York Times and other news organizations had people on the scene. Bodies out of Washington were not required. But military assistance was essential.

The reporters, many of them holed up in the Marriott Hotel, needed protection, transportation and information that only American military forces could

provide. Lacking these essentials, self-preservation became their first priority. Fear immobilized most of them in their hotels or homes. The telephones worked. They could call the office. But they had only the sketchiest idea of what was happening at battle sites miles away.

Two lessons should have been learned from this little war. The first is that the press for all its swaggering and arrogance is virtually helpless in situations of that kind without the cooperation of the military. The second is that military field commanders—no matter what unctious oases from the Pentagon—will not give that cooperation unless they are made to do so. A major general commanding Rangers and airborne troops told Fred Francis he wanted to cooperate, but "my operational orders are that I cannot let you talk to any of my men. I can't speak with you."

For their part, members of the press pool allowed the imbecilic tyranny of deadlines to ruin opportunities for serious reporting and to sour their relations with the troops. Lt. Col. Joseph Hunt, commander of a Ranger battalion, made his men available for prolonged interviews on the fighting at Rio Hato. "They want to tell you," Hunt said to Francis, "how they jumped from under 500 feet and took this base in 20 minutes." But it was 4 in the afternoon, and "we would miss our deadline. . . . I'll never forget the look in his eye when I told him we had lost half the day waiting and simply had no choice. He didn't want to hear it. All Lt. Col. Hunt knew was that I did not have time for his troops."

Since the Vietnam War, there has been hostility and misunderstanding between these mammoth institutions—the

press and the military. The Hunts fought the war; many of the journalists opposed it. That is an important reason things don't go smoothly in the field. Adversarial relationships, the press discovered in Panama, can work both ways.

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things take time, and we appreciate the associated difficulties. Meanwhile, we should not jump to conclusions until all the results are in."

Gen Powell stressed that the growing political and military independence of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact governments was having some impact on JCS planning for US forces in Europe — "but by the very nature of the situation in Europe, not as much as some people think it should. "Remember, the Soviet forces have always been our chief concern. The Soviet Army in East Germany alone outnumber the entire US military presence in Western Europe. Moreover, our plans are based on capabilities, not on intentions. As long as the capabilities remain, we have to plan on ways to counter those capabilities.

"When we see real, hard evidence of sizeable reductions in Soviet forces, of a re-orientation to a defensive posture in the Soviet Western TVD, and elimination of forward-stationed ammunition stockpiles and other offensively oriented structures and logistic functions, then we can begin to discuss significant revisions in JCS planning." JDW

BUSH... from Pg. 7

lysts. Some of these experts contend that the "cuts" would apply only in projected, future military spending increases and thus constitute only a "savings" on paper from projected expenditures that might never become reality. Others point out that actual reductions in conventional or non-nuclear forces in Europe could produce large U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and result in actual savings.

Bush has previously maintained that a peace dividend is not likely to appear, given the continuing deficit problems. After his summit last month with Gorbachev, Bush said it would be "extraordinarily difficult" to achieve any such savings in his first term.

The president paid tribute to soldiers killed and injured in the Panama invasion, and he met here privately with the family of Pfc. James Markwell, who was killed by gunfire after parachuting into Panama during the invasion.

"In the past months we saw democracy restored to the brave people of Panama," Bush said. Although the president has said he would not talk about the case against ousted Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega, he told the business group: "We saw the powerful brought before the bar of justice."

The Pentagon Pool, Bottled Up

The invasion of Panama offered the first true test of the Pentagon's system for giving journalists access to live combat. The system failed. More precisely, the Pentagon failed the system. It is the President's job to make it work.

The system was devised after the Reagan Administration excluded reporters from the Grenada invasion in 1983, temporarily blinding press and public to one of the more debatable expeditions in American military history.

A commission headed by Winant Sidle, a retired general, then recommended that a select "pool" of reporters be allowed to accompany the military in any surprise operation and share its information with other news organizations. That seemed a fair compromise between the military's need for surprise and the public's need for information.

In Panama, the arrangement swiftly became a joke. The Pentagon did not get the 16-person pool to Panama City until four hours after the fighting began, and reporters were unable to file dispatches until six hours after that. Overall coverage improved as hordes of other reporters arrived, but the original pool remained under tight military control and contributed little. "We started behind the eight ball," one photographer said, "and it just got worse from there."

Part of the problem may have been an absence of institutional memory: George Bush's Pentagon seemed to feel no urgent need to abide by an accommodation struck by Ronald Reagan's Pentagon. No

civilian official accompanied the press pool to Panama City. The Pentagon simply handed the reporters over to the officers of the Southern Command, who treated the journalists as an unwelcome nuisance. In a rare burst of bureaucratic candor, Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, summed up the military's entire press performance in one word: "incompetence."

The larger problem, as it always has been, is one of mutual comprehension and trust. Since the goals of defending the nation and informing the nation often conflict, forbearance is required on both sides. For its part, the press is obliged to accept limitations, including rules on what may be published about military operations in the Gulf and Korea, the press agreed, if not always cheerfully, to rigorous censorship.

In exchange, the military is obliged to allow reporters to do their job, which means getting them to the scene of the action and providing means of communication. As General Sidle noted the day after the Panama invasion began: "If you're going to let the media in, you've got to let them do something."

But insuring adequate coverage is a civilian responsibility. It belongs to President Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the appointed officials who carry out their orders — not the military. As a post-Grenada report by the Twentieth Century Fund noted in 1985, the two cultures, military and media, have been divided since Vietnam. Commanders charged with leading troops into battle are likely to give the press low priority — unless told otherwise by their civilian chiefs.

The press and the Panama invasion

CAL THOMAS

Some journalists are complaining that U.S. commanders in Panama kept them from sights "that would detract from what they (the commanders) regarded as a military triumph."

So says Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News, in an essay in The Washington Post. Mr. Merida was one of the pool reporters who accompanied soldiers on the invasion.

"Military officials either didn't understand or ignored our needs as journalists," complains Mr. Merida. "Military commanders were especially eager to promote Noriega as a bizarrely prosperous dictator with a degenerate character." Perhaps that's because Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's profile exactly fit that description.

Mr. Merida's essay, along with one by George Carneou in Editor and Publisher in which he quotes UPI's Matthew Mendelsohn as saying the pool "was a complete and dismal failure," betrays a level of hostility by much of the press that the Pentagon did well to maintain.

Panama was the second major battle since Vietnam involving large numbers of American forces in which there have been press restrictions. Grenada was the first. Both operations were military successes that achieved their stated objectives.

The British, during their invasion of the Falkland Islands, also applied restrictions on reporters. That, too, was a successful operation.

In the modern era of satellite communication, is there a connection between delaying some of the sardonic musings of the press and the achievement of military objectives? I think there is. Government officials, including the military, must be held accountable by the press, but in the prisoned years following Vietnam and Watergate, some natural press skepticism has evolved into a variety of cynicism that is harming the nation.

Veteran journalists who covered World War II and other pre-Vietnam conflicts remember how things once were.

"You used to know who the enemy was," laments Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor-in-chief of The Washington Times and a former foreign correspondent. "Now, the enemy is your own government and the only reason you want to get in on Day One is to report on how it's screwed up."

Bryson Rash, a former NBC News correspondent, notes that while circumstances were far different in World War II ("there was all-out war and no alternative, and we also had censorship that was never violated except on one or two occasions"), there was a different spirit among journalists of that era and a different attitude toward their own country.

Bob Sherrod, a World War II correspondent for Time-Life in the Pacific, tells me, "The relations between the press and the powers were very close. We were all fighting the same war. There was no doubt that the press trusted the high command to a point and reporters were generally trusted."

Mr. Sherrod says Gen. Dwight Eisenhower would brief reporters in advance about an invasion. He also says that Navy Secretary James Forrestal advised him in advance of the invasion of Saipan in 1944 so he could return there in time to write a firsthand story.

No official would dream of doing such a thing today. Such privileged information would probably be broadcasted and printed all over the world by reporters anxious to beat the competition, jeopardizing U.S. policy and the lives of American soldiers.

A glance at reporting during World War II shows a crop of reporters who were a far different breed than some of today's overpaid spoiled brats.

The New York Times on Nov. 17, 1944, reported "a great offensive against the Ketch" and of the advancing soldiers as "our" ground troops.

The same paper carried an editorial that said, "Safe here at home, drying our shoes and overcoats and gloves in front of an open fire or over a radiator, suffering between one dry place and another only the momentary discomfort of a cold and rainy day, what can we do or hope or say to those brave men, fighting and dying in our cause, along the Siegfried Line? We can do each his appointed task, no matter how small, to speed the final victory. We can hope that success will be swift, and the losses small. We can say only, God bless you!"

Imagine such an editorial being written about America and American soldiers today. Instead we often focus on the irresponsible remarks of Ramsey Clark or Jesse Jackson questioning every government policy and every step of the soldiers.

Ernie Pyle, the greatest World War II journalist of them all, did his job so well that he was not only praised by fellow journalists abroad and at home, but by those he covered.

In his book, "The Story of Ernie Pyle," Lee Miller quotes a letter from Pfc. Robert O'Doherty of the 88th Division: "... [Pyle] would do us more good than any high-powered senator in Washington."

Gen. Omar Bradley said of Pyle, "I have known no finer man, no better soldier." And Pyle said, "If I could pick any two men in the world for my father except my own man, I would pick Gen. Omar Bradley or Gen. Ike Eisenhower. If I had a son, I would like him to go to Bradley or Ike for advice."

The bravery of American fighting men is undiminished. Unfortunately, responsible journalism and the esteem of too many journalists for their country has been on the decline. Military objectives ought to be policy-driven, not press-driven. Until these priorities are again placed in the right order, it is not a bad idea for the Pentagon to hold reporters at bay, at least until a mission's objectives have a chance to succeed. There will be plenty of time for critiques later.

Cal Thomas is a nationally syndicated columnist.

WASHINGTON POST

JAN. 16, 1990

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Nessen on Pentagon Coverage

During an interview with WWRC-AM's (980) Ed Walker and Bruce Alan on Wednesday morning, Ron Nessen, vice president/news for the NBC Radio News and Mutual Broadcasting System networks, said the Pentagon-organized press pools should be disbanded and that the media alone should be responsible for getting to the scene of breaking news and should not rely on the government for transportation, information or any other kind of help. He said "the Pentagon pool failed" to cover the Panama invasion because "the Pentagon has absolutely no interest in having reporters see what is going on... having photographers take pictures. That's not what they are in business for. They are in business to fight wars."

Nessen said the reporters who missed the story were ones who "put themselves in the hands of the Pentagon with the promise that the Pentagon would take them to where something was happening." He said that NBC Radio News didn't make that mistake. "We had somebody there a couple of days early because we had the sense that something was building toward this kind of climax."

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tively removed the threat of Soviet surprise attack. He announced he would withdraw some 5,000 tanks from Europe (about half have departed). An agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the conventional force reduction talks (CFE) this year would further dilute Soviet military power by eliminating at least 10,000 of the 14,000 Soviet tanks massed on the borders of Eastern Europe.

The United States now has 320,000 troops in Europe, and no less an authority than Admiral Crowe argues that the Bush administration should begin bringing them home. The withdrawal should be gradual—"We should walk, not run, to the exits," Crowe told *Newsweek*. But "Germany is a very prosperous country," he added. "Why should we provide ground forces for them? We shouldn't." Chairman Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee argues that the United States should essentially restrict its role to providing air power, and let the Europeans defend Europe on the ground.

But should the United States walk away from its historic postwar commitment in Europe? Some Europeans, as well as Americans, may not be comfortable with seeing Germany once again become the dominant land power in Western Europe. Nor is it clear that the Soviet empire will quietly wither away. The East-bloc remains tindery as it dissolves. "I lie awake at nights thinking of all the ways in which events could get out of control," says Gen. Jack Galvin, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe. (The favorite doom scenario over at Galvin's headquarters: angry East Germans storm one of the Soviet Army barracks. There is bloodshed. At the Kremlin, rebellious Soviet Army generals confront Gorbachev...) At a minimum, it is likely that the United States will have to keep 100,000 troops in Europe with enormous

stockpiles of arms and ammunition in case U.S. forces have to come back.

Even if the United States no longer needs to contain Soviet expansionism, it will have an essential military role to play, not only in Europe, but around the world. The United States is dependent on the global economy it created after World War II by exporting free markets and democracy. That economy cannot function without global stability. Ironically, the end of the cold war could bring more instability, not less. During the '60s and '70s, Soviets were often blamed for fomenting revolution in the Third World. But "the Soviets kept their clients in line, particularly in the Middle East," says a senior Defense Department official.

Balance of power: By turning inward, the Kremlin has left the United States as the world's only true superpower. No other country has the global reach of the U.S. military. The United States may find itself playing world policeman in the manner of 19th-century Britain, patrolling sea lanes and intervening to restore the balance of power in regional disputes.

What kind of forces will the United States need to play that kind of role? It has become fashionable to say there is no longer a need for the kind of heavily mechanized army necessary to defeat the Soviet Army on the plains of Europe. Future wars, the thinking goes, will require light, mobile forces, like paratroopers and Marines. In Pentagon jargon, the wars will not be MIC—high-intensity conflict, but rather LIC—low-intensity conflict. The invasion of Panama, in other words, not the battle for Germany. But Panama was an exception, caution Army planners. Rescuing hostages and attacking terrorist cells will still require quick-response special-operations teams like Delta Force. Future wars are more likely to be MIC—medium-intensity conflicts. "The truth is, there's hardly a contingency demanding LIC anymore," says a senior Army officer. "The forces out there are just too big."

Certainly, the armies of the world are becoming more lethal. Third World inventories of armored vehicles—the spearhead of land attack—have quadrupled in the last 20 years. A dozen Third World countries have armies with more than 1,000 main battle tanks. More than a dozen countries have ballistic missiles. Perhaps 20 have some form of chemical weapons, and an additional 10 are researching biological and toxic weapons. By the end of the next decade, it is not fanciful to expect that 10 countries may have tactical nuclear weapons.

Is it big: Defeating these nations will require more than the 82nd Airborne. An amphibious force of U.S. Marines, along with airborne troops, can "kick in the door" of some far-off foe. But then heavy forces will have to come in to rescue. "Guys in dune buggies get blown away by main battle tanks," mordantly notes Phillip Karber, a conventional-forces expert. Even in Panama, where resistance was light, the United States chose to pile on the firepower, sending in light tanks and artillery to back the paratroop assault. "The lesson Panama will teach the American military is that if you're going to go in somewhere, go in big," says an army general of one of America's principal allies. "After Grenada, people started thinking about rapid and

selective low-profile operations—all that low-intensity stuff. But the truth is that nobody in the brass was keen on it. And the success of Panama will reinforce their prejudice: go in big."

In Panama, the United States had the immense advantage of some 12,000 troops already based in the country. Other adversaries will not be so accommodating. Backing up the initial shock troops with armored divisions will require enormous airlift and sealift capacity—and at the moment, the United States has not enough of either. A C-8 transport plane can carry only two M1 tanks, and the United States has only 97 C-8s. The Pentagon is trying to develop an effective light tank, but the designers are having trouble building a light-weight cannon with enough punch to destroy a heavy tank. Another solution would be to "pre-position" cargo ships laden with heavy armor around the world. But that would require more funds for military transport—an area traditionally neglected in the defense budget because cargo ships and planes have no natural constituency in either the Pentagon or Congress.

Not surprisingly, when it comes to carrying up the Pentagon pie, politics usually counts for more than strategic necessity. In the past, when Congress has wanted to cut the defense budget, the lawmakers have slashed manpower and "readiness"—the fuel, spare-parts and ammunition stores necessary to train and fight. If the Soviet threat continues to evaporate, the United States will probably be able to cut the size of the Army by a third, from 768,000 men to 519,000 men. But cutting manpower is not very cost effective. A division costs about \$1 billion a year, so cutting a heavy division would shrink the Army's ready land power by 8 percent, but would whittle only 3 percent from the defense budget.

The hidden costs come in maintaining the vast military infrastructure that has grown up over the years. There are about 6,000 military installations, ranging from giant bases to small armories, scattered through some 8,000 communities across America. Many of them are virtually useless. The United States needs its bases along the coasts as jumping-off points for foreign wars. But it has little use for relics of the 19th-century Indian Wars like Fort Douglas, Utah, or Fort Riley, Kans.

Yet Congress is loath to cut them. Last year, when the Pentagon prevailed on the Hill to close 86 bases, the squeaks could be heard coast to coast. The reason, of course, is money. Defense contracts are not the only way Congress spends the largesse. Bases are even bigger pork barrels. In 1988 Congress sent \$566 million in defense contracts to South Carolina but spent \$2.4 billion just maintaining bases there.

Political motive: Congress is equally reluctant to cut weapons systems, no matter how costly. Lawmakers prefer to "stretch out" production, buying fewer copies a year, but at a greater cost for each. Rather than kill the controversial B-2 Stealth bomber, Congress is likely to buy fewer than half the original order of 132 planes. But that means the price tag per plane, already a

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UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO MIAMI 34003-0176 0201

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
GROUND RULES (U)

1. You have been selected to participate as member of the DOD media pool in an operation which you will be briefed on soon. The following ground rules will protect the security of the operation and the safety of the troops involved, while allowing you the greatest permissible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all US media.
2. You may not mention to anyone the fact that the pool has been activated.
3. You may not file stories, or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other material (film, sound bites, etc.) have been pooled with other media organizations. This pooling may take place at a briefing immediately following the operation, or by filing from military communications facilities. You will be expected to brief other members of the press concerning your experiences at this briefing. Detailed instructions on filing will be provided at a later briefing.
4. You must remain with the escort officers at all times, until released--and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting, and are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety.
5. Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool.
6. Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these guidelines and your willingness to abide by them.

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO MIAMI 34003-0176 0201

TAB E TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
OPSEC GUIDANCE FOR DOD MEDIA POOL (U)

D O:

Upon receiving a call that activates the DOD pool, have worked out in advance what you are to tell your family, friends and co-workers about your absence.

Drive yourself, take a taxi or use another transportation system to get to assembly point without getting anyone else involved with your departure.

Have your equipment, clothing and other material needed for the deployment, ready to go; but not in a place that would raise questions.

Have prearrangements made that will allow you to disappear with no significant disturbance in your work, neighborhood and family.

Think hard about things you do or say that might be out of the ordinary or give indications/signals that you are doing something unusual. Could a good investigative reporter determine something unusual was going on?

Keep the fact you have been called away on the pool secret. Lives depend on your ability to do this.

Follow the ground rules and instructions given you by your PAO escort.

D O N ' T:

Let your co-workers know you are in the DOD media pool.

Let the equipment you take with you give away that something "big" is going on.

Have a friend drive you to the assembly area.

Call home until allowed to do so by PAO escort.

Use the telephone to notify your headquarters that the pool has been called away.

Be concerned if the story of your deployment is released in Washington, D.C. because it normally will be done that way. Remember your pool report will be the first on-scene report with information about the planning phase.

UNCLASSIFIED

Let the clothes you pack signal where you are going. Have both warm and cold environment clothing in a location where they won't be missed.

Inadvertently talk about any information concerning your call-up, ultimate destination, etc.

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APO MLAMI 34003-0176-0201

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TAB F TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6666-88 (U)
USSOUTHCOM CHECKLIST FOR DOD MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS (U)

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Receipt of LIMDIS Warning Order/Message Addressees and formats and transmission to OSC. | DOD, SCPA |
| 2. Establish and test communications between USSOUTHCOM, OSC and DOD by voice (commercial and military) and message. Establish feasibility and/or procedures for collect calls. Consider and use facsimile machines if feasible. | SCPA, SCJ6
OSC, DOD |
| 3. Establish Press Center for Pool:
a. 4-5 typewriters (preferably electric to be tested in advance), paper, pencils.
b. Electrical outlets and extension cords to be tested in advance.
c. 4-5 tables, chairs for tables and for briefing area.
d. Access to telephone, message center facsimile machine and transportation facilities.
e. Secure facility for equipment.
f. Access to food, beverages (MREs are acceptable).
g. Access to rest area (cots, blanket, etc). | OSC |
| 4. Arrange intra-theatre transportation for pool members with backup. Time and recon routes. Plan for communications during transport and appropriate security/escort. | OSC |
| 5. Coordinate for briefings, briefers and associated equipment (map, charts, etc). | OSC |
| 6. Coordinate for security of pool equipment. | OSC |
| 7. Determine and arrange means for transmission of pool A/V products. | OSC ← |
| 8. Coordinate for customs and immigration and entry and exit procedures if required. | OSC |

UNCLASSIFIED

9. Coordinate with debark/embark location officials for entry/exit and pickup and delivery of pool members. OSC
10. Evaluate likelihood and/or implications of host country international or US media or representatives based in country. Coordinate with USIS. OSC
11. Consider in-country media representatives for handoff of A/V products. If used, coordinate for identification of those personnel, access to facilities and possible translator requirements. Arrange transportation if necessary. OSC
12. Arrange deployment of USSOUTHCOM public affairs representative. SCPA
13. Coordinate for message typing, location personnel, equipment. OSC
14. Arrange for foreign currency transactions and change. OSC
15. Determine local ground rules and arrange for distribution to pool on arrival or in advance by DOD; e.g., photography restrictions on flight lines, etc. OSC
16. Consider safety, OPSEC, A/V considerations (e.g., sunlight) for pool requirements. OSC
17. Consider and arrange if necessary billeting for pool members and food service arrangements. OSC

[REDACTED]

PAGE 1 MLN=28186
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1 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:PA//
2 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCPA//
4 WFO RUEHWP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY
5 JEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS:PA//
6 JEHK/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
7 4CUAAA/USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
8 4CGSRB/FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
9

E C R E T

SUBJECT: MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS - JUST CAUSE (U)
REF PHONE CON ASD(PA) WILLIAMS AND COL SCONYERS, SCPA, 22 DEC 89.
(U) PER REF, THE DOD MEDIA POOL WILL TERMINATE OPERATIONS ON
R ABOUT 1200, 23 DEC 89. USSOUTHCOM WILL ESTABLISH A REGIONAL
EDIA POOL TO BE COMPOSED OF AVAILABLE LOCAL MEDIA AND MEDIA
4 WHICH HAVE ARRIVED AT YOUR LOCATION DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS.
(U) POOL COMPOSITION AND GROUND RULES WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY
5 SOUTHCOM. SUGGEST FIXED POOL SIZE WITH DAILY MEMBERSHIP ROTATED
6 ALONG THE MEDIA AT YOUR LOCATION. ALSO SUGGEST GROUND RULES
7 SIMILAR TO THOSE USED BY THE DOD POOL.

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]

(U) FOR THE TIME BEING, FILING PROCEDURES WILL REMAIN THE
SAME AS THOSE FOR THE NATIONAL POOL. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF
MATERIALS SHOULD ALSO BE ARRANGED FOR REGIONAL POOL MEMBERS IN
PANAMA. OASD(PA) DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS WILL MAINTAIN 24-HOUR
OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT FILING OF MEDIA MATERIAL.
(U) MAC AIR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE
RETURN OF NATIONAL POOL MEMBERS. BASED ON LACK OF COMMERCIAL
CARRIERS, AND TO BENEFIT THE COMMAND, BY TEMPORARILY REDUCING
THE NUMBERS AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES, THOSE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE ARRIVED IN
PANAMA SINCE THE OPERATION BEGAN ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO RETURN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AGE 2 MLN=28186
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>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS ON THE MEDIA POOL AIRCRAFT TO ANDREWS
B, MD. NORMAL WAIVERS OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY ARE REQUIRED.
NON-POOL MEMBERS USING THE RETURN FLIGHT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THEIR OWN TRANSPORTATION FROM ANDREWS AFB TO THEIR FINAL
DESTINATION.

(U) THE BUREAU CHIEFS OF MEDIA IN PANAMA ARE AGREEABLE TO
PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEIR PERSONNEL IF REQUIRED. REQUEST
USOUTHCOM IDENTIFY AND INFORM OASD(PA) OF ANY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS,
ORGANIZATION, OF THOSE MEDIA PERSONNEL. PLEASE INFORM BY 1800,

AGE 03 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]
DEC.

(U) YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ONSLAUGHT OF MEDIA IS CONSISTENT
WITH THAT OF THE OPERATION IN GRENADA, WHEN MORE THAN SIX HUNDRED
PEOPLE REPRESENTING THEMSELVES AS MEDIA DESCENDED ON BARBADOS
DURING THE FIRST 24-HOURS OF THE OPERATION. THEREFORE, SUGGEST
YOU ANTICIPATE FURTHER MEDIA ARRIVALS WHEN YOUR CURRENT AIR
RESTRICTIONS ARE LIFTED AND OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE IS ESTABLISHED.
SINCE THE MEDIA ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY IN PANAMA, ALL MILITARY
PERSONNEL, OPERATIONS, ETC WILL BE SUBJECT TO THEIR ATTENTION.
THIS COULD REQUIRE MORE PA ASSETS THAN YOU CURRENTLY HAVE.
PLEASE IDENTIFY YOUR REQUIREMENTS TO US SOONEST, BY MESSAGE, SO
THAT APPROPRIATE AUGMENTATION RESOURCES MAY BE IDENTIFIED.

(S) SECRETARY CHENEY WILL VISIT THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND,
ARRIVING ON SUNDAY, 24 DECEMBER AND DEPARTING MONDAY, 25 DECEMBER.
FORMAL PLANNING INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY. THE
TRIP WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE OF THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL
IN PANAMA. MEDIA QUERIES ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S TRAVEL WILL BE
RESPONDED TO WITH, QUOTE: WE DO NOT DISCUSS TRAVEL PLANS OF
SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. END QUOTE. AMEMBASSY PANAMA AND
CPA MAY ACKNOWLEDGE THE VISIT UPON ARRIVAL OF THE SECRETARY.

AGE 04 RUEKJCS2176 [REDACTED]

THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO ENABLE THE
SECRETARY TO SEE FIRST HAND THE SITUATION IN PANAMA AND TO GIVE
HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMED
FORCES THE GRATITUDE AND PRIDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR

[REDACTED]

SECRET

GE 3 MLN=28186
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>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

URAGEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND
FREEDOM IN PANAMA.

(U) OASD(PA) POC FOR THIS ACTION IS MAJOR JOHN SMITH AT
TELEPHONE, CMCL 202-697-9312 OR AV 227-9312.
CLAS 25 DEC 89

176

NN

[REDACTED]

SOUTHCOM ORGANIZED DOD MEDIA POOL OPPORTUNITIES

20 DECEMBER 89

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Briefing by Mr. Bushnell, Charges d'Affairs U.S. Embassy, on current political events in Panama.	All - 14 press, 2 technicians and 3 DoD escorts	Helicopter Howard to SCN
Activities at Ft. Amador. Photos of troops, fighting positions, interviews with troops involved in assault on barracks complex, interviews with family members residing at Ft. Amador.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Helicopter
Tocumen International Airport activities. Photo op of limited ground ops, interviews with two women held by PDF during early stages of assault.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Helicopter
Detainee camp near Albrook Air Station. Photo opportunity.	14 press, 2 DoD escorts	Bus
U.S. Ambassador returns to Panama.	14 press, 3 DoD escorts	Bus/HMWV

21 DECEMBER 89

Tocumen. Shots, interviews of 7th ID (L) soldiers.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Patillo Airport No coverage due to hostile fire.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Rangers at Rio Hato. Interviews with commanders, soldiers, photo op of arms cache and prisoners being loaded onto C-130.	5 press, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Driving tour of the city. Included Commandancia area, Calidonia, Via Espana. Saw looting, celebrations. Covered Endara ceremony. Visited Balboa displaced persons center.	9 press, 2 DoD escorts	Van

22 DECEMBER 89

<u>EVENTS</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Tour of PDF barracks at Ft. Amador, including Noriega's personal office. Tour of "Witch House." Tour of Commandancia, including Noriega's personal office.	14, 1 DoD escort	Bus
Smithsonian hostages.	8, 1 DoD escort	Helicopter
Detainee center.	6, no DoD escorts	Helicopter
Colon to visit 7th ID (L) troops.	5, no DoD escorts	Helicopter

23 DECEMBER 89

Urban operations with 82d Abn Div and 7th ID (L).

Pool formally dissolved before these stories were covered. Pool teams that covered these operations were primarily made up of DoD press members who stayed in-country.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT TO PANAMA

CHRONOLOGY

Tuesday, 19 December 1989

1930 Began call out.
2115 (Approx.) Departed Pentagon for Andrews AFB.
2140 Arrived Andrews AFB.
2300 Boarded C-141.
2326 Took off from Andrews AFB.

Wednesday, 20 December 1989

0015 Briefed pool members on aircraft. Made following points:

1. Destination Panama.
2. Major U.S. military operation to remove Noriega and install duly elected government officials.
3. Air drop scheduled for 0100.
4. Presidential announcement 0100.
5. We arrive approximately 0530.
6. U.S. ground troops arrive 1300.
7. We will cover what is taking place. Caveat: I don't know what will be happening when we arrive.

0500 Arrived Howard AFB. Picked up at plane by bus. (Truck for satellite gear.) All time on ground spent in bus waiting to be loaded on helicopter.

0553 Departed Howard AFB.

0604 Arrived Ft. Clayton. Although original plan was for pool to be taken to the media center upon arrival, Quarry Heights was taking heavy fire, so decision was made to have the pool go to the Southern Command Network (AFRTS affiliate) headquarters building until safe passage to Quarry Heights could be arranged. Watched President's speech, then briefing by SecDef and CJCS. Watched video tape of fighting on CNN. Media frustated that they were watching action on TV that they felt they should have been covering. Mr. John Bushnell, Charge d'Affairs at U.S. Embassy, gave a background briefing on how he had briefed Mr. Endara over the weekend on the pending U.S. operation. Discussion with Col. Sconyers by phone about security review. Maj. Bill Maddox, our SOUTHCOM escort, named reviewer.

0900 Radio report #1 filed.
0928 Print report #1 filed.
0953 Print reports #2-4 filed.

1008 Arrived Ft. Amador by helicopter. Gunfire and explosions from direction of Chorillo. Loudspeakers calling for people to come out with hands up. Prisoner driven by in HMMV. Firing from direction of PDF barracks.

1039 Wife of a battalion commander interviewed while fight for PDF barracks went on. 105 mm howitzer aimed at barracks.

1120 Howitzer fired at barracks. Much small arms fire. Media moving through garages under houses.

1219 Fred Francis (while waiting for helo pickup at Ft. Amador) said he will recommend that NBC pull out of pool. No quid pro quo. NBC had story before attack. Held off anticipating pool. No return on investment. Won't hold tongue in future. \$25,000 uplink with no return. Pool media are not getting story.

1235 Plan was to go to Howard AFB to see arrival of troops; then to Tocumen airport to see 82nd Airborne; then to overfly city and return to Ft. Clayton. Media requested to see wounded. This request was made numerous times by the pool members. Pool escorts were instructed by OASD(PA) that it was not appropriate and violated the Privacy Act. The pool then saw the wounded being interviewed at military treatment facilities. Pool members felt they were not being given access to the story.

1238 Helo arrived Ft. Amador.

1245 Arrived Howard AFB. Nothing going on, no troops arriving. Pool members learned that helicopters damaged in combat were being repaired in a nearby hanger. Requests to photograph the ongoing repairs were denied. General feeling of pool members was this is a joke. When are we going home? Why are we here? Need to see more action. Downtime is killing us. Can't photograph flight line at Howard because of special aircraft present.

1350 Fax print report #5. Given to PA rep to fax.

1355 Departed Howard.

1405 Arrived Tocumen airport. General Johnson, Rangers commander, could not talk to us because of restriction in Ops Order. Found Maj. Baxter Ennis, 82nd Airborne, who could talk and was interviewed by Fred Francis. General Johnson said too risky to fly to perimeter of airport; had no ground transportation for us. Impression was that general really wanted to help, but felt that he is under orders (Ops Order) and could not. The general expressed the opinion that he thought it was important for the media to tell the story of what our soldiers had accomplished, but that the Ops Order prevented him from making anyone available to discuss what had happened during the fight for the airport.

1500 Found two college girls held in airport previous night as hostages of some PDF and other Panamanians. Pool interviewed them at length.

1524 Depart Tocumen. Pilot said it is too risky to fly over city as requested by media.

---- Arrived Ft. Clayton.

---- Departed Ft. Clayton.

---- Stopped to cover detainee area. Delayed in coverage by soldiers guarding detainees. Even though SOUTHCOM PA escort said approval had been given for media to see and photograph the detainees, the unit commander went through the chain of command to obtain permission. This situation was encountered often, no matter what event had been arranged for the pool.

1645 Arrived Quarry Heights. The media center had four phone lines, one fax machine, one computer and printer, a television (featuring CNN and all network news shows) and two typewriters. The center was manned by one SOUTHCOM officer (O-5) and one enlisted man. This arrangement worked relatively well when only the pool was in the center; as the second wave of media arrived, there was competition for use of telephone lines.

1744 Print pool reports 6 - 8 sent out.

1830 Fred Francis went live with NBC and CNN. Video tape already uplinked to satellite. Technician advised that satellite uplink requires a dedicated phone line available for technicians to confirm quality of transmission constantly during process.

1950 Print reports 9 - 11 sent.

2000 Col. Sconyers brief.

1. U.S. Ambassador to Panama to have news conference tonight upon arrival at Howard AFB from CONUS.

2. General Thurman, maybe General Steiner will brief them tomorrow.

3. Will get us downtown with security escorts.

4. More photo opportunities will be attempted.

5. Some Dignity Battalion troops still roving and getting in last licks.

2045 Departed Quarry Heights. Possible Dignity Battalion member captured at checkpoint at Bridge of the Americas while media pool bus was at checkpoint.

2130 Arrived Howard AFB for press conference with U.S. Ambassador. Some pool members complained that they were being forced to cover events considered advantageous to administration goals while being denied the opportunity to cover combat activities.

2205 Departed Howard AFB.

2235 Arrived Quarry Heights.

2310 Print reports 12 -15 sent.

Thursday, 21 December 1989

0010 Fred Francis appeared live on CNN.

0830 SOUTHCOM plans officer gave briefing on previous night's action.

1015 Faxed press report 16.

1145 Faxed press report 17.

1150 Gun fire south of Quarry Heights.

---- Ground team of pool saw refugee center at junior high school. Some wounded. Car with dead body and parts of weapons. Looters were shouting "Viva Bush." Went to Commandancia, Assembly - saw assumption of power by new government. Then first press conference by new leaders. Civil disturbance outside of ceremony.

---- Air team of pool went to LZ near Marriott Hotel, but was waved off because of gunfire. Saw airport and Seventh Infantry Division establishing positions. Overflow Panama Canal and saw ships. Went to Rio Hato to see where Rangers assaulted. Talked to Ranger commanders and soldiers. Saw captured Soviet weapons and POWs loaded onto a C-130.

---- Left for Witch House.

1900 Returned from Witch House. No luck getting in, house still being cleared of booby traps. Thirty radio reports and 31 print reports filed to date. First group of new reporters arrived. Sam Donaldson and Prime Time Live crew arrived. The arrival of Sam Donaldson (ushered in like a VIP) angered the pool because they perceived that he would get what they did not.

Friday, 22 December 1989

0710 Plan for day: Tour PDF barracks at Ft. Amador, Witch House, Commandancia and Empire Range detention compound. Note: Media have requested morning brief - advised SOUTHCOM, nothing scheduled.

0800 Departed Quarry Heights.

0805 Arrived Ft. Amador. Noriega Headquarters, Barracks, boats for escape, Witch House.

---- Commandancia, Noriega office, weapons rooms. Man in street with RPG round, turning self in, ex-PDF.

1108 Helo to Ft. Clayton to interview Smithsonian hostages. Ten adults + 1 child.

1145 Ft. Clayton PA office to work on stories and file.

1405 Departed Ft. Clayton enroute Empire Range to tour detainee center.

1505 Departed Empire Range.

1515 Arrived Ft. Clayton. Short situation summary distributed to pool members.

1715 Departed Ft. Clayton.

1730 Arrived Quarry Heights. Pool members announced their motto is: "If it's news today, it's news to us!" Another motto: "Semper Tardis." They talked about a DoD media pool T-shirt bearing both mottos; front and back.

Saturday, 23 December 1989

----- Media declined opportunity to visit prison, see political prisoners. Rationale was that they should have been there to cover the action to liberate the prison, not the aftermath.

0900 SOUTHCOM formed a pool to cover a sweep action. Pool included Fred Francis and his crew, Bill Clayton, Houston Chronicle, and Scott Applewhite, AP.

1445 Pool print reports up to 45.

1500 Arranging for pool departure. By this time in the week, the SOUTHCOM public affairs staff was exhausted. They were asking the DoD escorts why DoD had not augmented the staff with additional public affairs support. Scheduled for 1825 takeoff from Howard AFB.

2345 Departed Howard AFB for Andrews AFB. Passengers include Evergreen employees held hostages. Pool members talked to them.

Sunday, 24 December 1989

0445 Arrived Andrews AFB.

Comments:

A. Callout:

During the second hour of the callout, DPL was asked to inform the wire service bureau chiefs that they could each send a writer and a photographer on the deployment. This caused short term and long term problems. In the short term, it delayed the pool's departure from Andrews AFB because reporters/photographers added to the pool by this supplemental callout could not be expected to report within the 40 minutes remaining prior to the original reporting time. The longer term problem is that the pool included three photographers, rather than two, resulting in requests that they each go to different places to avoid duplication of effort. This was not always possible due to transportation shortages. In addition, this last-minute change to pool composition may raise questions regarding our future intentions with respect to wire service representation on the pool; i.e., was this a one shot deal, or will the wires be able to take two people on future deployments as well?

B. Lack of Media Access to Early Combat Operations:

One of the complaints heard most frequently from the media is that the pool was not able to cover the beginning of the operation. Since many media believe the purpose of the media pool is to provide access to combat operations from the start, and since our own SOP states that a "specific" pool objective is to "enable the media to cover military contingencies from the onset of an operation," a case could be made that we failed in this regard.

Once the decision was made to deploy the DoD pool, the additional decision to delay the callout for a couple of hours violated our procedures. The delayed callout and the subsequent late pool arrival in Panama have led to some media speculation that we were concerned about COMSEC being violated and deliberately called the pool out later than we could have, thus precluding coverage of the operation from the beginning.

It appears that our only defense is that the report of the Sidle Panel reflects disagreement on the matter of how soon before an operation begins should the pool be called out, and how soon pool correspondents should be able to cover an operation after it begins. In each case, the report indicates that the timing should be as soon as possible and as soon as it is feasible.

C. DoD Pool vs. Regional Pool:

It appears that if SOUTHCOM had been directed to constitute a regional pool made of correspondents already in Panama on the night of 19 December, we would have avoided the criticism that media were not given early access to the operation. COMSEC could have been preserved and the regional pool correspondents could have been prepositioned with combat units before combat operations began. We may have been criticized for not activating the DoD pool, but we could have defended our action based on the report of the Sidle Panel which says that a pool should be used only when "media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation." The report also points out that the media dislike the pool concept in general. This was borne out by the large influx of media into Panama on 21 December. On the other hand, our action to get a satellite dish into Panama to facilitate TV coverage was an important, positive action. Without that dish, it may have been necessary to airlift video products to the U.S. at a time when confusion caused by the tempo of operations and flight schedule changes could have resulted in serious delays. Film shipped by the TIME photographer encountered such problems. Overall, the question of whether the DoD pool worked better than a regional pool would have worked is a tough call.

D. Alleged OPSEC Violations:

There have been press reports of OPSEC violations after the callout of the DoD media Pool. One allegation is that a pool reporter called a "law maker," who in turn called the White House. The other allegation is that when TIME's pool reporter left a TIME Christmas party "many of the nearly 200 guests wished him well on covering what all assumed was to be the invasion of Panama."

If the above allegations are true, we suffered a serious breach of security that could have endangered American lives. A formal investigation into each allegation appears to be warranted, especially since the allegations were in published news reports. If swift action is not taken it could be perceived that we are not concerned about possible breaches of security.

E. Difficulties in getting combat units to cooperate with the Media Pool:

DoD National Media Pool coverage of operational activities in Panama were thwarted by such problems as lack of helicopter support, lack of ground transportation, lack of cooperation by various units that had operations orders stating that soldiers were not to talk to reporters, etc.

SOUTHCOM PAO comments to us on this problem pointed out that an OASD(PA) message informing the CINC and PAO that the media pool is being deployed has little value with respect to obtaining in-theater operational support. Their recommendation is for the Joint Staff to issue a "frag order" to the CINC informing him that the pool is being deployed and that all operational units must support pool requirements with helicopter airlift, communications gear, necessary security support and access to personnel for briefings and interviews.

How well this would work is anybody's guess. It also would be contrary to our DoD directive that says public affairs guidance flows to the CINCs from the ASD(PA). Obviously, the matter requires further study.

F. Lack of Daily Update Briefings in Panama

While the DoD Media Pool was in Panama, there were no regularly scheduled daily update briefings for the press. On one day there was a briefing in the morning by an officer who was deeply involved in planning Operation "Just Cause." There also was a news conference held by General Thurman. More briefings probably would have served the media well.

G. Overall Assessment

The acid test of the DoD National Media Pool concept is whether the American people are kept informed of developments in the field during the early stages of a U.S. troop deployment to a combat area.

With respect to the deployment of the media pool to Panama, there was a time after the pool's arrival early Wednesday morning when media coverage didn't take place as quickly as we would have liked. However, by the time the pool was dissolved on Saturday morning the pool print reporters had filed 45-50 stories, the wire photographers had transmitted some 150 still photo images, the radio reporter had filed many stories and the pool TV

crew had provided continuing reports to all the major networks for use on morning news shows, evening news shows and other series telecasts, such as NIGHTLINE.

Overall, despite glitches that occur under combat conditions, the American people were well served by the DoD National Media Pool and it functioned as well as could be expected in a combat situation.

DoD National Media Pool was established by Executive Order in 1964 in Panama City, Panama, to provide a central source of information for the media. The pool was initially composed of various units and personnel from the Panama Canal Zone and the U.S. Navy. The pool's primary mission was to provide the media with accurate and timely information about the Canal Zone and the U.S. Navy's operations in the area. The pool was organized into several functional areas, including news, public relations, and technical support. The pool's operations were coordinated by a central office in Panama City, which was staffed by a mix of military and civilian personnel. The pool's success in providing the media with accurate and timely information was a key factor in the U.S. Navy's ability to maintain a strong presence in the Canal Zone during the 1960s and 1970s.

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With respect to the deployment of the media pool in Panama, there was a time when the pool's arrival early in the morning when media coverage didn't take place as quickly as it would have liked. However, by the time the pool was deployed on Saturday morning the pool's reporting had been fully operational. The wire photo service had been established some 15 days before the pool's arrival. The pool's reporting had been fully operational and the pool's operations were coordinated by a central office in Panama City, which was staffed by a mix of military and civilian personnel.

AN EVALUATION OF THE DOD MEDIA POOL

"If it's news today, it's news to us." That was the motto of the Pentagon pool deployed for the invasion of Panama. An amusing but entirely accurate slogan for the first 36 critical hours of combat.

Since it was supposed to function at the "onset of an operation", the pool was a failure. The Sidle Commission, which was formed after the media was frozen out of the 1983 invasion of Grenada, made specific recommendations that inclusion of the national media be part of the initial planning of all future military operations. Those recommendations were adopted in full by the Pentagon. This invasion did have the media but they arrived after the fighting began and were not permitted near U.S. troops who were still involved in action.

The pool was in the air on a C-141 two hours out of Andrews Air Force base when U.S. troops began their assault on Noriega strongholds. Upon its pre-dawn arrival in Panama the pool was sequestered for five hours when there was still a real opportunity to report to the American people on the actions of U.S. soldiers still engaging an enemy.

"Where the hell have you guys been?" barked Colonel Mike Snell, whose men controlled the area around the commandancia, Noriega's headquarters. "I been wanting you guys to talk to my kids about how they took this place in one hell of a fire fight," Snell said to the pool two days after the fierce fighting. It was impossible to explain to that proud Colonel that the pool was looking for today's news.

It was first and foremost a failure of policy makers to follow up on specific orders to deploy the pool. The decision to use force in Panama was taken at the White House on Sunday yet it was not until Tuesday, less than twelve hours before the invasion, that the Pentagon's Public Affairs shop was directed to ready the National Media Pool.

So, the fatal flaw of the National Media Pool's deployment was that it was ignored in the first thirty-six hours of operational planning. It is difficult to judge whether the continued missteps once on the ground were the result of poor Pentagon liaison with Panama or a Grenada mentality on the part of the on-scene commanders. In my view it was both. A complicating factor was the pool's composition. It was clearly too large with many pool members unprepared and wholly inexperienced.

The errors on both sides are too many to detail, but a few examples will paint a picture of a Pentagon pool which DID NOT cover the inception of the largest U.S. military action since Vietnam.

The Pentagon's top priority in any military campaign is operational security. As it must be. The Staff of the Joint Chiefs moved 12 thousand troops with 48 hours planning, but gave the Pentagon's Public Affairs chief only a few hours to form a pool to cover the action. Inadvertantly, that short notice jeopardized security and insured that the pool missed the opening stages of combat. Most pool members were given less than two hours to report to Andrews. Everyone made it, but the frenzy in some shops contributed to leaks.

It is unclear why a Pentagon pool had to be formed at all. The Sidle panel said a stateside pool should be used when that is the only way

the American media can accompany the troops. There were enough reporters already in Panama who could have been quietly gathered from hotels the evening before the invasion and sent out with the troops. I am told by DOD sources that that suggestion was rejected by military leaders.

Once on the ground in Panama the pool had to wait five hours for a briefing and transportation. In the middle of that period CNN carried a news conference from the Pentagon in which we learned ALL the details of the operation we were constituted to cover. It was especially frustrating since we were only a few miles from troops fighting, yet we were grounded.

~~FLIGHT~~

The first serious attempt to work the pool came at ten o'clock with a ~~flight of~~ helicopters to Fort Amador where combat operations were still underway against a Panamanian Army barracks. The siege at Amador involved occasional shooting and a few interviews. But less than two miles away the pool could clearly see the area around Noriega's headquarters in full blaze. Loud speakers were blaring at Noriega loyalist to surrender. A tank was pounding away. We told our escorts that was where we needed to be. We were told, "It is too dangerous."

We were shuffled around for the rest of the day missing action and being denied access. At the captured international airport General Johnson, a two star commander who genuinely wanted me to interview his airborne and ranger troops said, "Sorry, my operational orders are that I can not let you talk to any of my men. I can't speak with you."

One escort officer who was almost as frustrated as pool reporters complained that they were not getting cooperation from Commander in Chief General Maxwell Thurman or the staff of operational commander Lt. General Carl Stainer. We would hear that often in the days ahead.

The pool was repeatedly denied or ignored when it asked for access to front line troops, wounded soldiers, picture opportunities at the air base, senior commanders, simple interviews with GIs who had seen fighting. Even a basic request to spend the night in the field with soldiers was turned down. What we got was a steady stream of propaganda. We were taken to greet the returning U.S. Ambassador, offered freed political prisoners and scheduled for events with Panamanian political leaders.

All we wanted was to join troops who were hunkered down against sniper fire and on perimeter defense against looters and armed bands of Noriega supporters. Though I never heard an escort or an combat officer say it, it seemed that those stories of an incomplete operation were too embarrassing for the military.

Put simply, in the first 36 hours the commanders were not prepared for reporters, seemed to go out of their way to keep the pool away from combat or controversy and either had no concept of what constitutes news or deliberately tried to steer us to events that supported the political objectives of the Panama invasion. I have determined since returning from Panama that those were not the wishes of the senior leadership at the Pentagon.

There seemed to be a constant friction and confusion between the Pentagon's office of Defense Information who wanted to make things happen but had no clout on the ground, the staffs of both the Commander-in-Chief General Thurman and Operation Commander Lt. General Stainer, who seemed to care little what access the pool enjoyed, and the host Public Affairs officers of the Southern Command who were undermanned and caught in the middle.

The media can be faulted almost as much as the Pentagon for poor planning and execution of the pool. Though the number of transgressions

was much fewer, the one single lapse in security far out weighed all the Pentagon's fumbling.

There is no excuse for being ill prepared for pool duty or careless of operational security. Time Magazine was both. It was notified at a Christmas party that the pool was activated. In the course of finding a correspondent to go the entire staff of Time Magazine learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement.

Some pool members showed up at Andrews without passports and without the proper gear. Even my NBC News team had to call back to the bureau for a vital piece of transmitting equipment. That raised the number of staffers privy to the invasion to an unacceptable number.

Furthermore, only a few members of the pool had any combat experience and fewer still had ever covered a military event. A good reporter ought to be able to cover any story but combat is no time for on the job training. Troops expect seasoned professionals, not reporters who have to be looked after.

In the evolution of the DOD media pool the Washington bureau chiefs insisted on a broad representation of professionals if the pool were ever activated. It doesn't work. With a military reluctant to help in the first place it is extremely difficult to get one helicopter for news coverage. This pool needed a nearly impossible two helicopters whenever it moved.

The working pool was made up of a reporter and a photographer each from the Associated Press, Reuters and Time Magazine, a photographer from United Press International, a reporter from ABC radio news, one reporter each from the Houston Chronicle, the Houston Post and the Dallas Morning News. NBC NEWS sent one correspondent, a cameraman, sound man and two satellite technicians with 25 hundred pounds of gear.

We were good company. We were too many.

If the DOD pool is to function, to serve the needs of the military the media and ultimately a free democracy some fundamental changes are needed.

First, there must be clear and unequivocal political and military instructions to the commanders in the field. It must be ordered that the DOD media pool be involved in the initial phase of combat.

Second, the pool must be reduced to its absolute minimum of one print reporter, one television reporter, one radio reporter, one video cameraman and one still photographer. As in any military operation a second echelon of producer(s), reporter(s), photographer(s) and technicians can join the mini-pool within 24 hours to create an expanded pool.

Third, the pool should be exercised every three months and the pool members should interact with commanders of rapid response forces each time. In addition, at least once a month during each cycle the pool should be tested for quick reaction and operational security.

Fourth, a general or flag officer for the Joint Chiefs should be the pool escort. The senior officer should rotate the duty and drill with the mini pool and the second echelon. There is no substitute for someone who speaks for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Fifth, a minimum standard of military experience should be expected of pool members. Conversely, senior military commanders should

be familiar with media needs and methods. The bureau chiefs and the Pentagon public affairs office should organize the ways and means to achieve that understanding.

Finally, if we are ever to have a working relationship both the military and the media MUST begin to work on a basic level of trust. It seems to me the Panama operation was only one step above Grenada. Consider the example of this reporter and a Lt. Col. Joseph Hunt, a Ranger, whose men attacked Rio Hato, 75 miles from the capital. Late on day two I was flown with a crew and two other pool members to Rio Hato where the largest arms cache in Panama was discovered. Hunt had laid on several hours of show and tell with interviews. I tried to explain to him that it was past four o'clock, that we only had thirty or forty minutes on the ground or we would miss our deadlines.

Hunt said, "My Rangers want to tell you how they jumped from under, five hundred feet and took this base in twenty minutes." I'll never forget the look in his eyes when I told him we had lost half the day waiting and simply had no choice. He didn't want to hear it. All Lt. Col. Hunt knew was that I did not have time for his troops.

Fred Francis, Chief Pentagon Correspondent, NBC NEWS

DoD Press Pool Meeting
Fort McNair, Wash. D.C.
Friday, January 19, 1990

Mr. Williams: I appreciate you all coming here on a day when there is a story of some substance going on out in town. (Laughter) I guess that's not the greatest choice of words. This shows you some of the skills I have and how I got my job!

We had originally planned to go as long as you wanted, but I think what we'll do is even though I know there are some people who are still on their way and ordinarily, I suppose we would wait for them, but this is just an indication of the sort of problems you have with a pool. When do we start? But I think we'll try to get it wrapped up here and give you a chance to say, so that some of you who may have to cut away for other events can go without missing the substance of this.

The purpose of this meeting here today is to gather your impressions of what went wrong, your impressions of how the pool worked, what you think was good about it, what you think was bad about it, so that we can fix the problem. I very much appreciate your willingness to make contributions today because indeed, the success of this meeting will depend very much on your willingness to make contributions.

Someone who isn't here today but who is working very hard on this question right now is Fred Hoffman. Many of you know Fred. Fred is a 35 year veteran of the Associated Press, covered the Pentagon since before there was a Pentagon for AP, covered Vietnam, and later under Secretary Weinberger, became a principle Deputy of Public Affairs of the Pentagon for a short time. Any of you who know Fred know that Fred is a very independent person. Fred owes no allegiance to anybody. He has strong feelings about the pool. And we have asked him, although he retired in December, we asked him to come back and make a very thorough, independent review of the pool. He's doing that now. He's in Panama today. He talked to Max Thurman when General Thurman was in town earlier this week. He's down talking to military commanders, field commanders today. He will be making his way up, probably going to Fort Bragg and trying to talk to General Stiner, talk to all of the people who were involved. I realize he's spoken to many of you who were in the pool so far, and he will try to do that before he's finished. He will not try, he will in fact talk to every reporter who was on the pool. But it is not possible for him to talk to all of you who are Bureau Chiefs and who are reporters involved and who care about the pool.

So one of the things that we are doing today is making a transcript of these proceedings, and Fred will get a copy of that as indeed will all of you, and that will help him a great deal. So any comments you make here today will not simply vanish into the ether. They are being recorded. That will be part of the record on the pool.

I realize that to some extent you will want to know what went wrong and why. There will be a natural tendency to sort of want to fix blame, and we will work with you as much as you like on that question, but I think the real goal for us now is to try to find solutions. After all, if this pool is to work, it's to work for you. It's your pool as much as it is the DoD pool. If you don't find it satisfactory, then it has a problem.

So the question is what do you want? How do you want to fix the pool? What are your ideas on how you think it could be made to work better? Or indeed some of you might say at all. There are different viewpoints on this issue, I've discovered.

Many of you who are in the pool have already spoken out. Fred Francis from NBC News has written a paper for a professional journal on the subject. There are a variety of different viewpoints, and I hope to hear some of those today.

While I am doing my best to remain open to Fred's ideas, and indeed I am open to Fred's ideas, I want to hear what Fred has to say because he will be doing, unquestionably the most exhaustive analysis of the pool, looking at it from all possible sides, I do have some initial observations of my own that I would make.

The first point is, I think perhaps lost in all the discussion, and indeed we probably won't hear much about it today but I think it's nonetheless important to bear in mind, after General Sidle's panel, the Winant Sidle Commission recommended the national media pool concept in 1984, there were many exercises of the pool. It was used in the Persian Gulf, but certainly the majority of the time that the pool has been called out has been on exercises. There were many people who said it's nice that you have exercises but we know that when push comes to shove and something really serious happens, you won't use the pool. I hope this has at least dispelled that notion.

The Secretary of Defense in one of his first acts when he became Secretary, was to sign an order furthering the pool and continuing the pool, and in fact the decision was made to use the national media pool very early on. The Secretary informed me on Monday that the President personally wanted to use the pool, and I think that's a good sign. So I want to dispel the notion that the pool won't be used when things get rough.

Obviously that's not to say that on every conceivable military mission the pool will be used. I am sure you can all imagine scenarios, something akin to the aborted Iranian rescue mission, that kind of special operation, in which the pool may not be practical. But I hope that if nothing else, it has dispelled that idea that we wouldn't use the pool when things really got interesting.

During the Panama operation General Tom Kelley who is the Chief of Military Operations in the Pentagon on the Joint Staff, said no plan survives contact with the enemy, but even so, I think it's fairly clear that the pool, to some extent, suffered from insufficient or the wrong kind of planning. There is no way to guarantee anything in the military, but we obviously need to raise the potential for the pool's success.

The pool's goal remains to get eye witnesses to the scene of action. That has to be the primary reason for having a pool. All of the other things about getting the right kind of cameras and the right kind of equipment there have to follow on to that.

Things obviously won't end with this meeting. In addition to Fred Hoffman's report, which we intend to make public, by the way. I would say that I have not seen Fred's report. I have no idea what kind of report he will write. I have simply said to him that everything is on the table as far as I'm concerned--even the very question of whether there should be a pool is up for discussion. There are no preconceptions. I've given Fred very free reign and encouraged him to look at a number of different questions, but not limited him to anything. So he has wide range and he's totally on his own in terms of what he'll report. I don't know whether he will include in his report for the sake of detail things that military folks might be sensitive about releasing publicly. I hope to keep the number of redactions private, but as Molly Moore said, she'll undoubtedly get an unredacted copy and she can write a story comparing them to see whether we redacted the right things or not. But in any case, it's our goal to make the report public.

But we will be making our own suggestions, obviously. The National Defense University has an instructor, for example, at this meeting today, who is interested in learning about the media pool. At the conclusion of this meeting we're going to meet with another instructor who wants to revise his training plan to enable him to make his students more aware of these issues. Indeed, his students are future military commanders. The Joint Operational Planning System which instructs commanders to incorporate media coverage plans into their combat operations will obviously be something we'll be spending some time with. The discussion of the pool has indicated that those plans may not be sufficient. They may have to be reevaluated to ensure that they adequately cover the mechanics of getting the pool into action and getting pool members back so that they can file.

Anyway, those are my preliminary comments. There's no question but that the pool didn't work right in Panama. We got it there, and then from there on it was less than a thrilling success. We are interested in your comments.

Let me prevail upon you to do this. As shy as you all are, we are making a transcript, and indeed I would say that the transcript of the proceedings is important. There are microphones throughout the hall. Those of you in the front row will find microphones behind you. There's a little black button that you need to press and hold down while you speak.

I have no great structure in mind for this meeting, but we'll be happy to impose one if that will help the proceedings. This meeting grows out of, as I said, two forces, I suppose you could say. One is our own desire to hear from you and see what you think--not only the people who were on the pool, and there are many reporters here today who were part of that pool, but also those of you who use the pool, who receive the pool. You are as much a part of the operation as those who went down there and put things into that end. So those of you who receive the pool products on the other end are important to hear from as well. So it's important to get both those sides. But as I say, part of it is our own desire to hear from you and part of it is the regular quarterly Bureau Chiefs meeting we had in January with the new rotation, the new organizations that come in. Several of them at that time suggested we have such a meeting. So for those two reasons, that's why we're here.

Those are my initial comments, and I'm happy to respond to questions. I'm happy to hear from you. Perhaps to get things going, I see Fred Francis from NBC News, Steve Kamarow from AP who were reporters on the pool, perhaps you would be willing to share some of your observations about how it went. Fred, you're so shy and humble. Why don't you go first?

Mr. Francis: I think since I wrote that paper, which some of you have seen, I have since learned, Pete, that the planning for the pool, while you may have been told on Monday, over the weekend prior to the invasion, during the planning in the Joint Chiefs, it may have been Friday, it may have been Saturday, and Fred Hoffman can track this down. What I'm saying I think goes right to the crux of whether the military wants the media in place. The public affairs man in the Joint Chiefs, Erv Sharp, went to General Kelley and said, "General Kelley, a lot of activity. Do I need to stick around, because I'm going on vacation on Monday to visit my parents." General Kelley said you don't need to stick around.

Mr. Williams: That was what day?

Mr. Francis: That was either Friday or Saturday. General Kelley hesitated for a moment, and said to Captain Erv Sharp, "You don't need to stick around," I am told. Erv Sharp went off on vacation to visit his parents.

If the concept of the pool is to be effective, the planning for a pool has to begin with the planning of the operation, as the Sidle Commission said. I don't question Tom Kelley's motives. All I'm saying, quite simply, is that Tom Kelley told the one public affairs guy with an institutional memory in the Joint Chiefs, to go off on vacation.

I think, based on my conversations, that that key decision prior to your learning, prior to the President even making a firm decision on Sunday, damned the pool from the beginning. That's what we have to get at, it seems to me.

It was our experience when we were on the ground there, as you all heard, that there was no real concept or no real logistics laid on for us. If Colin Powell or General Kelley don't tell the three star commanders on the ground that we are to be there at the beginning of military actions or as soon as possible, it's not going to work. I don't believe this worked because it was never planned for when it should have been. That's a mindset, I think, and that's what we have to change.

I think everything else that's been said about the pool has either been in print or we talked about it. That's my key concern right there.

Mr. Williams: Steve, would you like to make some observations? You don't have to.

Mr. Kamarow: I've talked to Fred about this and I tend to agree, there are a whole host of logistical problems which you'll have to go through, but the key thing to me is sort of the cultural acceptance of the pool. It seemed, and Fred Hoffman, again, will have to track this down, that there was a strong institutional resistance to us seeing anything and there was a lot of difficulty understanding the difference between the pool which wanted to see action, and the reporters who were trapped at the Marriott who wanted to be protected. Perhaps a subtle difference in the roles of the press was misunderstood.

The only thing I'd add is I think within the pool there are going to be arguments made about whether the pool was too large or too cumbersome with equipment and this sort of thing. I think there should also be an operational understanding that within the pool, regardless of the size, we could have broken down upon arrival in Panama to a smaller group. If we had arrived there and the military could only get us an armored vehicle or something to take us in, we could have flipped coins or something and just taken a small group in. I have the feeling, and I haven't confirmed this, that there was a bias toward taking the whole group everywhere together, and that was not a necessary thing in my mind.

Mr. Williams: Thank you.

Ms. Lewis: It strikes me that there were four key problems--the very first being our very late arrival in Panama. I at some point would like to ask the question of why the decision was made to bring us in hours after the invasion.

The other has already been mentioned, the lack of action. During the time we were there I saw one body and one wounded U.S. soldier, and that, I think, illustrates the fact that we didn't really cover an invasion.

MORE

Missing

Mr. Aukofer: Frank Aukofer for the Milwaukee Journal.

I think Fred really hit the nail on the head when he talked about mindset. I remember in the early days of the pool we had endless discussions about commanders, military commanders on the ground and how they didn't like the press and they were busy with other things. I don't know how you change that, how you change attitudes. But it seems as if the exercises have worked fine, but the real thing doesn't because maybe the mindset changes. I've been on one of the exercises and it worked great, but it seems as if on the two occasions when the real thing happened, it didn't work.

Mr. Starr: Frank Starr of the Baltimore Sun.

I would defer to those who were members of the pool for discussion about why the pool didn't work and the extent to which it didn't work. I'd like to speak to another issue as a user of the pool. I think there needs to be some common understanding among the people who are administering it as to what the purpose of the pool is.

By that I mean this. Two days after the invasion had occurred, the existence of the pool as being cited to us as reason why we were not allowed to send anyone into Panama independently after the pool had been there for a couple of days. We had a correspondent in San Jose, Costa Rica who was trying to get in, could not get permission for an aircraft to land at Howard Air Force Base.

Mr. Williams: What day was that?

Mr. Star: That was the second day. I believe it was Thursday. That discussion started on Thursday and went over into Friday, and by Friday he still wasn't in. He ultimately went in over land, through David. But the point is, the existence of the pool, which by the way was not working very effectively, was cited to us as a reason why he could not go in, because there was a pool down there, and we were told the purpose of the pool was to make it so that the military would not have to handle additional individual requests.

It seems to me that the Sidle Commission report makes the point clearly the purpose of the pool is to protect the security of the mission. By this time there was no secrecy at all involved.

Mr. Williams: That's a good question and I'm not sure I know the answer to that one.

Mr. Fichenberg: I'm Bob Fichenberg of the Newhouse Newspapers.

Our national security reporter, who is a member of the pool and has participated in several exercises, and incidentally who is on his way to Panama today to do some followup stories, gave me a little memo at my request. I'm not going to read from the memo but I'd like to give you the sense of what he suggests.

Mr. Williams: I would say, by the way, that any of you who have similar memoranda from your people that you think would be useful to us to have, we'd certainly be interested in seeing those, and Fred would be interested as well.

Mr. Fichenberg: What I'll do, instead of reading this, is give you a copy of it for the record, but I just want to give you the sense of what he suggests and what he says is that what he sees as one of the cores of the problem. He says I think the key

problem is that the press has not earned the trust of the military, and that is essential if we are to literally drop in on a combat commander and ask for his or her cooperation.

In the pools in which I have participated, and I think this may have been the case in Panama, pool members have been unfamiliar with the military and uncertain how to behave in combat, and thus unwilling or unable to take the necessary risks.

What he suggests, in brief, is that all the reporters selected for the pool be required to undergo a brief military-type training, perhaps a day of classroom work and a day of field work, perhaps at a place like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The benefits of this, he says, would one, enable the pool to demand quicker and more immediate access to combat action as it is happening rather than being held back by the commanders until the fighting is over and there's not much to report. Also it would give the combat commanders confidence that the pool is seasoned and professional and can be placed in risky situations, and it would give the pool reporters a new understanding and sympathy for the troops who bear the burden of combat. I will give you the rest of the memo, but that's the sense of it.

Mr. Nelson: Jack Nelson of the LA Times. I wanted to support what Frank Star said. We had a reporter, of course, who tried to get in for several days too, and couldn't give in, and we were given the same reason. But it also seems to me that the problem goes far beyond just the pools. I only know, of course, what I've read about what happened down there, but for one thing, as I understand it, we were barred from even interviewing injured soldiers for four days. There were other restrictions put out. It seems to me that a lot of the reason for lack of cooperation on the part of the military came from the top officers who told lower commanders to tell their troops not to cooperate with the press.

Mr. Williams: For those who are here from the pool, this is the first I've heard of barring from interviewing injured soldiers. Is that correct?

Voices: Yes, or photographing. They wouldn't even let us photograph an injured helicopter.

Mr. Mendelsohn: I'm Mat Mendelsohn from UPI. For the record, we were not allowed to see crippled aircraft which were sitting maybe 150 yards, 200 yards away from us. We were not able to talk to civilian wounded, military wounded. We were not allowed to visit with POW's. This is on the first day. Although we inadvertently stumbled upon a makeshift detainment camp and there was a little mutiny there and we forced our way into the camp. But at that point there was no plan for us to see POW's, wounded, dead, crippled aircraft. These were definite no's. No, you cannot do this. It wasn't we did not ask, it was a definite no. I asked Colonel Sconyers several times about the aircraft, we were at Howard Air Force Base. The aircraft were sitting within eyesight and they were working to repair aircraft. We were not even allowed to see crippled aircraft.

Mr. Williams: What kind of aircraft were they?

Mr. Mendelsohn: They were helicopters. I'm told they were Apaches, I believe. We didn't see them. So it's not a question, it was clearly we were not allowed to see this.

Mr. Raines: I'm Howell Raines, New York Times. Pate, to return to your opening point, I think it's worth noting that I was among those who thought the Department

would not use the pool in a real situation, so I think your point is well taken and the Defense Department is to be commended for following through.

However, I'm also struck by the fact of the predictability of these problems. I was on the first pool that was activated on an exercise in the spring of 1985, and we had a meeting which I think Fred Hoffman was a witness, in fact, discussing the problems, and the problems that were predicted then were exactly the ones that pertained here. I think it's important not to get too detailed in the analysis. The needs were simple and the problems were simple, and the cure seems to be simple. It is to get people to the action in a timely way. That means what was missing here and what was missing in '85 needs to be applied--that is a senior escort officer who is sophisticated and has a commitment to the mission. That was lacking in '85, and I gather from the report here it was lacking in this instance. And secondly, to provide timely communications from the start. In '85 we were more or less held incommunicado while at the same time watching Signal companies set up switchboards in the boondocks. Everyone knew that it was possible to call the K-Mart back home within 15 minutes if the will was there.

From an editor's point of view back in Washington, the pool may have some long term utility if it's there and can't file, but the real usefulness in the first 12-24 hours is if you're getting dispatches every 15 minutes, every hour, on unfolding actions. So from an editor's point of view with some experience here, I would say the escort officer and the timely filing are the keys. If you take care of that, I think a lot of these other problems are going to melt away.

As a historical footnote, one of the ironies here is that the model for how to do this is clear, the historical model. If you look at World War II, if you look at Korea, if you look at Vietnam, it was simply correspondents being put into the action with the understanding that they incurred the possibility of risk and injury and let it go from there.

Mr. Williams: There are several other comments, but let me just suggest one of the big problems, and one of the things I think we have to think a lot about. The distinction I would draw with experience from World War II is simply this. There were no people like Fred Francis in World War II. There were no needs to file television, for example, or there were no means to get pictures out. One of the things that General Thurman told me when he was here the other day when we were discussing the pool is, you know it never occurred to me how much the logistical problems of getting reporters to the action and then back to file and into the action and back to file were a complicating factor.

So I guess one of the questions that I would add into this process is, is there a way to file from the field and satisfy everybody? Radio, television, still pictures, and data for newspapers. I don't know the answer to that question. Is it worth looking at I think is one question we have to look at.

Mr. Raines: Not to monopolize the discussion, I think that's a valid point, and obviously print and electronic media are going to be at odds on this, but it seems to me that the rule of logic would be to start your print filing as early as possible, teletype dispatches and so forth, even television with Dan Rather or Tom Brokaw there would know information and the camera saying it would be snatching at those pieces of paper. Then as the situation became more predictable, the handing off of video-tape or audio-tapes or electronic links, it would seem to me would fall in logically. But in the outset, I think, I'm guessing that the broadcast media would be willing to pool on some kind of handoff that their people back home would have access to on an equal footing.

Mr. Rubenstein: Larry Rubenstein from Reuters.

Two things I want to raise. The first one is I'm hearing two sets of complaints here, and I want to make sure that in Fred's report, and if not in your mind, we separate these things. I think it's integral to separate them. One are the problems we had with the pool, with the call-out, with the implementation of the pool in the first 12-18 hours, and getting them into action, and getting that material back. That is one problem that I think we all agree on needs to be addressed.

The second problem that I think needs to be separated from the DoD pool is the problem of unilateral coverage of an invasion, or for that matter anything else that goes on, and how the Pentagon and the Southern Command or whatever command is involved, responds to that. I think those are separate issues.

Mr. Williams: Tell me what you mean by unilateral coverage.

Mr. Rubenstein: That means the 500 reporters that wanted to drop in on D+24 hours. What do you do with them? Do you let them in or not? The press in the Marriott demanding protection. The whole gamut. Our pool representative has told me the horror stories that I'm sure all the pool members suffered trying to get access to the four telephones in the press center. They had a shot at it initially, and then all of a sudden a tremendous amount of unilateral press descended on the same facilities and they had to invoke all kinds of higher military authority just to get near a phone on the ground. So I think that is a separate issue. I think the Pentagon's response to that, and more importantly, the individual command's response to that, is something that definitely needs to be looked at and how you deal with that.

In Grenada there were no unilateral people on the ground, and people didn't try to fly into that airport within five hours of the invasion because it was still full of potholes and military craters, so the Sidle Commission I'm not sure really explored that issue.

The second point along those lines is, as we discussed in the Bureau Chief's meeting, the third triad of the pool, the Pentagon, the pool members, and the individual commands and their representatives, I'm not sure have been represented well to this point in pool discussions and in pool meetings. I think as we have seen in all the pool exercises and in the actual deployments we've experienced on the tanker export and stuff like that, that invariably the problems that occur, occur with the commands, with the local on-scene colonel, whoever is in charge of the press and who's actually given the responsibility, as Colonel Sconyers was in Panama, of a lot of authority and what the pool did.

Mr. Conan: Neil Conan from NPR. I would just like to point out that perhaps Fred Hoffman would like to go back in history a little bit, other than details, as one who survived a fabulous tour in the Persian Gulf, other than details and differences between the Army restricting your access and the Navy restricting your access, the same problems occurred on the Persian Gulf pool. We were kept out of the action, filing was a nightmare. Everything was very similar. The same kinds of problems that we had in the Persian Gulf are the same kinds of problems that people are reporting from Panama, to some degree even worse in the Persian Gulf. Why were those lessons not learned? Why were there no meetings like this after that?

Mr. Williams: That's interesting, Neil. Yesterday Larry Rubenstein on the radio from ABC Radio, said that he thought the problems were just the opposite. That in the

Persian Gulf they saw stuff but couldn't file, and in Panama they couldn't see stuff but could file.

Mr. Conan: Different times.

Mr. Calbfeld: Brad Calbfeld, AP Radio. In answer to the question you raised, it is possible to set up a very small portable uplink from very many locations, as long as you can see certain satellites, and the satellite time has to be arranged.

Mr. Williams: For audio.

Mr. Kalbfeld: For audio, for still photographs, and for data. They can all be filed from the same location. Television is a lot more difficult because the equipment is larger and the number of satellites much more limited, but it is within a longer period of time and with greater expense, it is something that can also be done from very many field locations.

What is troubling to me is that these are questions that we raised back in 1985. The same questions of access to how to file and those kinds of things were raised back then. The lack of follow-through on the Pentagon's part is very troubling, especially in light of all the ways in which we have been asked as members of the pool, to change in very many arcane ways, our security procedures, our filing and reporting procedures. I think there is a degree to which the Pentagon needs to take some responsibility for asking us to follow through on very many details and being real sticklers about it, but not in fact following through on many of the things that we've been asking for five years.

Mr. Wolman: Jon Wolman from AP. Tom Kalley says no plan survives contact with the enemy, and clearly the enemy here was lack of preparation and SOUTHCOM in the field.

I just want to emphasize a couple of points that were made earlier. The need for a strong escort from the Joint Chiefs is absolutely essential. A couple of people have said, both on the broadcast and on the print side, that these problems are predictable, have occurred as early as 1985, have occurred in both exercises and in the Persian Gulf. We know they're going to happen. I don't think we're going to stop them from happening. What we need is a strong Joint Chief's presence to work between the pool and the local command. The local command, obviously, is juggling any number of balls. We were talking about command problems in the first four hours of the existence of this pool, and through this extremely annoying circumstance where we were trying to drop open coverage into Panama and finding out that the pool, lo and behold, was being held as a reason not to provide open coverage. All of these things can be addressed by a strong troubleshooter, I think. Instead we found the Pentagon essentially walking away in the face of SOUTHCOM resistance on the ground. I don't know about in Washington, but on the ground. I think the Pentagon escorts essentially were walking away to any SOUTHCOM resistance at all.

Mr. Lewis: My name is Chuck Lewis. I'm with the Hearst Newspapers. I have an observation and a question.

My observation is that the Sidle Commission and the early architects of the pool in 1984 and 1985 envisioned the possibility that everything would be nicely arranged within the beltway and would fall apart downstream. To thwart that, both the Sidle Commission and the early architects, including Secretary Weinberger, decided there would be no operational plan approved without a public affairs annex that accounted for downstream operations of the pool.

My question is this. Was there a public affairs annex to the plan of operation for the assault in Panama?

Mr. Williams: My understanding is that there was. Bob Taylor's been looking into that question. Do you know the answer?

Mr. Taylor: The annex that I saw was there and it suggested that the DoD media pool would be used, but it fell short of discussing exactly how it would be employed.

Mr. Williams: The annex was...

Voice: That's your problem right there.

Mr. Hoyt: Clark Hoyt from Knight Ridder. Into this rich stew you're developing here I'd like to throw in one other issue which is the sharing of pool material after it was gathered in Panama.

As you know, we operate with the Chicago Tribune a photo service that was denied pool photos throughout that operation. You and I talked about it at the time. We have since applied to have that photo service be part of the rotation. But it's always been my understanding from the beginning of pools, that all material, that pool members were surrogates for everyone, and that all pool material gathered was to be shared with everyone. Is there something I don't know here that says that principle does not apply to photographs?

Mr. Williams: No, all material is for pool members. I guess that's the distinction that I would make.

Mr. Hoyt: These two news organizations are and were pool members.

Mr. Williams: I don't want to debate with you here, Clark, because I think you raise an interesting point and one we will look into. In explaining why it worked the way it did, clearly member newspapers, KRTN's member newspapers were receiving pool material from the wires, from AP, from UPI, from Reuters, but as to specific photographs exclusively or given, provided for KRTN, for you, and in turn to pass along to your clients, KRTN is not a pool member, and that's the distinction. Obviously individual newspapers are and they received their pool materials. But you raise a good question and we will look at it.

Mr. Clayton: I'm Bill Clayton of the Houston Chronicle. I'd like to elaborate on the access question. I'm not clear whether we should be demanding to be on the front lines in the cross-fire. I personally don't relish that idea. But there's middle ground for access that would be better than what we had. One example is on Quarry Heights, there's a place at which the hot firing could be observed if we had been there early enough to see it, that would satisfy the questions of personal security.

A lot of the access ground could be covered by earlier briefings by somebody knowledgeable. Our first briefing, the whole time we were there, our first briefing was by a diplomat who was not briefed on military matters and wanted to discuss the history of the Panama Canal.

The other thing about transmission, aside from the equipment malfunction at the sending point which took hours to correct, there was a delay that I don't understand, maybe some people here in Washington know, between the time the copy was transmitted successfully and the time it was received by outlets for newspapers.

Mr. Williams: How long a delay?

Mr. Clayton: I'm not sure. I don't know that.

Mr. Williams: We'll look into that. The way it's supposed to work is as soon as they get that stuff in the Pentagon, they immediately turn around and fax it to the distribution points here. But I'm sure we can figure out some better way to do that. That's the first I've heard of that problem. Do you know anything about that, Bob?

Mr. Taylor: The only one I'm aware of is we had a couple of pieces of copy that came in that had one side completely blanked out and they asked to have it retransmitted, they asked them to transmit it upside down, and finally we ended up back here trying to cut the two and paste them together to get them out quickly. That's the only ones I'm aware of.

Mr. Clayton: That relates to the fax machine problems mostly.

Mr. Francis: I just wanted to answer a couple of the things. First and foremost I agree wholeheartedly, and I wrote in the paper that you need a senior escort. It needs to be from the Joint Chiefs, needs to be a one star, needs to speak for the Joint Chiefs to the operators on the ground. Without that, you can't do anything. But first and foremost, the planning has to begin.

In Panama, and I agree with Hal, that a small pool, and I'm not saying this for NBC, I'm saying this as a practical matter, that you can't set up a satellite uplink for television in the middle of combat. I agree with Hal, that the first words, the first pictures, the first copy can get out as long as provisions are made for a second echelon pool, as long as provisions are made that after the initial pool, after that pool goes in with the troops, files the material, with the equipment we have that can file the initial reports, then a second echelon comes along, a pool, 12-24 hours later with the uplinks, with the feed machines to feed the photographs, to feed the video. Those are the key things.

But none of this will work unless --

(END OF SIDE)

Mr. Mendelsohn: -- it doesn't help to ask. I think that just kind of underscores some of the problems we were having. Again, this was a civilian escort and seemed pretty much out of the loop.

Mr. Merida: I'm Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News. I just wanted to amplify on some of the logistical questions, particularly as relates to firing. At least as far as newspapers go, we had incredible difficulty. My understanding from talking to my own desk and from other news organizations, that there were significant delays from the time the copy, the faxes, got to the Pentagon and when they got out. I think it's also a question of distribution, how they distributed. That should be addressed.

One of the problems, other than just the copy getting lopped off. This happened over a several day period. It wasn't just one day. The faxes, material we went, repeatedly showed up in news organizations with margins cut off, and in some cases they were unusable. This was not relayed to us. That, I think, makes Kathy's point about having an editor there, someone to represent us, more relevant.

In many cases, we had filed and only hours later did we know there was this problem. There was no relaying from the Pentagon back to SOUTHCOM so that we would know this was a problem.

I think there's another point to be addressed. The rules, I believe, are sort of stringent, sort of restrictive from the standpoint of newspapers. We have to submit our files to a commander on the scene to be read. As it was, in many cases we were getting back sort of late. We had to get the copy and then send it through a fax, sometimes two or three times, before it got there. I think early on when we realized this was a continuing problem, Kathy had asked one of our escorts can we just call the wires and let them distribute it, or call our news organizations and let them distribute it through the wires, or some way to get around that and make it more expedient for news organizations, and we ran into bureaucratic red tape. Our escort then had to call the Pentagon. He said well, he's waiting to get clearance for that. That is the kind of thing in a timely situation, we need to be able to make these kind of amendments right on the spot. It's just a flexibility question.

Mr. Bagnato: I'm Barry Bagnato from CBS. I want to look at some of these same problems in a non-combat situation. Last spring we were involved in an operation where the first additional troops were flown into Panama. It was a 24 trip, two stops: North Carolina and one in Panama. We discovered in both places that unilateral coverage had already been permitted. There were other reporters on the ground there, which made us unnecessary. In Panama we were given an hour and a half to talk to whomever we could find, and then to deal with the logistics which were three telephones in an office, and to file.

What this underlines is the same problem in both the combat and the non-combat situations we've been finding, that somewhere deep in that mindset is a concern that the wrong story is going to get out, that the press should somehow be an arm for the Pentagon in some ways. I know that mindset must exist. And the point has to be made to commanders in these situations that it doesn't do any good to put the media in a situation where they're not going to be able to do their job, to do our job, because that is only in the end going to make the Pentagon look bad, as it has especially in the case of the last couple of weeks.

Mr. Sloyan: Pat Sloyan with News day. This is a big brother question. You're sitting on what I'm told is dynamite footage of the largest airborne assault since World War II, combat footage. Infrared, electronically enhanced, of the jump itself. I'm also told pretty good stuff at the Comandancia. Some of that was released. You're also sitting on when Noriega comes out of the Vatican Embassy and outlines his deal to Thurman, footage of his surrender at the Vatican. Why are you holding this stuff back?

Mr. Williams: I've not heard of some of this, Pat. The only videotape that I know of that I've seen myself is the videotape of Noriega getting on the C-141 at Howard. I'll look into this other stuff.

Mr. Sloyan: Have you not seen the jump?

Mr. Williams: No.

Mr. Sloyan: Do you know it exists?

Mr. Williams: This is the first I've heard of it, Pat.

Mr. Sloyan: There may even be stuff of Rio Hato.

Mr. Williams: I don't know. I will look into it, though.

Mr. Sloyan: Isn't there some freedom of information stuff filed?

Mr. Williams: I don't know. Not every FOI request goes through me. Do you know the answer to this Fred?

Mr. Francis: It was promised today.

Mr. Williams: I'll look into it, Pat, and give you a buzz.

Mr. Hillman: I'm Bob Hillman with the Dallas Morning News. Just another point on the distribution of the newspaper pool reports. When they got back to the Pentagon in some fashion they were faxed over to member pools, but I never got the idea, other than being distributed to the Pentagon, that really anybody else was really getting access to it like they should, particularly late in the night.

Mr. Williams: You mean such as individual newspaper members?

Mr. Hillman: Right. Such as the Baltimore Sun, did they have access at midnight to the newspaper pool reports that were being faxed in for the Pentagon? That part of the distribution. I never was sure that other newspapers around the country were getting access.

Mr. Russell: Bruce Russell of Reuters. This is a peripheral matter, but given the context of the military as looking into its relationships with the press on this particular occasion, the coverage was on two levels. It was the pool and it was reporters on the ground. If the military is reviewing its attitudes, we found we had 12 reporters on the ground, there was a very high string of incidents involving those reporters, I only want to give one. It was an American national. Our chief photographer for the region, caught out doing his duty slightly after curfew time, was instructed to slam down on the ground and told to stay there in the rain for quite a long time, for what seems to me to be nothing but punitive purposes. So if military attitudes are being reviewed, I'm not making a special case, and I only cite that one. We had reporters shot as well. That's perhaps the risk of the game. But it seems to me the military was sometimes treating clearly identifiable press people who were part of the coverage as almost the enemy.

Mr. Aubry: Tim Aubry from Reuter Pictures. The basic thing I want to say is I've got to reiterate what Fred said. Unless we get orders from the top and unless there's someone at the top of the chain making this stuff happen for us, we're dead in the water, and everything else we talk about is very incident. It makes no difference at all unless there are people who are going to say in Washington that this stuff has to be done and has to be given priority.

To address one other comment made earlier, there was some talk about reporters not being allowed to come into Panama partly because the pool was there. I don't know the reasoning why they didn't let other people in. I can state very plainly, though, the people that were brought in, and maybe this needs to be addressed, if they were allowed in, maybe they should have been allowed into the airport because the military controlled the airport and then let them do their own ground support once they were there. When the military tried to add ground support for every person that came in there, it was a logistical nightmare at SOUTHCOM. When you had, the first night there were 40 or 50, the second day we were there filing, the days tend to run together, 40 or 50 of them

were brought in, and they were eager to go and do whatever they could do, made it very difficult for us. The next day there were the people that were kept from 5:00 in the morning until midnight at the airport and then brought to SOUTHCOM. These people were fighting, screaming mad. I was in the middle of transmitting pictures, and one of them came in and told me they were going to take my phone.

We can't lend ground support. If you're going to give the ground support to all these people that are coming in, 250 people or whatever, it needs to be done somewhere else other than where the pool people are. The pool people need to have their facilities, and if the military wants to lend ground support, which for the first three days, some ground support was necessary because there was nothing downtown. Everything was looted, a lot of the stuff was closed, there was no food, the people that had been at the airport had not eaten, had not slept, had not showered. There were a lot of specific problems, but it should not have all come to SOUTHCOM. It was a very big problem for the pool people that were there, and it did hamper what we were trying to do as far as I'm concerned.

Mr. Glass: Andy Glass, Cox Newspapers. One quick anecdote and then a philosophical observation, if I may. Our regional correspondent was in Bogota at the time of the invasion. We chartered an airplane to fly to Panama. While we were over the area, the military air controller said if you don't get out of here in five minutes, we'll shoot you down. So we got out of there. It was quite awhile before our correspondent got in.

But it seems to me that what we're really dealing with is that World War II was the last good war in the sense that the press and the military were on the same side and cooperated. Many of the senior commanders who are now in charge were the same people who were junior commanders in Vietnam, and for better or worse, regard the press as an enemy, and feel that one reason the United States failed in Vietnam was that the press was on the other side.

So until these attitudes change, until there is a philosophical feeling that we are one country and that the people deserve to know what is going on, Pete, many of these things are just going to be bandaid solutions and are not really going to be addressed.

Mr. Bascomb: John Bascomb, ABC Radio. I had the good fortune of being not only on the Persian Gulf pool, the original DoD pool, not the theater pool, but the Panama pool as well. I wanted to point out a couple of similarities and differences.

We were told in Panama frequently when we asked to go close to the action, that it was not safe. However, I felt we were in much greater risk in the Persian Gulf. We were on a body of water filled with mines. In the Persian Gulf they supplied us with flak jackets and helmets which were never even offered to us in Panama. We know the risk and we're willing to take that risk if we're part of the pool. So keeping us away because it's not safe for us, I don't think is a good argument.

In terms of access, in the Persian Gulf we were on the ship with the captain. We had access 24 hours a day in his quarters, on the bridge, immense briefings. We just couldn't file. In Panama, we had no access, of course. And I think something that should be included in future public affairs annexes would be a rigid minimum of two briefings a day from perhaps the G3. I couldn't understand why we were not housed closer to or even in the operations center where we could listen to the briefings that General Thurman must have been getting throughout the day.

Finally, as far as communications, there's been a lot of concern about ground support. This is something I suggested when I came back from the Persian Gulf. I think there needs to be a separate fly-away package, if you will, uplink of phones and faxes and television transmission that goes in on the second wave, perhaps handled by DoD personnel, perhaps handled by broadcast and print personnel. This would make the initial wave of reporters small enough to go in with the troops, and it would mean you could be assured of having quality transmission out anywhere in the world and not have to rely on the local phone system.

Ms. Sproul: Robin Sproul from ABC Radio. In addition to all the ground problems, Pete, I hope Fred Hoffman's report will really deal with the issue on the thought process that went into sending the pool in as late as it went in and why, when they got to Andrews, they sat on the ground another two hours, and how that decision was made. That's a really key thing.

Mr. Williams: I agree. Although key as it is, I have a hunch we probably wouldn't be discussing it if the pool had access to whiz-bang stuff once they got there. But it's all part of the same stew.

Let me just take advantage of the passage of an hour to say a few things, and then we'll go back for another round here.

First of all, some small points. We will look at all these points that you raised, the questions that several of you have raised about the size of the pool and breaking it up into smaller groups, having an editor in Washington, having pool members attend briefings before they go, communications problems, better briefings, all that sort of thing.

In terms of the late arrival, the question you just raised Robin, and that you raised as well Kathy, the call out on this pool was the most complicated call out of any pool deployment we've ever had, exercise or for real. Partly because of the season of the year. It was very difficult to find Bureau Chiefs. Once we found the Bureau Chiefs, it was very difficult for them to find their reporters. This was the most time consuming, problematic call we've ever had, I suppose because of the season. It was December 19th, and people were at Christmas parties or on leave or that kind of thing. That was problem number one.

As I've explained to many of you already, the original operational plan for getting the pool to Panama, the general procedure is to get reporters in with the first troops who land. Those of you who know the operation know that the first that arrived in Panama jumped out of airplanes. That was not practical, clearly. So the operational staff came to us on Monday and said all right, here's the plan for the pool. They'll leave Washington at midnight and go to Fort Bragg. They will load on with the troops. They will leave Fort Bragg at 8:00 a.m. This was when H-hour was 1:00 a.m., and they will arrive in Panama at 1:00 p.m. We said no, that won't work. That's too late. That's 12 hours after the operation started.

I'm sure many of you are saying in retrospect, you should have done that and then we would have at least been with troops. But at that point it did not seem like the right idea, so we said the pool has to have its own airplane. The airplane was ready to go. The call outs began at 7:30, and it was not until I guess shortly before midnight that the plane left and arrived in Panama at 3:00 a.m. So that was an improvement from 1:00 p.m., and it was a compromise. Just about everything you do. Who should be in the pool, where should it go, all that stuff is a compromise. This was too. But that

accounts for why it took so long. It just was a complicated call out. It was hard to get everybody rounded up.

There have been some who suggested that rather than continuing to try to fill the slots in the pool, as soon as you get a certain critical mass the pool should leave and you shouldn't wait for people. So if you can't find the radio correspondent or you can't find the news magazine representative or whatever, you start a stop watch and then when that time elapses you say okay, the plane's gone. That suggestion has arisen since the Panama operation. I see several of you nodding yes. Be sure you note all the people who nodded yes so that when they don't go on the pool they will remember that they consented to that. (Laughter) But that's the sort of thing you're up against in terms of the lateness of the arrival.

I guess the primary point, and the one that keeps coming up over and over again is this idea of cultural acceptance, or the idea that somehow the people who are running the military now were the ones who felt abused in Vietnam. I've heard this point made over and over and over again. It was made after the Sidla Commission and it was made in Grenada, and it's been made repeatedly. I will wait for Fred's report. Fred is obviously aware of that criticism. He will look at it. I'm confident that Fred will give us an honest assessment of that.

Having talked to General Kelley, and I think it was important for you to note, Fred, in your initial discussion of the fact that he said it was okay for Erv Sharp to go home, I would just remind everybody that no decision was made to undertake this operation until Sunday. Whether Tom Kelley should have guessed that things might get dicey, that it would be a good idea for Irv Sharp to stay or not, I suppose is a different question. I just don't want anyone to think, nor did I think you meant to imply, that Tom Kelley knew all along there was going to be an operation and he intentionally got Irv Sharp out of the way. I suspect that was not your point, and I think it's important to emphasize that.

I've talked to Thurman, I've talked to Ron Sconyers. I don't have the advantage of what Fred will have and what several of you had of talking to the lieutenant colonels and colonels who made the operation work on the ground. I have found no evidence of the cultural acceptance problem. My own view is that it was a matter of insufficient planning. Now you may well say if the cultural acceptance problem went away, the planning problem would go away as well. That may well be. I intend to look into that.

I guess my point is this. I don't know how to make the military culturally accept reporters. I don't know a way to do that. I do know a way to try to fix the planning process if it turns out that the planning process is the problem. I guess I'm going to concentrate on things where I think the situation can be fixed. But the other point that I would make, is obviously the cultural acceptance thing is a long term question. There are people here from the National Defense University today that are eager to address this. This is something we work on all the time. It's a continuing matter of getting reporters and military people together, and indeed there was a recommendation of the Sidla Commission, as many of you may recall, which Admiral Baker reminded me of the other day, which is we should have more meetings between editors and military people. I think all that is true and all that is good, but at the same time, if it's fundamentally a planning problem, then that's something we fundamentally need to address.

Mr. Francis: First of all, this notion that we have to do something to have the military trust us, is ludicrous. The second notion I think that is ludicrous is that we have to jump out of airplanes or go to the National Training Center and become combat ready. That's ludicrous. It's the planning process.

I don't find a lot of evidence in the field that men like General Kelley don't like reporters. I don't see that evidence. I see a professional Army that will take orders, and I see a professional group of journalists that know how to do their jobs. Sure, there are going to be colonels and generals out there that remember Vietnam and want nothing to do with us, but I've yet to meet a colonel or a general who will not take orders when the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense issues orders. I don't think that's a problem. I don't think there has to be some lovefest here. I do think there has to be exercising of the pool every three months. I think those commanders like General Stiner and the commanders at the 82nd Airborne ought to have some interaction with us on a fairly frequent basis because the memory is gone every couple of years. It's a function of planning. It's not a function of changing customs and mores and ideas.

Ms. Cohen: Barbara Cohen, CBS. Some of the points that I wanted to make Fred just made about the professionalism on both sides, and I wanted to speak particularly to the responsibility that we members of the pool have. Once you agree to be in the pool, it is a very serious thing. There really is no excuse for not being reachable 24 hours a day for the three month period. It's a burden, but it's a burden that we willingly accept, and it's the tradeoff for having this arrangement made that facilitates our coverage.

Secondly, the notion of training people or of having people who are not adequately prepared to be members of the pool, I think again it's up to the Bureau Chiefs to select people who are capable of carrying out this responsibility. The fact that this and the Persian Gulf are the only real events that have occurred, whereas the exercises I think were seen as not particularly useful in journalistic terms, I think maybe this will cause us all to think among ourselves about the kinds of decisions we make in selecting who's available and the kinds of steps we take to be prepared to respond to a call out at any time.

Ms. Moore: Molly Moore from the Washington Post. I've been on three of the pool exercises, including the Persian Gulf. I can't speak to the Panama situation from firsthand, but I think in addition what's critical to the planning and the support of JCS up here is to underscore one of the things that's been brought up before, is to have the rank on the ground to back the execute orders.

The exercises, one of the problems I've found is the military escorts the Pentagon sends along with the pool from up here are very well versed in what the media needs, that they want to be where the action is. The problem you encounter is with their mid-level equivalent on the ground of the command you're going to. It's sort of the natural military inclination is to be very territorial. I've seen quite a bit of resentment from the ground officers toward the Pentagon corps who comes down and tries to tell them what to do. I think this is where a general officer or flag rank could help.

The other problem, that can also help with the commanders. In all the situations I've been on, the ground commander in charge, once they knew what the media wanted and what they needed, was actually very accepting to providing it. The problem was cutting through the mid-level ranks to get to that commander to get the request in for what you wanted.

Mr. Lewis: Findley Lewis of the Copley News Service. Among the things you said you wanted to look into, let me just reiterate the problem of unilateral coverage, the issue that Andy raised and some others raised. Just be aware that with editors and reporters there will be a continuing interest in getting access to scenes of action. I

suspect that boils down to the issue of getting people on planes, on military aircraft, and into the scene of combat. Since you did not mention that in your recap of things that you were going to look at, I just wanted to reiterate that as an issue that's of concern to many of us here.

Mr. Williams: I understand. While it's not technically a pool matter, it is one that we spend a considerable amount of time on. Somebody was, I can't remember who was making the point about World War II was the last time that there were warm and fuzzy feelings between the military and the press. There was also full field censorship. Korea was the last conflict where there was full field censorship. I can't envision a time in which there would be full field censorship again.

The unilateral coverage problem is a very real one. We had, at some point while the Panama operation was still going strong, 600 reporters all trying to jam into Quarry Heights Officers Club. I guess the difference is, between World War II and where it becomes a different matter not only in terms of quantity but quantitatively as well, communications are faster and more complicated. More people are needed to support the news product now than used to be. Although fundamentally I would agree that the principal part, and this is off the pool topic for just a moment, the principal point of the pool, again, is to get reporters, eye witnesses, if you will, to military actions and at some point you get right back down to pencils and notebooks again, and that's what we need to remind ourselves of. But when you get to the unilateral coverage issue, it's a lot of people with a lot of support stuff, and John made this point yesterday when we were on WAMU. In a sense, we had fairly good facilities in Panama, but if we undertake a military operation, and I had better for the sake of diplomatic nicety not mention a specific country, but if we go to Taylorland which is about as lush and comfortable as there is hair on top of Bob's head, we're out literally in the middle of nowhere. Then we're really going to be up against it when suddenly we have an enormous number of people wanting to come in to some makeshift airstrip and that kind of thing. I don't know the answer to that question, but it's certainly something we have to look into.

But to some extent, while the purpose of the pool and the purpose of the unilateral coverage are the same, to allow more and better coverage of military operations, as some have already suggested in terms of demand for telephones and facilities, unilateral coverage is a competing interest, to some extent, with the pool. I suppose your response might be well if the pool had worked better we wouldn't have wanted so much unilateral coverage. That may be true early on, but there are a lot more reporters out there than there were in World War II.

Voice: It seems to me that the purpose of the pool originally, as originally conceived, was a temporary arrangement to last until the unilateral could get there. The purpose was to protect the security of the operation.

Mr. Williams: That's part of it.

Voice: Two days after the invasion had occurred, when the whole world knew that the United States had military operations going on in Panama, there is no excuse for not allowing unilateral coverage.

Mr. Williams: There were at least two charter planes that I know of that came in Thursday. There was an L-1011 that came in Friday with over 250 people on it. There were reporters already in Panama before the operation started. So this is not like Grenada in that sense. It's not like we went to a remote place where there weren't any reporters to start with.

I guess the problem is this. The unilateral coverage issue, and please understand that I'm not telling you what the answer is, I'm just indicating to you some of the problems that we face as we go through this process. The unilateral coverage issue is significant for two reasons. Number one, it's a matter of people come in and they want to be able to do stuff. There is no point in going somewhere and getting your reporters there if they can't do anything, if they just sit on Howard Air Force Base. That means they want to be able to go out into the countryside. That means they want to be escorted. It's very difficult to escort 250 people.

Now you'll say, well we don't want escorts. As a matter of fact, there were reporters who called during the operation saying hey, I've got a reporter on Howard Air Force Base. Let my people go. Let them go out and cover.

Some would say all we need is an escort to our bureau downtown. It's safe, just escort us to the bureau. Of course there's a little tilt sign that comes on that says well if it's safe, why do you need an escort?

The second problem is that while, and I don't know what the answer is but I'm just drawing you into the problems we face, while on the one hand I have you saying look, reporters have been covering military operations since the Peloponnesian Wars, these are risks we take; we also had reporters in the Marriott Hotel and news organizations calling us saying what's the matter with you? Don't you know there are reporters in there? Go save us. We also had at least one instance that I know of of a producer who was held against his will by the PDF. The news organization understandably calling on behalf of that individual saying what is the matter with you, go fix that.

It's slightly more complicated than it might appear, the unilateral coverage issue. Fundamentally, reporters are American citizens. At some point that has to be remembered as well, and indeed in this operation there were news organizations saying go get my guys. If I worked for that organization I would like to think they would do that for me too. But it's not as simple as it might appear.

Voice: One aspect of the unilateral coverage, I know it's difficult to decide where the dividing line is, where the pool is called out and goes back home, and the 250 people who have arrived on a plane are allowed to do whatever they want to do. But whatever the answer to that, the pool operations center should probably be where nobody else can get to a phone, as long as the pool is operating those phones should be only for the pool. It became too difficult, I know, for SOUTHCOM people, to just tell those people to wander into Panama City, so they said well come over to the Officer's Club and try for the three phones.

Mr. Rubenstein: Larry Rubenstein from Reuters. Two things. One, in echoing what we're already hearing about the leadership at the Pentagon, one thing we have found on past pool movements, and it's changed somewhat. When the two Taylors were originally in charge of the original pool, there was always one back here and one on the mission so we had somebody with knowledge of operations that we could talk to. In ensuing events, through the change of commands, what we've found most often is -- Colonel Alexandrakos and before him, they go on the mission. We are left with very competent and concerned individuals who take our phone calls, but who are just not high enough in the loop to be able to take the information and run with it or the problems.

It shouldn't have been up to NBC, whoever got to Colin Powell, or to you raising hell on that first day to say hey, this is not working. There should have been somebody at the Pentagon who the Bureau Chiefs could have gone to and said this is not working,

what can we do, and gone to somebody with enough clout here in Washington in addition, you know, I understand the value of a high ranking escort, that's probably very valuable too, but to get back to the command and control center, if the command and control is here in Washington we need better input here in Washington from the moment the pool leaves me.

For instance, I heard on NBC that the pool had been deployed at like 1:06 a.m. on Tuesday. I called our contact at the Pentagon and said are we in second stage notification on pool movement? First her response was what's second stage notification? The second one was she didn't think so and she'd get back to me. An hour and a half later she called back and said yes, we're in second stage notification. I said thank you, the world knew about this three hours ago. So I think we need to enforce that.

The second one about unilateral coverage, I debriefed extensively our photographer who was shot and wounded down there who was with the photographer who was killed by the American troops down there accidentally. One point he made was the fact that the troops on the ground really had no conception of media, and they weren't even, for instance the wounding took place, a group of American tanks and personnel carriers came down the street in front of the Marriott, and there was a group of news people standing together in front of the Marriott, visibly, with cameras and the whole thing, and all of a sudden the second tank in the thing opened fire, supposedly at a sniper, and just was sweeping the entire area with bullets and nailed everybody that was standing in this little crowd. Right afterwards the American medics came up to them and interrogated them as to who they were, and then gave them medical assistance, which he thought was kind of ridiculous. It wouldn't have saved the other guy, he was dead instantly, but in his case it prolonged the thing. Then they medivac'd them to the hospital.

So if you're talking unilateral coverage, that's a risk of unilateral coverage you automatically assume by being there, but I just don't know where you can draw the level with the military about acceptance of that.

Mr. Williams: The purpose of the pool, of course, was number one, to be a way of getting reporters with early arriving troops and maintaining operational security. Several of you are right, it was not envisioned that the pool would last forever. The complications that we had in Panama, and this is not an excuse but it is an observation, were fundamentally that the first troops jumped out of airplanes, and that would not work.

We could have put a pool together from people who were already in Panama, and perhaps in retrospect that's what we should have done. But our feeling was that the people here in the national media pool were best qualified and knew the ground rules and all of that. In fact as some of you know, the Persian Gulf pool was a locally assembled pool.

Voice: Not so.

Mr. Williams: The first one was.

Voice: The first one was a DoD pool, and then they went locally.

Mr. Williams: Okay. But the only other point I'd make is this. I don't have any doubt that we need to do a better job of planning these pools. I don't think anyone can have any doubt about that. On the other hand, I think I have wondered whether if it weren't that Howard Air Force Base were on the other side of the Panama Canal, we probably wouldn't be sitting here today. So we have to bear in mind, this is no excuse,

this is merely an observation that even if we improve, and I hope we will, improve substantially our planning, it's no guarantee that it will always succeed. We need to do better. In fact, if the swing bridge had been working and the Bridge of the Americas had been ours, maybe we wouldn't be here today. But still it doesn't absolve us of the need to do a much better job of planning and execution.

Voice: (Kathy) Besides the things you point out, it still would have been better to have had us landed at Howard six hours earlier than we were. I mean it seems to me it's not an either/or of going six hours later or jumping out of airplanes with the paratroopers. We could have been positioned in Panama and tried to do something.

Mr. Williams: That's true. The only thing I would add about that is this. The other dimension of the pool is operational security, and it's terribly important. It's not just some sort of code word that people like to say at the Pentagon. The success of an operation and the lives of people depend on it, and I know you all know that.

The daytime call outs which we've experimented with in the past, have proved to be the least operationally secure. That's one of the reasons that we decided to do it after dark, after 7:30.

Mr. Francis: In defense of us being able to keep a secret. If we downsize the initial pool and plan for a second echelon with all the equipment and support staff, if we downsize for the initial pool and we have a minimum that handles radio, TV, and print, and stills, that initial pool, and we're talking six people, we could have that equipment every three months sitting at the Pentagon so there wouldn't have to be a draw of equipment or something like that. My point is that six people can keep a secret and you can move six people just like General Stiner moved in a couple of days or a day before in his own private plane, he didn't jump out of an airplane. You could have moved people 24 hours earlier. I'm not at the Pentagon every day. Nobody would have said where's Fred, well he's somewhere else. It was doable and you can keep a secret. Twelve hours later the second echelon, second call up, whatever you want to call it. That solves that problem.

Voice: I was just going to add that the continuing pool in the Persian Gulf was a six person pool and was enough to fit in a Black Hawk and move around fairly comfortably.

Voice: I don't want to beat this poor dog to death, but just one point here that perhaps ought to be made. That is that the issue of multilateral coverage wouldn't be so urgent had the pool that was there been able to function effectively.

Mr. Williams: Sure. However, while I have no doubt that that's true, I can't imagine that at some point the same thing wouldn't have happened. Maybe it would have happened two days later or something, but I can't imagine that there still wouldn't have been a desire to get people in to supplement, to rotate...

Voice: There certainly would have, and I'm not saying it would go away altogether. I think there are a lot of people at DoD that work very hard to make the pool work and there was a lot of good will and good intention in making it work. However, in the heat of the operation at a certain point along about Thursday afternoon, it was very tempting to conclude that some commander had used the pool to prevent any news from getting out. The pool was locked up and multilateral reporters couldn't get in, and that's that so go away.

Mr. Williams: I can understand that, and frankly I'm astonished that I haven't heard more of that today. You're all being very charitable. But I do want to reassure you that we were working on the unilateral coverage problem as well, and some of it wasn't entirely of our making. Some of the Costa Rican authorities wouldn't let planes take off even after we had cleared them. But still, your point remains a sound one.

Mr. Headline: Bill Headline from CNN. To punctuate that point, remembering back to the Sidle hearings, we made the point over and over and over again that pools are basically repugnant and we want unilateral coverage, we want unilateral coverage as quickly as we can make it. As superb a job as Fred Francis did for television, NBC would rather have had Fred covering for NBC and we all would rather have had our own people covering as quickly as possible. That won't change. So I think the point there is that while we need to continue perfecting the pool, and we certainly appreciate your willingness to proceed down that path, at the same time you do have to take a careful look at the next stage in handling unilateral requirements as quickly as you can.

Mr. Williams: That is something that I think is less well thought out on both sides. In a sense, if this operation had been in some bizarre, small, remote, uncivilized in the sense of having landing strips and that kind of thing, country, I think our problems would have been much worse because the problem is this. You say to news organizations or they come to you and say we want to send in more people. We need more people in. I say okay, but remember that I've got no place to put you, I've got no place to house you, I can't feed you, there's no water, there's no phones, I don't know what the hell to do with you once you get there, and people say yes, fine, we'll figure that out. That's our job. You just get us in there.

Once they get there, of course, people start saying could I get a jeep, how about this, and that's just the natural part of things. So I guess what I'm saying is I'm willing to do that, but we all have to understand it's not going to be real smooth.

Mr. Francis: Unilateral means you're on your own. 

Mr. Williams: Fred's point is unilateral means you're on your own and of course that's true, but it also means I can't absolve myself, I mean you say you're on your own, but another organization will say say, my guy just got captured, would you please go get him.

Mr. Francis: The point is that until Friday afternoon, Panama was not safe. If you had let the Howard 200 or 300 loose on the streets of Panama you'd have had 20 or 30 hostages. That's the simple fact. I don't know if your people told you that, but it wasn't safe to work. You go to ugly-land somewhere, and it's basically the same problem. We've got to fix the pool to make the pool work in that first 12, 24, 36, 48 hours. Unilateral means you're on your own and NBC will take care of themselves, and the New York Times and the other papers will take care of themselves on a unilateral basis. I think the concept is that it's a competing interest. NBC was still trying to get people in while the pool was working, and that's the way it's going to be in any situation.

Mr. Russett: Tim Russett, NBC. I was the lucky guy who was the network pool chairman for this great event. I think one thing for the Hoffman report, Pate, and to your point about notification, in the very early stages, after the initial notification which we were able to execute pretty well, there really was a major delay in the second phase allowing me to tell the other networks that in fact the Pentagon pool had

been activated, when it was all over the wires that we were at war, the invasion had taken place. I finally had to call and say listen, this is ridiculous. I have to be able to notify my colleagues. It was through no fault of the people who were designated as liaisons because they just weren't authorized. Finally after several hours of difficulty I called you out of frustration. I think as part of this process, either you or someone at your right arm has to be designated in the initial stages as the contact person. Once we were able to get through to you or Kudla, things moved and things happened and there were responses and tensions were lowered considerably. It's just --

(END OF SIDE)

-- principal deputy be authorized to deal directly with us.

Voice: I just wanted to throw in a vote for the idea of the six person pool as an original pool going in. The basic concept of the pool as I see it are those first 12 hours. You have to get the information out. I can understand commanders sitting around looking at an operation and not wanting to send 30 people into the field. It's just inconceivable. If they had six people to deal with and every thing they planned an operation they know there are going to be just six people, they can plan from the start getting those people onto the scene. That also helps the second wave too, because by the time these people are in the field they have a better understanding of where they can send the second wave, if they can send them out at all. So I think that's an excellent concept. It solves the problem of getting the news out immediately, and it would help solve the problem of getting people in the field where the reporting is supposed to be taking place.

Mr. Rubenstein: I totally agree with what you're saying on numbers. I think the numbers have to be issued. But the problem with a six person pool is that while logistically it's easier to move them around and you could break that out of a larger pool on arrival, that doesn't deliver you the information. Six people, if there's one still photographer he doesn't have time to file the pictures. If there's one TV crew you've got nothing to do with the tape. If you've got one or two print reporters possibly you might be able to get some print media out. If there's one radio tech, if the radio tech's out in the battlefield there's no way to file those tapes. So in effect what you have is fine, you have a pool in motion and that's great and we love that idea, but the pool in motion doesn't do us any good because in this case with the first still pictures, 16 or 17 hours for the first still pictures after the pool call out, that kind of thing, unless we can, and this is something we've gone over with Bob and Steve from the very beginning and everybody since then, the logistics of dealing with material and how long and when and where and how. So the problem with a small pool is it's not really a small pool.

Mr. Williams: Let's talk about this for just a second, and maybe kind of try to wrap things up here shortly. Who is on a six member pool? One wire reporter, one wire photographer, that's two; one television reporter, one television cameraman, that's four; one newspaper reporter; one news magazine reporter?

Voice: No, radio. It's got to be a two man TV crew in a wartime situation.

Mr. Williams: Three television people?

Voice: With the new equipment that we have available to us, and if it were done right, you only need two television people. Only if there is a provision made for a very quick second echelon.

Voice: I don't want to overrule my own correspondent here.

Voice: I know you're going to fight for three, and that's fine.

Voice: We wouldn't send a one man crew in a riot on the streets of the United States. I think for safety's sake a guy with a camera needs someone to hold on to his belt.

Voice: We can work that out later. The point is, that your small crew with a still photographer, with a wire reporter, with a radio reporter, and your second echelon, the point is the second echelon handles the filing. The second echelon handles the filing. Everybody wants immediate stuff within an hour, that's just not going to work. You're covering combat.

Mr. Williams: I guess I still would like a little more discussion, and I apologize to the radio reporters. I spent ten years as one, I don't know why I forgot radio. It's a problem we constantly fight. But who is the six person pool?

Voice: In the Persian Gulf the standing pool was a three person TV crew, a wire still photographer, they varied. The people who were on the pool when I went there were both wire service photographers. There was one writer who happened to be either from AP or UPI, they just rotated it; and the radio guy.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time Magazine. Excuse me, I think in the Persian Gulf there was a wire still photographer and a magazine still photographer and they went to different places.

Mr. Williams: Larry says that was only on the initial deployment.

Voice: (John) I just want to second what Fred Francis had to say. I think it can be done with a five person pool, and to allay any concerns about how you get these photos back, the videotape or the audio tape or the written reports, the second echelon goes in. I think the plane we took out of Andrews at 11:20 at night should have carried the second echelon. If we had been notified during the day and flown to Fort Bragg and left with the troops, we would have been on the ground for four or five hours before the uplink arrives, and we would have been able to file by 6:00 a.m. the day of the invasion.

Mr. Williams: On what day? You wouldn't have gotten there until 1:00 in the afternoon.

Voice: No, if we had gone in with the troops. Or if we had gone in during the day. There were planes landing at Howard all during the day on Tuesday before the invasion began. If we could have gone in pre-positioned 12 hours, we would have filed on the invasion as it occurred, and then the support gear could come in on the same plane we left Andrews on, and the first reports could have been out of there in time for the morning shows, the morning drive.

Mr. Williams: There's a radio guy!

Voice: I was just going to emphasize the importance of that quick second echelon to file, even on the standing Persian Gulf pool when we were out in the ship, they would helicopter tape back to the island we weren't ever on. They'd just bounce it around one of the news bureaus until they figured out somebody knew how to feed a radio

tape. That was a major problem. It was a problem for the TV, of finding a way to get the TV video back to the States. The idea of the second echelon is crucial.

Mr. Aukofer: Frank Aukofer for the Milwaukee Journal. Once again I have this sort of deja vu feeling. In the early days of the pool, the whole discussion over the size of the pool was to be determined by the size of the exercise. If you had something where you could only squeeze five people on a plane, that was going to be that.

Mr. Williams: But it had its own plane so we could squeeze a lot more.

Mr. Aukofer: But again, this was supposed to have all been handled in the planning process. If it was a small operation, you had a plan for a small pool. If it was a larger operation, as the one I went on with Fred one time, we had 14, and that worked fine.

Ms. Moore: This will be sacrilege to some of my print colleagues, but if you're talking about trying to keep the numbers down on a first echelon, there in truth is no need for a wire service, newspaper and magazine. You could have any one of the three, as in fact we did out in the Persian Gulf on the pool and it worked fine. When you have two or three from the different medium, we generally always file together anyway.

The advantage to having more later on, obviously you can be in more than one place at the same time. You're going to get a lot of territorialism between the daily newspapers and the magazines and the wire services who all think they have to have one of their own, but if you're really trying to keep the numbers down in a first group, I think you could get away with one representative and you could rotate them among the three over the course of the year.

Mr. Aubry: Tim Aubry, Reuter Pictures. Basically I see the need for the six man pool or the five man pool for logistics, to move people around for tactical stuff. One of the problems, and I think we did it several times in Panama when we were down there. I think there were several occasions where it came up and they said we can only take a tight group and we broke that up very easily. Among ourselves we said this is what's going to happen and they're going to go. That worked very well to the point that we still had some people there that knew what was happening and that kind of stuff.

I think when you come into a second echelon type thing you're going to have several problems. One, how are you going to notify who is going to be the second echelon? And in what capacity are they going to go down? If we're going down with one photographer as a tactical first small group person, the inclination then on a second echelon would be to send someone down that can edit and file. But in a situation where you're only going to have two people doing that, you have to have someone that, in my case of still photography, you have to have someone that can shoot too. A lot of times the person that was left back at SOUTHCOM that was doing the actual stuff, if something came up and the guy was in the field the second thing that was of interest or was necessary to have, if you only have someone there that can file, you're once again dead in the water.

So I agree that maybe we could take the group and break it up as we're down there, and I don't think there was a problem of breaking the group up into something very small when we were there.

Voice: Just to underline, the reason for the smaller pool is to take care of that problem of immediacy in getting on the scene. That's what the pool, in my mind, is the main objective of having the pool. It does no good to get 30 people down there when

they have nothing to report and they can't get the news out. You can do that initially as long, and the point has been stressed here, as you have that second group coming in. There are still pool people who will take care of the filing, who will also take care of more extended reporting after that. But you've got to get the immediate reports out, and from a place where they will be credible and where they're needed. That's what a smaller pool can do.

Mr. Rosenberg: Jeff Rosenberg, NPR. After the Persian Gulf operation we discussed with the DoD people the filing problems, and they told us that there was a plan afoot to put in MARSAT telephone equipment on at least a significant number of fleet ships, which would certainly take care of all voice. I don't know if you're familiar with the MARSAT system. It's a global telephone system that's absolutely public, and you can access it from almost any spot on the globe. It produces acceptable voice data, faxes, it takes care of all that problem. You may not know, we had terrible trouble getting voice back from the Persian Gulf, the initial stages. Can you report any progress on that?

Mr. Williams: I don't know the answer. Alex or Bob, do you know the answer? I'm sorry that I don't. We'll have to make sure that our next operation is on board ship, obviously.

Mr. Massey: Toby Massey with AP. I'm afraid I have to agree with Mr. Francis totally. I think when you have a small working group, and that's what a pool should really mean, that it's a workable group, that you get them in initially, and if you bring in the backup crew, and as far as who's in there, that's just housekeeping chores. We can decide who's going to be in it, whether there will be a second editor, a second photographer, three more writers, whatever it is. But I think the initial thing, and we made the point over and over again on the pool, is to get them to the scene, make them eye witnesses, and get them out into the field of action. It's easier to do with six or eight people than it is with thirty.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time. I just would like to say in terms of magazine still, or in addition to wire still, we have very different requirements for the magazine: We shoot chrome. We very rarely use wire pictures unless we can get a print. That's just the requirements of a magazine. So it's another factor to consider.

Mr. Williams: And I'm aware of the fact that you guys prefer color and other people what black and white, that kind of thing.

Ms. Johnson: It's not a difference between, the wires shoot color. It's that we use chrome. We print our magazine from chrome.

Mr. Williams: Other comments?

Let me thank you all very much. Let me assure you that we intend to follow up on all these ideas. We'll be meeting with our planners. We'll be giving a transcript of this to Fred, and we'll send a transcript to all of you as well. Thanks very much for coming.

END

Second-Hand News Coverage Blamed on Military

By Michael Specter
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Department spokesman Pete Williams said yesterday that the "incompetence" of U.S. military leaders in Panama prevented American reporters from accompanying troops into battle on the first day of the invasion.

"There really is no excuse for it," Williams said when asked why access of media pool reporters was limited almost exclusively to interviews with U.S. Embassy officials. He said that he and other Pentagon officials protested strongly to U.S. commanders in Panama. "Yesterday [Wednesday] was a disaster. We stomped all over them and they got the message in spades."

Pool reports yesterday on the combat in and around Panama City were second-hand and sparse. Despite promises of help from the Defense Department early in the day, bureaucratic hurdles plagued the press. Hundreds of reporters, television producers and film crews trying to reach Panama sat helplessly in planes parked in Miami and Costa Rica.

Late in the day, after his initial comments had been reported widely, Williams said he had not meant to blame only the military in Panama. He said that the pool got off to a shaky start and that he deserved the blame.

"Today I feel better about how things are going," he said yesterday evening. "We made some mid-

course corrections." However, they were not sufficient to placate most news organizations.

On the second day of the largest U.S. combat operation since the Vietnam War, American news organizations, with the exception of ABC-TV, remained largely unable to get their reporters and film crews into Panama.

Costa Rican officials, afraid to permit American planes to take off for a war zone, spent hours seeking what they considered appropriate permission. Messages flew wildly among embassies, the Pentagon and news organizations across the United States. But by early last evening nothing seemed to have worked.

"It has been a terribly frustrating

day," said ABC Washington bureau chief George Watson, who, like most of his competitors, struggled all day to get a crew into Panama. "A while ago it seemed that you couldn't imagine another bureaucratic hurdle that needed to be cleared. After the Pentagon said yes, and Howard Air Force Base said yes, and the Southern Command said yes, Costa Rica said no."

Howard Air Force Base outside Panama City was where reporters on the ground from Costa Rica were told they would land in Panama. The Southern Command is the headquarters for U.S. military forces in Central America.

The only plane reported to carry American journalists to make it to

NEWS...Pg. 12

White House takes a slap at impatient journalists

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House expressed impatience yesterday at repeated demands from media executives and questions from reporters that seemed aimed at gaining special treatment for correspondents in Panama.

The calls from the news organizations represented a "selfish disregard for the others in Panama," including the American troops and the 35,000 other U.S. citizens there, said a key administration official who asked not to be identified.

"News organizations fully know that risks are involved" when stationing a correspondent and technical crews in battle zones, the official said.

Heightening the White House's impatience was the leak of information about the Panama mission by a Pentagon "pool" reporter to a lawmaker, who in turn called the White House. That call, the administration official said, without elaborating, "seriously undermined the mission."

White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater expressed disgust yesterday at the pool reporter's breach of the rules.

The identity of the reporter has not been determined, but the Panama pool includes representatives of NBC News, Time Magazine, the Houston Post, the Houston Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, Reuters news agency and The Associated Press.

President Bush, at an afternoon press conference yesterday, bristled

at repeated questioning from CBS White House correspondent Wyatt Andrews about the American citizens trapped in the Marriott Hotel, many of whom were journalists.

"We had calls from your network, your chairman of the board, urging us to go in and take the... No, he did!" insisted Mr. Bush, as some in the White House press corps laughed. "And I understand it. He had a... producer that he felt was held."

"... There's been an awful lot of interest in the Marriott Hotel. But I'm very pleased to say that it is secure," the president said. "And we've had heads of corporations, we've had news organizations other than his, concerned about their people."

The Pentagon said U.S. forces seized the hotel yesterday, freeing all Americans. But three soldiers were wounded, one seriously.

White House and State Department officials said television's preoccupation with the temporary seizure of the Marriott by Panamanian Defense Forces was because the media uses the hotel as a headquarters.

In the case of CBS News, the company's top executives called President Bush and others at the White House "dozens of times" requesting a military plane and U.S. Embassy staff to help locate missing producer Jon Meyersohn, the administration official said.

"I got their point after the first six calls," he said.

CBS spokesman Tom Goodman confirmed that network executives

SLAP...Pg. 10

Pentagon took notes in Grenada to avoid error in Panama operation

By Peter Almond
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Operation Just Cause demonstrated that the Pentagon has learned from its mistakes in Grenada, military experts said yesterday.

However, the possibility remains of continued U.S. military involvement in Panama to contend with thousands of troops loyal to ousted strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, they said.

U.S. forces showed vast improvements in carrying out low-intensity conflicts since the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, but intelligence weaknesses remained a major problem.

"So far, it's a classic joint operation, involving all three services," said retired Army Col. William J. Taylor, director of political-military studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It shows that we have learned a hell of a lot since Grenada."

But with thousands of Panamanian Defense Force troops still at large — one battalion of over 500 men devoutly loyal to Gen. Noriega completely eluded U.S. forces yesterday — questions emerged about prospects of U.S. troops being tied down for months in guerrilla warfare.

"They melted away. We carry them as a possible future problem," said Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the failure of U.S. troops to find Battalion 2000, one of those units which came to the rescue of Gen. Noriega in last October's at-

tempted coup.

Also still unanswered is whether U.S. troops are able to occupy Panama City and turn peacekeeping over to Panamanian forces.

While the successes and failures of Operation Just Cause have yet to be assessed, military experts say it is far superior to the Grenada rescue mission.

Six years ago, U.S. Marines and Army troops moved slowly and often uncertainly against ill-prepared troops under Marxist leadership on the island of Grenada. Although declared an unqualified success by U.S. officials at the time, serious flaws were detected later.

Army helicopters could not refuel from Navy ships for "budget" reasons, radio communications between units were poor and special operations helicopters blundered in broad daylight to attack well-defended positions. Few troops had maps. Considering the weak opposition, casualties were relatively high.

On Wednesday morning in Panama, however, apparently there were no such failures.

In one of the most complex and precise operations since the Vietnam War, helicopters and armored personnel carriers set out from bases in Panama to attack PDF targets all over the country.

At the same time, C-141 and C-130 transports from the United States brought men of the 82nd Airborne Division to coordinated parachute drops onto Tocumen Airport at Panama City.

This was an example of the "new military" of Third World conflicts

GRENADA...Pg. 10

Mission's spotlight shines on Powell — and he shines back

By Alan McConaha
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Gen. Colin L. Powell, the reserved, thoughtful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has emerged as a pivotal figure in the American military effort to restore democracy to Panama.

As a result of his acclaimed presence on television the morning of the invasion and reports of his decisive presence in White House deliberations, the respected Army professional overnight became a household name.

The Wall Street Journal yesterday noted the positive impact of the general's appearance on television Wednesday morning to explain the military operation "in a performance that left politicians and viewers marveling."

At the time, the 52-year-old general's description of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega as "decapitated" from his dictatorship and vow that "we will chase him and we will find him" established the theme of the day's news coverage.

"As an inside player, he seems to be the person who turned the tide on this. He also seems to be playing a much more public role as an administration spokesman," said Jay Kosminsky, defense policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation.

Gen. Powell's willingness to reverse his reservations about use of military force in Panama had enormous influence with White House policy-makers, according to inside accounts.

As White House national security adviser, he had sided with the Pentagon in opposing State Department recommendations that U.S. troops be used to depose Gen. Noriega. He reportedly favored less direct (and unsuccessful) methods.

But outraged at the slaying of an unarmed American Marine by Panamanian troops, Gen. Powell contended later as chairman of the joint chiefs that support for Gen. Noriega was thin and a military operation would work.

Apparently, it has. And his reputa-

tion is likely to be enhanced by yesterday's smoothly unfolding U.S. military effort in Panama despite problems with American hostages and failure to capture Gen. Noriega.

Gen. Powell, who became the youngest chairman of the joint chiefs in history less than three months ago, is the son of Jamaican immigrants. He was born in Harlem and grew up in the South Bronx.

His father was a shipping clerk and his mother a seamstress in the New York garment district. They persuaded their son that the key to opportunity in the United States is education.

Gen. Powell graduated from City College of New York in 1958 with a degree in geology; a ROTC commission and the dream of retiring from the Army after 20 years as a lieutenant colonel.

He is the father of three children and a veteran of two tours in Vietnam. In 1972, he became a White House fellow and was assigned to work for a year in the Office of Management and Budget.

Both Caspar Weinberger, then director of OMB, and his assistant, Frank Carlucci, were so impressed by their aide that each would later lure him from command posts to serve in the Reagan administration.

Coming into the White House as national security adviser at the peak of the Iran-Contra affair, Gen. Powell restored credibility to a position that had been at the center of the controversy.

Earlier, he had peripheral roles in preparations for the Grenada invasion of 1983 and the Libyan bombing mission in 1986. In his new job, he directed the largest U.S. military combat effort since the Vietnam War.

After approving details of an incursion involving the deployment of 24,000 troops in early morning darkness, the general took a brief nap before meeting with his staff to monitor the beginning of the combat.

In effect, his forces appeared to be successful in ending organized re-

POWELL...Pg. 11

that they have been pressured by news executives to open up the international airfield in Panama and let correspondents in. But Mr. Fitzwater noted yesterday, "There are reporters all over Panama — everywhere. The Marriott Hotel is full of them."

A pool system was set up for coverage of overseas military oper-

THREAT...from Pg. 6

The terrorism threat appeared to grow yesterday, officials said, when Soviet-made tanks surrounded the U.S. Embassy in Managua after reports that U.S. troops had taken up positions outside the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama City.

Secret Service Special Agent Allan Cramer said, "We're certainly concerned with all the events taking place...."

But he said the president and vice president are being well protected.

Yesterday the White House received a "suspicious" package at the northwest gate on Pennsylvania Avenue, an official said.

The Secret Service temporarily closed the road in front of the White House as the package was inspected. The official said the package was harmless.

Mr. Bush and his wife, Barbara, repeatedly have shrugged off re-

ports of threats, claiming that they will never be a hostage to the White House. The clearest example of the first family's commitment to shun security shackles was Mr. Bush's decision to fly to Cartagena — the resort city in the world's cocaine center — despite objections from some on his staff and the Secret Service.

"There's always a concern because you never know when" terrorists will strike, Mr. Cramer said yesterday.

Security was increased along White House gates late Wednesday as anti-war protesters gathered along Pennsylvania Avenue to march against the administration's action in Panama.

Uniformed Secret Service officers took positions on both sides of the protesters and cars and trucks were placed along the street. And guards stood at attention right inside the White House gate while protesters were marching along the fence chanting anti-war slogans.

equipped by us. We threw in another 10,000.

"If we couldn't do it there, where could it have worked? Grenada was pulled together in a hurry. And we had no one on the ground to start with."

To the experts, two factors prevent the Panama operation from being a total success: the failure to seize Gen. Noriega and the inability to prevent hostage-taking.

"Unfortunately, our intelligence failed us at the last minute," said Col. Taylor. "We lost track of Noriega 45 minutes before H-hour (start of the operation). "If he is still in communication with at least some of his troops, then we're in some deep trouble.

Losing Battalion 2000 was another failure.

"[That's] another intelligence failure. Here we are in possession of every kind of technical equipment and we can't find a whole battalion?" said Col. Taylor.

The experts would not call the hostage-taking a failure since the risks were considered in attack plans.

"One of the things that still haunts the military is this idea of a surgical operation," Col. Taylor said. "I don't think there's ever been an operation that is really surgical. The military is not a scalpel. It's a sledgehammer."

GRENADA... from Pg. 5

the Army and Marine Corps are focusing on — in contrast to previous planning geared to full-scale conflict in Europe.

Instead of the divided commands in Grenada, all field operations in Panama came under Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the U.S. Southern Commander in Panama. "Packages" of forces, tailor-made for the operation, were sent out against specific targets. Army Rangers worked with paratroopers, Air Force gunships and Navy SEALs under one command structure.

There were very few accidents, and few killed by hostile fire. Pentagon officials had expected at least 50 dead in the first phase of such a major operation. Only 12 were killed in the first seven hours.

"As a military operation, it went very smoothly, isolating the enemy and removing them as an obstacle," said retired Army Col. Harry Summers.

"Well, it should have worked," said one Pentagon official, who declined to be identified. "We've had contingency plans for this for years. We've been practicing it and practicing it. There are 12,000 troops on the ground in Panama, up against, what, 6,000 regular PDF trained and

ations after media complaints of being cut out of the 1983 U.S. operation in Grenada.

Under the system, when the troops left for Panama late Tuesday night, the Pentagon picked a pool of reporters to go along and provide news to their colleagues back home. To avoid jeopardizing the mission, the pool reporters were forbidden to inform anyone but their bosses that they were going.

"We were greatly disturbed that one of the major organizations had divulged their participation and departure before they left here and

had called other government officials to tell them that," Mr. Fitzwater said yesterday. "That does call into question the integrity of the pool and the commitments made."

But Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday that they were pleased with the operation of the media pool, despite media complaints that there had been only limited access to the military action in Panama.

• This article is based in part on wire service reports.

SLAP...from Pg. 5

had made calls to several government agencies.

Representatives of CBS, ABC and The New York Times were seized at the Marriott, but Mr. Meyersohn was the only media representative not released.

White House officials also said

LEAKS...from Pg. 4

President Bush almost certainly will propose some kind of aid plan to repair part of the extensive damage caused in this week's fighting and to help get the economy back on its feet. But U.S. aid will not restore prosperity, and a new government will have to find new ways for the country to compensate for lost banking and commercial business.

The need to reform the Panama Defense Forces poses even thornier problems, according to officials and experts on Panama. Congressional sources disclosed yesterday that White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu had sought advice from some on Capitol Hill as to which past or present Panamanian officers might be able to help Endarra rebuild his military establishment.

The military has traditionally provided a means of upward mobility for poor Panamanians with Indian or African blood. Although the military stayed out of politics for most of its history, it has long been permeated with corruption, collecting the traditional type of police graft from contractors, bars and brothels and distributing the payoffs according to an elaborate system that reached down from the officers to the enlisted ranks.

In 1968, a radical president, the late Arnulfo Arias, tried to shake up the National Guard, which retaliated by deposing him and beginning the period of military domination that lasted until Wednesday's U.S. invasion.

After Noriega became commander in 1983, he moved the Defense Forces from its small-time graft to

alleged collaboration with Colombian drug traffickers in multimillion-dollar smuggling and money-laundering operations that finally brought him into confrontation with the United States. Even with Noriega gone, the United States—and Endarra—now must deal with or help replace a corrupt Panamanian military establishment.

Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on western hemisphere affairs and a supporter of the intervention in Panama, said yesterday: "We cannot be a guarantor of a civilian government or of the security of the Panamanian streets for very long. It's up to the new government to demonstrate it has support among the people. They can't be in hiding. This government has got to be out in the streets."

EXPERTS...from Pg. 6

attachment to the canal, referring to the attacks he suffered while negotiating and defending President Jimmy Carter's 1977 treaties that will cede control of the canal to Panama at the end of this century.

The same history of U.S. domination, Linowitz said, makes Panama a particularly sensitive issue for other Latin American nations.

When the 1977 treaties relinquishing U.S. control over the canal were signed, Linowitz recalled, the presidents of 20 Latin American countries came to Washington to hail a new day of mutual respect in the hemisphere. Linowitz said many of those Latin countries are today displaying "very strong disapproval" of the Panama invasion, which for them "raises the specter of the

SEALS...from Pg. 3

machine-gun emplacements and guard towers, Mr. Livingstone said.

"My guess is it would have taken between 30 and 50 people under cover of darkness, who worked their way up to the buildings, blowing doors and cleaning out rooms," Mr. Livingstone said.

"They usually give very tough stuff to the SEALs, and Paitilla was probably a major target," he added. "It probably wasn't hand-to-hand combat, but I'm sure it was 'up close and personal.'"

There are six active-duty SEAL teams and five reserve teams based in the Philippines, Scotland, Puerto Rico and Miami, in addition to two command centers in Little Creek, Va., and Coronado, Calif., near San Diego.

gringo from the north coming in to interfere in their affairs."

Another special factor in the approval by most of the U.S. public is strong antipathy to Noriega, who was described by Linowitz as "the guy in the black hat" who became a target of official and popular distaste.

Prof. William Leogrande of American University, a scholar of Latin American affairs who also has served as an aide to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, said the unusually broad and fervent U.S. political opposition to Noriega is due "first to the drug connection and second to the fact he is a dictator with a reputation for brutality who, in the television era, looks the role."

Especially since Noriega's indictment on drug-trafficking charges in two U.S. courts in Florida early last year, he has been the target not only of U.S. economic warfare and covert attack but of verbal assaults

Will Ball, a former Navy secretary in the Reagan administration, said the SEALs are the "grandsons" of the famed Navy frogmen, who carried out underwater demolition operations in World War II. They first were set up as counterinsurgency forces in the 1960s, according to the Navy. Most operate in secrecy.

Four SEALs also were killed and a number injured in the October 1983 invasion of Grenada.

"They were among the first to go ashore at night," he said. "They were under cover and their job was checking the situation on the beach and making a preliminary assessment as to the emplacements on shore."

"Their training is suited toward a wide range of missions," Mr. Ball said. "Flexibility is the key."

that are extremely rare from U.S. presidents about the leader of a foreign government.

President Ronald Reagan in May 1988 said that the U.S. goal "must be the removal of Noriega from power."

A year ago today, even before his inauguration, Bush declared that "I am as determined as President Reagan is to see that Noriega not continue in his dictatorial ways there in Panama." In May 1989, in an open invitation for a coup against Noriega, Bush said he would "love to see" the Panama Defense Forces "get him out. . . . The will of the people should not be thwarted by this man and a handful of these Doberman thugs."

After an unsuccessful coup attempt by Panamanians in early October, Bush reiterated that "I would like to see him [Noriega] out" even though he did not on that occasion order open U.S. military interven-

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Panama City before nightfall yesterday was transporting a group from ABC. Executives of the ABC News show, "Prime Time Live," said that Sam Donaldson, Judd Rose and Forrest Sawyer arrived in Panama at about 5 p.m. Both "Prime Time Live" and "Nightline" planned live shows from Panama City.

"We were on the phone all day with everyone we could think of," said Rick Kaplan, "Prime Time Live" executive producer. "It takes some skill but it's also a lot of luck."

On Wednesday many major news organizations, including The Washington Post, the New York Times, United Press International and all the major television networks rushed reporters, photographers and producers to Miami and Costa Rica to gain easy access to Panama as soon as the U.S. military opened airports there.

Beginning early yesterday morning senior officials of those organizations and others began calling the Pentagon to complain that their reporters were not getting access to the country. Most Washington-based ed-

itors said that top officials of the Department of Defense, including Secretary Richard B. Cheney, expressed sympathy and a desire to help.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post, said he called Cheney yesterday morning and asked him to help get reporters into the country. Editors at other news organizations did the same.

By all accounts Cheney responded quickly to the requests from several news organizations. By noon, officials at the Southern Command began issuing clearances for flights chartered by accredited media. But none could leave Costa Rica for Panama City without approval from Costa Rica.

"At least in Washington the Defense Department has been extremely helpful," said Howell Raines, Washington bureau chief of the New York Times. "They told us we could either get on an NBC charter in Miami or cleared us to use one of our own."

But promises from Defense Department leaders were not fulfilled for most news

organizations. And despite the assertion of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell that the "pool worked marvelously the other evening," few editors were happy with the ability of their reporters to cover the war unhindered.

With little conventional news coverage, perhaps the most vivid early accounts of the invasion and early hours of the conflict came from a Marine who filed a colorful and convincing report for the Marine Corps Public Affairs Office.

"Tracers split the darkness, spraying in all directions," wrote Marine Chief Warrant Officer Charles Rowe, in a dispatch to the Marines and then sent to frustrated news organizations hungry for any details of the combat. "The dull heavy thump of mortar and artillery fire was easily audible."

Rowe, who is based in Norfolk, is on rotation in Panama. As the public affairs officer for the Marine Corps there, he became a sensation among Pentagon reporters who have had to rely on colorless background briefings, rumors and pool reports based far too often on second-hand accounts of fighting.

Journalists constrained by Pentagon

By Walter V. Robinson
GLOBE STAFF

PANAMA CITY — Unlike the 1983 US military intervention in Grenada, this one is open to coverage by American journalists. But they have discovered that this newfound freedom, for the most part, has been illusory.

The US government, after acquiescing to demands that it open Panama to coverage, has made it all but impossible for journalists to do their jobs during much of the last week. Indeed, more than 100 members of the news media opted to take a military flight home on Saturday, many of them without ever filing a story.

They were long gone by the time Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's surprise arrival at the Vatican Nunciature here became public yesterday.

Until Saturday, armed guards had prevented reporters from leaving the US military installations where they had been confined since Thursday, in many cases without food and in nearly all cases without a place to sleep other than on concrete or linoleum floors.

There were few telephones, just two at the principal facility at Howard Air Force Base where 350 members of the news media were kept. Those who could get to phones found themselves waiting for hours to get calls through the strained Panamanian central telephone facility.

Then too, Murphy's Law — if something can go wrong, it will — seems to have taken hold in the army's overburdened public relations apparatus here.

The result, in many cases, has been a lack of information that has been reflected in the coverage of the US intervention.

The press arrived just in time to discover that the military operation was not nearly as close to completion as the Pentagon suggested. Indeed, the first briefing for the horde of reporters had to be scrubbed when Panamanian forces mounted a fierce assault not far from the supposedly secure site where the news conference was to be held. Several soldiers and Panamanian civilians were killed or wounded.

Then, too, the military took a step that would make a public relations professional blanch: the air

base site chosen to confine most of the journalists was two floors above the morgue set up to receive the bodies of US soldiers. So the only scenes available to many television news cameramen showed the last thing the Defense Department wanted on the air — arriving body bags.

By all accounts, the situation was the direct result of a policy disagreement between the Pentagon and the field commander, General Maxwell Thurman. When US forces invaded Grenada in 1983, the Pentagon and the commander in the field decided jointly to keep the news media off the island. As a result, that operation's flaws received scant attention, but the protests of journalists still reverberate.

This time, the field commander made much the same argument — the battle area was too dangerous and the facility too meager to handle the number of reporters who wanted to come here. But the Pentagon decided otherwise, first letting in a trickle of small chartered jets carrying small numbers of reporters, then clearing the way for the landing early Friday of a chartered jumbo jet with nearly 200 journalists aboard.

Commercial air service to Panama has been suspended, and the civilian airport here was not considered safe for any arriving flights until yesterday, when it was opened for planes carrying humanitarian aid.

"When we set up the plan to allow the aircraft in, we expected 25 to 30 journalists," lamented Col. Ronald Sconyers of the Air Force, the chief public affairs official in Panama. "What we got was more than 300."

Sconyers, of course, has ended up as Johnny-on-the-spot. And he said in an interview yesterday that the command's inability to support the press contingent adequately at the outset was the most "professionally embarrassing" time of his two-year tour in a country that, for all that time, has attracted intense media interest.

But the colonel, despite the admitted shortcomings and the failure to allow the press early access to the fighting, insisted that the Southern Command had quickly recovered and had given reporters the access they needed.

To an extent, reporters agreed.

Addison Armstrong, a television cameraman from VisNews, an international video service for television networks, said the armed forces had definitely improved access to the city as the week wore on. But at the be-

ginning, he said, their attitude and the logistics were "horrendous."

Peter Arnett, a veteran war correspondent who spent 10 years in Vietnam for the Associated Press and is now a correspondent for Cable News Network, said the Pentagon had not improved over its dismal press performance during the Grenada invasion.

Fortunately, Arnett said, many major news organizations already had correspondents in Panama when the fighting erupted early Wednesday morning.

In refusing reporters and camera crews access to the fighting, Arnett said, "They are saying that they are concerned for our security. But their real interest was with keeping a lid on the news as much as possible. They did not want negative images of this action."

"They were able to keep us at bay for those first few critical days," he added.

One negative image of the US military action that remains unclarified is the extent of civilian casualties, which are believed to have been substantial. But the lack of coverage of the early fighting, when most of those casualties occurred, kept those images from the public. And Scon-

yers and other American spokesmen have repeatedly refused to quantify those losses.

Yesterday morning, for instance, when Lt. Col. Jerry Marguia was asked about the numbers of civilians killed and wounded, he claimed not to know. "We'll get back to you on that," he said, repeating a line used by officials in one form or another since Wednesday.

Arnett said: "We still don't know the extent of those casualties. Nor do we know how well these American troops performed in the stress of battle. Those are two very important gaps in the knowledge of the public."

Other reporters have grumbled all week that the command's unwillingness to give them controlled access to the city forced many to take risks to get the story on their own.

But Maj. Tim Vane, a deputy to Col. Sconyers, said that the US command was in a difficult position. Noting that one journalist, a Spanish photographer, had already been killed and several others had been wounded, Vane said that granting reporters wider access would have inevitably increased their casualty toll. But, he said, by refusing reporters access for their own safety, the military might face charges that it was hiding atrocities.

WASHINGTON TIMES DEC. 27, 1989 Pg. 9

Seized Panama files may be good evidence

By Doralisa Pilane
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

PANAMA CITY, Panama — U.S. drug agents have been poring over thousands of seized documents that are providing valuable intelligence on international drug trafficking, authorities said yesterday.

They said the information could be used against Panamanians facing U.S. drug indictments, such as Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega and his associate, Lt. Col. Luis del Cid, who has been arrested and taken to the United States.

One windfall came at the headquarters of Panama's Anti-Narcotics Special Force.

U.S. soldiers stormed the headquarters Monday and detained three men after being tipped off by an informant, said U.S. Army Lt. Col. William Leszczynski, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regi-

ment.

Authorities reported finding rifles, shotguns, handguns and much ammunition as well as cocaine, marijuana, morphine and drug paraphernalia.

Torture apparently was carried out in the same building. Lt. Col. Leszczynski said his troops found "electronic devices that could be hooked up to people for electric shocks."

They found a room filled with immigration files of foreigners from more than two dozen countries, including Cuba, Nicaragua and Colombia. The files, in racks that reached the ceiling, contained detailed information on foreigners' entries and exits. Each file had a small photo of the subject.

One Miami-based agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration who visited the white stucco house said the files largely were from the 1960s through the '70s.

Basic Blackout

The Pentagon kept the press — and public — in the dark about the Panama invasion.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says he's pleased with the operation of the media pool that accompanied the U.S. invasion force to Panama last week. Maybe, from his point of view, there's reason for satisfaction. But from the public's point of view, it was a bloody outrage.

As news, the first days were Granada reviewed, a wholly unsatisfactory, sanitized and one-sided version of events spoon-fed to the public. The Pentagon kept the press and public in the dark about the invasion, the only coverage came from Pentagon cameramen and public relations operatives giving the story with the Defense Department's spin in briefings that could as well have been held in Washington.

Why doesn't the Pentagon understand that reporters might just as well stay home if they're denied the opportunity to be eyewitnesses to newsworthy actions of U.S. troops?

16 Pentagon reporters from television, radio and print media was activated, but not in time to cover any of the heavy fighting in the early hours of the invasion. And when 300 other journalists and camera crews arrived two days later, they found themselves without transportation and effectively restricted to military installations for a day or longer.

This was in fact violation of an understanding reached after Grenada to facilitate news coverage. Such restrictions were imposed by the Pentagon on the press and public relations operatives giving the story with the Defense Department's spin in briefings that could as well have been held in Washington.

Why doesn't the Pentagon understand that reporters might just as well stay home if they're denied the opportunity to be eyewitnesses to newsworthy actions of U.S. troops?

Pool operations should be a way to gather and disseminate information, not a way for the Army to control the press, and there has to be accommodation for other journalists as well.

Of course, there are logistical problems in handling large numbers of reporters and photographers. But it's ludicrous for the Army to act as if it were surprised that there would be so much interest in the Panama story, and disingenuous to blame some of the problems on safety considerations. Reporters and photographers conscientiously and willingly take risks all over the world to carry out their mission to inform the American people. It's the same public that the military is accountable to in a relationship that must depend on independent reporting. It's nothing but sham and mockery to ignore this vital principle while going to war for Panamanian democracy. Worry first about American democracy.

BALTIMORE SUN

JANUARY 12, 1990 Pg. 21

Defending Korea

London.

NOT LONG before the invasion of Panama there had been serious talk of relocating the U.S. Southern Command away from Panama back to the U.S. mainland. Even the Pentagon brass regarded this large permanent foreign presence on Latin American soil as an unnecessarily provocative problem.

But there has been little talk about South Korea where there is no international canal, no strategic back yard, indeed no vital interest. But there are 31,600 U.S. troops and

By Jonathan Power

150 land-based nuclear weapons. The reasons for them remaining there lessen by the year.

After the post-war settlement with the Soviet Union that carved Korea into two halves, one led by a fanatical communist and the other by a fanatical rightist, Washington felt that South Korea had little strategic value and that its protection should be left to the United Nations. Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw America's interest in the Far East as encompassing Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, but excluding Taiwan and South Korea.

So uninterested was America that North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950 took nearly everyone by surprise. But it angered President Truman, who reasoned that aggression tolerated was aggression encouraged. The United States (and a number of its friends and allies) were committed to battle — under the U.N. flag. The three-year war cost 34,000 American lives. Nevertheless, overshadowed by the Vietnam war, it has all but faded from public memory.

Today, thanks to the economic miracle that made it the world success story of the 1980s, culminating in the brilliant extravaganza of the Seoul Olympics in 1988, every schoolboy has heard of South Korea. But it would be hard to find a North American or European schoolboy to explain why the West went to war against North Korea and China. More problematical would be to find a South Korean schoolboy to explain it. Two thirds of the South Koreans

alive today were born since the war ended. Popular resentment has grown at the continuing American presence. What was once a feeling localized to rebellious leftist students is now widespread, even among some senior government figures.

Yet the troops stay on, their nuclear arsenal with them, as if nothing has changed. But the Korean peninsula is a different world than it was a mere ten years ago.

South Korea has moved from rags to riches in a generation. In 1950 it had an income per head of \$87. Today, it is over \$4,000 and growing fast. In 1950 it was poor, with weak defenses and easily assailable. In 1990 it is wealthy, militarily strong and virile. Politically, it is no longer isolated. The east European states are recognizing its government. China trades more with the South than with the North and the Soviet Union is increasing its trading links.

North Korea, in contrast, has a troubled economy. It has defaulted on \$770 million worth of Western debt and is unable to borrow another cent. Politically, it is more and more on its own. Even its old admirers like the Japanese socialists and communist parties have begun criticizing it, and after the bombing of a South Korean airliner two years ago by Northern secret agents many of its Third World friends cooled. The Soviet Union and China still maintain close links, but the North finds

it more difficult to play off one against the other as both reduce their estimation of the geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula, while raising their appreciation of the value of ties with the South Korean economy.

Expert opinion still believes North Korea has the military edge, not least because it has bled its economy to build up armed prowess, but times are changing. Over the last decade Seoul has modernized its armed forces, buying the best equipment from the United States. Now it's outspending the North without any apparent harmful effect on the rest of the economy.

Washington badly needs to look at the situation afresh. President Bush should be talking to Moscow and Beijing, fashioning an understanding that would commit the major outside powers to refuse to intervene in any war in Korea, whichever side began it. Further, that they would encourage the two Koreas to partially demobilize and to disengage from the front line.

Most important, as a contribution to the spirit of perestroika and disarmament, the U.S. should unilaterally withdraw its nuclear weapons. There are none on the northern side. They are a historical anachronism, a grim reminder of a period of extreme South Korean vulnerability and dependency on the United States which has long since passed.

DEFENSE WEEK

JANUARY 2, 1990

Pg. 4

Muddled Pool: Fred Hoffman, the Pentagon's just-retired principal deputy assistant for public affairs, has promised to find out why the media pool activated for the Panama invasion started out as a "fiasco."

Hoffman had nurtured the media pool concept since its inception after the news blackout that accompanied the 1983 Grenada invasion. He convinced the Pentagon brass that it was vital to have the press on hand when the fighting began and to accompany units in the field—tenets that worked pretty well in the Persian Gulf but not in the early hours of "Just Cause."

Hoffman told us he was worried that the Pentagon's civilian leadership might have "rolled over" to requests from the brass to keep the press at bay. Hoffman said that he was very upset by one pool report that a ground commander decided against taking reporters on a flight over Panama City out of concerns over sniper fire.

The ground commander had no business making that decision, Hoffman said. "I want to get to the bottom of this," he said.

Military press pool misses most of the action

By George Garneau

The national military press pool flunked its first combat assignment, missing most of the fighting it convened to cover in Panama.

The pool of 16 broadcast and print reporters arrived from Washington after the key military action, the assault against Panamanian Defense Forces headquarters, was mostly over Dec. 20.

Then, captives of their handlers for hours at a U.S. military base, pool reporters watched CNN television coverage of the invasion that began just hours before and several miles away.

Much of the pool's reporting, under military escort, for the next four days focused on scenes of past action — "house tour" viewings of Noriega's offices and voodoo altar, for example — pool members said.

"In my eyes it was a complete and dismal failure," said UPI photographer and pool member Matthew Mendelsohn. Except for some artillery firing, he witnessed no combat as part of the pool.

"It seemed as though we had been deputized into the public affairs department of the military," he said, explaining that public affairs handlers controlled what was and was not shown to the pool.

"When the real thing came down, it was the equivalent of journalistic martial law. They did what they wanted with us," he said.

Early pool reports were "basically useless to us," said *Washington* (D.C.) *Post* deputy managing editor for foreign news Michael Getler. Finding no detailed, independent account of the attack to this day, Getler called for "another reassessment of Pentagon planning for press coverage of its actions. I don't think this was a good performance."

The Pentagon begged to differ.

Spokesman Bob Taylor declared the pool "a big success." He admitted reporters could have gone into action sooner after arriving — some things "need to be looked at" — but called the pool "a good, viable system" that has been "accepted" by the military.

Plans called for the pool to arrive

after the predawn attack started, he said, because reporters could not take positions before the assault without giving it away or fly with paratroopers whose planes returned home.

It was the first combat assignment of the Washington-based press pool that was created after reporters were locked out of 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. Practices such as the Persian Gulf tanker escort saw unplanned combat.

The pool certainly found news in the largest U.S. military action since Vietnam, but its access to events was so limited initially that even Pentagon officials had criticism.

Top Defense Department spokesman Pete Williams called press arrangements the first day "a disaster," finding "no excuse" for the "incompetence" of military leaders in Panama. Corrections were made the next day, he said.

In addition, hundreds of journalists on charter planes were prevented from taking off for Panama for at least a day because military officials halted all civilian air traffic. Media complaints flooded Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.

Much of the news about the invasion by 24,000 U.S. troops initially came from non-pool reporters already in Panama, leaving some people questioning the pool's effectiveness.

The pool "did not work to anybody's satisfaction initially," said UPI spokesman Milt Capps. "This is definitely something that needs to be discussed further."

UPI had two full-time reporters in Panama, one staffer and one stringer.

About the only newspeople not complaining were from Reuters, which had three photographers in Panama before the invasion and boosted staffing to seven photographers and five reporters, including two pool members.

"We think that the pool functioned well. It provided a good flow of pictures and greatly enhanced our coverage," said Bruce Russell, Washington bureau chief for Reuters. The pool was "a little slow" the first day but later worked "extremely well," Russell said.

The pool contributed to reporting on the U.S. military point of view, which otherwise would have been hard to get, he said, conceding he would not want to rely solely on the pool.

The pool was activated at about 8 p.m. Dec. 19 in Washington. It included 16 people from a rotating list of news organizations, in this case Associated Press, UPI, Reuters, *Time* magazine, NBC, ABC radio, the *Houston Chronicle*, *Houston Post* and *Dallas Morning News*.

Pool rules designed to protect troops prohibit disclosure of the deployment. The Pentagon said it would look into reports in the *Washington Post* that when *Time* reporter Dick Thompson was called from the company Christmas party to join the pool, it was widely understood his destination was Panama.

The pool left Andrews Air Force Base near Washington in a C-141 military transport, arriving at Howard Air Force Base about 5 a.m., five hours after fighting began.

At Fort Clayton, pool members watched television for five hours before a public affairs officer reported that the operation was a success, but Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had escaped. Then a U.S. diplomat elicited groans from frustrated reporters when he lectured on Panamanian history.

It was not until the pool, traveling with public affairs officers and armed escorts, flew by helicopter to near Panamanian army barracks, that they first saw U.S. soldiers firing.

The pool later saw looting during a downtown bus tour. They were briefed by the commanding general. They saw Noriega's offices, his witchcraft altar, his refrigerator, empty of alleged cocaine.

But Mendelsohn said military handlers refused requests to let reporters see wounded Americans, damaged helicopters, and caskets (which he soon saw on television being unloaded in Delaware).

"It was a non-stop series of events that had already happened," Mendelsohn said of the pool's experiences.

Pool members joked that they were

PRESS POOL...CONTINUED

documenting "lifestyles of the rich and infamous," their motto: *semper tardus*.

"We were always one step behind what was going on. That seemed to defeat the purpose of the pool," the photographer said. "We did not come up empty, but a lot of us felt the quality of events we were covering was far from ideal."

"I think it tended to be short on up-to-date military information," Houston Chronicle reporter William Clayton said of the pool. "On the other hand, we were escorted to some places where there was considerable material available of what I would call a sidebar nature, and that was valuable in its way, but it wasn't what some people expected, which was briefings on the war itself."

Briefings they got were neither daily nor up to date, and "not the sort of thing that would make the pool the source of copy for that day," he said, advocating the need for regular briefings on the latest battle information.

There were no reports of military censorship or of news organizations hoarding news, which is supposed to be shared.

Mendelsohn cited continuing transportation problems. The pool had no ground transport of their own. Once the pool's bus blew out its front tires on protective wire on its way to a briefing.

"It was difficult even to get back from where they took us," Mendelsohn said, adding that public affairs people seemed to have little idea of what reporters needed.

Editors were concerned that it took until the first evening for the first pool pictures to arrive.

Despite the fact that the pool did not witness the U.S. invasion of Panama or report to the American people on the actions of their armed forces, Taylor of the Pentagon insisted, "We did our very best to get them there in time to report on as much as possible."

A "major" problem, he conceded, was, when pool reporters arrived, "we weren't able to get them out to cover as much as we wanted them to."

He said the Pentagon will look into how the pool worked and will solicit comments.

The pool covered a variety of things and overall, he said, coverage was "very good."

"I think we had a big success," Taylor said. "It wasn't perfect — nothing is — but we'll go back and try to fix it."

WASHINGTON POST
JAN. 18, 1990 Pg. 25

Quayle Visit Resisted in Latin America *Panama Invasion Fallout Is a Concern*

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush's plan to send Vice President Quayle on an extensive high-profile tour of Latin America to shore up relations in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Panama has run into strong resistance from the planned host nations, administration officials said yesterday.

When the president announced the trip almost two weeks ago, he called it "very, very important diplomacy." He said he was sending Quayle to a number of Latin American nations to "personally deliver" his message that despite the Panama invasion, U.S. policy remains that of a "friendly, supportive and respectful neighbor."

Yesterday, officials said that Quayle probably will end up taking two trips to Latin America, both tied to presidential inaugurations he had been scheduled to attend. He plans to meet at these events with leaders who were unenthusiastic about a visit to their countries when the State Department began consultations with them after Bush announced his plan on Jan. 5.

Quayle, in a question-and-answer session following a speech to the Hoover Institution, acknowledged that certain "diplomatic sensitivities require a coordination to determine the time," but added, "No country has said we don't want the vice president period."

Administration officials said Venezuela and Mexico, among others, had indicated that heightened anti-American feelings stemming from the Dec. 20 U.S. invasion of Panama made an early trip by Quayle or any senior official unhelpful. One diplomat said, "We have never said we don't want the vice president. We have suggested that this per-

haps is not the best time and a high-profile trip not the best idea."

Quayle's office announced yesterday that he would travel to Honduras, Panama and Jamaica Jan. 27-29. The visit to Honduras was long planned because Quayle was to represent the administration at the inauguration of its president-elect, Rafael Callejas.

In addition, Quayle was scheduled to attend inaugurations in Brazil on March 11 and Chile on March 15 and is working on using that trip to visit other countries. An administration official said that the White House made a "miscalculation" in announcing Quayle's mission so soon after the invasion of Panama, when Bush believed that high-level attention to the region would be appreciated, not cause political problems for the leaders involved.

"We think if we give it a little more time and let it be awhile" the antipathy growing from the invasion and the resulting political uproar in some of the nations will "settle down. That's the hope," the official said.

Aides to Quayle and more neutral officials at the White House and State Department said the reluctance to have Quayle visit had little to do with the vice president. One official noted, "I don't think it had anything to do with Dan Quayle. They just didn't want anyone right now."

Some of the foreign leaders involved told U.S. officials that the trip would be an "invitation to the left" in their nations to attack them because of strong popular sentiment against U.S. intervention in the region. But the left has not fielded the only attacks. In Venezuela yesterday, a spokesman for the opposition said a Quayle visit there was not "opportune."

"It doesn't seem to me that Vice President Quayle's visit to try to improve relations between the United States and Latin America is the most advisable or opportune," Eduardo Fernandez, head of the centrist Christian Democratic Copei Party told El Nacional newspaper. David Beckwith, Quayle's spokesman, said that within two months Quayle will have met with virtually all the leaders in the region to carry the administration's message, accomplishing its goal.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

JAN. 7, 1990

Pg. I-10

In 1st battlefield test, media pool misses mark

By James Warren

You probably don't know the name, but John Bascom was an important voice heard around the world last month. The only problem was that he had precious little to say due to the failure of a mechanism designed to inform the public about U.S. military engagements abroad.

Bascom, a reporter for ABC Radio, was part of the national pool of TV, radio and print journalists flown by the Pentagon to Panama City to cover the U.S. invasion. It was the first time the pool, created following the media blackout of the 1983 invasion of Grenada, was used in a conflict situation, and truth was clearly among the first casualties.

The 12-member pool's C-141 cargo plane didn't arrive in Panama City from Washington's Andrews Air Force Base until 4:52 a.m. Dec. 21, four hours after the invasion started. The journalists were flown to a U.S. installation north of the city and then sat around for several hours "waiting a briefing that never came," said Bascom, the pool's only radio reporter.

"So there we sat, watching CNN and President Bush and Defense Secretary (Dick) Cheney in Washington telling us what was really going on down," he recalled. It was a version, one learned days later, that was far truer than the reality of vigorous Panamanian resistance and many civilian deaths.

For the next 24 hours, the pool's combat reporting consisted of being helicoptered to minor shelling of a Panamanian installation, listening to a history of Panama from the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Panama and receiving a briefing from an American lieutenant colonel who, according to Bascom, "wasn't on duty the night before and was in no position to answer our questions."

Thus, Bascom said of the reports he filed for ABC, CBS, NBC, National Public Radio, Voice of America and other networks around the world: "I didn't have a whole lot to report. It was tremendously frustrating."

"What we got was barely passable. For the first 24 to 36 hours, it was kind of worthless," said George

Watson, ABC vice president and Washington bureau chief for ABC News, echoing the view of newspaper, TV and radio executives.

Even the Pentagon's chief spokesman, Pete Williams, acknowledged that much had gone awry, in particular the failure to let the pool reporters accompany U.S. troops into battle.

"There really is no excuse for it," said Williams, who last week received an analysis critical of the pool's operation from Fred Finkle, an NBC reporter and the TV representative in the pool.

One is left with the impression that a crucial test of a liberal proposition—cooperation between the media and military—was, at best, better than nothing. At worst, it revealed the media's submission to government, aiding an administration's short-term foreign policy goals but providing little insight to citizens of a democracy back home.

Relations between the media and military have varied. During the Civil War, reporters tended to ride horseback with the side favored by their newspaper and, in an age of slow communications, filed reports that tended to be published several days later.

During World War II, the media often saw themselves as patriotic boosters of a good cause and were allowed substantial access, such as to the Normandy invasion. They submitted willingly to censorship.

In Vietnam the press attitude was less obliging and its access was virtually unfettered. Reporters heeded certain ground rules, such as not reporting troop movements in advance. But those who could hitch a ride or a flight could go where they desired, taking responsibility for their notepads, cameras and safety, and often making careers in the process.

The results included some graphic and critical reporting, and military unease. Some felt that journalists undermined the war effort. And as noted by Nicholas M. Horrocks, the Tribune's Washington editor, who covered the Vietnam War, the mili-

tary in the late 1970s and early 1980s was run by "the guys who were the Vietnam battalion commanders in the late 1960s, and they were bitter toward the press."

When the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, the press not only wasn't tipped off and brought along, but it was unceremoniously kept off the island for several days. In a fitting coincidence, the Pentagon's chief media relations post was unfilled at the time. The blackout prompted a hue and cry and formation of a joint military-media commission headed by retired Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle to consider a better way.

The result was the pool arrangement. The members were to be picked by the media, and the pool was to be funded and given access to engagements. The Panama crew included reporters, photographers, camera operators and technicians from the Houston Post, Houston Chronicle, Dallas Morning News, Time, Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, ABC Radio and NBC News.

Reporters are assigned to the pool for three months. They must make sure their passports and inoculations are in order and have a backpack and sleeping bag ready to go, along with walking shoes, boots and clothes for a moderate climate.

A kindly Pentagon, serving as a cross between L.L. Bean and Banana Republic, provides garments if the action is in especially hot or cold settings.

"We felt an obligation to give American people information from the battlefield," said Fred Lash, a commission member and a former Marine Corps public relations officer. "We didn't feel views should be tilted one way, which is why the rotation. The thinking was that varied points of view would be better for the military and American people."

The pool had been activated previously in the Persian Gulf, as well as taken on play-acting exercises in Honduras and Alaska, but it never came close to genuine combat.

Last May, when President Bush deployed an extra 1,000 Marines in Panama, the pool was flown to Panama City. Unlike last month's operation, the May trek was no big secret and of little news value.

POOL... CONTINUED

and the pool was back in Washington within 26 hours.

Surely, the notion of a pool, of bureaucratizing press coverage of anything, is ungainly.

It serves the aim of fairness, but not necessarily accuracy. The best reporters may be left in the cold if only because it's not their institutions' turn. The values that make good reporters good—digging, cultivating sources—may have nothing to do with their being pool members.

But if a pool is a necessary evil in certain situations, especially when the military is the only way to gain access to a story, its only utility is in getting to the action. In Panama, it did not.

Said Tim Russert, NBC's Washington bureau chief and TV's representative in pool-related dealings with the Pentagon: "We showed we could keep a secret. Now, the military has to demonstrate that they'll let us in to cover the story."

The media's frustration may have derived from benign incompetence on the ground, perhaps a harried commander who botched instructions. But it may underline something deeper, namely that reporters, if they do their jobs right, work a different side of the street than the government.

Especially in a TV age, the press poses a threat to the military, noted David Evans, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Marines who writes on military affairs for the Tribune.

Instantaneous broadcasts narrow the gap between action and accountability.

Unlike the Civil War, it may take seconds, not days, before the public learns of a deadly mistake.

"I think pool coverage is something we must see work," said Ed Turner, executive vice president of CNN. "Things being what they are, conflicts like Panama won't go away and, for sure, we won't go away."

James Warren covers media issues for the Tribune.

WASHINGTON POST

JAN. 7, 1990

Pg. 1

Arms Cuts Urged in 2 Germanys

Communist Seeks Troop Withdrawal

By Marc Fisher
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 6—East German Communist Party chief Gregor Gysi called on East and West Germany today to halve their armed forces by the end of next year and urged that all foreign troops leave both Germanys by 1990.

Gysi, a 41-year-old reformer chosen last month to head the party, proposed a disarmament plan calling for immediate abolition of low-altitude military test flights in both Germanys and establishment of a 50-mile-wide demilitarized corridor along their border.

The Communist chief's proposals, presented to the party's executive board in East Berlin, appeared aimed, in part, at demonstrating to East Germans that the party has dropped its former hard-line views.

Under Gysi's "Security 2000" plan, the only weapons remaining in Europe by the turn of the century would be small arms for local police agencies. The Communist leader called for removing all nuclear and chemical weapons from German soil and recommended dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"Between the Urals and the Atlantic, there should be no nuclear weapons, no biological or chemical weapons, no tanks, cannons, bombers or combat helicopters," Gysi said.

By stepping far ahead of the disarmament debate, Gysi appeared to be seeking credibility and support

for his corruption-riddled party and to blunt momentum toward unification of East and West Germany.

Gysi made his announcement two days before massive weekly anti-government demonstrations in Leipzig are to resume after a holiday break. The demonstrations, which helped topple the hard-line government of former party leader Erich Honecker in October, have become a forum for growing calls for a single German state.

The Communists have opposed any discussion of unification and Gysi—who, unlike Honecker, runs only the party and not the government—today called the idea "nonsense." Prime Minister Hans Modrow's government also opposes reunification.

Gysi's proposals parallel strong sentiment among East and West Germans against use of German soil as a European staging area for weapons and troops of the two major military alliances. The United States has about 250,000 troops in West Germany, and about 380,000 Soviet troops are in East Germany.

The West German government today denied a newspaper report that it plans cuts in military strength beyond those announced last month. The West Germans had announced plans to decrease their armed forces by one-fifth, from nearly 495,000 to 400,000, if arms control talks underway in Vienna are successful. The report said the cuts would be deepened, reducing total manpower to 350,000.

[In West Germany, defense policy specialists from Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party called for a new European security force independent of Moscow and Washington, the Associated Press reported. A newspaper article, scheduled to be published Sunday, quoted party officials as proposing that European segments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact be re-aligned to establish an independent European force, the AP said. A De-

The Panama Press-Pool Fiasco

The Military Let Journalists Do Everything Except Cover the News

By Kevin Merida

NOW THAT the Panama invasion is behind us, news organizations should press the Pentagon to reform its flawed system of granting a select group of journalists controlled access during live combat situations. As one of three newspaper reporters in the pool of 14 journalists assembled to cover the invasion, my frustration with the U.S. military bureaucracy reached an early climax. I'm not alone in the pool; I felt the same way. The Pentagon's system failed so miserably in Panama that some of us laughed at the absurdity of it all—especially at being flown 2,500 miles to begin our war coverage by watching television.

The first briefing we received—three hours after arriving in Panama City and seven hours after the invasion began—was given by the U.S. chargé d'affaires, John Bushnell, a diplomat who could not speak knowledgeably about the military operation. He thought he was being helpful by giving us a history lesson on Panama's politics and the rise and fall of General Noriega. We quickly dispelled that notion.

"Here we were sitting in the middle of invasion, watching CNN and listening to some guy tell us when the Panama Canal was built," complained Matt Mendelsohn, a UPI pool photographer who said his first pool picture wasn't transmitted until 17 hours after the invasion began. "I started behind the eight ball and it got worse from there."

The Defense Department created this rotating National Media Pool in 1984 in response to criticism that there had been a virtual news blackout during the 1983 Grenada invasion. Operating under strict guidelines and with military escorts, the pool is supposed to represent all news organizations and serve as eyes and ears of the American public. But what happened in Panama seemed designed to render the American people

blind and deaf to much of the U.S. troop activity.

During the four days the pool was in operation, military officials either didn't understand or ignored our needs as journalists. On the critical first day, for instance, we were taken to Omar Torrijos International Airport to cover the arrival of more troops.

This was not a news event that demanded pool coverage.

We kept explaining to our escorts that we needed to see troops on combat maneuvers, military police on patrol, wounded American soldiers, Panamanians being taken prisoner, whatever was happening today that hadn't been reported or photographed.

What military officials kept showing us was what had happened yesterday—buildings that had been bombed and gutted by fire, weapons that had been confiscated and more weapons that had been confiscated. Officials at the U.S. Southern Command post were not interested in showing journalists scenes that would detract from what they regarded as a military triumph.

Military commanders were especially eager to promote Noriega as a bizarrely prosperous dictator with a degenerate character. This was done by taking the pool on a series of tours of Noriega offices and living quarters, which we jokingly dubbed "Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous."

Indeed, the tours provided colorful details of the deposed dictator's opulent lifestyle, his love of skin magazines and his reliance on voodoo. But enough was enough. When a tour of Noriega's main residence was offered to the pool on Day 4, we respectfully declined, with NBC's Fred Francis insisting that something more relevant be found for the pool to see.

In some respects, the pool was destined for failure from the outset. We didn't depart Andrews Air Force Base until 11:20 p.m. on Dec. 19, and we didn't arrive at Howard Air Force Base in Panama City until 4:55 the next morning. By that

time we were four hours behind American paratroopers and had already missed most of the fighting.

It was not until 10 a.m. that we arrived by helicopter at Fort Amador—the first place where we could actually observe troops in combat position.

And even at Fort Amador, a military installation shared by the United States and Panama under the Panama Canal treaties, the action was largely over. U.S. troops had repeatedly shelled the barracks of the Panamanian Defense Forces in the early morning hours when we were still on a military transport plane. All that was left to do was smoke out a few remaining Noriega loyalists, none of whom surrendered in our presence.

We were told that because of continued sniper fire on the first day it was too dangerous for us to visit the neighborhood of Chorrillo, which housed Noriega's headquarters and was still burning from heavy shelling by U.S. troops. It was also too dangerous, we were told, to take a helicopter tour of Panama City.

The pool didn't work because military officials didn't allow journalists to do their jobs. To best serve the public in times of war, we need to cover events as they happen and not after they are over. We need access, not obstruction. If the pool is to operate effectively in the future, better coordination is needed between the Pentagon and the military command center. In Panama, no one seemed concerned that news organizations have deadlines and that pool members don't have hours to waste on tarmacs, on golf courses and in holding rooms.

During a moment of creative steam-letting, Jon Bascom of ABC radio sketched a proposed T-shirt that may forever symbolize our frustration. On the back will be the words that became our mantra in Panama: "If it's news today, it's news to us."

Kevin Merida covers the White House for *The Dallas Morning News*.

Editorial

The media and priorities

We normally find journalists' analysis of their trials and tribulations inappropriate for widely circulated magazines and newspapers. They're better suited for journalism reviews and doctoral theses. When scribblers contemplate their navels in public, it's often not a pretty sight.

But these kinds of articles have formed a goodly portion of the news analysis of the U.S. invasion of Panama — Operation Just Cause. The problems with the press pool, the media hostages taken at the Marriott hotel, and Southern Command's public affairs' problems in handling hordes of reporters have taken second place only to the failure to apprehend Manuel Noriega as the operation's biggest shortcomings.

And like every media organization that tried to cover Just Cause, we had some of these problems in our efforts to get stories in last week's paper.

Nevertheless, we are appalled and embarrassed by the way many members of our trade have whined and pouted.

Take, for example, *The Boston Globe's* Christmas Day story, "Journalists constrained by Pentagon." In it, Walter Robinson complains that press freedom to cover the operation "has been illusory. The U.S. government, after acquiescing to demands that it open Panama to coverage, has made it all but impossible for journalists to do their jobs during much of the last week. Indeed, more than 100 members of the news media opted to take a military flight home Saturday [the invasion began Wednesday, Dec. 20], many of them without ever filing a story"

"Until Saturday, armed guards had prevented reporters from leaving the U.S. installations where they had been confined since Thursday, in many cases without food and in nearly all cases without a place to sleep other than on concrete or linoleum floors."

Does anyone else detect a childish tone here?

In all fairness to Robinson and his newspaper, this story reflects a good reporter's instincts for getting a story, any story, when sent on an assignment. An *Army Times* reporter was locked up along with those hundreds of others. Robinson simply experienced the frustration of being so close to a hot story with no way to report on it.

But lest we forget, there was a war going on. War reporting is an important

American tradition and we would not like any attempt by the Army to manage the news. For 50 years, our life's blood has been our independence from formal channels of Army information. But shepherding a gaggle of reporters, most of whom likely had little expertise in military matters, through street-by-street firefights deserves its place at the lower end of the Army's wartime priorities. Especially in this kind of operation — a quick, violent application of force and the dangerous mopping-up actions that followed.

These complaints about access were at the same time contradicted by the concern of the journalists staying at the Panama City Marriott. Some were taken hostage by Noriega supporters and held for varying lengths of time. CBS News was so worried about one of its producers that

CBS President Laurence Tisch reportedly telephoned the high and mighty to get his man rescued.

This have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too attitude has no place under such circum-

stances. There is no way the government should acquiesce to a demand that journalists be given both access to the war and a comprehensive guarantee of military protection while the fighting rages.

□□□

If journalists' attitudes about their proper role in combat situations were embarrassing, articles and television analyses unfavorably contrasting the Panama operation with events in Eastern Europe were simply obscene. In the minds of some commentators, the liberation of Panama does not hold up to the liberation of the Soviet empire.

As recent events in Rumania demonstrated, the steps towards freedom and democracy often come at a heavy price. The peaceful changes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are to be blessed. But so are the changes in Panama, as the Panamanians themselves are saying loud and clear.

It also is worth observing that the Soviet army could not have performed in Rumania the role the U.S. army did in Panama. If the Soviets intervened, the Rumanians certainly would have worried that the Soviets were propping up the Ceausescu regime, not delivering them from it. There were no such doubts in anyone's mind in Panama.

War reporting is an important American tradition and we would not like any attempt by the Army to manage the news

MAS. MAJDOX

How Reporters Missed the War

On a tight leash, journalists assail the Pentagon's pool system

BY STANLEY W. CLOUD


When Allied troops stormed the Normandy beaches in 1944, American correspondents and photographers were on hand to tell the story. But two weeks ago, when U.S. Marines and Rangers led the charge into Panama as part of Operation Just Cause, not a single journalist accompanied them. The Pentagon-sanctioned pool of reporters did not arrive on the scene until four hours after the fighting began, and they were unable to file their first dispatches until six hours after that. Worse, the initial pool report shed almost no light on the confused military situation, leading off with the hardly titanic news that the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Panama, John Bushnell, was worried about the "mischief" that deposed dictator Manuel Noriega could cause. Complains pool member Steven Komarow of the Associated Press: "We kind of missed the story."

Responsibility for that failure lies with the military—particularly the Defense Department's Southern Command—not with Komarow or his seven colleagues in the pool. From the time the hastily summoned reporters arrived at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington on the night of the invasion until they returned from Panama four days later, the Army kept them under such tight control that journalistic initiative was all but impossible.

During their first, crucial day in Panama, the reporters were kept for several hours in a windowless room at Fort Clayton and treated to a tedious, history-laden briefing. Nor were things much better once the poolers were allowed into the sunlight. "To the extent we got any news at all," Komarow says, "it was pretty much by accident." He notes, for example, that the pool did witness looting in Panama City, but only when their military driver lost his way. Exposure to actual combat was also a matter of chance, as when Noriega forces attacked the Southern Command's headquarters, about 400 yards from the press center.

"It was a Keystone Kops operation, especially at first," says Kevin Merida of the *Dallas Morning News*. "The military seemed to have no concept of what our role was. The whole first day was devoted to taking us to places where the action was already over. It was like forming a White House pool and then showing them an empty hall and saying, 'This is where the President spoke.'"

Acrimony between the press and the military is hardly new. It existed even during the fondly recalled days of World War II, when correspondents had to wear uniforms and submit to censorship, a practice the military abandoned in Viet Nam and has avoided since. In response to criticism over the barring of reporters from the 1983 Grenada invasion, the Pentagon created a National Media Pool of rotating news organizations. The military not only decides when a pool



Captive audience: U.S. military officer briefing correspondents

"To the extent we got any news at all, it was pretty much by accident."

will be "activated" and "deactivated" but also sets the ground rules for participation, including understandably strict limits on what information can be published before an operation begins. Moreover, it allows the local commands to exercise almost complete control over the movements of participating reporters and photographers and acts as a traffic cop for the transmission of copy and the shipment of film and videotape.

That is a price many experienced journalists are willing to pay if it means getting into a place that would otherwise be closed to them. "Bad as the pool operation was in Panama," says Carl Leubsdorf, Washington bureau chief of the *Dallas Morning News*, "it was better than what we had in Grenada." Nonetheless, says Jonathan Wolman, Washington bureau chief for the *Associated Press*. "I don't like prunk. I like open coverage. Our guy just sat around in a little room, feeling frustrated."

Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams blamed much of the difficulty with the Panama pool on "incompetence"—his own and that of the Southern Command. The command's officers argued that logistics and concern for the safety of journalists made it impossible to permit pool members to get closer to the action.

So far the pool system has been tested twice under combat conditions: during the Navy's 1987 Persian Gulf operation and this year in Panama. Retired Major General Winant Sidle, who headed the Pentagon commission that recommended the pool system, has been unimpressed with the results. "If you're going to let the media in," Sidle says, "you have to

let them do something. Others think there may be no acceptable way of achieving that goal. "I just don't see a happy ending to this story," says a Navy public affairs specialist. Pools, he adds, "just don't work."

They never will unless the military agrees to let reporters do their job. Even then, pools cannot substitute for hard-nosed, entrepreneurial reporting. Retired Admiral Joseph Metcalf, who led the Grenada task force, responded to complaints about the way the Panama pool was handled by huffing. "But what about the reporters who were already in Panama? They had plenty of indication that something was happening. If they could have found out days in advance, if they can't use their knuckleheads, it's their own damn fault." The admiral was being unduly harsh, but he had a point. —*With reporting by Bruce van Voorst, Washington*

SUPPLEMENT: FRIDAY, January 12, 1990

Achtung! About those helmets . . .

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
JAN. 11, 1990
Pg. 17

RICHARD C. CARTER

we called Nam helmets. You know, the odd-shaped, emblem-bedecked combat headgear with the sloping sides and back.

Whether it was action newsreel footage from early in the war when a triumphant Wehrmacht ran rampant, hard-hitting magazine photos of Panzers barreling through the countryside or gritty newspaper shots of individual soldiers peering over their weapons, that curious-looking helmet was the one constant. And it struck fear in our hearts.

I can't begin to count the times, seated in a dark movie house, that I and my boyhood chums scowled and growled at some scurrilous SS-type wreaking havoc on some defenseless civilian or helpless prisoner — every move punctuated by that glowering black Nazi helmet.

How well I recall the evil Erich Von Stroheim, the suave Conrad Veidt, the smooth George Sanders, the slimy Martin Kamenik or the calculating Helmut Dardine sipping and savoring their mad furthur in his delicious dream of world conquest.

What scoundrels they were in a variety of Hollywood films. And there was always that horrific helmet basting the image of impending Nazi mayhem. Ugh!

It seems strange today that a basic part of a military uniform could seem so terrifying — even if it was worn by the enemy. What makes it even more strange, however, is the sight of U.S. combat troops now wearing the same kind of distinctive helmets as the German troops of 50 years ago.

The first time I noticed the new U.S. battle helmet was a couple of years back. And as an army veteran who served in the Corps of Engineers in the late 1950s — prior to America's involvement in Vietnam — I was just about knocked off my feet. Of all places, it was in a television commercial aimed at attracting army recruits!

For a moment, I thought my eyes were playing tricks on me. Could I really be seeing this? Are these really American soldiers scaling a cliff wearing Wehrmacht-style helmets? Say it isn't so, G.I. Joe!

After that, I began paying closer attention to news photos, magazine ads, TV film and, yes, even recruiting commercials (remember "Be all that you can be . . ."). And except for the camouflage, what I saw was the new American combat soldier looking for all the world like a member of the dreaded WW II Wehrmacht war machine!

What had happened to the time-honored, all-purpose, heavy steel pot so many of us knew and loved and hated? The thing

we sometimes shaved in, occasionally cooked in and, once in a while, barfed in?

About that time, I asked a good friend of mine — a fellow with an open mind who loves military history — his reasoning.

"Simple," he said. "The so-called Nazi helmet, which actually was adopted by the Germans toward the end of the World War I, provides better protection. It covers more of the ears and neck. Let's face it, when it came to military innovations — tactics, weapons and even uniforms — the Germans were way ahead of us then."

Of course, the U.S. has been way out in front in the ways of war since WW II — which is probably why we've managed to keep our country from being invaded or bombed by a foreign power.

Yet, I have to admit, during the recent American invasion of Panama — righteous though it may have been, which is open to doubt — I got a sick feeling in my gut when I saw all those TV and magazine and newspaper pictures of many of the 14,000 invading U.S. soldiers sporting their terrifying Wehrmacht-style helmets.

Real scary, I thought. Which just may be another reason, aside from extra protection, that our fighting guys and gals are wearing them. Images and memories of war — righteous or not — are always scary.

But for those of us who were around during WW II, it is something we'd like to forget. Every little part of it — including those intimidating Wehrmacht-style helmets.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

JAN. 11, 1990

Pg. 17

The Panama invasion was private

By RICHARD REEVES

There is an arrangement, called the national media pool, between the Department of Defense and American newspapers and television news operations. The idea is to give the press reasonable access to wars large and small — on the theory that the people whose taxes and children are needed to make war have some right to know what is being done with both.

But the current Pentagon-press arrangement is the same deal I have with my 5-year-old when we're out on the street: I hold her hand tight, and she sees only what I want her to see when I want.

At the beginning of the recent unpleasantness in Panama, for instance, the national media pool consisted of 14 reporters and cameramen who were flown to Panama City in military aircraft and then locked in a room and allowed to watch Cable News Network reports from Atlanta.

I exaggerate, but only a bit. Actually, a fellow did come over from the U.S. Embassy and give a lecture on the history of the country. He went a little easy, though, on the good parts, like how we stole the land in the first place from Colombia.

"The Pentagon's system failed miserably in Panama that some of us laughed at the absurdity of it all."

wrote one of the pool members, Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News, "especially at being flown 2,500 miles to begin our war coverage by watching television."

"I would think the military folks were laughing even harder. The system did not fail for them. As far as I can tell over the years, Pentagon systems are designed to keep the press away from action and decision-making until the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the White House too, get their stories straight and the mistakes cleared up. It is a high-stakes game for them. Like doctors, military officers bury their mistakes — and critical reporting is the equivalent of malpractice suits.

In my experience, the U.S. military professionally defends country and Constitution, but that does not mean it believes every itty-bitty word of wild stuff like the First Amendment and freedom of the press to criticize strategies, execution and officers. I've met more than a few U.S. officers more than willing to risk their bodies to protect mine — for which I was humbly grateful — but who made it clear they thought such duty was wasteful and reporters an unnecessary evil.

Well, they have their job and I have mine. And we are often at cross-purposes. They may not see it the same way, but my gripe is that they usually prevail — and they certainly did in Panama, where they basically

presented us with the heartwarming story of our paratroopers coming down chimneys with sacks of toys and goodies from their sleighs.

"We are doing what we are supposed to do, defending our country," said one Army captain, apparently believing he was a Panamanian or that Panama was a part of the United States of America.

I should make my beliefs (or bias) clear if they are not already obvious: (1) I think the invasion of Panama was stupid and wrong; (2) I think the press has caught the same chicken laryngitis that seems to prevent Democratic "leaders" from questioning the actions of any bureaucrat who wears a uniform to work.

This invasion was a waste of American energy and young men, to say nothing of Panamanian men, women and children and, when we stop congratulating or deceiving each other, of moral credibility. It is hard to figure out why we did this.

To protect Americans? Before the paratroopers came, we already had, under the Panama Canal treaties, more than twice as many troops in the country as Manuel Noriega did.

To stop the dread Noriega from shipping drugs into the United States? There can't be anyone so foolish to believe that the hundreds of millions of dollars we spent on this adventure will stop a single grain of

essence from reaching Harlem.

It is almost impossible to think of an analogy as sensible other than our turning troop ships back from Lebanon, where the going was getting rough in 1982, to the soft sands of Grenada.

In the Mexican War, in the 1840s, we at least got something worthwhile — California and the rest of the Southwest — from the annoying smaller bids on our behalf. Actually, at best, this invasion was a pale imitation of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 to drive out the Khmer Rouge — an invasion we are still officially condemning.

It was in Grenada that the modern U.S. military was first able to use force — pointing its guns at American reporters and cameras — to control totally what Americans knew about a military action. The best reports for a while then were coming from Cuba.

When American reporters tried to reach Grenada by boat, they were stopped by U.S. Navy ships and guns, threatening to blow them out of the water if they did not turn their little boats back. Those reporters, in fact, had as much legal right as the Navy to be landing in Grenada, but the press boats were unarmed.

When it became obvious in Panama that the pool reports were just about useless, some newspapers and television operations in Washington demanded that the Pentagon allow them to fly their chartered planes into the country. Feel free, said people working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the planes arrived over

INVASION...CONTINUED

Central America, they were forbidden to land by American officers. "We can't guarantee your safety..." began the argument the military never loses.

Another famous victory. Once

again the combined military might of the most powerful country in the world has proved it can defeat its own free press — in war and peace and "intervention."

Richard Reeves is author of "American Journey," a modern version of Alexis de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America."

day in Panama," Mrs. Legate said.

"One of Our Guns"

Duff's brother, 22-year-old Jim Duff of Lincoln, said the family had been told that the death might have been caused by "possible friendly fire."

"It could mean he was cleaning guns," Jim Duff said. "It just means it was one of our guns and it was accidental."

Duff was one of a dozen or so students to graduate from Clearwater High School in 1988.

He joined the Army under its delayed entry program during his senior year and did not have to report for service until August 1988, Mrs. Legate said. He received basic training at Fort Benning, Ga.

Duff's last trip home was during a leave between basic training and his first duty assignment. Mrs. Legate said her son spent an early Thanksgiving holiday at the farm near Elgin before leaving in mid-November for Fort Ord, Calif.

Promoted in 10 Months

At Fort Ord, Duff was attached to Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Battalion Division. His mother said he was proud to have won promotion from private to specialist within 10 months.

On Dec. 20, a day before his scheduled trip home, Duff called his mother at her farmstead near Elgin.

He told her that his leave had been canceled, that his infantry unit at Fort Ord had been placed on alert and that he wouldn't be home for Christmas.

Duff called again two days later to tell his mother, "They're shipping us out to Panama."

The phone conversation lasted less than a minute, prompting Mrs. Legate to think her son was not supposed to call.

He called home again Sunday, for the last time. The call came from Panama, collect.

"He told me he couldn't tell me

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

OMAHA WORLD-HERALD

JANUARY 3, 1990

Pg. 13

'Possible Friendly Fire' Fatal to Nebraska GI

By Jeff Gauger

World-Herald Staff Writer

Army Specialist Douglas J. Duff Jr. had bought his plane ticket from California and was all set to fly into Eppley Airfield for a two-week Christmas leave.

It was to be the 20-year-old infantryman's first visit home to Nebraska in more than a year.

He never made the trip.

One day before the flight home, Duff received new orders. They sent him to Panama.

He died there of a gunshot wound — possibly "friendly fire" — on New Year's Day, 12 days after U.S. military forces invaded the country in an effort to oust Panamanian Gen. Manuel Noriega.

"Supposed to Be Home"

"He was supposed to be home for two weeks for Christmas, and then they sent him to Panama," Duff's mother, Shirale Legate, said Wednesday from her home in rural Elgin, Neb.

Duff was the first Nebraskan to die in Panama since the United States launched its military action there Dec.

20. Twenty-three U.S. servicemen have been killed in action in Panama, most in the first few days.

Duff's death differed from the other military fatalities. Officially, the Army is calling his death an accident, making him a "non-battle casualty."

Pentagon Comment

Maj. Joe Padilla, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon, said Duff died about 6 p.m. Monday of an accidental gunshot wound. Padilla declined to provide more details until Duff's family has been informed of circumstances surrounding the death.

"The Army is regretful that this accident had to happen," Padilla said from the Pentagon.

On Wednesday, Duff's relatives, including his mother and father, Douglas J. Duff Sr. of Bermer, Neb., were still awaiting more information.

Mrs. Legate said she learned of her son's death from an Army officer who visited her home at 8 a.m. Tuesday.

"All we know is what we were told yesterday morning, just that he had been shot and killed by an accidental gunshot wound the day before yester-

ST. LOUIS
POST-
DISPATCH

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At Marine Court-Martial, The Truth Hurts

The Marine Corps says it did not punish a female drill instructor for telling the truth at a court-martial rather than parroting the company line, but that is how it looks.

The case involves Christine Hillinski, a former Marine drill instructor at Parris Island, S.C., fighting to get back pay and restoration of her good-service record. While still in the Corps, she testified at a court-martial in 1988 of a fellow drill sergeant charged with homosexual activity with a female recruit. While stating firmly that she backed the Marines' longstanding policy against homosexual acts, Sgt. Hillinski told the court that overall, the other instructor "did a fine job."

For her answer, Sgt. Hillinski was quickly punished. The brass accused her of questionable judgment for being "lenient in her position on homosex-

uality." That was hardly the case. Still, she was removed as a drill instructor, docked in pay and had unfavorable ratings placed in her service record by the same supervisor who had only days before filed a report saying "her judgment is outstanding."

One Marine spokesman, Lt. Col. Fred Peck, defended the Corps' action this way: "If I'm a priest who's called upon to testify, and I suddenly start espousing views that are antithetical to the church, what kind of faith is my bishop going to have in me?" Col. Peck is wrong; the issue is truth, not the party line. The colonel apparently would have priests commit perjury in the name of dogma.

Sgt. Hillinski should get her back pay and service record restored. The Marines should brush up on legal procedures.

Lax military security could be ruinous next time

By Bill Gerz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Leaks of information prior to the U.S. military operation in Panama did not affect its outcome, but military analysts say such lax security under less favorable conditions could be disastrous.

Norman Polmar, a military specialist and co-author of the book "Merchants of Treason" about U.S. security breaches, said this week that deficiencies in security were of secondary consequence in the Dec. 20 action because the United States had bases and large numbers of forces already in Panama.

"Against another type of enemy, say the Soviets, or if we were engaged against Libya or a country of significance, one would hope things would be a bit more secure," Mr. Polmar said. "Otherwise losses could be catastrophic."

Twenty-three U.S. servicemen died and several hundred were wounded in the mission known as Operation Just Cause. Military planners had expected that as many as 70 troops would die, according to U.S. officials.

Rep. Les Aspin, Wisconsin Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, last week described the Panama intervention as unique because of the U.S. military's existing deployments and familiarity with the country. "We should note that it almost surely won't be as easy anywhere else," he said.

"What I know — what I'm sure of" — is that the PDF (Panamanian Defense Forces) and Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had enough information ahead of time, from various

sources, that told him that we were coming," Mr. Aspin said.

Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also has criticized U.S. intelligence shortcomings in the operation.

The Pentagon has said a preliminary review of the Panama operation found operational security to be adequate, but that a full review of security precautions would be conducted later.

Pentagon spokesmen have said security did not appear to be a problem because Gen. Noriega apparently did not believe reports he received about the impending U.S. operation.

Edward Luttwak, a military affairs specialist with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said operational security should be reviewed as part of the Pentagon's assessment of the lessons learned from the operation.

"An operation that size is not going to have perfect operational security," he said. "On the other hand, a detailed examination of what was done [to protect the secrecy of the operation] is warranted."

Mr. Luttwak said one apparent flaw was notifying U.S. troops about the intervention days in advance, a potential security problem he called "unnecessary."

John M. Collins, a military specialist with the Congressional Research Service, agreed that the mobilization of U.S. troops in the United States was an inevitable flaw in security precautions and may have limited the "tactical surprise" of the Panama operation.

"A possible lesson learned is that if you hope to gain tactical surprise, a deception plan is absolutely in-

dispensable," he said.

An administration intelligence official said the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded a telephone tipoff from Washington to Panama some 24 to 48 hours before the operation as a serious security breach that nearly compromised the operation.

According to U.S. officials, some of Gen. Noriega's forces were on a heightened state of alert, including units that put up unusually heavy armed resistance during the night of the intervention.

In addition to the telephone call that was monitored, U.S. officials have provided the following details indicating that information about the military operation leaked out in advance:

- PDF troops overheard two U.S. soldiers talking about "11-Hour" some three hours before it occurred.

- A former Israeli intelligence operative and a reputed security adviser to Gen. Noriega was tipped off to the intervention some six hours before the operation began. The adviser, Mike Harari, fled the country and later surfaced in Israel. Intelligence sources said Mr. Harari is believed to have been on board an Israeli C-130, loaded with evidence detailing Israel's ties to Gen. Noriega, that left Panama City six hours before U.S. troops attacked.

- An unidentified television correspondent was asking telephone questions about the planned military operation 36 hours before it took place.

- Some PDF forces went on alert after Cable News Network reported troop arrivals in Panama at about 10 o'clock on the night of the operation.

- The operation also became known outside Pentagon channels

when members of the media pool selected to cover the event reportedly failed to follow secrecy procedures.

Time broke the secrecy rules after the magazine's staff was notified at a Christmas party about the pool call-up. In a memorandum on the incident, NBC reporter Fred Francis, a member of the Panama press pool, wrote that "in the course of finding a correspondent to go, the entire staff of Time magazine learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington, the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement."

Another pool member violated the secrecy rules by contacting a member of Congress hours before the operation, prompting one lawmaker to call the White House in search of more information. White House spokesman Martin Fitzwater said. An administration official said the breach "seriously undermined the mission."

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ment command in Washington. The Navy expects cutbacks "not nearly the size of the others," she said. With a total recruitment ad budget of \$19.4 million last year, the Navy, too, must compete for candidates who "score high on tests to be able to handle the technical hardware," she said.

BBDO, New York, has the Navy account.

The Marines, whose officers were not available to comment, still are stressing the image of "A few good men" in their ads from J. Walter Thompson Co., New York.

Candor Panama's 1st Casualty

By Patrick J. Sloyan
Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington — The face of battle is haunting: Robert Capa's photograph of a Spanish civil war soldier shot in mid-step, the grainy footage of GIs withering in the surf of Omaha Beach, a tank rumbling out of Hue covered with dead American Marines.

Those indelible images, along with equally grim eyewitness dispatches, are part of the recorded reality of political decisions that result in military conflict.

But from President George Bush's invasion of Panama, there is not a single public photograph, video or eyewitness account of the moments when 23 U.S. servicemen were killed and 265 wounded.

There is, however, a secret record of what was essentially a one-day war that also resulted in a still uncertain num-

ber of Panamanian dead and injured. But the Bush administration has concealed it from public viewing.

Those classified moments of "Operation Just Cause" were also a triumph for photographic technology. The murky 1 a.m. H-hour over Panama was transformed into daylight by electronically enhanced infrared military cameras. Air Force, Navy and Army combat photographers recorded — from above and below — some of the 4,800 U.S. paratroopers who took a 17-second plunge into combat.

"It is really dramatic stuff," said an Army official who viewed the combat photography. But that footage, along with the moment when Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega surrendered at the Vatican Embassy before Army video cameras, are not for taxpayer consumption.

"Combat photography is for combat

use — internal use," said Robert Hall, an aide to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. To a reporter's request for films of combat and Noriega's surrender, Hall advised legal action against the Defense Department. "File a freedom-of-information suit."

The Pentagon's refusal is just one of the reasons there is only a smattering of images of American troops in the two major battles on Dec. 20 — at the Commandancia, the Panamanian Defense Forces' headquarters in the slums of Panama City, and 76 miles to the west at the PDF barracks in Rio Hato.

"It is all a terrible mistake," said Pete Williams, the chief Pentagon spokesman, of U.S. military decisions to prevent media coverage of the fighting in Panama. Also blocked from witnessing the Commandancia fighting was the so-called Defense Department media pool, a band of newspaper, wire

service, broadcast and magazine journalists and photographers.

"The president personally decided that the pool should be used," said Williams, who arranged to have reporters flown from Washington to Panama as the invasion got under way. "They weren't sent down there to be locked in a closet."

But the delay in getting journalists to the scene left a void in the record of Operation Just Cause that enabled the Bush administration to control the initial and, often, most lasting public perception — a flawless feat of arms on an almost bloodless battlefield.

"If you just looked at television, the most violent thing American troops did in Panama was play rock music," said Robert Squier, a political media expert. "They feel if they can control the pictures at the outset, it doesn't make a damn what is said now or later."

By reducing the reality of combat to sanitized statistics, the administration effectively silenced its critics and enlisted the media in portraying the invasion as Bush's showdown with Noriega. The image was summed up by an Army

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colonel asked to explain the source of the code-name for the invasion. "Just 'cause Noriega really us off," the officer said.

But in the race to tint the first blush of Operation Just Cause, the administration has left a tangle of hyperbole, distortion and half-truths that are just beginning to unravel.

Some senior members of Congress, for example, are concerned over the handling of intelligence that led to the Navy's SEAL team attack on Petillo airport, where it immobilized Noriega's potential get-away plane. Four of the Navy commandos were killed and 11 wounded when the small U.S. force encountered hundreds of Panamanian soldiers and armored personnel carriers.

"The Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence knew the base was heavily fortified," said a House Armed Service Committee investigator. "But there is a real question if the intelligence was given to the SEAL team."

Even though it was a superpower amassing 25,000 elite troops against a Panamanian combat force estimated at only 4,000 men, U.S. casualties were almost certain. But in addition to a photographic blackout, the administration sought to minimize to the media any self-inflicted wounds.

For example, reporters repeatedly pressured military commanders at the Pentagon on the day of the invasion for details of almost predictable accidental injuries from what was the largest airborne assault since World War II.

"I know of no casualties that occurred as a result of the air drop," said Army Lt. Gen. Tom Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "To my knowledge, none of them were accidental." Kelly spoke after the most serious casualties had been evacuated to the United States.

But the Army this week acknowledged that 86 of its 253 casualties resulted from fractures and sprains. "It is presumed they were caused by the jump," said Maj. Col. Joe Padilla, an Army spokesman. All of them were evacuated quickly from Panama to Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.

"It was the worst collection of fractures I'd ever seen in my life," Air Force Dr. William Burner said last week. In a telephone interview in San Antonio he described the first plane-load of wounded as "an absolute orthopedic nightmare." In addition to shattered arms, shoulders and legs there was severe damage to nerves and blood vessels, which was more difficult to treat, Burner said.

Some of those injuries were clearly an inescapable part of combat for the 860 Army Rangers who jumped in Rio Hato to attack the Cuban-trained "Men of the Mountain," Noriega's elite 7th Infantry company. Two one-ton concussion bombs dropped by an Air Force F117 Stealth fighter-bomber stunned some of the Panamanian soldiers but alerted others.

"They were ready for them," said an Army official who told how the Panamanians filled the air with small-arms fire. One Ranger was shot while he stood in the doorway of his plane. Col. William Kernan, who led the Ranger assault, later told reporters they jumped at 375 feet to minimize the time his troops dangled as easy targets.

Kernan's force suffered two killed and more than 40 wounded, but there is still no breakdown on injur-

ies caused by the 12-second jump in which some Rangers plummeted into the roof of the barracks the PDF was defending.

The Pentagon has yet to break down the cause of 23 deaths. But the Army, in addition to listing jump-related injuries, reported 70 gunshot wounds, 51 injured by shrapnel and 11 felled by the tropical heat. Five are reported as "cuts," six as "other" and 24 other soldiers were hurt for "miscellaneous" reasons.

Those catch-all categories may include at least five soldiers injured by their own explosive mauler charges in a raid on Gamboa prison, a Pentagon official said. The Marines, Air Force and Navy still are compiling the causes of their casualties, the official said.

Panama City's international airport was a much cooler landing zone than Rio Hato.

The bulk of U.S. paratroopers jumped there, including the 82nd Airborne, which arrived hours late because of freezing weather at Ft. Bragg, N.C. The airport was secured within the first hour of the invasion by U.S. Rangers. But the paratroopers jumped rather than being landed at two available airports.

"They always jump from perfectly good airplanes," said one senior military planner. "You can't second-guess that forever but the Airborne will always jump." While as many as 40 — the exact figure is still unclear — were injured, the military planner said the rate of injury was within the predictable level for a night drop.

Burner is the chief of surgery at Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center, where reporters were banned for four days after the invasion from interviewing the injured. For reporters, San Antonio and domestic military bases of the invasion force are a backdoor to first-hand information about what really happened in Panama.

But the Bush administration scaled both back and front doors during Operation Just Cause. Orders from the top down silenced soldiers in the field.

"Sorry, my operational orders are that I cannot let you talk to any of my men," an Army major general told NBC reporter Fred Francis. "I can't speak with you." Francis sought the interview only hours after the general's paratroopers had seized the international airport in Panama City on Dec. 20.

For Francis, the chief Pentagon correspondent for the network, it was a day of anger and frustration. As one of the most experienced members of the Pentagon pool that arrived from Washington at 8 a.m. — four hours after H-hour — Francis knew that a 6-year-old pact between the media and government entitled him to a front seat at the fighting.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada featured a press blackout by U.S. military commanders who actually "detained" for days journalists, including a Newday reporter, who arrived to cover the conflict. Media protests led to creation of the pool and Pentagon approval for frontline access.

But in some of the most important ways, Panama was just as bad as Grenada. A horde of reporters was kept out of Panama for three days until the U.S. Army permitted a chartered jetliner to land at airports under U.S. control. Peter Arnett, a Pulitzer Prize-winning combat journalist, was reduced to reporting on Noriega's alleged pornography collection. "They got away with it again," Arnett said of the initial press blackout.

Other reporters in Panama were shut out of Noriega's surrender at the Vatican Embassy. "We got notice

At 10 a.m., Francis was only two miles from the Comandancia where American tanks were still firing. "We told our escorts that was where we needed to be," Francis said. "We were told, 'It is too dangerous.'"

Four days later, the Pentagon released a brief clip of the combat footage at the Comandancia. But it gave no inkling of the firefight that included Army tanks, helicopter gunships and a converted Air Force cargo plane called Specter, or of the pounding by 40-mm. and 20-mm. cannons, along with a Gatling machine gun. That film record could shed some light on what the military calls "collateral" casualties to Panamanian civilians who lived in slums between the American position and the Comandancia. Last week, the Pentagon was continuing to shun all questions about the Panamanian toll resulting from the firefight.

For Francis, most details he gathered about the invasion that first day came from the same source: the rest of the world used — the Pentagon briefing televised in Panama. He watched as Gen. Kelly assured viewers that Operation Just Cause was a "10" on a scale of 1 to 10.

"It was especially frustrating since we were only a few miles from the troops fighting, yet we were grounded," Francis said. When he and his camera crew were permitted into the field the next day, all the dead and wounded had been evacuated.

Squier, who uses television to create Democratic political images, noted Hush's only appearance with the dead from the invasion was accidental. The president would complain later about network split-screen broadcasts that showed him bantering at the White House as flag-draped coffins arrived at Wilmington, Del.

"Everything else was carefully staged," Squier said.

A teary-eyed Bush visited 44 of the wounded in San Antonio on Dec. 31. The "beautiful thing" Bush later told reporters was that he heard no "second guessing" from the victims of Operation Just Cause.

Whatever political motives were involved in sanitizing the record of Operation Just Cause, they were reinforced by some military leaders. Media coverage is still blamed by some senior commanders as the reason for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

"Two things people should not watch are the making of sausage and the making of war," said Burner, who has watched the flow of American blood in Vietnam, Beirut and in San Antonio last month. "All that front-page blood and gore hurts the military. We're guilty by association."

But former Sen. Eugene McCarthy believes it was the reality of war promoted by the media that ended public support for the Vietnam conflict. "That picture of the dead Marines on the tank — that was a turning point for the United States," said McCarthy, who led the public outrage over the war in 1968 that drove Lyndon Johnson from the White House.

One result of Vietnam, according to McCarthy, is little, lauded wars such as Panama, where public approval is secured by limiting the perception of death and injury.

Germany to Join Norway Exercise

For the first time since World War II, troops from the German Army will be on Norwegian soil when a parachute battalion from the Federal Republic of Germany participates in NATO's "Array Encounter" exercise scheduled for Feb. 3 to Feb. 28.

Array Encounter is held twice a year with participation from Canadian, British, and Italian troops of the NATO Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. This year it will take place in Troms, in northern Norway.

only seconds before," said Pentagon spokesman Hall. "There was no time to get the prize at the Embassy." Army video and still cameras filmed 40 minutes of Noriega. But the Pentagon would release only 3 minutes of the footage, showing Noriega inside an Air Force plane that carried him to Miami.

The elaborately planned Pentagon pool did not arrive on the invasion's first day until after most of the heavy fighting ended.

"The pool was repeatedly denied or ignored when it asked for access to frontline troops, wounded soldiers, simple interviews," Francis said in an after-action report. "The pool was a failure."

Richard Harwood

A Pool In Panama

Some things in this world are not fixable.

One of them may be the Pentagon press "pool," an entity properly unknown to the mass of humanity.

We are reminded of its existence by the Panamanian military adventure in which the "pool"—a somewhat ragtag collection of 16 Washington "media" people—was mobilized in the dark of night, flown by military aircraft to the scene of action where, metaphorically speaking, it vanished into the void. Its members were to have been our eyes

Ombudsman

and ears on the battlefield, the Ernie Pyles and Hemingways through whom the world would experience vicariously the rocket's red glare, the bombs bursting in air. And all that good stuff.

But they produced no memorable prose. They shot no film that sears its images onto the brain. The whole enterprise, Fred Francis of NBC news has written in a memorandum on the affair, was doomed from the start by bunglers and incompetents in both the Pentagon and the pool, of which he was a member. The Pentagon, he concludes, wanted

this little war to be covered properly. The field commanders—Gen. Maxwell Thurman and Lt. Gen. Carl Stiner—evidently did not. So the pool members got a cold reception when they arrived and were effectively muzzleed by neglect through much of their stay.

The press was as sinning as sinned against. It endangered the security of the operation hours before it began. This "lapac," Francis wrote, "far outweighed all the Pentagon's fumbling. . . . Time magazine . . . was notified at a Christmas party that the pool was activated. In the course of finding a correspondent to go, the entire staff of Time magazine (and other guests at the party) learned that the invasion was imminent. In a news town like Washington, the Pentagon might as well have made a public announcement. Some pool members showed up . . . without passports and without the proper gear. . . . Only a few members of the pool had any combat experience, and fewer still had ever covered a military event. . . . Combat is no time for on-the-job training."

This bad show, in the sensible view of Fred Francis, was needless. Long before the shooting began, American correspondents were in goodly supply in Panama. The Associated Press, United Press International, CBS News, the Chicago Tribune, The New York Times and other news organizations had people on the scene. Bodies out of Washington were not required. But military assistance was essential.

The reporters, many of them holed up in the Marriott Hotel, needed protection, transportation and information that only American military forces could

provide. Lacking these essentials, self-preservation became their first priority. Fear immobilized most of them in their hotels or homes. The telephones worked. They could call the office. But they had only the sketchiest idea of what was happening at battle sites miles away.

Two lessons should have been learned from this little war. The first is that the press for all its swaggering and arrogance is virtually helpless in situations of that kind without the cooperation of the military. The second is that military field commanders—no matter what unctious oases from the Pentagon—will not give that cooperation unless they are made to do so. A major general commanding Rangers and airborne troops told Fred Francis he wanted to cooperate, but "my operational orders are that I cannot let you talk to any of my men. I can't speak with you."

For their part, members of the press pool allowed the imbecilic tyranny of deadlines to ruin opportunities for serious reporting and to sour their relations with the troops. Lt. Col. Joseph Hunt, commander of a Ranger battalion, made his men available for prolonged interviews on the fighting at Rio Hato. "They want to tell you," Hunt said to Francis, "how they jumped from under 500 feet and took this base in 20 minutes." But it was 4 in the afternoon, and "we would miss our deadline. . . . I'll never forget the look in his eye when I told him we had lost half the day waiting and simply had no choice. He didn't want to hear it. All Lt. Col. Hunt knew was that I did not have time for his troops."

Since the Vietnam War, there has been hostility and misunderstanding between these mammoth institutions—the

press and the military. The Hunts fought the war; many of the journalists opposed it. That is an important reason things don't go smoothly in the field. Adversarial relationships, the press discovered in Panama, can work both ways.

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things take time, and we appreciate the associated difficulties. Meanwhile, we should not jump to conclusions until all the results are in."

Gen Powell stressed that the growing political and military independence of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact governments was having some impact on JCS planning for US forces in Europe — "but by the very nature of the situation in Europe, not as much as some people think it should. "Remember, the Soviet forces have always been our chief concern. The Soviet Army in East Germany alone outnumbered the entire US military presence in Western Europe. Moreover, our plans are based on capabilities, not on intentions. As long as the capabilities remain, we have to plan on ways to counter those capabilities.

"When we see real, hard evidence of sizeable reductions in Soviet forces, of a re-orientation to a defensive posture in the Soviet Western TVD, and elimination of forward-stationed ammunition stockpiles and other offensively oriented structures and logistic functions, then we can begin to discuss significant revisions in JCS planning." JDW

BUSH... from Pg. 7

lysts. Some of these experts contend that the "cuts" would apply only in projected, future military spending increases and thus constitute only a "savings" on paper from projected expenditures that might never become reality. Others point out that actual reductions in conventional or non-nuclear forces in Europe could produce large U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and result in actual savings.

Bush has previously maintained that a peace dividend is not likely to appear, given the continuing deficit problems. After his summit last month with Gorbachev, Bush said it would be "extraordinarily difficult" to achieve any such savings in his first term.

The president paid tribute to soldiers killed and injured in the Panama invasion, and he met here privately with the family of Pfc. James Markwell, who was killed by gunfire after parachuting into Panama during the invasion.

"In the past months we saw democracy restored to the brave people of Panama," Bush said. Although the president has said he would not talk about the case against ousted Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega, he told the business group: "We saw the powerful brought before the bar of justice."

The Pentagon Pool, Bottled Up

The invasion of Panama offered the first true test of the Pentagon's system for giving journalists access to live combat. The system failed. More precisely, the Pentagon failed the system. It is the President's job to make it work.

The system was devised after the Reagan Administration excluded reporters from the Grenada invasion in 1983, temporarily blinding press and public to one of the more debatable expeditions in American military history.

A commission headed by Winant Sidle, a retired general, then recommended that a select "pool" of reporters be allowed to accompany the military on any surprise operation and share its information with other news organizations. That seemed a fair compromise between the military's need for surprise and the public's need for information.

In Panama, the arrangement swiftly became a joke. The Pentagon did not get the 16-person pool to Panama City until four hours after the fighting began, and reporters were unable to file dispatches until six hours after that. Overall coverage improved as hordes of other reporters arrived, but the original pool remained under tight military control and contributed little. "We started behind the eight ball," one photographer said, "and it just got worse from there."

Part of the problem may have been an absence of institutional memory: George Bush's Pentagon seemed to feel no urgent need to abide by an accommodation struck by Ronald Reagan's Pentagon. No

civilian official accompanied the press pool to Panama City. The Pentagon simply handed the reporters over to the officers of the Southern Command, who treated the journalists as an unwelcome nuisance. In a rare burst of bureaucratic candor, Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, summed up the military's entire press performance in one word: "incompetence."

The larger problem, as it always has been, is one of mutual comprehension and trust. Since the goals of defending the nation and informing the nation often conflict, forbearance is required on both sides. For its part, the press is obliged to accept limitations, including rules on what may be published about military operations in the Gulf and Korea, the press agreed, if not always cheerfully, to rigorous censorship.

In exchange, the military is obliged to allow reporters to do their job, which means getting them to the scene of the action and providing means of communication. As General Sidle noted the day after the Panama invasion began: "If you're going to let the media in, you've got to let them do something."

But insuring adequate coverage is a civilian responsibility. It belongs to President Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the appointed officials who carry out their orders — not the military. As a post-Grenada report by the Twentieth Century Fund noted in 1985, the two cultures, military and media, have been divided since Vietnam. Commanders charged with leading troops into battle are likely to give the press low priority — unless told otherwise by their civilian chiefs.

The press and the Panama invasion

CAL THOMAS

Some journalists are complaining that U.S. commanders in Panama kept them from sights "that would detract from what they (the commanders) regarded as a military triumph."

So says Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning News, in an essay in The Washington Post. Mr. Merida was one of the pool reporters who accompanied soldiers on the invasion.

"Military officials either didn't understand or ignored our needs as journalists," complains Mr. Merida. "Military commanders were especially eager to promote Noriega as a bizarrely prosperous dictator with a degenerate character." Perhaps that's because Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's profile exactly fit that description.

Mr. Merida's essay, along with one by George Carneou in Editor and Publisher in which he quotes UPI's Matthew Mendelsohn as saying the pool "was a complete and dismal failure," betrays a level of hostility by much of the press that the Pentagon did well to maintain.

Panama was the second major battle since Vietnam involving large numbers of American forces in which there have been press restrictions. Grenada was the first. Both operations were military successes that achieved their stated objectives.

The British, during their invasion of the Falkland Islands, also applied restrictions on reporters. That, too, was a successful operation.

In the modern era of satellite communication, is there a connection between delaying some of the sardonic musings of the press and the achievement of military objectives? I think there is. Government officials, including the military, must be held accountable by the press, but in the prisoned years following Vietnam and Watergate, some natural press skepticism has evolved into a variety of cynicism that is harming the nation.

Veteran journalists who covered World War II and other pre-Vietnam conflicts remember how things once were.

"You used to know who the enemy was," laments Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor-in-chief of The Washington Times and a former foreign correspondent. "Now, the enemy is your own government and the only reason you want to get in on Day One is to report on how it's screwed up."

Bryson Rash, a former NBC News correspondent, notes that while circumstances were far different in World War II ("there was all-out war and no alternative, and we also had censorship that was never violated except on one or two occasions"), there was a different spirit among journalists of that era and a different attitude toward their own country.

Bob Sherrod, a World War II correspondent for Time-Life in the Pacific, tells me, "The relations between the press and the powers were very close. We were all fighting the same war. There was no doubt that the press trusted the high command to a point and reporters were generally trusted."

Mr. Sherrod says Gen. Dwight Eisenhower would brief reporters in advance about an invasion. He also says that Navy Secretary James Forrestal advised him in advance of the invasion of Saipan in 1944 so he could return there in time to write a firsthand story.

No official would dream of doing such a thing today. Such privileged information would probably be broadcasted and printed all over the world by reporters anxious to beat the competition, jeopardizing U.S. policy and the lives of American soldiers.

A glance at reporting during World War II shows a crop of reporters who were a far different breed than some of today's overpaid spoiled brats.

The New York Times on Nov. 17, 1944, reported "a great offensive against the Ketch" and of the advancing soldiers as "our" ground troops.

The same paper carried an editorial that said, "Safe here at home, drying our shoes and overcoats and gloves in front of an open fire or over a radiator, suffering between one dry place and another only the momentary discomfort of a cold and rainy day, what can we do or hope or say to those brave men, fighting and dying in our cause, along the Siegfried Line? We can do each his appointed task, no matter how small, to speed the final victory. We can hope that success will be swift, and the losses small. We can say only, God bless you!"

Imagine such an editorial being written about America and American soldiers today. Instead we often focus on the irresponsible remarks of Ramsey Clark or Jesse Jackson questioning every government policy and every step of the soldiers.

Ernie Pyle, the greatest World War II journalist of them all, did his job so well that he was not only praised by fellow journalists abroad and at home, but by those he covered.

In his book, "The Story of Ernie Pyle," Lee Miller quotes a letter from Pfc. Robert O'Doherty of the 88th Division: "... [Pyle] would do us more good than any high-powered senator in Washington."

Gen. Omar Bradley said of Pyle, "I have known no finer man, no better soldier." And Pyle said, "If I could pick any two men in the world for my father except my own man, I would pick Gen. Omar Bradley or Gen. Ike Eisenhower. If I had a son, I would like him to go to Bradley or Ike for advice."

The bravery of American fighting men is undiminished. Unfortunately, responsible journalism and the esteem of too many journalists for their country has been on the decline. Military objectives ought to be policy-driven, not press-driven. Until these priorities are again placed in the right order, it is not a bad idea for the Pentagon to hold reporters at bay, at least until a mission's objectives have a chance to succeed. There will be plenty of time for critiques later.

Cal Thomas is a nationally syndicated columnist.

WASHINGTON POST

JAN. 16, 1990

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Nessen on Pentagon Coverage

During an interview with WWRC-AM's (980) Ed Walker and Bruce Alan on Wednesday morning, Ron Nessen, vice president/news for the NBC Radio News and Mutual Broadcasting System networks, said the Pentagon-organized press pools should be disbanded and that the media alone should be responsible for getting to the scene of breaking news and should not rely on the government for transportation, information or any other kind of help. He said "the Pentagon pool failed" to cover the Panama invasion because "the Pentagon has absolutely no interest in having reporters see what is going on... having photographers take pictures. That's not what they are in business for. They are in business to fight wars."

Nessen said the reporters who missed the story were ones who "put themselves in the hands of the Pentagon with the promise that the Pentagon would take them to where something was happening." He said that NBC Radio News didn't make that mistake. "We had somebody there a couple of days early because we had the sense that something was building toward this kind of climax."

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tively removed the threat of Soviet surprise attack. He announced he would withdraw some 5,000 tanks from Europe (about half have departed). An agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the conventional force reduction talks (CFE) this year would further dilute Soviet military power by eliminating at least 10,000 of the 14,000 Soviet tanks massed on the borders of Eastern Europe.

The United States now has 320,000 troops in Europe, and no less an authority than Admiral Crowe argues that the Bush administration should begin bringing them home. The withdrawal should be gradual—"We should walk, not run, to the exits," Crowe told *Newsweek*. But "Germany is a very prosperous country," he added. "Why should we provide ground forces for them? We shouldn't." Chairman Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee argues that the United States should essentially restrict its role to providing air power, and let the Europeans defend Europe on the ground.

But should the United States walk away from its historic postwar commitment in Europe? Some Europeans, as well as Americans, may not be comfortable with seeing Germany once again become the dominant land power in Western Europe. Nor is it clear that the Soviet empire will quietly wither away. The East-bloc remains tindery as it dissolves. "I lie awake at nights thinking of all the ways in which events could get out of control," says Gen. Jack Galvin, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe. (The favorite doom scenario over at Galvin's headquarters: angry East Germans storm one of the Soviet Army barracks. There is bloodshed. At the Kremlin, rebellious Soviet Army generals confront Gorbachev...) At a minimum, it is likely that the United States will have to keep 100,000 troops in Europe with enormous

stockpiles of arms and ammunition in case U.S. forces have to come back.

Even if the United States no longer needs to contain Soviet expansionism, it will have an essential military role to play, not only in Europe, but around the world. The United States is dependent on the global economy it created after World War II by exporting free markets and democracy. That economy cannot function without global stability. Ironically, the end of the cold war could bring more instability, not less. During the '60s and '70s, Soviets were often blamed for fomenting revolution in the Third World. But "the Soviets kept their clients in line, particularly in the Middle East," says a senior Defense Department official.

Balance of power: By turning inward, the Kremlin has left the United States as the world's only true superpower. No other country has the global reach of the U.S. military. The United States may find itself playing world policeman in the manner of 19th-century Britain, patrolling sea lanes and intervening to restore the balance of power in regional disputes.

What kind of forces will the United States need to play that kind of role? It has become fashionable to say there is no longer a need for the kind of heavily mechanized army necessary to defeat the Soviet Army on the plains of Europe. Future wars, the thinking goes, will require light, mobile forces, like paratroopers and Marines. In Pentagon jargon, the wars will not be MIC—high-intensity conflict, but rather LIC—low-intensity conflict. The invasion of Panama, in other words, not the battle for Germany. But Panama was an exception, caution Army planners. Rescuing hostages and attacking terrorist cells will still require quick-response special-operations teams like Delta Force. Future wars are more likely to be MIC—medium-intensity conflicts. "The truth is, there's hardly a contingency demanding LIC anymore," says a senior Army officer. "The forces out there are just too big."

Certainly, the armies of the world are becoming more lethal. Third World inventories of armored vehicles—the spearhead of land attack—have quadrupled in the last 20 years. A dozen Third World countries have armies with more than 1,000 main battle tanks. More than a dozen countries have ballistic missiles. Perhaps 20 have some form of chemical weapons, and an additional 10 are researching biological and toxic weapons. By the end of the next decade, it is not fanciful to expect that 10 countries may have tactical nuclear weapons.

Is it big: Defeating these nations will require more than the 82nd Airborne. An amphibious force of U.S. Marines, along with airborne troops, can "kick in the door" of some far-off foe. But then heavy forces will have to come in to rescue. "Guys in dune buggies get blown away by main battle tanks," mordantly notes Phillip Karber, a conventional-forces expert. Even in Panama, where resistance was light, the United States chose to pile on the firepower, sending in light tanks and artillery to back the paratroop assault. "The lesson Panama will teach the American military is that if you're going to go in somewhere, go in big," says an army general of one of America's principal allies. "After Grenada, people started thinking about rapid and

selective low-profile operations—all that low-intensity stuff. But the truth is that nobody in the brass was keen on it. And the success of Panama will reinforce their prejudice: go in big."

In Panama, the United States had the immense advantage of some 12,000 troops already based in the country. Other adversaries will not be so accommodating. Backing up the initial shock troops with armored divisions will require enormous airlift and sealift capacity—and at the moment, the United States has not enough of either. A C-8 transport plane can carry only two M1 tanks, and the United States has only 97 C-8s. The Pentagon is trying to develop an effective light tank, but the designers are having trouble building a light-weight cannon with enough punch to destroy a heavy tank. Another solution would be to "pre-position" cargo ships laden with heavy armor around the world. But that would require more funds for military transport—an area traditionally neglected in the defense budget because cargo ships and planes have no natural constituency in either the Pentagon or Congress.

Not surprisingly, when it comes to carrying up the Pentagon pie, politics usually counts for more than strategic necessity. In the past, when Congress has wanted to cut the defense budget, the lawmakers have slashed manpower and "readiness"—the fuel, spare-parts and ammunition stores necessary to train and fight. If the Soviet threat continues to evaporate, the United States will probably be able to cut the size of the Army by a third, from 768,000 men to 519,000 men. But cutting manpower is not very cost effective. A division costs about \$1 billion a year, so cutting a heavy division would shrink the Army's ready land power by 8 percent, but would whittle only 3 percent from the defense budget.

The hidden costs come in maintaining the vast military infrastructure that has grown up over the years. There are about 6,000 military installations, ranging from giant bases to small armories, scattered through some 8,000 communities across America. Many of them are virtually useless. The United States needs its bases along the coasts as jumping-off points for foreign wars. But it has little use for relics of the 19th-century Indian Wars like Fort Douglas, Utah, or Fort Riley, Kans.

Yet Congress is loath to cut them. Last year, when the Pentagon prevailed on the Hill to close 86 bases, the squeals could be heard coast to coast. The reason, of course, is money. Defense contracts are not the only way Congress spends the largesse. Bases are even bigger pork barrels. In 1988 Congress sent \$566 million in defense contracts to South Carolina but spent \$2.4 billion just maintaining bases there.

Political motive: Congress is equally reluctant to cut weapons systems, no matter how costly. Lawmakers prefer to "stretch out" production, buying fewer copies a year, but at a greater cost for each. Rather than kill the controversial B-2 Stealth bomber, Congress is likely to buy fewer than half the original order of 132 planes. But that means the price tag per plane, already a

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Panama Coverage: One Big P.R. Job

By Eric Boehlert

During wartime, most Americans follow the flag. That was clear as our 24,000 troops took on Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's Panama. An overwhelming majority commended George Bush for a job well done. That included the news media.

Looking back, the White House must have been generally delighted with the coverage. Most of the highs were highlighted and the lows were subordinated. The first, albeit slightly restricted press pool pictures from Panama were nothing short of an Army recruiting film: helicopters silhouetting the sky; soldiers dodging through the foreign, pre-dawn streets, and the opposition's headquarters engulfed in flames.

Even when the networks stationed crews down there, the pictures remained much the same: G.I.'s patting youngsters, celebrating Christmas and recovering in the hospital.

Where, you may have wondered, were the hundreds of dead and thousands of injured? Where was the violence so many soldiers described?

For some reason, the fighting shown in American living rooms was severely restricted. The pitched Panamanian struggles were nowhere to be seen. And today, of course, if they're not on television, they don't exist. Just ask the families of dead American soldiers.

Heading into Panama, President Bush faced a potential image problem: the inevitable dead Americans delivered home for the holidays and the grim scenes of their funerals. After ABC, CBS and the Cable News Network showed live, on split screen, Mr. Bush joking at a news conference alongside pictures of the first coffins arriving home, Peter Jennings, ABC's anchor, apologized for any embarrassment the juxtaposition may have caused the President. Later Mr. Bush's decision not to attend the soldiers' funerals was not questioned and the memorial services were barely covered.

Without President Bush, apparently the funerals weren't news. They got, at best, 30 seconds' air time. It

seems best, even patriotic, to forget the dead. It's easier that way.

Not only American dead but Panamanian dead, too. Although the State Department, the invasion's de facto news service, had precise statistics on Panamanian soldiers killed, captured and wounded, it could not say how many civilians (President Bush's other possible sore spot) had been killed. And since the reporters were so press-release driven, they were slow to begin digging to find the actual number of Panamanian civilians dead. Estimates range from 200 to thousands.

Other less-than-inspired reporting abounded as well. When the White House said that several Latin American leaders privately backed President Bush's move, no essential went largely unquestioned. Apparently, no one tried to find out who may have supported the President, and who did not, or if the story was merely a well-placed public-relations ploy. The strings were practically visible.

Television continued to restrict the story's range. On most panel discussion shows following the strike, virtually no Americans said it was unwarranted or unsuccessful. That was left to foreign commentators.

The networks and newspapers alike also appeared more than willing to ignore or downplay reports on some of the unattractive aspects of the invasion. Some U.S. soldiers' troops dropped on Panamanian shores suddenly found themselves stuck up to their waist in mud and unable to move. A Spanish photographer, with cameras draped around his neck, was mistaken for American troops and shot dead in cross fire on the second day of fighting. It was reported that General Noriega simply drove around Panama City, among the 24,000 troops, for five days and negotiated his escape to the Vatican Embassy at a Dairy Queen.

After habitual accusations of leaning to the left, and of even being unpatriotic, the invasion provided a chance for the media to show the country they like a splendid little war, too. Indeed, they helped make it a splendid little war. □

Eric Boehlert is associate editor at News Inc., a monthly magazine covering the newspaper industry.

DEFENSE...

From Pg. 2

military leaders, that American troops in Western Europe are not "occupying forces" and will remain only as long as they are "welcomed by the governments and publics."

Although he did not say it directly, the reference was evidently intended to bolster the resolve of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which have either requested or begun negotiations for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from their national territory.

Dubrov's surprisingly detailed plan was privately hailed by East and West European officials. The officials said a strident address by Moiseyev in the late afternoon had offered little new information and much familiar rhetoric about U.S. military policies.

U.S. officials said Moiseyev—who attacked the U.S. "Star Wars" anti-missile defense program, the B-2 "Stealth" bomber, and the U.S. Navy, among other targets—had misjudged his audience by aiming his speech at the United States and referring only briefly to the tumult in Eastern Europe.

"It is very important that the Warsaw Treaty countries have reaffirmed their... commitments within the alliance, which has been of defensive nature since the day of its establishment," Moiseyev said in a single, pointed remark.

But Moiseyev also acknowledged that Moscow had regarded "an offensive as the main method of mil-

itary operations" after World War II and adopted a "new defensive military doctrine" in 1987.

Powell appeared to pay greater heed to the changing European scene. He began by noting that the military leaders were gathered in a wing of the Hofburg Palace, the baroque monument to the Hapsburg empire that once ruled much of Europe and the site of the 1815 Congress of Vienna that divided the continent after Napoleon's defeat.

"Our task today is different," Powell said. "It is to help shape a new order in Europe... that responds to the desires of our citizens to live in peace, security and freedom."

Powell offered a general defense of U.S. military strategy, saying that "we do not shrink from protecting our citizens by deposing tyrants such as [Gen. Manuel Antonio] Noriega," the former Panamanian leader ousted in an American invasion last month.

The twin Western strategies of "flexible response" and "forward defense," which Moiseyev assailed, do not warrant modification at the present time, Powell said. These vague words, enshrined in Western alliance planning for at least the past decade, represent a commitment to deployment in Europe of tactical nuclear weapons and to a strategy of attacking the enemy far behind the front lines of a European conflict.

A top Joint Chiefs of Staff official, Lt. Gen. George I. Butler, said at a press conference later that those policies might be reassessed in the aftermath of a new East-West treaty on conventional forces, which U.S. and Soviet leaders have pledged to conclude by the end of this year.

Anticipating a Soviet broadside on naval arms control, Powell drew a distinction between "raising armies"—which he said Americans generally disdain—and "maintaining navies... [which] cannot seize territory" and are vital to maintaining U.S. security commitments.

But Powell also said "there is nothing sacrosanct about the number of troops stationed in Europe," and acknowledged that "as I sit here today, my Congress is at home in Washington thinking up ways to shrink our army."

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ernment shares "Sen. Dole's evaluation of the... importance of the changes in Eastern Europe. However, the winds of change have failed to reach the Mideast, and the dangers Israel faces have even increased" militarily. A cut in economic assistance, she said, would make it "almost impossible" for Israel to absorb "hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union" now allowed to emigrate.

EUROPEAN MEDIA

NATO/WARSAW PACT TALKS: The *International Herald Tribune* quotes U.S. delegate to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, John A. Maresca, as saying that five of the seven Warsaw Pact military leaders attending the conference were appointed in the last month. This "raises

questions about East European military doctrine and planning," Maresca said. *Corriere della Sera* quotes a NATO spokesman as saying the talks are very important because rapid changes in the East have rendered NATO's strategic planning somehow anachronistic.

SPAIN/TURKEY AIRCRAFT DEAL: *El Pais* reports that Turkey has decided to buy 52 CN-235

military transport aircraft from the Spanish company CASA. The contract, worth 60 million pesetas, was signed following Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's visit to Spain last September, the newspaper said.

(Summarized from translations and transcripts from the JIARS Public Information Office. Source material available at CNARS, 4C881.)

COMMENTARY BY JACK NELSON, WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF OF THE LOS ANGELES
TIMES, TO AIR : JAN 19, 1990

7:30 pm

DISCOVERY CHANNEL

World monitor T.V.

On a scale of 1 to 10 An Army spokesman rated the Panama invasion a 10. President Bush hailed it as an outstanding success. Polls showed a great majority of Americans supported it. And Republican Chairman Lee Atwater called it "a political jackpot."

So what was all the fuss about at the Defense Department today when reporters met with Defense officials to discuss the invasion?

It was about the news blackout and heavy-handed military restrictions on the press pool assigned to cover the invasion. The Government denied the American people their rights to know the facts of a military operation that cost the lives of 26 Americans and maimed almost 300 more and left many times that number of Panamanian casualties--how many no one yet knows.

Journalists were prevented from getting photographs or eyewitness accounts of the action that caused all the carnage and were barred from interviewing some of the thousands of Panamanian prisoners swept up by the Army.

For four days reporters were banned from even seeing the American injured. Not until after an Army denial of accidental casualties did reporters learn about what one doctor called "an absolute orthopedic nightmare" involving at least 66 parachutists.

Defense Department officials now say the handling of the press was "a terrible mistake."

Terrible, it was. But mistake? Hardly. It's obvious the crackdown on the press was calculated to prevent disclosure of flaws in the operation as well as the cold reality of war.

As Vice President Bush had a part in the policy that led to the news blackout of the Grenada invasion. In Panama he extended his presidential seal to that policy.

The buck does stop in the Oval Office.

JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU/MEDIA CENTER

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

1. PURPOSE: To establish internal procedures and policies for the operation of a USSOUTHCOM Joint Information Bureau/Media Center to facilitate the flow of news and background information to news media representatives. A Media Center will be activated using SOUTHCOM Public Affairs assets. If the situation warrants and on the approval of the CINC the Media Center will be expanded to become a Joint Information Bureau, to include representatives of USIS, with Ambassadors concurrence, and the PCC.

2. TASKS:

a. USCINCSO WILL:

1. Upon recommendation of the Director, Public Affairs USSOUTHCOM, constitute a Media Center utilizing local Public Affairs assets.

2. Maintain liaison with OASD and JCS the interagency arena on Public Affairs policy matters.

3. Detail Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM and other personnel to the Media Center as needed.

b. COMPONENTS WILL:

1. Provide manpower to support the Media Center as tasked by USCINCSO.

2. Provide equipment to support the Media Center as tasked by USCINCSO.

3. FACILITIES: The Media Center will be located in the Orchid Room of the Quarry Heights Officers' Club, Quarry Heights, or such other facility as may be designated. Media Center equipment requirements are listed at Annex A. The Quarry Heights theater will be used, as needed, for large press conferences.

4. HOURS OF OPERATION: The Media Center will be operational from 0730 to 2000 hours daily. If a full Crisis Action Team (CAT) is activated the Media Center will operate the same hours the CAT. Shift manning will be determined by the SOUTHCOM Director, Public Affairs.

5. PERSONNEL: Initially, members of the Media Center will be constituted from available SCPA, augmentees, theater support element and PAD's, if in theater. Should additional personnel be required, they will be constituted from deploying public affairs personnel. See Annex B for initial staffing requirements.

6. MEDIA ACCREDITATION:

a. The Media Center will accredit newsmen on the basis of reasonable evidence that they represent bonafide news agencies and proof of accreditation by the Government of Panama. See Annex C for details on how to obtain Panamanian media accreditation.

b. Newsmen will be advised that accreditation is conditional on their adherence to the security ground rules at Annex D and that loss of accreditation will bar them from the Media Center, military installations, and operational areas under military control and preclude them from receiving assistance. In addition, each media representative will be given a letter that outlines the USSOUTHCOM ground rules and services available. A sample of that letter is at Annex E.

c. Accredited newsmen will receive Media Center press cards for ease of identification. The SOUTHCOM press card along with valid photo identification will authorize media representatives access to USSOUTHCOM personnel, facilities, and activities while being escorted by a public affairs escort. This identification will also allow media representatives unescorted access to the Media Center. (At the time of Media Center activation, samples of these cards will be issued to component commanders and COMJTFFM for distribution to security personnel.)

7. RELEASE OF INFORMATION:

a. News releases, after appropriate coordination and approval by the Director SCPA, will be released by the Media Center to local, national and international press and to SCN and the Tropic Times for local use. Component PAO's will be tasked to prepare and coordinate news releases on component specific matters. When these releases are received by the Media Center the center OIC will assume that they have been fully staffed by the component. documentation of such coordination must accompany the news release. It must be realized that time is critical in the release of information and all news releases must be processed in a timely manner. Releases will be distributed to all media in Panama. Appropriate news releases will be forwarded to the electronic message center in English and Spanish and sent to all MILGP's/USIS offices in the region for dissemination in their countries. Copies of all news releases will be forwarded to OSD-PA.

b. All releases issued by the Media Center will be made under the USSOUTHCOM heading and will be prepared for dissemination in English and Spanish versions.

c. Personnel with official duties involving contacts with newsmen may discuss personal experiences, assigned duties and the mission of the agency they represent only after coordination with the Media Center. In so doing, they will adhere to the established security guidelines (Annex D) and those limitations imposed by established policy and regulations.

d. Other personnel approached by unescorted newsmen for their views on local current events will courteously decline responses to query. The newsmen will be referred to the Media Center through Public Affairs channels.

e. All news releases will be sequentially numbered for ease of tracking. A press table will be set up in the Media Center and all news releases, fact sheets, and other information for media representatives will be placed on this table for pick-up. News releases will be read over the telephone or faxed to media representatives only with the approval of the Media Center OIC. Under normal circumstances releases must be picked up at the Media Center.

f. Procedures for responding to queries are contained at ANNEX F.

8. SUPPORT TO MEDIA PERSONEL:

a. To facilitate accurate reporting of local events, USSOUTHCOM will assist all accredited newsmen in gaining access to military activities as long as interference with military operations and safety will not result.

b. As long as Panamanian hotels are accessible, newsmen will be responsible for their own billeting. If hotels are not accessible, because of continuing large demonstrations or riots, the Media Center will coordinate with the Component Commanders and USSOUTHCOM, in that order, to obtain billeting.

c. If commercial resturants and other places to eat are closed or inaccessible because of large demonstrations or other reasons and with USCINCSO approval, newsmen may be authorized the use of designated military dining facilities. Newsmen will be escorted while using military dining facilities other than the Quarry Heights Officers' Club.

d. If the situation warrants and with USCINCSO approval newsmen may be authorized use of certain designated military recreational facilities and purchase of sundries and minor necessities at designated military exchange facilities. Escorts will accompany newsmen while these facilities are being used.

e. When private services are not available, newsmen may be provided emergency medical and dental support by military medical facilities. Newsmen will be required to reimburse the U.S. government for any services received.

f. Messing, billeting, and incidental expenses will be borne by individual newsmen.

g. Newsmen will be provided escorts when covering any stories concerning USOUTHCOM personnel, activities, or facilities. When commercial ground transportation is unavailable, the Media Center will use designated vehicles to transport newsmen to cover USSOUTHCOM-related stories.

h. Newsmen's requests for aerial transportation in connection with news gathering activities will be consolidated to the extent

possible and forwarded through SCPA with recommendations to the USSOUTHCOM J-3 by the Media Center.

9. MEDIA CALL-UP ROSTER:

a. Upon USSOUTHCOM accreditation newsmen will be asked to fill out an information sheet (Annex G). Media Center personnel will use this information to compile a media call-up roster. This roster will be updated on a daily basis.

b. In addition, this roster will be used in the event of the activation of a Media Pool. See Annex H for Media Pool procedures.

c. All newsmen will be required to sign in and out of the Media Center.

10. MEDIA CENTER SITUATION REPORTS: At COB each day the Media center will publish a SITREP of that day's activities. If the Media Center is operating on a shift basis a SITREP will be prepared at the end of each shift. The SITREP will contain at a minimum:

a. Number of newsmen who visited the media center to include their names and media affiliation.

b. Number of media queries received by telephone and visits and the name of the newsmen and their media affiliations.

c. Number of escort missions performed and a short summary of each mission.

11. CASUALTY INFORMATION ACTIONS:

a. Names of casualties will normally be released only by the Service to which casualties belong. Where facts of the emergency are obvious to the public or covered by NMRs on-scene, the Media Center OIC may announce, when queried, the number of known dead, the number of known survivors, and the number of injured survivors.

b. The Media Center OIC will inform NMRs that release of names of casualties will be made by the parent service involved after casualties' next of kin have been notified and that all subsequent queries concerning casualties should be addressed to the public affairs office of the parent service.

ANNEX , Media Center Equipment Requirements

1. Telephones: A minimum of 4 separate Class A lines and instruments.
2. 3/4" VCR player and monitor.
3. Computers: A minimum of three computers with word processing software and printers.
4. 2-way radios: A minimum of 3 radios with dual channel capability. (JOC and SCN channels)
5. Military vehicles: Two vans on a full time basis.
6. Tables and chairs to accomodate 25 personnel.
7. Facsimilie machine: One with non-secure capability.
8. Portable cassette tape recorders: A minimum of 3 with batteries and blank tapes.
9. Telephone answering machine: One
10. Bulletin board: One stand alone.
11. Map boards: One each of Central America, Panama, U.S. Military Installations, and a Treaty Map.
12. Administrative supplies: i.e. paper, pencils, paper clips, etc.

ANNEX B, Media Center Personnel Requirements.

Media Center OIC, appointed by Director, Public Affairs, USSOUTHCOM.

Public Information Branch: One Public Information Officer

If additional Public Information Officers/Specialists are required other than original staffing as listed in this paragraph they will be added in the following order:

- 1 from USARSO
- 1 from 830th Air Division
- 1 from USARSO
- 1 from NAVSO

Escort Officers (On call at each component) Upon activation of the Media Center each component will identify an on call escort officer and provide the name of this person to the Media Center. This person will be responsible for escorting newsmen when they cover stories concerning that components personnel, facilities, or activities.

Support Branch:

- One administrative NCO
- Two drivers

Full JIB manning:

Media Center Director (Appointed by Director, Public Affairs, USSOUTHCOM)

Public Information Branch:

- Public Information Officers/Specialists
- 3 from SCPA
- 1 from each component
- 1 from MARFOR
- 1 from USIS (With Ambassadors concurrence)
- 1 from PCC

Support Branch:

- One administrative NCO
- Two drivers
- One clerk typist

Additional manning will be provided by deployed Public Affairs Detachments and the SCPA Theater Support Element.

ANNEX D, Security

1. To minimize the possible compromise of operational security and/or embarrassing incidents with military interior guards, newsmen will be escorted at all times while on military installations or in operational areas. However, on USCINCSO approval, this requirement may be relaxed on designated, nonsensitive installations where newsmen have been authorized messing and billeting.
2. For visits to military installations, escorts will be provided through the Media Center. When requirements for escorts exceed Media Center capabilities, the commander controlling the installation to be visited will be requested to provide an escort.
3. Newsmen will not be permitted to visit those portions of installations which have been restricted for security reasons. They will not be excluded from operational areas solely on the grounds of personal danger, but will be warned when danger exists and advised that the U.S. Government assumes no responsibility for their safety. Newsmen will be apprised that the operational commander is the sole and final judge in determining when their presence interferes with operations.
4. Personnel briefing or granting interviews to newsmen will bear in mind that newsmen do not have security clearances and the newsmen assume all conversations to be "on the record" unless another ground rule has been agreed upon. To minimize misunderstandings, the following policies apply to briefings and interviews.
 - a. General news briefings will be "on the record," i.e., statements may be quoted directly. However, unless the briefer is a key official, newsmen will be requested to attribute to a U.S. military official rather than the briefer by name.
 - b. Interviewees will establish ground rules with the newsman before the interview. PAO will assist interviewees, as required, with the technical meanings of such terms as "background," "deep background" and "off the record" and will coordinate with security personnel regarding material which should not be discussed.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SCPA

DEAR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE:

Welcome to the USSOUTHCOM Media Center. The purpose of this letter is to provide you information on available facilities and the USSOUTHCOM "Ground Rules."

The Media Center is located in the Orchid Room of the Quarry Heights Officers' Club and is open from 0730 to 2000 hours daily. The telephone numbers of the Media Center are 282-4410 or 282-4617. You are welcome to use the club facilities for meals.

Upon initial arrival at the Media Center, please fill out a Media Information Sheet so you can receive USSOUTHCOM media accreditation. Without accreditation, you cannot gain access to any U.S. military installations and activities. Failure to obey the ground rules and security requirements will result in the loss of accreditation.

Following is a list of USSOUTHCOM ground rules:

a. You must request interviews with all military personnel, dependents, and DOD civilians through the Media Center director. The Media Center will schedule the interview and notify you of the date, time and place of the interview. A public affairs escort will accompany you to all interviews.

b. To collect information for stories concerning USSOUTHCOM personnel, activities and facilities, you must have an escort. Escorts will be provided by the Media Center.

c. All press briefings and conferences will be "on the record." Unless the briefer is a key official, attribute your story to a U.S. military official rather than the briefer by name.

d. Ground rules will be established prior to all briefings and interviews. The USSOUTHCOM definitions of the following terms will be used when establishing the ground rules.

(1) "On the record": Comments made "on the record" can be assumed to be true, unclassified, accurate and for publication and broadcast. "On the record" remarks can be quoted verbatim and attributed directly or indirectly to the individual giving the information.

(a) Direct attribution means the individual releasing the information may be identified by name and/or title. This should only be used if the briefer or interviewee is a key USSOUTHCOM official and only if announced/approved by the Media Center director or the Director, Public Affairs.

SCPA

(b) Indirect attribution (or not for attribution) means that the information or statement is attributed to an official source or spokesman, but there is no specific identification of an individual by name or title.

(2) "Off the record": An "off the record" statement can neither be published nor attributed. Such statements will be made by senior officials to prevent a breach of security or policy.

(3) "Background": Information given on this basis is not to be attributed to any official source even in general terms. Information provided "on background" must appear to be a product of your own efforts.

A press table will be located in the Media Center. Copies of all news releases, fact sheets, and other information will be on the table. News releases will not be read over the telephone or faxed to media representatives without the approval of the Media Center director. Under normal circumstances news releases must be picked up at the Media Center. It is suggested that you check the table at least once a day. All news releases will be sequentially numbered for ease of tracking.

Our job is to help facilitate your news gathering and reporting efforts as they relate to U.S. Southern Command. We will work hard to that end.

RONALD T. SCONYERS
Colonel, USAF
Director, Public Affairs

ANNEX F, Response to Media Queries

1. On receipt of a media query Media Center personnel will get the media person's name, telephone number, affiliation and take the question. This information will be entered on the News Media Query Record, contained as enclosure 1 to this annex. If the query does not pertain to a subject with approved PA guidance tell the newsman you will get back to him and give the query sheet to the Media Center Director. The Media Center Director must approve all responses that are not contained in approved PA guidance.

2. If the query pertains to a subject that has approved PA guidance, use the guidance but limit your response to the guidance. All questions beyond the scope of the guidance will be taken for later response. However, if the guidance states that "questions beyond the scope of this guidance will be referred to (OSD-PA normally) do not go beyond the guidance but refer the newsman IAW the instructions.

3. Query record sheets will be maintained on all queries received (either telephonically or in person).

4. After obtaining an approved response from the Media Center Director the answer will be provided to the newsman and the Query Record completed. The completed query record will be given to the Media Center director to be included in the next Media Center SITREP.

USSOUTHCOM
MEDIA REGISTRATION FORM

Last Name	First	MI	Nationality	Age
Employer	Address	Phone	Passport	
Local address	Local phone			

Check type of Media

<input type="checkbox"/> Wire Service	<input type="checkbox"/> Newspaper	<input type="checkbox"/> Photo Service
<input type="checkbox"/> Radio	<input type="checkbox"/> News Service	<input type="checkbox"/> Freelance
<input type="checkbox"/> TV	<input type="checkbox"/> Magazine	<input type="checkbox"/> Other

I agree to abide by the rules governing public releases of military information and concerning access to U.S. military installations and operational areas. I understand that violation of the rules or failure to present credentials to military authorities upon request may result in suspension or cancellation of my accreditation.

Signature Date

Card Number: Date Issued

ANNEX H, Media Pool

1. In the event it becomes necessary to create and deploy a media pool either because of operational security or available space requirements the following will apply.
2. The USSOUTHCOM media pool when deployed is an official USSOUTHCOM sponsored group and is considered a part of the exercise or operation.
3. No reporter will be allowed into the media pool unless he or she has valid USSOUTHCOM media accreditation.
4. All media pool members will be required to follow USSOUTHCOM ground rules and security requirements. Failure to follow these rules will result in expulsion from the pool. Each newsman will be required to agree to these conditions prior to being approved as a member of the media pool.
5. News media will be afforded the opportunity to select their own pool members. Should they fill the pool to their own satisfaction their is no need for PAO action in the selection of pool members. A USSOUTHCOM media pool will consist of:
 - a. One wire service reporter and one wire service photographer.
 - b. One reporter and one photographer from news magazines
 - c. One TV team; reporter, cameraman, soundman
 - d. One reporter and one photographer from major daily newspapers
 - e. One radio reporter.
 - f. One USSOUTHCOM escort officer.
6. Sequence of events: In the event the decision is made to activate a USSOUTHCOM media pool following is the sequence of events.
 - a. Pool members are notified and brought to a central location.
 - b. Director, Public Affairs briefs the pool members prior to deployment.
 - c. Media pool deploys to training or operational site.
 - d. Pool members are briefed by onsite personnel (if required) and deploy throughout the force to provide balanced coverage of the exercise.
 - e. Pool members are reassembled and returned to their point of origin. At this time all stories are filed and shared with the

other media representatives.

7. If it becomes necessary to form a pool of foreign correspondents, a separate pool will be formed. The Media Center Director will insure that the escort is bi-lingual or an interpreter is with the pool.

12-11-1964
The following information was obtained from the files of the
Internal Security - Communist Division, New York Office, dated
12-11-1964, regarding the activities of the Communist Party
of the United States of America, New York City Chapter, during
the period from 1950 to 1964.

SOUTHCOM ORGANIZED MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES**
 23 DECEMBER 89
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 183)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Press conference conducted by the CINC.	75	At Media Ctr.
Field press pools were organized to cover current operations involving the 82nd Abn Div and the 7th Inf Div (L).	2 groups of 5 each	Helicopter
Pool organized to cover rally in support of President Endara, presidential palace activities and the refugee center at Balboa.	6	Van
Media tour of Building 8 Ft. Amador, the Witch House, Comandancia, Marriott, Noriega's residence and Via Espana.	100	3 Buses
Press conference conducted for CBS reporter who was held hostage.	40	At Media Ctr.
Press conference conducted for Evergreen Airline employees who were hostages.	20	Bus
Provided video of Panama Vice President swearing in new public force.		

24 DECEMBER 89
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 240)

Pool teams remain with the 82nd Abn Div and the 7th Inf Div (L)	2 pools 5 each	Helicopter
Pool team covered surrender of PDF elements to new PPF at Rio Hato.	2	Helicopter
One team covered humanitarian airlift at Tocumen airport.	5	Van

**Does not include DoD Media Pool events. Media Center did not start arranging general media events until 23 Dec.

24 DECEMBER 89
(Continued)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Foreign broadcast pool representing 11 TV stations and numerous newspapers conducted interviews in refugee area.	6	Bus
Pool covered PDF wounded at Gorgas Army Hospital.	5	Van
Pool covered detainee/prisoner camp	20	Van
Conducted urgently called CINC briefing to announce Noriega's appearance at the Papal Embassy.	60	At Media Ctr.
Pool covered President Endara press conference.	5	Van
Organized movement to Howard AFB for Sec Def press briefing.	12	Bus

25 DECEMBER 89

(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 310)

Covered Sec Def visit at selected locations.	6	Helicopter
Press conference arranged and conducted for the Secretary of Defense.	75	At Media Ctr.
Pool covered joint US and Panamanian security patrols.	16	Van
Arrangements made for St. Louis Post Dispatch reporter to cover Missouri National Guard MP unit.	1	At Media Ctr.
Pool covered President Endara, Sec Def meeting at Foreign Ministry.	12	Bus

25 DECEMBER 89
(Continued)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
SCN dispatched to cover humanitarian airlift arrival and off-load at Tocumen airport. Tape made available for network use.		

26 DECEMBER 89
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 320)

Coverage of 7th ID units in vicinity of David and Chiriqui.	6	Helicopter
7th ID units in Colon.	6	Helicopter
Coverage at Tocumen airport of humanitarian assistance supplies.	5	Bus
Tour of Noriega's residence.	30	Bus
Exhibits of Noriega's voodoo artifacts.	30	Bus
Swearing in ceremony of new Public Force commander at David.	6	Helicopter

27 DECEMBER 89
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 456)

Joint U.S. Marine and Panamanian walking security patrol in Vera Cruz.	4	Van
Visit to Gamboa Prison. Interviewed troops who liberated prison and released political prisoners.	15	Bus
Food distribution site at Tocumen airport.	3	Car
Two media pools to David to cover arms cache and 7th ID (L) operations. Part of pool stayed overnight to cover 7th.	2 pools of 6	Helicopter

27 DECEMBER 89
(Continued)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Detainee/prisoner camp.	6	Van
Downtown tour of public works facility. Also covered U.S. soldiers distributing MREs.	22	Bus
Engineer unit handing out toys for a belated Christmas at the refugee center.	35	Bus
Pool coverage of Marine patrol on west bank.	4	Van
Food distribution site.	12	Bus
Weapons turn-in site.	30	Bus

28 DECEMBER 89
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 527)

Marine patrol on west bank.	4	Van
Two media aircraft to Colon to cover 7th ID (L).	2 groups of 6	Helicopter
Interviews with helicopter pilots who flew initial air assault missions. Also flew assault routes to collect footage for stories.	8	Helicopter
82nd Abn. Div. soldiers clearing buildings in San Miguelito area.	6	Van
Pool coverage of three province tour swearing in new government and public service officials.	6	Helicopter
Humanitarian airlift arrivals and Comandancia area humanitarian activities.	20	Bus
Pool coverage of 193rd Inf. soldiers patrolling and clearing their AOR.	6	Bus

28 DECEMBER 89
(Continued)

<u>EVENTS</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Comandancia humanitarian assistance and weapons turn-in site.	30	Bus
Ambassador's visit to refugee camp.	15	Bus

29 DECEMBER 89
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 567)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Media tour of Noriega's offices at Fort Amador and the Comandancia.	30	Bus
Pool coverage of Congressman Murtha's press conference.	15	Bus
Media coverage of 7th ID (L) in clearing action in Panama City.	8	Van
Pool coverage of province tour to swear in new government officials in Colon, Darien and San Blas.	4	Helicopter
Pool coverage of Vice President Calderon's visit to Las Tablas to swear in new officials.	6	Helicopter
Pool coverage of the CINC's visit to David to view arms cache.	2	C-12 Aircraft
Media coverage of SCN radio and TV. Included DJ playing music at the Papal Nuncio and the station as the community's voice.	10	Van
Pool coverage of the Chief of Staff of the Army's visit.	3	Helicopter

30 DECEMBER 1989
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 595)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Media interviews with Colonel Cornell, who is in charge of recruiting and training the new Panamanian Public Force.	10	Bus
Media coverage of Humanitarian Aid by the 142nd Med Bn in La Chorrera.	4	Van
Video pool coverage and Hometown New Service coverage of 7th ID troops in David.	3	Helicopter
Panamanian media coverage of PDF medical cache on Panamanian side of Albrook AFS.	6	Van
Media coverage of 5/87th Infantry civil affairs activity at Comandancia.	15	Bus
CBS California affiliate coverage of refugee camp.	3	Van
Pool coverage of 400 tons of ammunition stockpiled at Rodman Naval Station.	20	Bus
Media tour of Rio Hato	6	Helicopter
Coverage of Joint US/PF patrols in the San Felipe area.	12	Van
Coverage of the detention center on Empire Range.	15	Bus
Coverage of AC-130 gunship flight.	3	Van
CBS coverage of SCN radio station.	3	Van

31 DECEMBER 89
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 616)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Media tour of a humanitarian aid distribution site and the refugee camp.	3	Van
Media coverage of the refugee camp at Balboa.	15	Bus
Two media trips to the Comandancia area and the joint patrol location for interviews with troops and civilians.	30	Bus
Media coverage of joint patrols.	6	Van
Media coverage of the "Guns for Dollars" operation at Ancon Gym.	20	Bus
Media orientation flight on OA-37 Aircraft.	1	OA-37 Aircraft
Media coverage of captured weapons on display at an Albrook AFS hangar.	10	Van
Media orientation flight on AC-130 Gunship.	3	AC-130 Gunship
Media pool interview with Spadafora murder witness.	3	Van

1 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 620)

Media tour of the 7th ID area in Colon.	6	Helicopter
Media interviews with female soldiers at the media center.	4	n/a
Media coverage of 82nd Airborne troops at Panama Viejo.	10	Van
Media coverage of the Detention Center at Empire Range.	20	Bus

1 JANUARY 90
(Continued)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Media coverage of 82nd Airborne troops at Gamboa Prison.	18	Bus
Media pool coverage of prison facility at Coiba Island.	6	Helicopter
Hometown television coverage of 82nd Airborne troops in the field.	2	Car
Photo coverage of captured arms in Albrook AFS hangar.	10	Van
Media orientation flight on AC-130 gunship mission.	3	AC-130 Aircraft

2 JANUARY 90
(Total Media Registered as of 0001 Hours - 640)

Media coverage of Special Boat Unit 26 providing canal security on a mission in Gatun Lake.	14	Bus
Media coverage of Navy patrol boat on station in the Bay of Panama.	1	Car
CBS coverage of a joint patrol	2	Car
Media coverage of the Detention Center and separate interview with North Carolina soldiers.	12	Van
Media interviews with PSYOPS officer on their operations and background information on Noriega.	3	n/a
Media coverage of 82nd Airborne troops in the field.	23	Bus
Media tour of the Comandancia.	25	Bus

3 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 668)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Pool coverage of the prison at Coiba Island.	6	Helicopter
Media coverage of detainees at Curundu beginning clean-up.	5	Van
Media coverage of joint patrols.	12 (3 trips of 4)	Car
CBS interview of Col. Cornell in reference to new PF.	3	Car
Pool coverage of 75th Rangers departure.	6	Van
Media coverage of detention camp at Empire Range.	12	Bus
ABC-TV stand-up interview of General Stiner at captured arms storage area on Albrook AFS.	3	Van
Photo opportunity of Codel at captured arms storage at Albrook AFS.	25	Bus
Media coverage of engineers beginning clean-up of Chorillo section near the Comandancia.	10	Bus
Senators Nunn and Warner Press Conference at Howard AFB.	15	Bus
Pool coverage of explosives cache found on Atlantic side.	6	Helicopter
Coverage of CINC's press conference on Noriega's capture.	75	Holiday Inn

4 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 685)

Congressional delegation and CINC press conference.	11	Bus
MG Cisneros press conference.	70	Holiday Inn

5 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 698)

EVENT	NUMBER PARTICIPATING	TRANSPORTATION
Photo opportunity to cover Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff visit to the Comandancia	20	Bus
Army Reserve participation in Just Cause. MG Ward interviewed by ABC News at refugee center.	3	Van
Joint patrols.	8	Car
Photo opportunity to cover CODEL visit to DNTT.	20	Bus
Interviews with soldiers from 4th/6th Inf., 5th Mech who participated in attack on Comandancia.	8	Van
CINC interview with CBS.	3	At Media Ctr.
CINC interview with George Wilson, Washington Post.	1	At Quarry Heights
CODEL press conference.	40	Own transport
Chairman, JCS press conference.	40	Own transport
Pool coverage of Coiba Island.	6	Helicopter

6 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 705)

Detainee camp at Empire Range.	12	Bus
David trip to visit 7th ID(L).	6	Helicopter
Trip to Colon to cover first shipment of arms from Panama.	5	Helicopter
Joint patrols.	6	Car
Interview with LTC Ryan, a member of the Civil Affairs team.	3	At Media Ctr.

7 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 716)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Visit Rio Hato, briefed by Special Forces commander. SCN included.	6	Helicopter
Interview with LTG Stiner by reps from several newspaper chains.	5	Van
CBS interview with soldier hit in helmet by sniper bullet.	3	Van

8 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 781)

DNTT to interview and see new PPF.	12	Bus
Senator Dodd press conference.	20	Bus
Refugee center.	25	Bus

9 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 804)

Memorial service for soldiers.	8	Van, Car
Joint patrols.	2 groups of 3	Van
Press briefing on civil affairs rebuilding efforts.	4	Van
Soldiers Magazine interviewed troops from 7th ID in Colon.	3	Helicopter
Detainee center.	5	Van

10 JANUARY 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 - 809)

Detainee center.	10	Bus
Civil affairs rebuilding efforts.	4	Van
New refugee center.	10	Van
82nd Abn redeployment prep.	3	Car
Networks interviewed CPT Bray for morning shows.	Several	Holiday Inn

11 JANUARY 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 818)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
Press conference at Comandancia.	25	Bus
Joint patrol.	9	Van
Detainee facility.	4	Van
82d redeployment prep.	3	Car
New refugee center at Albrook.	4	Van

12 JANUARY 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 832)

4th/6th Inf., 5th ID (Mech)	6	Van
Detainee facility	8	Car
Army aviation, pilot interviews	2	Car
DNTT(to view PPF training)	4	Car

13 JANUARY 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 835)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
4th/6th Inf., 5th ID (Mech) by NBC	2	Van
Move of displaced civilians to new camp at Albrook AFS	6	Van
Army aviation interview by Armed Forces Journal	1	Car
7th ID redeployment	6	Van

14 JANUARY 90

(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 841)

Visit captured	6	Van
Fly over Panama City	4	Helicopter
MG Cisneros interview by News Week	1	Helicopter
7th ID redeployment	6	Van
7th ID patrol	10	Van
Army aviation interview by Armed Forces Journal	2	Car

15 January 90

(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 844)

Joint patrols	4	Car
Visit to Fort Amador	6	Van
DNTT to interview and see new PPF training	4	Van
Visit to 7th ID	6	Van

16 January 90

(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 850)

Visit 7th ID at Curundu area	6	Van
ABC visit displaced civilians camp	4	Van
NBC coverage of joint patrol	3	Car

17 January 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 864)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
ABC covered breakfast operations at the displaced civilians camp	3	Van
NBC covered DNTT training of PPF	3	Van
Joint patrol	4	Car
AP interviewed members of CMO Task Force	2	Car
Belgian TV covered DNTT training of PPF	4	Van
CBS interviewed members of the 193rd Support Bn	3	Car

18 January 90
(Total Registered Media as 0001 Hours - 870)

Belgian TV covered DNTT training of PPF (PPF at work)	4	Van
Focus on HMMWV in combat	4	Van

19 January 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 874)

Media visit to 7th ID	6	Van
AP interview Civil Affairs Task Force	2	Car

20 January 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 876)

Coverage of Senator De'Amato visit	10	Van
7th ID award ceremony and preparation for redeployment	14	Van
Coverage of Mr. Duncan visit	6	Van

21 January 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 878)

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NUMBER PARTICIPATING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
7th ID returning	7	Van
New York Times with 193d	1	Car
Senator De'Amato at refugee center	10	Van

22 January 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 885)

Media coverage of drugs at Corozal	20	Van
New York Times and Defense Week covered 193rd	2	Van
Group viewed training of new PPF	2	Van
Joint Patrol	2	Van

23 January 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 894)

Medical care in San Miguelito with 7th ID	8	Van
Defense Week at Fort Clayton with 193rd Inf. Bde. (Lt)	1	Car
Cisneros interviews	3	Car
Command task force activities	1	Car
Training of FPP at DNTT	6	Van

24 January 90
 (Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 903)

Medical Care in San Miguelito with 7th ID	8	Van
Ceremony at Tocuman to transfer official airport authority to Panama	15	Car

25 January 90
(Total Registered Media as of 0001 Hours - 915)

EVENT	NUMBER PARTICIPATING	TRANSPORTATION
NY Times & Defense Week to Rio Hato (Spec Opns)	2	Heli
Wall Street Journal at Civil Affairs (Gorgas Area)	1	Car
White Castle hamburgers at Tocumen	12	Own Trans

REGISTERED MEDIA
(Cumulative by day)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
20 DECEMBER 1989	Formal accounting began on 21 Dec.
21	44
22	126
23	183
24	240
25	310
26	320
27	456
28	527
29	567
30	595
31	616
1 JANUARY 1990	620
2	640
3	668
4	685
5	698
6	705
7	716
8	781
9	804
10	809
11	818
12	832
13	835
14	841

Registered Media (January continued)

15	844
16	850
17	867
18	870
19	874
20	876
21	878
22	885
23	894
24	903
25	915

REGISTERED MEDIA
(By organization)

<u>Media</u>	<u>Total</u>
ABC	55
ACAN-EFE	12
Acumele (Argentina)	5
AFP	5
Agencia de Noticias Xinhua (China)	2
Agency France Press	2
Albuquerque	1
AP	20
Aqui Deporte (Venezuela)	1
ARD (German TV)	3
Arizona Republic	1
Armed Forces Journal	1
Army/Air Force Hometown News Service	2
Army Times	4
ASAHI Newspaper (Japan)	1
ASAHI Shimbun (Japan)	1
Australian Broadcasting	1
Austrian Radio/TV	1
Baltimore Sun	1
Black Star	2
Boston Globe	3
Boston Herald	2
British Broadcasting	12
California Herald	3
Camarografo	2
Camarografo Televisa (Panama)	1
Cambio (Peru)	1
Canadian Broadcasting	13
Captial Services	1
CBS	39
CDI (Belguim)	1
Channel 2 (Panama)	3
Channel 4 TV (Panama)	5
Channel 5 (Panama)	5
Channel 7 (Costa Rica)	2
Channel 13 (Panama)	7
Charlotte Observer	1
Chicago Tribune	7
Christian Science Monitor	2
CMQ Radio and Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro	1
CND Broadcasting Company (Canada)	2
CNN	27
Congreso	1
Connosporsal (Panama)	2
Copley News Service (DC)	1
Correo Espanol (Chile)	1
Correspondant Service (Mexico City)	2
Corriere Della Sera (Italy)	1
Cox Newspaper	1
Critica Libre (Panama)	1
CTV	3

Dagens Nyheter Ralamsuagen (Sweden)	1
Daily Telegraph (DC)	1
Daily Telegraph (London)	1
Dallas Morning News	1
Dept. of State (Guatemala)	1
Dept. of Public Information (Panama)	3
Der Spiegel	1
Detroit Free Press	2
De Volusgrant	1
Diablo 16 (Spain)	1
Diario El Siglo (Panama)	5
Diario La Cirtica Libre (Panama)	2
Die Presse (Austria)	1
Die Tagesneitung (Austria)	1
DPA (Germany)	1
Drew Associates	2
Edidorenobaro (Peru)	1
EFE-TV (Colombia)	1
El Herald (Panama)	1
El Mercurio (Chile)	1
El Nacional (Mexico)	2
El Norte (Mexico)	1
El Nuevo Herald	1
El Pais (Spain)	1
El Periodico de Cataluna (Spain)	1
El Siglo (Panama)	28
El Tiempo (Colombia)	3
El Tiempo de Panama	3
Estrella de Panama	4
Excelsior de Mexico	1
Exitosa (Panama)	1
Exitosa Periodista (Panama)	1
Express News (Texas)	3
Fayettevill Observer/Times	3
Fenu Radio Network (PM)	2
Financial Times	1
Finnish Broadcasting Company	1
Fotografio (Peru)	3
Francisco Arias (Panama)	2
Freelance (British)	1
Freelance (Panama)	2
Freelance (USA)	1
Friday Magazine (Japan)	1
FTF Productions	1
Fuji-TV (Tokoyo)	3
Gamma (NY)	3
German News Service	1
German TV	1
Ha'Aretz (DC)	1
Hearst Newspapers (NW)	1
Hokkaido Press	1
Holitusion (Meticasa)	1
Home Box Office	1
Honduran Embassy	1
Houston Chronicle	1

Houston Post	2
Hurriyet Newspaper (Turkey)	1
Il Giorna (Italy)	2
Il Messaggero (Italy)	1
Il Resto del Carlino (Italy)	1
ImeVision (Mexico)	4
Independent Radio News (London)	1
Independent Television News (London)	7
Insight News Service (Canada)	1
IPB Communications (California)	1
Journalist (Chile)	1
KGGM-TV (USA)	1
King Publishing	1
KMST-TV	1
KRA 6	2
KRWG Public Television (USA)	1
KSBW (California)	2
KW Continente	1
Kyodo News Service (Japan)	3
La Capital (Argentina)	1
La Estrella de Panama	12
La Exitosa (Panama)	10
La Nacion	2
LA Opinion (California)	1
La Pata (Panama)	1
La Prensa (Panama)	15
La Republich (Italy)	1
La Stampa (Italy)	1
La Vanguardia (Spain)	2
La Voz der Istma	1
Le Monde (Paris)	2
Le Figaro (France)	1
Liberation (France)	1
Life Magazine	1
Lita Broadcasting	1
LMQ Radio and Ministle Harienda y Terso	1
London Financial Times	1
London Independent	1
London Times	1
Lonnosponsal (Panama)	2
Los Angeles Times	8
MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour	6
Mainchi Newspaper (Japan)	1
Maranatha (Panama)	1
Mendoza (Panama)	1
Miami Herald	5
Ministerio de Obras Publicas (Panama)	1
Ministerio de Salud (Panama)	6
Monitor TV	1
Municipio de Panama	17
NAG Engineer	1
National Geographic	1
National Public Radio	3
NBC	50
News Agency (Italy)	2

Newsday	1
Newsweek	10
New York Daily News	5
New York Press	1
NHK (Japan)	2
Oberrio (Panama)	1
O Estado de Sao Paulo (Brazil)	1
O Globo (Brazil)	1
Oiga (Veneguella)	1
OMEPSA (Panama)	2
Onda Polular (Panama)	6
Panama American Press	4
Panama Canal Commission	3
Panama Consul General in Miami	1
PAO-Quarry Heights	1
Paris Match	1
PCC News (Panama)	2
People Magazine	1
People-Time Inc. (New York)	1
Reporters, Inc. (New York)	1
Periodico Campas/University of Panama	3
Periodico Oudciones	2
Periodista (AP - Mexico)	1
Periodista Lanacion (Costa Rica)	1
Photo Reporter INC (NY)	2
Picture Group (RI)	2
Post Dispatch (St. Louis)	4
Presidencia de la Republica	5
Press (Radio - Panama)	1
Proceso (Mexico)	1
Providence Journal (RI)	2
Publicidad (Panama)	1
Radio Continente (Panama)	2
Radio Guadalupe	2
Radio Impacto (Argentina)	3
Radio Marte (Panama)	1
Radio Mia (Panama)	24
Radio Onda Popular (panama)	3
Radio Red (Mexico)	3
RAI Italiana (Argentina, Buenos Aires)	1
RAI (Italy)	1
Reporter	1
Reporter (Panama)	4
Retlan Broadcasting KMST (California)	1
Reuters	13
Revista Magazine TV #5 (Peru)	1
Revista Mas	2
RPC-TV 4 (Panama)	33
Saba Press (NY)	2
Salinas Californian	2
Scripps-Howard (US)	2
Sekai Nippo (Japan)	2
Seven TV Network (LA California)	3
Shimbun	6
Shooting Star Photo	1

Simon and Schuster (DC)	1
Sky TV News (Britain)	1
Soniorista	1
Southampton Press (USA)	1
Spanish TV	2
Spanish Radio	1
Station Radio (Panama)	1
Stereo Rey Onda Popular (Cuba)	1
Stereo Rey SOP (Panama)	1
St Petersburg Times	2
Sun Sentinel (Ft Lauderdale)	4
Swedish Broadcasting	1
SYGMA News, Inc. (NYC)	3
Teching	1
Televisa (Mexico)	2
Televisa Eco (Mexico)	1
Televisora Nacional Transitoria (Panama)	1
The Bulletin (Panama)	1
The Guardian (London)	1
The Herald (California)	2
The Monterey Hearld	1
The Nation (New York)	1
The Observer (London)	1
The Panama America	8
Time	5
Times Picaune (New Orleans, LA)	1
Tokyo Broadcasting Service (Ecuador)	1
Tropic (Miami)	1
TV Asahi (Japan)	8
TV Hoy (Colombia)	2
TV Noreuga	3
TV Spain	2
Ultimas Noticias (Panama)	1
Univision (Miami)	4
UPI	4
U.S. News and World Report	2
USA Today	5
USIA (U.S.)	1
Venevision	4
Visnews	4
Voice of America	2
WABC-TV	2
Wall Street Journal	12
Washington Post	1
Way Press (French)	3
WCNC-TV (NBC-NC)	2
WLTV	2
World Mointor TV (Massachusetts)	4
WRAL-TV (USA)	2
WSVN Channel 7 (Venezuela)	1
WTN (Italy)	1
WSVN-TV (Miami)	1
WTVJ (NBC)	1

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CODEL AND VIP PRESS CONFERENCES

The following is a summary of CODEL and VIP press conferences conducted:

Arthur Davis, U.S. Ambassador to Panama - Wednesday, 20 Dec 89, 2100-2130 at Howard AFB (Ambassador's return to Panama after 7 months absence)

General Maxwell R. Thurman, CINC - (1) Saturday, 23 Dec 89 1700-1740 at the Quarry Heights Media Center (2) Sunday, 24 Dec 89 1800-1815 at Quarry Heights Media Center (Announcement of Noriega at Papal Nuncio) (3) Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 2130-2200 at Holiday Inn Media Center (Details of Noriega surrender to U.S. authorities) (4) Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1130-1200 at the Tecumen Airport (Inpromptu)

Jon Meyersohn, Producer CBS News - Saturday, 23 Dec 89 1830-1900 at the Quarry Heights Media Center (PDF hostage)

Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense - (1) Sunday, 24 Dec 89 1810-1840 at Howard AFB; (2) Monday, 25 Dec 89 1630-1700 at Quarry Heights Media Center

John P. Murtha (D-PA), U.S. Representative - Friday, 29 Dec 89 1300-1320 at Howard AFB

Sam Nunn (D-GA), John Warner (R-VA) and Charles S. Robb (D-VA) U.S. Senators - Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 1500-1530 at Howard AFB

Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State - Wednesday, 3 Jan 90 1700-1730 at the U.S. Embassy.

Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) U.S. Senator and Congressional Delegation-
(1) Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1200-1230 at Tecumen Airport; (2) Friday, 5 Jan 90 1515-1600 at Howard AFB

Major General Marc Cisneros, USARSO Commander - Thursday, 4 Jan 90 1300-1330 at the Holiday Inn Media Center

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff - Friday, 5 Jan 90 1615-1645 at Howard AFB

Christopher A. Dodd (D-CT) U.S. Senator - Monday, 8 Jan 90 1545-1615 at Howard AFB

Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY) U.S. Senator - Sunday, 21 Jan 90 1500-1530 at USIS Library

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE PRESS RELEASES
ISSUED BY THE FBI DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS

RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - (MURKIN)
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RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - (MURKIN)



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA Release 89-12-8

SLAIN U.S. OFFICER IDENTIFIED

The U.S. officer shot and killed Saturday night by members of the Panama Defense Forces has been identified as Marine 1st Lt. Robert Paz.

Lieutenant Paz, 25, was from Dallas, Texas. He was assigned to the Operations Directorate at Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command. Lieutenant Paz entered the Marine Corps in 1983 and was assigned to U.S. Southern Command in September. He is survived by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jaime Paz, who reside in Cali, Colombia.

Lieutenant Paz was shot after he and three other U.S. officers drove away from a PDF roadblock after being threatened by PDF officers. All four officers were off duty in civilian clothes, in a privately-owned car and unarmed. They had gotten lost on their way to a downtown restaurant and were stopped at a roadblock near the PDF Headquarters.

Flags were flown at half staff at U.S. Southern Command installations Monday in memory of Lieutenant Paz.

~~TEACHER KILLED~~

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama -- A Department of Defense school teacher was shot and killed early Wednesday morning as she and her husband were returning to their home in Panama. ~~Ped - teacher~~ Kundi

The teacher has been identified as Mrs. Gertrude Helin, wife of Mr. Steven Helin, a Panama Canal Commission employee. The couple was returning to their home at Los Rios, a PCC housing site near Corozal Defense Site, when their car was exposed to weapons fire on Gaillard Highway near Albrook Air Force Station. Mrs. Helin was taken to a first aid station at Corozal where she died.

Mrs. Helin was teacher at Curundu Junior High and Balboa High School. "She was a gifted and talented teacher," said Dr. James Wolf, Director, DoD Dependent Schools, Panama Region. "She will be sorely missed."

release

SCPA RELEASE 89-12-10

DODDS TEACHER'S SON

DIES FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--December 22--The son of a Department of Defense Dependents Schools' (DODDS) teacher died of gunshot wounds received early Wednesday morning while returning home from a party with a friend.

Richard Paul, son of Yolanda Paul, a host-nation and English teacher at the Howard Elementary School, was returning to his home in La Boca shortly after midnight from a party in Cardenas shortly after midnight at the time of the incident.

Mark Mirrop, a passenger, was injured by the gun fire and is in Gorgas U.S. Army Hospital.

Paul graduated from Balboa High School in 1985 and later from the Panama Canal College in La Boca. He also attended St. Joseph College in Indiana.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4255

SCPA RELEASE 89-12-10

ADDITIONAL DETAILS SURROUNDING FLEEING

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--December 26, 1989--After initial interviews with numerous former PDF officers now in U.S. custody, we have been able to put together additional details surrounding Noriega's attempt to flee from U.S. forces.

Just prior to the initial attack, Noriega was in Colon where he had visited a new facility near Coco Solo. He was aware of increased U.S. force activity but discounted the notion of an attack, passing the increased activity off as more U.S. posturing.

He returned to Panama City around 6 pm on December 19 and went to the PDF officers club (La Siesta) near the military side of the Omar Torrijos airport at Tocumen. There, he was provided a prostitute by one of his aides--apparently a routine occurrence.

When Tocumen was attacked just prior to 1 AM on December 20 by U.S. forces, Noriega drove from the officer's club and evaded U.S. forces by driving around the city in circles.

He spent the next several days at different locations, but allegedly most of the time at the home of a relative of one of his closest conspirators Marcella Tason, his personal secretary. Sources say he was highly agitated and avoided contact with other PDF officers fearing a trap had been set. He was never in command of his forces, spending all of his time worrying about his own personal safety.

-MORE-

At one point, according to these sources, he allegedly made contact with the Cuban ambassador but was fearful of being apprehended near the Cuban embassy. Many of his cohorts tried to get him to leave the city but he never made that decision. Becoming more and more disillusioned, his aides apparently left him and in desperation he made his way to the Papal Nuncio. (Details here are conjecture as he apparently made his way singlehandedly.)

Other details that have emerged are as follows:

Sources called him a conditioned drinker.

During the initial U.S. attack, informants say Noriega's first action was not to call his wife, but rather his mistress, Vicky Amado and her family. According to our sources, he never attempted to call his wife.

He moved several times during his frantic search for safety, and one time sources say he had to low crawl to get to a phone to make his clandestine radio broadcast.

One of our sources who spoke very little English, heard something about a million dollars, but said that if he had known it was a bounty, would have turned Noriega in himself.

During his attempts to avoid capture, he lost his voodoo paraphanelia which he thought warded off evil. One source close to Noriega said that the dictator even wore red underware to ward off the "evil eye."

-MORE-

Noriega allegedly made the decision to turn himself in when he heard that Lt Col Del Cid had agreed to surrender.

At one point in time, we have been told that Noriega considered fleeing to the mountains to mount an insurgent attack, but he was concerned about his heart while living in difficult terrain without the opulent luxuries and intensive medical care to which he had become accustomed.

The story of this truly evil man continues to unfold with bizarre evidence of his incredible lifestyle. We will keep you updated on other details as they become available.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82

SCPA RELEASE 89-12-12

DODDS TEACHER'S SON DIES FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--December 29--Contrary to reports in the U.S. media today, the son of a Department of Defense Dependents Schools' (DODDS) teacher died of gunshot wounds on December 20, 1989 while returning home from a party with a friend. His death was originally reported by USSOUTHCOM on December 22.

Richard Paul, son of Yolanda Paul, was returning to his home in La Boca shortly after midnight from a party in Cardenas at the time of the incident. Out after curfew, he ran a U.S. roadblock (it is not known whether it was intentional) where soldiers signalled him to stop. When he failed to stop and ran the roadblock, U.S. soldiers fired on the car. Paul was killed and a passenger, Mark Mirrop, was injured.

Paul graduated from Balboa High School in 1985 and later from the Panama Canal College in La Boca. He also attended St. Joseph College in Indiana.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-8.

SCPA RELEASE 89-12-13

ABDUCTED TEACHER FOUND DEAD

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--December 29, 1989--The body of a man buried on Dec. 26 and exhumed yesterday has been positively identified as Raymond Dragseth, 47, a DODDS computer science teacher, who was abducted from his home on December 20 by four gunmen, claiming to be members of the Panama Defense Forces. The cause of death is being investigated.

His body had been found and taken to Santo Tomas Hospital on Dec. 23 and was buried as a "John Doe". U.S. authorities received word from Anel Beliz, an aide to Panamanian President Guillermo Endara and Dragseth's brother-in-law, that a body fitting the general description of Dragseth had been buried. An exhumation order was carried out and positive identification made today by dental records..

Two of the four gunmen toting revolvers and Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles, broke into Dragseth's upstairs apartment about 3 a.m. stating they were looking for Americans. Dragseth was the only American taken from the building because other families were able to escape while Dragseth's wife, Victoria, argued with the captors.

Victoria Dragseth described one of the captors as light complected and he spoke cultured Spanish with a non-Panamanian

MORE

accent. The other was dark complected, wore glasses and a straw hat, described as a "Cubano" and similar to a cowboy hat. The two other gunmen remained downstairs and could not be identified.

An unfortunate irony is that Victoria Dragseth is the sister of Richard Paul's mother. In a totally unrelated incident, Paul, son of Yolanda Paul, died of gunshot wounds in the early morning hours of Dec. 20 while returning home from a party with a friend.

Dragseth resided in the same apartment building as Manuel Noriega's mistress, Vicky Amado.

Dragseth and his family moved to the Canal Zone in 1972 when he was hired as a math teacher at the Curundu Junior High School. In 1973, he transferred to Balboa High School as a chemistry teacher; and in 1976 started teaching computer science. In 1980, Dragseth transferred to the Panama Canal College and during his tenure there served three years as the chairman, Computer Sciences Department.

"We mourn his loss and he was a much valued member of the Panama Canal College faculty," Dr. James Wolf, DODDS superintendent, said.

Dragseth graduated from Oregon State University with a BS in 1964. In 1971, he received a masters degree in chemistry and physics from the University of Portland, OR.

He is survived by his wife, Victoria and their children, Carolyn and Carl.



United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4255*

SCPA RELEASE 89-12-14

December 30, 1989

NICARAGUANS SEARCHED

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama--With good cause, U.S. soldiers entered and searched what is now claimed to be the alleged home of the Nicaraguan ambassador to Panama in the El Dorado section of Panama City around 6 p.m. last night.

Acting on reliable information from a Panamanian citizen that the house contained a large arms cache, soldiers from JTF-South moved to the location and surrounded it. Occupants of the house were notified by loudspeaker to evacuate the building. After the request was ignored, warning shots were fired into the air. At this point, a man identifying himself as the Nicaraguan ambassador, Mr. Antenor Ferrey, drove up. He stated that the building was his quarters and had diplomatic immunity. When asked for credentials, the man provided a blue identity card, indicating that he had left his red diplomatic identity card at the embassy.

- MORE -

The unit continued to secure the area and requested guidance from higher headquarters. Information provided by the American Embassy indicated that the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador was located in a high rise apartment building Edificio Villa Magna, at Punto Paitillia rather than the building surrounded by U.S. forces. Based on this information that the house was not covered by diplomatic immunity the commander on the scene informed Mr. Ferrey he had received authorization to search the house and intended to do so.

Mr. Ferrey instructed the occupants, four men and three women, to come out of the house. Mr. Ferrey also stated that there were a few weapons in the house. Asked if these men were his personal security force, Mr. Ferrey responded that they were members of his family. The commander of U.S. forces at the scene was directed to confiscate all weapons.

At 7:10 p.m., all individuals and confiscated weapons were released and U.S. forces left the premises. There was no damage to the house or injuries to the occupants.

It should be pointed out that the weapons and munitions found were in fact an arsenal far in excess of "a few" weapons we were told were in the house. It is obvious that Mr. Ferrey was less than candid with us regarding the quantity of weapons present.



United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
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APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4*

SCPA Release 12-16-89

December 31, 1989

SOLDIERS INJURED

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama--Two U.S. soldiers were injured in a non-battle related accident Sunday morning and are in good condition at Gorgas Army Hospital.

One of the soldiers was cleaning his weapon in a room at the U.S. embassy when the weapon discharged, sending a round into a rucksack which exploded a fragmentation grenade.

The names of the soldiers is being withheld until notification of next of kin. The accident is under investigation.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
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APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-1

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- January 1--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,483

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 27,355. Total number of refugees are 2,867 and the total number of detainees are 5,483.

Significant Activities:

Panama City:

Panama city remains calm with minimal enemy activity reported. PDF troops continue to surrender to U.S. Forces. Fifty members of the Macho de Monte Battalion surrendered to elements of the 7th Inf Div at Rio Hato. U.S. Forces captured Rodolfo "Papito" Chirari, a long time Noriega croney and number two on the most wanted list. Chirari was captured in the Portobelo area.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Joint Task Force-South continues operations in the joint area of operation to capture Noriega, protect U.S. lives,

secure key sites/facilities, and neutralize the PDF.

Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met. Combined patrols of U.S. and Panamanian forces are taking place within the city.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 75,895. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$461,000 for 4,855 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

The humanitarian assistance effort has been provided for the refugee and detainee centers, with the primary effort directed toward preventive medicine, medical supplies, and reestablishment of Panamanian health services. Extensive efforts have been directed toward providing assistance to the Health Ministry in pushing supplies down to the local health clinics. The humanitarian assistance program has been effective and targets the most needy. The banking system is expected to restore full services on Jan. 2. Activities are still proceeding briskly at Tocumen Airport. Limited operations are still in effect. Flights are proceeding a little more smoothly and there have been several Panamanian flights (COPA).



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-2

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- January 2--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,683

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 27,238. Total number of refugees remains at 2,867 and the total number of detainees is 5,683.

Significant Activities:

Panama City:

Panama city still remains peaceful and calm with minimal enemy activity reported. Combined patrols of U.S. and Panamanian forces involving four mobile and 65-walking patrols throughout the city continue. Efforts continue to help the Endara government establish law and order and provide normal government functions.

-more-

The focus is on stability operations in both urban and outlying areas. Small elements of unapprehended PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for deployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,253. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$517,000 for 5,115 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

No humanitarian assistance flights arrived in Panama on New Year's Day. No humanitarian assistance flights are scheduled for Jan. 2. Activities at Tocumen Airport are still proceeding briskly. Limited operations are still in effect. Commercial air traffic during the last twenty-four period consisted of one Eastern arrival from and return to Miami. Flights operations involving Panamanian flights (COPA) are proceeding.



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-3

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- January 3--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,313

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 26,080. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 5,313.

Significant Activities:

Redeployments:

As of today, approximately 1,000 soldiers returned to the United States. Over 14-pallets of rolling stock and artillery equipment were shipped on Air Force transports involving members of the 7th Inf Div and the 82d Abn Div.

Panama City:

Panama city remains relatively calm with minimal enemy activity reported. Combined patrols of U.S. and Panamanian forces involving four mobile and 65-walking patrols continue throughout the city. Efforts continue to help the Endara government complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions.

The focus continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas. Small elements of PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for deployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$553,000 for 5,265 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

One humanitarian assistance flight arrived in Panama during the last twenty-hour period. This is part of the second shipment of DoD humanitarian assistance supplies designed for 50,000 people. Additional supplies for 50,000 people are expected to arrive today at Tocumen Airport. Commercial activities at Tocumen airport are still proceeding briskly. Limited operations are still in effect. Flight operations involving Panamanian flights (COPA) are still proceeding.

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Upcoming Media Opportunities:

Upcoming media opportunities for today involve Senator Warner's Press Conference at 2:30 p.m. at Howard Air Force Base and coverage of the security operations by the 2d Battalion 27th Infantry at Coiba Island.

Also, cleanup efforts by Panamanian detainees in the Curundu area and on Central Avenue in Panama City will begin at 12:30 p.m. Three joint military police patrols are going out at 11:00 a.m., 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. today. The Media Center will provide a tour of the detention camp at Empire Range and reservations for this tour are available now.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42*

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-5

NON-BATTLE DEATH

FORT CLAYTON -- A joint Task Force South soldier was killed Monday in Panama City by a round discharged from an M-16 rifle that was being cleaned.

The name of the dead is being withheld pending notification of next of kin.

The soldier was taken to Gorgas Army Hospital and pronounced dead at 5:45 p.m.

JTF-South officials are investigating the incident.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
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APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42*

SCPA Release 90-1-6

January 3, 1990

TROOPS BEGIN RETURNING HOME

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama--Non-mission essential equipment and personnel used in Operation "Just Cause" have begun returning to the United States.

As of 6 a.m. today, 1193 troops have returned to the United States along with a variety of equipment. This figure does not include evacuated casualties.

Between 6 a.m. Jan. 2 and 6 a.m. Jan. 3, 337 personnel and various equipment items departed.

Personnel and equipment are scheduled to be removed throughout the week.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-8*

SCPA Release 90-1-7

January 4, 1990

TROOP REMOVAL CONTINUES

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama--Equipment and personnel used in Operation "Just Cause" continue returning to the United States.

As of 6 a.m. today, approximately 2000 troops have returned to the United States along with a variety of equipment. This figure does not include evacuated casualties.

Personnel and equipment are scheduled to be removed throughout the week.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA RELEASE # 90-1-8

BY: PFC DON DEES

CORRECTED COPY

FEMALE MP

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --3 Jan.--For Capt. Linda Bray, commander of the 988th Military Police company, Operation "Just Cause" started December 19th. That's when she and commanders of other MP companies attached to the 519th MP battalion from Fort Meade, Maryland learned of their involvement in the strike which led to the collapse of Manuel Noriega's regime.

Bray was given her objective by Lt. Col. Michael Shanahan, commander of the 519th MP BN. She was also told to establish a plan to obtain her objective and to discreetly accomplish all preparation for the operation.

The objective of the 988th MP company, under Bray's command, was to neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces' canine unit's barracks in Panama City. Preparation for the mission included a reconnaissance mission of the area to be secured. Bray turned to her top non commissioned officer for support.

First Sergeant Hubert Ijames is a Viet-Nam veteran whose combat experience Bray says, "had a calming effect on me and all of my soldiers." Bray looked to Ijames for his input during the reconnaissance of the area. "I had been there once before, but on the second trip I saw additional buildings outside the compound which could have been trouble if I hadn't seen them."

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After meeting for a second time that day with the 519th battalion commander, Bray briefed first her platoon leaders, then her soldiers of the pending mission. She shared her plan with them and set about executing it.

Assault units of Bray's company rolled from their base camp at Harvest Bare and into the Curundu Elementary School area. From the school the MP company moved into positions to prepare for the 1 a.m. "H" hour strike. When the time was right PFC Paul Badillo, a Spanish speaking MP from Bray's company, told the occupants of the canine units barracks they had 30 seconds to surrender. Bray says lights in the building came on and went off. She was told of the response over her radio which she was manning from her tactical operations center. From here she ordered a warning shot be fired. The response to the single round was the same as to the verbal warning. Now Bray ordered M-60 fire to the side of the building, away from any personnel inside the complex.

That was it for the PDF inside she said. According to Bray her company then was fired upon. As the barrage continued, the same Spanish speaking soldier who had warned the buildings occupants to surrender was now running a bluff. He shouted to his adversaries, "We have artillery!"

Now the PDF, which had moments before confidently fired upon the MP's, were retreating to the wood line. Bray heard reports over the radio that some PDF were escaping the compound. Bray recalls, "It was really dark, and I knew my people wouldn't be able to spot them running into the woods at night." Bray said she was frustrated that the PDF were getting away and decided to take the situation under control herself.

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Bray says she had her driver take her up to the building. Then she used the cover of the existing vehicles to make her way closer to the building. The vehicles did not provide cover all the way up, so she utilized cover provided by a ditch to get closer to the building.

Bray used the illumination flares she had brought from the tactical operations center to provide enough light to find fleeing PDF. The light didn't reveal the PDF positions, but Bray did realize the fire now was coming from the wood line, and not the building. She sent teams to clear areas at the rear of the building and sent a team in to secure the front of the building.

When the building had been secured, Bray and her company found several weapons and many useful intelligence items. Included in the arms cache were 120 M16 type assault rifles, over one dozen AK 47 assault rifles, two cases of hand grenades and literally thousands of rounds.

At daylight, Bray and her soldiers were told they could pull back a little bit as the area was fairly secure. Just as Bray was working that out, one of her soldiers, PFC Christina Cabido (Proctor) captured a PDF who attempted to return to check on the dogs.

Bray says, "I'll probably never know how many people were in that building." But she did have a pretty good idea of where they had gone. "The whole next day," she adds, "we were getting some sniper fire from a hill top near the kennels." Bray says she knew they were up there.

Her suspicions as to who those snipers were did not receive confirmation until several days later when she returned to the site to

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have her picture taken by a magazine photographer. "I talked to an MP dog handler who said the First Sergeant from the unit in the building that night was around; he introduced us."

"At first," she recalls, "he was surprised there were women involved." Bray said that through an interpreter the First Sergeant asked her if she had really been there. Bray's response: "I'm the one who gave them the order to open fire." The former PDF First Sergeant was processed as a detainee after the operation and has since been repatriated and is serving in the newly formed Panama Security Force. He wished Bray the best of luck and she says she extended her wishes for his success. Bray smiles, "We shook hands and walked out of the parking lot together."

Regarding armed conflict, Bray struggles, "I don't think it's something that people want. I know I don't want it, but in defending yourself you'll do whatever it takes."

Bray reflects that from her recent experiences in Panama she has learned the value of the training she has received and administered. She admits that if it were ever to happen again that she would lead troops into a similar situation she would feel more confident. That's important she says because in a hot situation, "you don't have time to think, it has to be a natural reaction."



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-9

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 4--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,655

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 25,400. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 5,655.

Significant Activities:

Redeployments:

As of today, nearly 2,000 soldiers have returned to the United States.

Panama City:

Panama city remains relatively calm with minimal enemy activity reported. Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega left the Vatican Embassy sanctuary and was taken under custody by U.S. troops. Efforts continue to help the Endara government complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions.

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The focus still continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas. Small elements of PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for deployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$691,000 for 7,743 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

One humanitarian assistance flight arrived in Panama during the last twenty-hour period. This is part of the final shipment of DoD humanitarian assistance supplies designed for 50,000 people. To date, we have had a total of 23 civilian flights with 267,310 pounds of supplies delivered, and eight DoD flights with 759,000 pounds. Commercial activities at Tocumen Airport are still proceeding briskly. Limited operations are still in effect. Flight operations involving Panamanian flights (COPA) are still proceeding.

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Upcoming Media Opportunities:

The Media Center will provide transportation at 10:00 a.m. today for a CODEL Press Conference scheduled for noon at Tocumen Airport.

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UPDATE TELEPHONE NUMBERS TO REPORT INFORMATION

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- January 4, 1990--Telephone numbers are now in use to report general information relating to ongoing events in Panama.

The U.S. community is requested to call 287-3613 or 287-4246 to report weapons caches, Dignity Battalion activities, wanted persons, suspicious activity or other general information. Panamanian citizens are requested to call (2)87-4965 to report similiar information.

These telephones are manned 24 hours a day.



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-10

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 4--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,662

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 24,561. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 5,662.

Significant Activities:

Redeployments:

As of today, approximately 2,800 soldiers have returned to the United States.

Panama City:

Panama City remains peaceful and calm. The atmosphere here in Panama City is hopeful with the vast majority of Panamanians relieved that Manuel Antonio Noriega is gone. Panamanians continue to report suspected Dignity Battalion activity and cache locations. Lt. Col. Nivaldo Madrinan, former Chief of the DENI and Strategic Military Council surrendered to U.S. officials at 12:30 p.m. yesterday outside the Vatican Embassy. Efforts continue to help the Endara government

-more-

2-2-2-2

complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions. The focus still continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas. Small elements of PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for deployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$765,000 for 8,423 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

No humanitarian assistance flights arrived in Panama during the last twenty-hour period. To date, we have had a total of 23 civilian flights with 267,310 pounds of supplies delivered, and eight DoD flights with 759,000 pounds. Commercial activities at Tocumen Airport are still proceeding briskly. Limited operations are still in effect. Flight operations involving Panamanian flights (COPA) are still

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proceeding.

Today's Media Availabilities:

At 11:45 a.m., transportation will depart Quarry Heights Media Center for a photo opportunity at the Commandancia with Gen. Colin Powell. At 2:15 p.m., media are encouraged to be at the Howard AFB front gate for two press conferences involving first, the Congressional delegation and second, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell on the air base flight line.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4.*

SCPA Release 90-1-11

TROOP REMOVAL CONTINUES

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama--January 5, 1989--Equipment and personnel used in Operation "Just Cause" continue returning to the United States.

As of 6 a.m. today, approximately 2800 troops have returned to the United States along with a variety of equipment. This figure does not include evacuated casualties.

Personnel and equipment are scheduled to be removed throughout the weekend.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42*

SCPA RELEASE # 90-1-12

MG WARD

By: PFC Don Dees

Quarry Heights, Panama -- Jan. 5, 90 -- Thousands of soldiers are hard at work following Operation "Just Cause." Security and restoration of law and order continue to be objectives of U.S. troops in Panama.

According to Col. Edward Dandar, chief of staff for the Civil Military Operations Task Force, another aspect of military involvement in the wake of recent events in Panama is the establishment of a "civil infrastructure" for the government of President Guillermo Endara. Achieving that goal is the task of a Civil Military Operations Task Force manned by over 170 U.S. Army reservists.

Lt. Col. Clyde Savell, a reservist from Texas, says restoring order to the government of Panama requires special skills. Reservists, he says, can supply those skills because they are specialty experts in both the civilian and military communities. To meet the special needs of the mission Savell says, "We took individuals from reserve units for their particular expertise."

Concerns of the task force, Savell says, include providing housing for more than 25,000 displaced civilians, and sparking the Panamanian economy. According to Savell; attorneys, civil engineers, and doctors are among the reservists aiding in efforts to restore order here.

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MG WARD

PFC DON DEES

Civil Affairs reservists received a visit Friday from Chief of Army Reserve, Major General William Ward. According to Southern Command's Army Reserve advisor, Col. Michael Naylor, Ward came to Panama because he was interested in the civil affairs operation.

Ward explained that civil affairs has always been important to military operations. "In Grenada," Ward began, "civil affairs helped rebuild schools and libraries and other institutions and as a result it became the tourist attraction it never was before."

There's no guarantee that will happen in Panama, but Ward says the U.S. has certain responsibilities regarding the support of the Panama Canal Treaty. Ward says it's important to help the Panamanian government regain its footing, however, "We are being very careful not to become a shadow government of the Republic of Panama."

Total weight of the responsibility of rebuilding after the fall of Noriega does not rest solely on the reserve units. Ward says the Panamanian government has the talent "to provide for those who are in need. They just need our help to get things started."

Ward met with the staff of the operations center for the task force, and visited the center for displaced persons. Later he was given a tour of other areas for which reservists are responsible. During the visit, Ward also expressed his satisfaction. "These reservists are doing exactly what they have trained to do. I'm extremely proud of them."

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-13

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 6--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figures of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 323 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,685

*see 27
4,320 as of 7-15*

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 24,012. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 5,685.

Significant Activities:

Redeployments:

As of today, approximately 3,300 soldiers have returned to the United States. We continue redeploying nonessential personnel and equipment.

Panama City:

In Panama City, progress is being made in almost all essential basic services. Efforts continue to help the Endara government

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2-2-2-2

complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions. The focus still continues to be stability operations in the major urban areas, as well as security operations aimed at capturing former PDF and Dignity Battalion leadership. There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. At approximately 12:10 p.m. yesterday, shots were fired at a U.S. patrol traveling in the vicinity of Panama Viejo. One soldier was struck in his Kevlar helmet. The soldier was not seriously injured but did sustain a concussion. Local civilians reported seeing one or two individuals in the area wearing black tee-shirts and carrying rifles. The soldier belongs to the 82d Airborne Division. In other developments, PDF troops are continuing to surrender. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$770,000 for 8,467 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

Humanitarian assistance flights continue to arrive in Panama during the last twenty-hour period. To date, we have had a total of 29 civilian flights with 455,008 pounds of supplies delivered, and ten DoD flights with over 987,979 pounds.

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Operations were much slower after yesterday's heavy flow of military and civilian air traffic. The Air Force continues to provide security at Tocumen.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

*Public Affairs Office
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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-*

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-14

SNIPER SHOOTING

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- January 6--At approximately 12:10 p.m. yesterday, shots were fired at a U.S. patrol traveling in the vicinity of Panama Viejo. One soldier was struck in his Kevlar helmet.

The soldier was not seriously injured but did sustain a concussion. He was treated at Gorgas Army Hospital and held for observation pending further release.

Name of the soldier is being withheld pending notification of next of kin.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-8.

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-15

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --January 7--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figure of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 324 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 5,704

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 23,871. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 5,704.

Significant Activities:

A U.S. serviceman was injured when an unexploded shell detonated while he was inspecting a pile of rubbish on Fort Sherman. The serviceman is in guarded condition at Gorgas Army Hospital after undergoing surgery for shrapnel wounds. The name is being withheld pending notification of next of kin.

Redeployments:

As of today, 3,400 soldiers have returned to the United States.

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Panama City:

The situation in Panama City remains calm. Panamanians continue to report suspected Dignity Battalion activity and arms cache locations. Remnants of PDF elements continue to surrender to U.S. forces. Efforts continue to help the Endara government complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions. The focus continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas. Small elements of PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and, as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for redeployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program has paid out \$798,100 for 8,769 weapons turned in.

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3-3-3-3

Significant Political-Military Activities:

No humanitarian assistance flights arrived in Panama during the last 24 hours. To date, we have had a total of 23 civilian flights with 267,310 pounds of supplies delivered, and DoD flights with 1,408,338 pounds delivered. Commercial activity at Tocumen Airport continues to pick up.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-16

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --January 8--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figure of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 324 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 4,320

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 23,000. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 4,320.

Redeployments:

As of today, approximately 4,000 soldiers have returned to the United States.

Panama City:

The situation in Panama City remains calm. Panamanians continue to report suspected Dignity Battalion activity and arms cache locations. Remnants of PDF elements continue to surrender to U.S. forces. Efforts continue to help the Endara government complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions. The focus continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-17

JUST CAUSE CIVILIAN DEATHS

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --January 9--The U.S. Southern Command currently estimates the total number of civilian deaths directly related to Just Cause operations at 220. In their continuing attempts to refine the accuracy of that figure, the U.S. military in Panama is working in concert with representatives of all hospitals, several agencies across the spectrum of the Panamanian government, and various relief and humanitarian organizations.

Panama's Institute of Legal Medicine, the official reporting authority for all violent and suspicious deaths, has reported today 212 civilians killed between 20 December 1989 and 3 January 1990 as a direct result of Just Cause. Included in these numbers are presumably Panama's Defense Forces and Dignity Battalions members not in uniform and otherwise unidentifiable, as well as bonafide civilians.

The Institute has been unable to make any determination as to whether the deaths were caused by U.S. military, PDF, Dignity Battalion, looters, other civilians, etc.

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2-2-2-2

Small elements of PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel still exist and, as a result, conditions exist for limited urban and terrorist attacks. Planning continues for redeployment and long-term stabilization operations.

Ground Forces Operations:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Limited combat operations continue with little or no resistance met.

Weapon Caches:

To date, captured enemy weapons total 76,553. Captured armored vehicles total 39, captured aircraft total 36 and captured boats total 7. The weapons for cash program ended yesterday with a total of \$811,078 paid out for 8,848 weapons turned in.

Significant Political-Military Activities:

No humanitarian assistance flights arrived in Panama during the last 24 hours. To date, we have had a total of 23 civilian flights with 267,310 pounds of supplies delivered, and DoD flights with 1,408,338 pounds delivered. Commercial activity at Tocumen Airport continues to pick up.



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-8.

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-18

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --January 9--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figure of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 324 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total figures of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 4,320

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 22,580. Total number of refugees is approximately 3,000 and the total number of detainees is 4,320.

Redeployments:

As of today, U.S. redeployments from Operation "Just Cause" are just over 4,000.

Panama City:

The situation in Panama City remains calm. Panamanians continue to report suspected Dignity Battalion activity. Remnants of PDF elements continue to surrender to U.S. forces. Efforts continue to help the Endara government complete reestablishment of essential basic services and normal government functions. The focus continues to be stability operations in both urban and outlying areas.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4255

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-19

CIVILIAN DEATH UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 11, 1990--The U.S. Southern Command, in conjunction with Panama's Institute of Legal Medicine (equivalent to a Coroner's Office), the official reporting authority for all violent and suspicious deaths in Panama, now counts the total number of civilian deaths resulting from Operation Just Cause as 202. This number has been reduced from 220 civilian deaths reported Tuesday after it was later determined by the Institute that 18 of those reported were in fact armed combatants.

This revised number of dead was briefed here by the Southern Command staff and the Director of Panama's Institute of Legal Medicine to humanitarian and relief organizations Wednesday afternoon. Organizations which had representatives attending that meeting included America's Watch, the Center for Investigation of Human Rights and Legal Assistance, the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights, CARITAS (a Catholic aid organization), and the Washington Office on Latin America.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NEW YORK OFFICE

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Not all of the 202 have been positively identified at this time. These unknown could conceivably include more members of the Panama Defense Forces and Dignity Battalions not in uniform. The Institute will continue to try to establish the status of those still unidentified.

These deaths were caused by many sources and could include the U.S. military actions associated with Just Cause, PDF, Dignity Battalion, looters, other civilians, etc.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-19

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA --January 11--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

The total figure of U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 23 WIA's - 324 MIA's - 0

In the last twenty-four hour period, U.S. casualties are:

KIA's - 0 WIA's - 0 MIA's - 0

The total estimates of enemy casualties are:

KIA's - 314 WIA's - 124 Detainees - 4,398

edeployments:

Total U.S. military strength in Panama is 21,803. As of today, U.S. redeployments from Operation "Just Cause" are approximately 4,600.

anama City:

Yesterday, Benjamin Colamarco (Cmdr of Dignity Battalions) and Belgica del Castillo (Director of immigration) surrendered to U.S. forces. No further details will be released at this time. The situation in Panama City remains relatively peaceful.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

United States Southern Command



News Release

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Panamanians continue to report suspected Dignity Battalion activity. Remnants of PDF elements continue to surrender to U.S. forces. Strong progress of essential basic services continue throughout all urban and outlying areas.

MIAMI - U.S. Southern Command (USCIB) announced today that

in the last 24-hour period, 30-40 PDF elements have

surrendered to U.S. forces in the area.

The command is continuing to receive reports of

PDF activity in the area.

USCIB said.

USCIB said that the Dignity Battalion is a

PDF unit

active in the

area. The command is continuing to receive reports of

PDF activity in the area.

The command is continuing to receive reports of

PDF activity in the area.

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United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-425

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-21

CAPTURED WEAPONS COUNT REVISED

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 11, 1990--The U.S. Southern Command has revised the current number of captured weapons during Operation Just Cause to approximately 52,000. It also reports over 600 tons of munitions captured.

The Southern Command previously estimated the number of captured weapons as more than 76,000. However, the Joint Task Force South has completed a detailed count of enemy weapons and have corrected the figure. The original count was based on battlefield estimates. In many cases, arms caches were overestimated due to the large number of crated weapons.

Of these weapons, approximately 35,000 have been returned to the United States for eventual shipment to a U.S. Army Weapons Depot in Letter Kenny, Pennsylvania for storage. Another 3,000 shotguns and pistols were returned to the Panama Public Forces.

Confiscated weapons included pistols, shotguns, AK-47s, U.S. and non U.S.-built M-16s, machine guns, crew served machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and rocket launchers.

The Southern Command continues to investigate reports of weapons caches.



UNIT
United States Southern Command

News Release

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APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-~~28~~ 22 *msg*

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 12--The Joint Task Force Headquarters, which was responsible for planning, staffing and executing Operation "Just Cause", was restructured and renamed at 6 p.m. last night.

The Task Force, which was called Joint Task Force (JTF)-South, was commanded by Lt. Gen. Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General 18th Airborne Corps and was comprised of elements of: the 18th Airborne Corps, 7th Infantry Division (Light), 82d Airborne Division, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), United States Army South, and the Marine Forces Panama.

The interim organization in Panama will be Joint Task Force (JTF)-Panama which will be commanded by Maj. Gen. Carmen J. Cavezza, Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division (Light). Subordinate units to the JTF-Panama Headquarters include elements of: the 7th Infantry Division (Light), 5th Infantry Division (Mech), United States Army South, Marine Forces Panama, and the 16th MP Brigade.

The final Joint Task Force-Panama organization will be commanded by Maj. Gen. Marc A. Cisneros, Commanding General, United States Army South, and will be comprised of elements of: United States Army South, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), Marine Forces Panama, and the 16th MP Brigade.

-more-

Page 2

Last night, approximately 2,200 members of the 82d Airborne Division, redeployed to Ft. Bragg, N.C. Total U.S. military strength in Panama is approximately 20,000.

-30-



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-425

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-~~23~~ 23 ²⁸⁹
CAPT WILLETT

DETAINEE STATUS

SOUTHCOM PAO, PANAMA

12 JAN 90

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA-- Officials from the U.S. military have processed more than 5,000 detainees during operation "Just Cause."

According to officials in the USSOUTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate office, people fall into the category of "detainee" if they're captured during a military operation. A screening process, handled by military intelligence personnel, determines how a person is further categorized. The categories include status as a combatant, a person of intelligence value, or a civilian not involved in the conflict. Other categories include those being held or wanted for criminal prosecution due to pre-conflict activities:

Since the operation began December 20, over 5,300 people have been detained at various primary holding sites throughout Panama. About 1,000 of those were determined to be non-combatants and released immediately after initial screening.

The remaining 4,300 warranted further questioning. These people were processed through the Empire Range detainee center located Northwest of Contractor's Hill.

According to officials at Empire Range, about 3,900 detainees have been released, many within 24 hours of arrival. Those released were taken to the Displaced Persons Center at Balboa High School and allowed to remain there or return home.

-MORE-

2/2/2/2

DETAINEE STATUS

About 100 others were screened at Empire Range and taken to a more secure detention facility at Ft. Clayton, where they remain. Approximately 300 people also remain in detention at Empire Range awaiting further processing.

-30-



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SCPA RELEASE 90-1-24

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 13--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

HUMAID Activities:

As of 4 p.m. yesterday, approximately 700-displaced civilians were moved from the Balboa High School camp to a new location at Albrook AFS. All remaining displaced persons are expected to be transferred today. The Civil Military Operations Task Force will assume operation of the new camp at Albrook AFS when the move is complete. Further details of the hand-off is not known at this time.

Panama

Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty continues in the Republic of Panama to assist the reconstitution of the Panamanian government, protect U.S. lives and secure key sites/facilities. In a recent development early this morning, U.S. soldiers located in a hotel near Agua Dulce were fired upon by unknown persons from a moving vehicle. There were no known U.S. casualties or injuries reported. The incident is under investigation.

-more-

2-2-2-2

Weapon Caches:

U.S forces discovered an underground cache site consisting of numerous AK-47's, Chinese explosives, and machine gun munitions in the rural areas of Panama. A second cache uncovering a few small arm weapons were discovered near the town of Concepcion.

Ground Forces:

There were no significant activity in the last twenty-four hour period. Units from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) will redeploy today to Ft. Ord, Calif. Total U.S. military strength in Panama is just under 20,000.

-30-



United States Southern Command

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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4255

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-25

DISPLACED PERSONS CENTER OPERATION

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 14, 1990--U.S. and Panamanian officials, who jointly administered the Balboa Displaced Persons Center since its opening Dec. 20, have moved the camp to a nearby site.

The move began Friday, Jan. 12, to a location on the Panamanian side of Albrook Airfield, about a mile and a half from the previous camp. The move was completed as scheduled Saturday evening.

The center processed and cared for more than 11,000 displaced persons. At the height of processing more than 6,000 lived at the Balboa site. That figure steadily declined as temporary housing and care with families and friends was found.

The operation provided approximately 3600 meals each day in the form of one hot meal and one Meal Ready to Eat (MRE).

Twenty-four hour medical care was provided. Besides the camp's medical clinic which was located in Balboa High School, five Army medics provided aid throughout the compound each day.

-more-

A Panamanian dentist was also available to provide emergency dental service. Thousands of displaced persons received medical and dental care at the center. Health care, provided by Panamanian government workers and volunteers, will continue at the new camp.

There are presently approximately 2,500 individuals still receiving assistance at the new site. Local officials are working on more permanent housing arrangements.

Overall administration of the camp prior to the move was the responsibility of the 96th Civil Affairs Bn., Ft. Bragg, NC. This unit, which was assisted by Reserve civil affairs personnel, U.S. private and government agencies as well as the Panamanian government, administered the move.



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
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282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-27

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 14--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

HUMAID Activities:

The displaced civilian camp move from the Balboa High School to Albroom AFS is completed. The Civil Military Operations Task Force will assume operation of the new camp. Further details are not known at this time.

PANAMA:

Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty continues in the Republic of Panama to assist the reconstitution of the Panamanian government, protect U.S. lives and secure key sites/facilities.

Ground Forces:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Total U.S. strength in Panama is just under 20,000.



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-4

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-28

JUST CAUSE UPDATE

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 15--The following is a recap of significant events over the last twenty-four hour period:

HUMAIID Activities:

Approximately 2,300 displaced civilians were moved from the Balboa High School to Albrook AFS yesterday. The Civil Military Operations Task Force will assume operation of the new camp. Further details are not known at this time.

PANAMA:

Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty continues in the Republic of Panama to assist the reconstitution of the Panamanian government, protect U.S. lives and secure key sites/facilities.

Ground Forces:

There were no significant activities in the last twenty-four hour period. Total U.S. strength in Panama is just under 20,000.

-30-



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

SCPA RELEASE 90-1-29

PANAMA TOUR POLICY CHANGES

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 20--USSOUTHCOM officials have announced approval of a return to the standard tour policy of 36 months for accompanied military personnel and 24 months for unaccompanied personnel in Panama, effective 1 June 1990. This will reverse the 12/24 month short tour program instituted in November as a force protection measure during the Noriega tyranny.

Under the new policy, personnel presently assigned to Panama will retain their current DEROS unless they request a change in their tour status. This was decided after personnel officers canvassed the "to-be-shipped group" and found that only 500-600 of those families wished to remain in Panama. The new policy takes into account that the other families have received orders, planned their futures, and want to comply with those orders.

"We should let them go," General Maxwell Thurman, Commander in Chief USSOUTHCOM said. "To reverse them now, after disrupting them twice - once in Blade Jewel and again on the current drawdown - would create a serious morale situation that the command and the several services do not need."

- more -

TOUR CHANGES 2 2 2 2 2

As with the drawdown, announced last November, the new tour policy has principles and rules to protect service members.

The principles are:

- Identify and treat special cases with compassion.
- Minimize hardships.
- Solicit input from all key elements of the community.
- Empathy for service members and families.
- Maintain family integrity throughout the process.
- Remain sensitive to the needs of unaccompanied personnel.
- Recruit volunteers to stay until backfill arrives - thereby sustaining unit readiness.

The 36/24 rules are:

- The new tour policy is effective 1 June 90.
- The policy honors sponsors' plans in accordance with the principles and rules established in the 16 Nov 89 drawdown.
- Personnel in Panama with 12 month unaccompanied tours may elect to serve the 12 month tour or choose new unaccompanied or accompanied tour options.
- Prior to 1 June 90, inbound personnel may elect to choose the new unaccompanied or accompanied tour options.
- Personnel arriving in Panama prior to 1 Jun 90 on a 12 month tour may remain on a 12 month tour.
- Effective 1 Jun 90, all arriving personnel (except those in

- more -

TOUR CHANGES 3 3 3 3 3

the two infantry battalions and two special forces battalions) will be placed on the 36/24 month tour.

- USSOUTHCOM retains the policy decision to require military families to reside in on post housing.

- Unaccompanied officers and the top three NCOs (E7 and above) may be allowed to live in off post government leased housing. Unaccompanied personnel (E6 and below) will be required to live on post.

Personnel currently stationed in Panama are being encouraged to volunteer for the new tour length. Any of the approximately 1750 sponsors currently on orders who wish to extend to their original 30 or 36 month DEROS will be permitted to do so. Any of the military sponsors who have already arrived on a 12 month tour will be permitted to extend to 36 months to bring forward their families as on post family quarters are made available.

The U.S. Army South has provided the following guidance for Army members wishing to extend here. Soldiers with command sponsored dependents in country have three options: (1) Submit a request for foreign service tour extension, (2) Depart on their current DEROS, (3) Request in place consecutive overseas tour.

Soldiers serving on dependent restricted tours will be able to continue their present short tours and depart on their current DEROS, or request a "with dependents" tour. However, those who elect to

- more -

TOUR CHANGES 4 4 4 4 4

serve the "with dependents" tour must serve 36 months from the date they arrived in Panama or 12 months after arrival of family members, whichever is longer.

The other services have very similar tour policies. Individuals interested in determining how the new tour policy may affect them should consult their personnel offices.

Prior to the May 1989 direction to move U.S. military families residing off-post onto post or to Stateside locations, there were a total of 5700 families in Panama. Approximately 1000 families and 1300 unaccompanied personnel lived off post.

During the drawdown initiated in November 1989, approximately 750 families have already left Panama; and approximately 1750 families were projected to leave by July 1990.

- 30 -



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-0061
282-4255 Overseas 507-82-42

EMPIRE RANGE CLOSURE

90-1-30

CAPT WILLETT

USSOUTHCOM PAO

22 JAN 90

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Panama -- USSOUTHCOM officials have closed the detainee center at Empire Range, located northwest of Contractor's Hill.

"This has been the largest detainee operation of its kind since the Korean War," said Capt. Kevin Govern, 16th Military Police Brigade legal advisor. The 16th MPs operated the detainee facility.

Since the beginning of operation "Just Cause," over 5,000 people were processed as detainees at various holding sites across Panama. Of that number, 4300 were taken to the Empire Range facility. As of January 22, 54 people remain in detention at Ft. Clayton.

The 54 being held at Ft. Clayton include high ranking members of the Panamanian Defense Forces, and ring leaders of the Dignity Battalions, who have been identified with a particular offense of Panamanian law, said Capt. Govern.

-more-

EMPIRE RANGE

2/2/2/2

According to Govern, during operation "Just Cause," all detainees were screened and placed in one of two categories - Combatant Detainees, and Criminal Detainees. The categories were determined by a combination of agreements from the laws of war (Geneva and Hague Conventions), agreements made between the US and the Republic of Panama, US Army regulations, as well as other DoD doctrine dealing with the handling of combatants and the civilian population involved in an armed conflict.

The Combatant category consisted of those involved in combat against US forces. It included members of the Panamanian Defense Forces and the Dignity Battalions. The Criminal Detainees were those people actually caught in the act of a crime or implicated by sworn statements and other evidence, said Govern.

If an individual was detained, and screening determined that person did not fall into one of these two categories, that individual was released. The screening process was carried out as quickly as possible. Those released were returned home, or taken to the Displaced Persons Center.

-more-

EMPIRE RANGE

SECRET

1/3/3/3

On numerous occasions, Republic of Panama repatriation teams visited the detainee camp. These visits, and extensive coordination with the Republic of Panama, helped realize the goal of prompt repatriation of those detained.

-30-



United States Southern Command

News Release

Public Affairs Office
Quarry Heights, Panama
APO Miami 34003-006
282-4255 Overseas 507-

SCPA RELEASE NO. 90-1-31

PDF LT. COL. CORDOBA AND ROMULO ESCOBAR BETHANCOURT
DETAINED LAST NIGHT IN PANAMA CITY

QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA--January 26--Two close associates of General Manuel Antonio Noriega were detained last night in Panama City by U.S. military personnel.

Lieutenant Colonel Luis Antonio "Papo" Cordoba, director of the former Transit and Traffic Directorate (DNTP) under the Panama Defense Forces, was apprehended by U.S. military personnel and members of the Panamanian Public Force shortly before 9 p.m. in the Costa del Sol hotel located on Via Espana and Federico Boyd Avenue. Cordoba had been implicated in the September 1985 murder and beheading of Hugo Spadafora.

Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, a long-standing prominent member of the previous governments' Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), voluntarily surrendered to U.S. military personnel last night in his home in the Miraflores residential area near Betania in Panama City. He had also been a close advisor to General Omar Torrijos and chief negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties signed in September 1977.

Both individuals were on the list of individuals most sought by U.S. military and Panamanian authorities since the December 20 U.S. military liberation action in Panama.

Both individuals are under custody of the U.S. Forces.



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MUSIC REQUESTS DURING THE PANAMA INVASION

It is not uncommon for SCN radio to play requests on our live programs. We went live at approximately 0430 20 December 1989. At 0620 we joined an ABC news report in progress, followed by SCN TV audio at 0710--which was airing on CNN. At approximately 1500 we began airing all the 5 minute newscasts sent by AFRTS-BC and filled with music and information. We did not take any requests 20 December so we would not tie up phone lines. We told the audience not to use the phone unless it was an emergency or official business.

We opened the request line 21 December. Requests were light until late in the day and Friday when they started picking up. At first we received requests from kids stuck at home and a few military units. When the troops started coming in from the field, the requests became quite imaginative. Canine handlers called asking for David Bowie, "Flesh for Fantasy", the Marine Corps Combat Security Company called saying they were going on a mission and needed a song to pump them up. The song was "Welcome to the Jungle" by Guns and Roses, a song which had been requested many times already. The Special Forces Combat Divers Team asked for several songs by the Doors, "Strange Days", "People Are Strange", "The End". The 82nd called from the Marriott Hotel, but not for a song. They did not have a phone book and needed a number on Albrook. We played a lot of songs with the word "jungle" in it as well as such songs as "God Bless the U.S.A." by Lee Greenwood, and "We're Not Gonna Take It" by Twisted Sister.

On 25 December we played Christmas music. The only requests we took were for Christmas music.

On 26 December the requests remained much the same as before the 25th. On 27 December someone who identified himself as a member of the PSYOPS team from Fort Bragg called to tell us what they were doing with their loud speakers. We already had reports on radio news as to what was happening. We had been receiving requests with a "musical message" for Noriega either by the words or the song title, but as soon as the media picked up on the story, those types of requests increased dramatically.

Here is a list of some of the songs requested:

(You've Got) Another Thing Coming, Judas Priest
50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, Paul Simon
All Over But the Crying, Georgia Satellites
All I Want is You, U2

Big Shot, Billy Joel
Blue Collar Man, Styx
Born to Run, Springsteen
Bring Down the Hammer
Change, Tears for Fears
Cleaning Up the Town, The Bus Boys
Crying in the Chapel, Brenda Lee
Dancing in the Streets, David Bowie
Danger Zone, Kenny Loggins
Dead Man's Party, Oingo Boingo
Don't Look Back, Boston
Don't Fear the Reaper, Blue Oyster Cult
Don't Close Your Eyes, Kix
Eat My Shorts, Rick Dees
Electric Spanking of War Babies, Funkadelics
Feel a Whole Lot Better (When You're Gone), Tom Petty
Freedom Fighter, White Lion
Freedom, No Compromise, Little Steven
Ghost Rider, The Outlaws
Give It Up, K.C. and the Sunshine Band
Gonna Tear Your Playhouse Down, Paul Young
Guilty, Bonham
Hang 'Em High, Van Halen
Hanging Tough, New Kids on the Block
Heavens on Fire, Kiss
Hello It's Me, Todd Rundgren
Hello, We're Here, Tom T. Hall
Helter Skelter, Beatles
I Fought the Law and the Law Won, Bobby Fuller
If I Had A Rocket Launcher, Bruce Cochran
In My Time of Dying, Led Zeppelin
Ironman, Black Sabbath
It Keeps You Running, Doobie Brothers
Judgement Day, Whitesnake
Jungle Love, Steve Miller
Just Like Jesse James, Cher
Mayor of Simpleton, XTC
Midnight Rider, Allman Brothers Band
Mr. Blue, The Fleetwoods
Naughty Naughty, Danger Danger
Never Gonna Give You Up, Rick Astley
Never Tear Us Apart, INXS
No Particular Place To Go, Chuck Berry
No More Mister Nice Guy, Alice Cooper
No Alibis, Eric Clapton
Now You're Messin' With a S.O.B., Nazareth
Nowhere Man, Beatles
Nowhere to Run, Martha and the Vandelas
One Way Ticket, George Thorogood and the Destroyers Panama,
Van Halen
Paradise City, Guns and Roses

Paranoid, Black Sabbath
 Patience, Guns and Roses
 Poor Little Fool, Ricky Nelson
 Prisoner of the Highway, Ronnie Milsap
 Prisoner of Rock and Roll, Neil Young
 Refugee, Tom Petty
 Renegade, Styx
 Rock and a Hard Place, Rolling Stones
 Run To The Hills, Iron Maiden
 Run Like Hell, Pink Floyd
 Screaming for Vengeance, Judas Priest
 She's Got a Big Posse, Arabian Prince
 Shot in the Dark, Ozzy Osborne
 Stay Hungry, Twisted Sister
 Taking It to the Streets, Doobie Brothers
 The Party's Over, Journey
 The Race is On, Sawyer Brown
 The Pusher, Steppenwolf
 The Long Arm of the Law, Warren Zevon
 The Star Spangled Banner, Jimi Hendrix
 The Secret of My Success, Night Ranger
 They're Coming to Take Me Away, Henry VIII
 This Means War, Joan Jett and the Blackhearts
 Time is on My Side, Rolling Stones
 Too Old to Rock and Roll, Too Young to Die, Jethro
 Tull
 Voodoo Child, Jimi Hendrix
 Wait For You, Bonham
 Waiting for a Friend, Rolling Stones
 Wanted Dead or Alive, Bon Jovi
 Wanted Man, Molly Hatchet
 War Pigs, Black Sabbath
 We Didn't Start the Fire, Billy Joel
 We Gotta Get Outta This Place, The Animals
 Who Will You Run To?, Heart
 You Send Me, Sam Cooke
 You Shook Me All Night Long, AC/DC
 You Hurt Me (and I Hate You), Eurythmics
 You Got Lucky, Tom Petty
 Your Time is Gonna Come, Led Zeppelin
 Youth Gone Wild, Skid Row

We continue to get and play requests for regular "pop", "soul" and "country" music.

At 0705, 29 December we stopped playing requests and started counting down the top 40 songs from Billboard's Top 100, Black 100 and Country 100 Charts. This was done to get a better mix of music for our listeners. We continue to receive phone calls for requests to play for Noriega, but we explain to each caller that we are no longer taking requests and thank them for calling.

SCN NEWS AND INFORMATION PROGRAMMING
DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE

	TELEVISION	AM	FM STEREO
Number of PML's	1277	1786	1140
Number of Special Announcement	187	1992	2327
Number of National News Programs	492	2159	1628
Number of Local Newscasts/Cut-ins (Television only)	126		


Chart 1 represents the number of PML announcements aired for television, AM and FM stereo. A reduction in the amount of TV PML's is noticeable 25 December. This was due to a significant increase in the number of local newscasts aired that day--each newscast emphasizing PML's at the opening and closing. TV PML coverage increased 21 January due to change in curfew hours.

Chart 2 reflects special announcements such as PCC workers returning to work, safety advisories, curfew and commissary hours, etc. Radio had a significantly higher portion of announcements to disseminate that were not appropriate for TV.


Chart 3 shows a dramatic increase in national news aired during the initial intervention to keep the audience abreast of ongoing actions. Heavy emphasis on television news programming gradually began to return to normal program scheduling starting 24 December. Radio decreased news programming 9 January.

Chart 4 reflects the number of local TV newscasts aired during Just Cause. The highest number of newscasts occurred 24 and 25 December which impacted the number of TV PML's and national news programs aired.


TELEVISION



AM RADIO




FM STEREO




NUMBER OF PMLS


TELEVISION



AM RADIO




FM STEREO




NUMBER OF SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT AIRINGS


TELEVISION



AM RADIO




FM STEREO



NUMBER OF NATIONAL NEWS PROGRAMS

TELEVISION



NUMBER OF LOCAL NEWS PROGRAMS

SCN LOCAL VIDEO TOPICS

20 DECEMBER

President Endara Swearing-in Ceremony
U.S. Charge d' Affairs

21 DECEMBER

Departure of LT Paz's remains
Overview on Panama City

23 DECEMBER

79th Army Band

24 DECEMBER

General Thurman announces Noriega's request for asylum Man on the
Street--Noriega seeks asylum
Secretary of Defense arrival at Howard AFB

25 DECEMBER

USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
Live Secretary of Defense Press Conference at USSOUTHCOM Secretary of
Defense Cheney's Departure
Holiday Mail Arrival

26 DECEMBER

USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
General Thurman Visits Troops
Noriega's Association with Witchcraft
Air Operations Center
Commandancia Damage
Humanitarian Aid
Gorgas P.O.W.'s
Commissary Volunteers

27 DECEMBER

Live USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
P.O.W. Processing
Harvest Bare
New Babies
Streets of Panama
Humanitarian Aid (new story)

28 DECEMBER

Live USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
Relief for Torrijos
Ordnance Handling
Noriega's Office and House
Marines in Veracruz
Volunteers at Post Office

29 DECEMBER

USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
General Vuono Visits Troops
Noriega's House (Flamingo Island)
6th Aerial Port Squadron

30 DECEMBER

Live USSOUTHCOM Press Conference
24th TASS
5th Battalion/87th INF
5th BN/87th INF Joint Patrols
1st BN/508th (ABN) INF (SCAT Patrol) 193rd Support Battalion (A
Company) 193rd Support Battalion (2nd Story)
Man on the Street Interview
DoD Families

31 DECEMBER

Control Tower
154th Signal Battalion
Happy New Year Close
142nd Medical Battalion (Part 1)
New Year's Resolutions

1 JANUARY

1st Battalion/508th (ABN) INF (Mortar) 142nd Medical Battalion (Part
2) Lieutenant General Kemp
C-130 Story
CINC's New Year Message

2 JANUARY

Acting PCC Administrator Manfredo Press Conference 1190th Signal
Battalion
Rodman Naval Station Detention
193rd Support Battalion
Marines at Veracruz
First Baby of the Year

3 JANUARY


Senator's Press Conference
1st Battalion/508th (ABN) INF (C Company)
1st Battalion/228th Aviation
24th Medical Battalion

4 JANUARY

Congressional Delegation
Major General Cisneros Press Conference
Senators Nunn, Warner, and Robb at Albrook AFS 534th and 549th
Military Police at DNTT
536th Engineering Battalion
1190th Signal Battalion (Part 2)

5 JANUARY

General Powell at Commandancia
General Powell Press Conference
Rep Gephardt Press Conference
Major General Ward
588th Military Police (Women in Combat)
SCN Mobile Van
1st Battalion/228th Aviation
JOTC at Ft Sherman
534th MP Company
Weekend Close



ENCLOSURE 1 to APPENDIX C

1941-1942

D DAY

	0600	1200	1800	2400
MIL OPS				
0001				
	-INVASION BEGINS	-LOOTING IN	-MARRIOTT HOTEL	-HOTEL SECURED
	-AIR DROP RIO HATO	-HOSTAGES TAKEN	RESCUE BEGINS	
	-GAMBOA/RENACER	ON PM VIEJO AT MARRIOTT	-TINAJITAS SECURE	
	PRISON ATTACK	-SEAL TEAM AT COLON	-FT CIMARRON SEC.	
	-BRIDGE OF AMERICAS			-COMANDANCIA
	ATTACK			SECURED
	-PAITILLA/TOCUMEN ATTACK			-RADIO NACIONAL
	-COMANDANCIA ATTACK			OFF THE AIR
	-PDF BARRACKS AT FT AMADOR ATTACK			
	-ANEMB MORTAR ATTACK			
	-GAMBOA/RENACER PRISON SECURE			
	-ANCON DENI SECURE			

AIRCRAFT IN

-MEDIA POOL (16)

DOD MEDIA POOL
ACTIVITIES

-DOD MEDIA	-AMEMB BRIEFING	-FT AMADOR	-TOCUMEN	-DETAINEE	-AMBASSADOR
POOL	AT SCN	FIGHTING	82ND OPS	CAMP	PRESS CONF
ARRIVE		TROOP			
		ARRIVAL			

D + 3

2400

1800

1200

0600

0001

MILITARY OPS

-LA CHORRERA
OP COMPLETED

-7TH ID OP
IN COLON
COMPLETED

-COIBA ISLAND
PENAL COLONY SURRENDERED

AIRCRAFT IN

-REUTERS (3)

DOD MEDIA POOL
ACTIVITIES

-DOD POOL DECLINES TOUR
-DOD POOL DISSOLVED
-REGIONAL POOL BEGINS

-DOD POOL DEPARTS

MEDIA ACITIVITIES

-82ND AB AND 7TH I.D
OPERATIONS

-CITY TOURS
INCLUDE
COMANDANCIA, -ENDARA RALLY -REFUGEE CENTER
FT AMADOR, WITCH
HOUSE, ETC.
-PRESS CONF
CBS HOSTAGE EVERGREEN HOSTAGES

	<u>D + 6</u>			
		1200	1800	2400
0001	-NBC (3)	-NBC (5)	-CNN (64)	-CNN (26)
AIRCRAFT IN				
AIRCRAFT OUT				
MEDIA ACTIVITIES	-DAILY PRESS CONF -7TH ID IN DAVID	-7TH ID IN COLON -TOUR OF NORIEGA'S RESIDENCE -CEREMONY AT DAVID	-HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT -TOUR OF NORIEGA'S RESIDENCE -TOUR NORIEGA'S VOODOO ARTIFACTS	-JOINT PATROL IN VERACRUZ

D + 7
1200 1800 2400

0600

0001

AIRCRAFT IN

-MISC MEDIA (7)

AIRCRAFT OUT

-NBC (6)

MEDIA ACTIVITIES

-DAILY PRESS CONF -GAMBOA PRISON -FOOD DISTRO -MARINE PATROL
-7TH ID OPS -DETAINEE CAMP -PUBLIC WORKS TOUR
-ENG UNITS -WEAPONS TURN-IN -FOOD DISTRO
DISTRIBUTE TOYS

	<u>D + 8</u>			
		1200	1800	2400
AIRCRAFT IN		-ABC (2)	-MISC MEDIA (4)	-CBS (2)
AIRCRAFT OUT			-CBS (2)	

MEDIA ACTIVITIES
 -DAILY PRESS CONF -MARINE PATROL -82ND ABN OPS - HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT
 -7TH ID OPS IN COLON IN SAN MIGUELITO -COMANDANCIA TOUR
 -HELICOPTER PILOT INTERVIEWS -POOL COVERAGE OF CEREMONIES
 -193D INF OPS AT SAN BLAS ISLAND
 -AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO REFUGEE CAMP

DV VISITS
 -CODEL MURTHA & MONTGOMERY
 -ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

D + 9
1200 1800 2400

0600
-NEWSWEEK (3)

0001
-NEWSWEEK (2)
-CBS (6)
-MISC MEDIA (27) VIA MAC
-CBS (6)

AIRCRAFT IN
AIRCRAFT OUT
MEDIA ACTIVITIES

-DAILY PRESS CONF -FT AMADOR & -CODEL MURTHA -7TH ID OPS -CINC VISIT
COMANDANCIA PRESS CONF IN PAN CITY TO DAVID
-CEREMONIES AT -POOL COVERAGE -COVERAGE OF
COLON, DARIEN, OF CALDERON SCN TV/RADIO
& SAN BLAS VISIT TO SAN BLAS
-POOL COVERAGE OF ARMY C/S

DV VISITS
-CODEL MURTHA & MONTGOMERY
-ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
-CDR, SPECIAL OPS COMMAND

	<u>-D + 10</u>				
		1200	1800	2400	
0001					
AIRCRAFT IN	-ABC (7)	-NBC (1)	-MCNEIL/LEHRER (7)		
AIRCRAFT OUT	-ABC (6)	-NBC (4)	-MISC MEDIA (9) VIA MAC		
MEDIA ACTIVITIES	-DAILY PRESS CONF -INTERVIEW -HUMANITARIAN AID -POOL COVERAGE -AC-130 FLIGHT -PDF MEDICAL W/PF CDR IN LA CHORRERA 7TH ID IN DAVID CACHE -5/87TH INF -REFUGEE CAMP -AMMUNITION CACHE -RIO HATO TOUR AT COMANDANCIA -DETENTION CTR -JOINT PATROL IN SAN FELIPE -COVERAGE OF SCN/RADIO				

DV VISITS -CDR, SPECIAL OPS COMMAND

D + 12

0001

0600

1200

1800

2400

AIRCRAFT OUT

-MISC MEDIA (2) VIA MAC

MEDIA ACTIVITIES

-7TH ID OPS
IN COLON
-82ND ABN AT
CAMBOA PRISON

-INTERVIEW
W/FEMALE
SOLDIERS

-82ND ABN OPS
AT PAN VIEJO
-POOL COVERAGE

-DETECTION CENTER
AT EMPIRE RANGE
-82ND ABN TROOPS
IN FIELD

-AC-130 FLIGHT

OF COIPA ISLAND
-CAPTURED ARMS AT ALBROOK AFS

D + 13

0001	0600	1200	1800	2400
MEDIA ACTIVITIES				
	-SPECIAL BOAT UNIT 26 IN GATUN LAKE	-NAVY PATROL BOAT IN BAY OF PANAMA	-JOINT PATROL -DETENTION CENTER -PSYOPS INTERVIEW	
	-82ND ABN TROOPS IN FIELD		-TOUR OF COMANDANCIA	

DV VISITS -CODEL NUNN, WARNER, ROBB

D + 14

0001	0600	1200	1800	2400
MEDIA ACTIVITIES				
	-POOL COVERAGE OF PRISON AT COIBA ISLAND	-DETAINEE CLEAN-UP AT CURUNDU	-JOINT PATROL -75TH RANGERS DEPARTURE	-INTERVIEW W/PF CDR -DETAINEE CAMP
	-GEN STINER	-ENGINEERS CLEAN-UP	-NUNN & WARNER PRESS CONF	-POOL COVERAGE OF EXPLOSIVES CACHE
	INTERVIEW	CHORILLO		
	-CODEL AT CAPTURED ARMS AT ALBROOK AFS			
				-CINC PRESS CONF ON MORIEGA CAPTURE

DV VISITS
-CODEL NUNN, WARRER, ROBB
-ASST SEC OF STATE

D + 15

2400

1800

1200

0600

0001

-CINC PRESS CONF
-CODEL PRESS CONF AT TOCUMEN
-CISNEROS PRESS CONF

MEDIA ACTIVITIES

-CJCS, GEN POWELL
-CHIEF, ARMY PA
-CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

-CODEL WARNER, ROBB
-CODEL GEPHARDT

DV VISITS

D + 16

	0600	1200	1800	2400
<p>0001</p> <p>MEDIA ACTIVITIES</p>	<p>-MG WARD INTERVIEW</p> <p>-COVERAGE OF C-JCS AT COMANDANCIA</p> <p>-POOL COVERAGE OF COIBA ISLAND</p>	<p>-JOINT PATROL -CODEL AT DMTT</p> <p>-INTERVIEW W/4TH/6TH SOLDIERS</p>	<p>-CODEL PRESS CONF</p> <p>-CJCS PRESS CONF</p> <p>-CINC INTERVIEW</p>	

DV VISITS

- CODEL GEPHARDT
- CJCS, GEN POWELL
- CHIEF, ARMY PA
- CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

D + 17
1200 1800 2400

0600
-DETAINEE CAMP -7TH ID AT
AT EMPIRE RANGE DAVID
-JOINT PATROL
-ARMS SHIPMENT
TO U.S. FROM COLON
-INTERVIEW W/CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM

0001

MEDIA ACTIVITIES

DV VISITS
-CHIEF, ARMY PA
-CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

D + 18

2400

1800

1200

0600

0001

-INTERVIEW W/SOLDIER SHOT IN HELMET

-LTG STINER
INTERVIEW

-RIO HATO TOUR

MEDIA ACTIVITIES

-CODEL DODD

DV VISITS

D + 21

2400

1800

1200

0600

0001

MEDIA ACTIVITIES
-DETAINEE CENTER -NEW REFUGEE CENTER -82ND ABN REDEPLOYMENT PREP
-CIVIL AFFAIRS REBUILDING EFFORTS
-CAPT BRAY
INTERVIEW W/A.M. SHOWS